In the Matter of Clarence B. Meldrum, Jr., Judicial Magistrate. On Application of the Iowa , 834 N.W.2d 650 ( 2013 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 13–0367
Filed July 19, 2013
IN THE MATTER OF CLARENCE B. MELDRUM, JR.,
Judicial Magistrate.
On application of the Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications.
The Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed an application to
discipline a magistrate. APPLICATION GRANTED; JUDICIAL OFFICER
REPRIMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Scott D. Brown and
Kevin R. Cmelik, Assistant Attorneys General, for complainant.
John M. French of Law Offices of John M. French, Council Bluffs,
for respondent.
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APPEL, Justice.
The Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed an
application in this court recommending a magistrate be publicly
reprimanded for publishing an advertisement for his services as a private
attorney in which he wore his judicial robes and referred to his position
as a magistrate. We find the magistrate violated the Iowa Code of
Judicial Conduct and grant the application. We agree the appropriate
discipline in this matter is a public reprimand.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Clarence B. Meldrum, Jr., is a magistrate in Pottawattamie
County. He has been a licensed attorney in Iowa for forty-one years. He
has been a magistrate since 1993. As a judicial officer, Magistrate
Meldrum handled criminal matters, municipal infractions, small claims
matters, and matters involving mental health and substance abuse.
Since the mid-1990s, he has limited his law practice to bankruptcy,
probate, real estate, and tax matters, purportedly to avoid conflict with
his position as a magistrate.
In addition to his work in private practice and on the bench,
Magistrate Meldrum has served as president of the Pottawattamie
County Bar Association, president of the magistrate judges’ association,
on the board of Legal Services Corporation of Iowa (which is now Iowa
Legal Aid), on the policy advisory committee of the legal aid office for the
fourth judicial district, and as a volunteer with the Volunteer Lawyer
Project. Meldrum received the meritorious service award as a magistrate
in 2007, awarded in recognition of his service to the public.
Beginning in 2009, Magistrate Meldrum placed advertisements in
phone books circulating in and around Council Bluffs. Both
advertisements featured a photograph of Magistrate Meldrum in his
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judicial robes. The photograph was taken by the Pottawattamie County
Bar Association in 2005 and had previously appeared in a composite
photograph hanging in the county courthouse. One of the
advertisements also noted his position as an “Iowa Judicial Magistrate.”
On December 8, 2011, the Commission on Judicial Qualifications
charged Magistrate Meldrum with a substantial violation of Canon 1 of
the Iowa Judicial Code of Conduct, including rules 51:1.2 and 51:1.3, for
abusing the prestige of his judicial office to advance his personal
economic interests and for failing to promote the public confidence in the
judiciary.
At a hearing on February 1, 2012, when asked about his intent in
placing the advertisements, Magistrate Meldrum replied that he wanted
to communicate his level of responsibility to potential clients, but that it
was not his intent to use the prestige of his judicial office for personal
gain or to obtain favorable treatment. He stated:
My intention in preparing the ad was to communicate to the
public in a permissible manner my availability as a private
attorney for private legal services, and it was my intention by
using the title of magistrate and the photograph in the robes
to indicate that I did hold a responsible public position and
that I was a reliable attorney with 40 years’ practice
experience. There was never any intention to indicate that
by virtue of my position as a magistrate I could pull any
strings, make things happen for people that shouldn’t
happen.
When asked if he was attempting to use his position as a magistrate to
attract clients, Magistrate Meldrum stated:
Only in the sense that I felt that being a member of the
judiciary, and specifically an Iowa Judicial Magistrate, lent
credence to my professionalism and my qualifications to
represent people. I never intended to indicate that I could
use my position as a Judicial Magistrate to effect any—
anything for any client, no.
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Magistrate Meldrum also agreed it would advance his personal or
economic interests if the reference to his judicial office helped him attract
business from people who found him to be trustworthy. Magistrate
Meldrum expressed his embarrassment, apologized, stated he took the
alleged violation to heart, and indicated he had no intention of violating
this ethical canon again. The commission found Magistrate Meldrum
violated the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct and recommends a public
reprimand.
In arguing Magistrate Meldrum’s conduct did not promote public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary, the commission points to Magistrate Meldrum’s assertion that
he referenced his position as a magistrate in the advertisements to
indicate he was responsible and reliable as an attorney. The commission
argues that the public could easily construe the advertisement to suggest
Magistrate Meldrum is a better attorney than others because he is a
magistrate or to suggest that Magistrate Meldrum has better access to or
influence over the judicial system.
In response, Magistrate Meldrum sets forth the following reasons
as to why he should not be disciplined: (1) his lack of intent to advance
his personal and economic interests; (2) that the advertisement could not
have advanced his personal or economic interests because of the lack of
overlap in practice areas between his job as a magistrate and his private
law practice; (3) that the advertisement has been deleted; and (4) that
while he diligently reviewed the attorney advertising rules, he had no
knowledge that his conduct might violate the code of judicial conduct.
He also argues his conduct has not eroded public confidence in the
judicial system, which he acknowledges is “the primary goal of judicial
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discipline.” Further, he argues there is no reason to discipline him to
deter other judges from engaging in similar conduct.
II. Scope of Review.
“Our standard of review of a recommendation of judicial discipline
by the commission on judicial qualifications is de novo.” In re
McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 2002). A judge’s ethical violation
must be established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. In
re Block, 816 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 2012); In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d
at 15.
III. Violations.
The first canon of the Iowa Judicial Code of Conduct “addresses
the need for judges to preserve the crown jewels of the judiciary—
independence, integrity, and impartiality—and directs judges to uphold
the fundamental qualities of judging by avoiding impropriety.” In re
Block, 816 N.W.2d at 364. It states, “A judge shall uphold and promote
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” Iowa Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 1. The rule applies to a judge’s conduct on and
off the bench. In re Block, 816 N.W.2d at 364.
Rule 51:1.2 essentially echoes Canon 1. Rule 51:1.3 provides, “A
judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the
personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to
do so.” According to the official comment, this rule prohibits a judge
from using or attempting to use his or her position “to gain personal
advantage or deferential treatment of any kind.” Iowa Code of Judicial
Conduct R. 51:1.3 cmt. [1]. As an example, the official comment
provides that “it would be improper for a judge to allude to his or her
judicial status to gain favorable treatment in encounters with public
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officials” or for a judge to “use judicial letterhead to gain an advantage in
conducting his or her personal business.” Id.; see also In re Harned, 357
N.W.2d 300, 302–03 (Iowa 1984) (disciplining a magistrate who sent a
letter on official judicial stationery with her name and title to another
magistrate’s office in an attempt to influence the outcome of her
daughter’s speeding ticket). These are not the only examples, however, of
improper conduct under the rule. See, e.g., In re Arrigan, 678 A.2d 446,
449 (R.I. 1996) (per curiam) (reprimanding an administrative law judge
who sold merchandise and raffle tickets for charitable causes in his
judicial chambers to attorneys who practiced in his courtroom).
In In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laatsch, 727
N.W.2d 488, 489 (Wis. 2007) (per curiam), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
publicly reprimanded a municipal judge who identified himself as a judge
in an advertisement for his private law practice and had presided over
matters involving his client, his niece, and his nephew. With respect to
the advertisement, the court stated that the judge “sought to use the
prestige of his judicial office to advance his private interests and
exploited the judgeship in the hopes of obtaining financial gain.” Id. at
491. The court cited the judge’s great remorse and that he was no longer
serving as a judge as mitigating factors. Id.
We agree with the Wisconsin court that a magistrate who also
practices as a private attorney violates the judicial code of conduct when
the magistrate attempts to influence potential clients to use his services
as an attorney by using his office as an indicator of his responsible and
trustworthy nature. In fact, Magistrate Meldrum concedes that he
intended to highlight his qualifications as an attorney by drawing
attention to his judicial office. It is not an excuse that Magistrate
Meldrum was unaware of the provisions of the Iowa Code of Judicial
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Conduct or that his conduct may have violated them. Wearing the hats
of magistrate and attorney, Magistrate Meldrum was required to comply
with ethical provisions applicable to each. Further, we cannot excuse
Magistrate Meldrum’s misconduct merely because the advertisements are
no longer circulating. Therefore, we find Magistrate Meldrum violated
Canon 1 and rules 51:1.2 and 51:1.3.
IV. Sanction.
We have said that the purpose of judicial discipline proceedings is
“to restore public confidence in the system and its officers,” not to punish
the individual judge. In re Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 271, 280 (Iowa 2001)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Block, 816
N.W.2d at 365. We also seek “to protect the public from further
excesses.” In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 16. There is no standard
sanction in judicial discipline cases. Instead, we rely on a number of
factors to fashion an appropriate sanction in each case. The factors
include:
(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or
evidenced a pattern of [mis]conduct; (b) the nature, extent
and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c)
whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom;
(d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official
capacity or in his [or her] private life; (e) whether the judge
has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f)
whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or
modify his [or her] conduct; (g) the length of service on the
bench; (h) whether there have been prior complaints about
this judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has upon the
integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to
which the judge exploited his [or her] position to satisfy [any]
personal desires.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Though Magistrate Meldrum’s advertisements ran for more than
one year and in multiple publications, his misconduct is less egregious
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than that in other cases involving violations of Canon 1. Cf. In re
Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 708, 716 (Or. 1998) (per curiam) (suspending
for six months a judge who sent numerous letters on his official judicial
letterhead to influence various parties for personal gain or that of others,
such as a letter to a department store about the price of a suit, a letter to
an electric company about service at his residence, letters to a golf club
indicating he would not be paying his bills, and letters to a city
protesting a parking ticket). Magistrate Meldrum did not renew the
advertisement after he became aware of the charges against him.
Further, Magistrate Meldrum expressed remorse for his violation. We
also note Magistrate Meldrum has not been the subject of prior
discipline. Finally, Magistrate Meldrum has led a distinguished career
on the bench and in the community. In light of the above factors, we
conclude a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction.
V. Conclusion.
We find Magistrate Meldrum violated Canon 1 of the Iowa Code of
Judicial Conduct as well as rules 51:1.2 and 51:1.3. We reprimand
Magistrate Meldrum for his conduct.
APPLICATION GRANTED; JUDICIAL OFFICER REPRIMANDED.