Chartis Insurance F/K/A American International Group, Inc. v. Iowa Insurance Commissioner , 831 N.W.2d 119 ( 2013 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 12–0383
Filed May 17, 2013
CHARTIS INSURANCE f/k/a AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.,
Appellant,
vs.
IOWA INSURANCE COMMISSIONER,
Appellee,
ACTION WAREHOUSE CO., LTD.,
Intervenor–Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis I. Reis,
Judge.
An insurance company appeals from a decision of the district court
affirming the decision of the Iowa Insurance Commissioner. REVERSED
AND REMANDED.
Scott A. Sundstrom and Ryan G. Koopmans of Nyemaster Goode,
P.C., Des Moines, and Constantine L. Trela, Jr., Susan A. Stone, and
Bruce Braverman of Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeanie Kunkle Vaudt,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Joseph G. Gamble and Bradley C. Obermeier of Duncan, Green,
Brown & Langeness, Des Moines, for intervenor–appellee.
2
ZAGER, Justice.
In this case, Chartis Insurance (Chartis), formerly known as
American International Group, Inc., urges us to consider whether the
Iowa Insurance Commissioner (Commissioner) has the authority under
Iowa Code section 515A.1 to consider an as-applied challenge to a
workers’ compensation liability insurance rating schedule approved for
use in accordance with Iowa law. We conclude the Commissioner does
not have the authority under Iowa Code section 515A.1 to reject a
faithful application of a plan previously approved under Iowa Code
section 515A.4, despite the perceived unfairness of that application. We
conclude this to be true even if, in the Commissioner’s judgment, this
individual application results in a premium that is excessive or unfairly
discriminatory under Iowa Code section 515A.1. Further, the legislature
intended a section 515A.9 hearing to be limited to a review of the manner
in which an approved rating system has been applied to an insured.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History.
The facts of this case are not disputed. Chartis issued two
workers’ compensation insurance policies to Action Warehouse
Company, Ltd. (Action), one that had a term of December 31, 2006,
through December 31, 2007, and one that had a term of December 31,
2007, through December 31, 2008.
During the terms of these policies, Action contracted with both
Firestone North American Tire, LLC (Firestone) and Titan Tire
Distribution (Titan) to provide employees to operate tire warehouses
owned respectively by Firestone and Titan and used exclusively to store
the goods manufactured by the respective owners. Action acknowledges
that both Firestone and Titan contracted with Action because the tire
3
manufacturers wanted to avoid dealing with labor unions in the
operation of their warehouses.
These Action employees were permanent employees who worked
exclusively in warehouses owned by the tire manufacturers. Both
Chartis and Action agree that these employees did not work directly in
the tire manufacturing process. In fact, Firestone’s warehouse is located
eight miles away from the factory where the actual tire manufacturing
process occurs, and Titan’s warehouse is located a quarter of a mile
away. Employees of the warehouses were not even allowed to enter the
factories where tire manufacturing actually occurred, as collective
bargaining restrictions prohibited their presence on the factory floor.
Insurers offering workers’ compensation liability insurance in Iowa
are required to comply with Iowa Code chapter 515A. The National
Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) has created a rating and
classification system for determining the premium rates insurers charge
for workers’ compensation coverage.1 NCCI filed its rating and
classification system for approval in accordance with Iowa Code chapter
515A.4, and the Iowa Insurance Division, headed by the Commissioner,
approved NCCI’s system. That rating and classification system is set
forth in the Basic Manual for Workers Compensation and Employers
Liability Insurance (Basic Manual). In accordance with Iowa statute,
1We have previously described the function of NCCI as follows:
“The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) collects
statistical data on behalf of approximately 200 member and subscriber
insurance carriers writing workers’ compensation insurance, analyzes
that data on a continuing basis, and acts as agent for its members and
subscribers in presenting requests for premium changes to the proper
state regulatory authorities. It carries out these activities in Iowa and
thirty-one other states.”
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 767 N.W.2d 646, 648 n.1 (Iowa 2009) (quoting
Sheet Metal Contractors of Iowa v. Comm’r of Ins., 427 N.W.2d 859, 860 (Iowa 1988)).
4
Chartis exercised its option to adopt the NCCI system for determining the
premium rates it charges for workers’ compensation. See Iowa Code
§ 515A.4(2) (2009). Thus, the coverage Chartis provided to Action was
governed under the terms of the Basic Manual.
Originally, Chartis classified the Action employees who staffed the
Firestone and Titan warehouses under the NCCI classification code
applicable to general warehouse employees (8292). However, pursuant to
the terms of its workers’ compensation insurance policies, Chartis
performed an audit of Action’s operations after the conclusion of the first
year of coverage, but during the second year of coverage. Action does not
dispute that Chartis had the right to do so under the terms of its
agreement with Action. After conducting this audit, Chartis both
retroactively and prospectively changed the employees’ classification code
to the code applicable to rubber tire manufacturing (4420). This change
resulted in a significantly higher premium. Another Chartis auditor
reconsidered and confirmed the findings of the initial audit. Action
argues the effect of this retroactive change in the classification code was
unfair.
In response, following the procedures set forth in the Basic
Manual, Action then ordered an inspection through NCCI to determine
the appropriate classification code for Action employees working in the
Firestone and Titan warehouses. The initial NCCI inspector agreed with
Action and concluded that the insurance premium should be changed
back to the rate applicable to warehouse workers. However, a
subsequent NCCI inspector agreed with Chartis’s assessment, and the
classification code remained as that applicable to rubber tire
manufacturing.
5
Action then appealed the change in classification code to the NCCI
Iowa workers’ compensation appeals board (appeals board), as required
by the dispute resolution provisions of the Basic Manual. The appeals
board ruled in favor of Chartis, holding that Chartis correctly applied the
relevant Basic Manual rules and accurately reclassified the Action
workers. In accordance with the provisions of Iowa Code section 515A.9,
Action appealed the decision of the appeals board to the Commissioner.
Chartis does not dispute the Commissioner’s authority to make a
determination about whether it complied with the filed rate schedule, as
defined by the Basic Manual. The Commissioner reversed the ruling of
the appeals board, finding that the original audit was improper and
requiring Chartis to classify the employees as warehouse employees.
This original decision of the Commissioner found Chartis had not
complied with the requirements of the Basic Manual.
Chartis then filed a petition for judicial review requesting the
district court reverse the decision issued by the Commissioner and
requesting that the district court uphold the decision of the appeals
board. Prior to a ruling by the district court, and upon motion by the
Commissioner, the district court remanded the case back to the
Commissioner for further proceedings. Rather than relying on or
expanding the original decision, the Commissioner ordered the parties to
submit postremand briefs. The Commissioner directed the parties to
address the issue of whether charging Action the premium rate for
workers’ compensation coverage under the rubber tire manufacturing
classification violated Iowa Code chapter 515A’s prohibition on rates that
are “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.” See Iowa Code
§ 515A.1. After reviewing the briefs, the Commissioner found, “NCCI
employee classification rules approved by the agency for use by workers’
6
compensation carriers in calculating premium rates cannot override the
broad review authority the legislature granted the Commissioner under
chapter 515A to review these rates as applied.” The Commissioner
further found that the rate charged by Chartis as a result of its
classifying Action workers as rubber tire manufacturing employees “is
excessive because the actual risk of harm to the affected workers is not
commensurate with the premium [Chartis] assessed Action Warehouse
for the coverage in question.”
Thus, after remand to the Commissioner, the Commissioner
reversed the ruling of the appeals board on entirely different grounds
than in her original decision, though she ruled in favor of Action both
times. Though the original decision specifically found that “the original
audit was improper in considering these employees to be classified as
Code 4420” based on its analysis of the rules in the Basic Manual, the
decision following remand never reached that issue. The Commissioner
relied on her general authority as provided in Iowa Code section 515A.1.
Pursuant to the NCCI filed rules, businesses are generally assigned
one classification, and “each classification includes all the various types
of labor found in a business.”2 Further, employees provided by a labor
contractor such as Action and “assigned to clients must be classified the
same as direct employees of the client performing the same or similar
duties.”3 Thus, Chartis has always contended that under the NCCI
2Basic Manual Rule 1-A provides:
The purpose of the classification procedure is to assign the one basic
classification that best describes the business of the employer within a
state. Subject to certain exceptions described in this rule, each
classification includes all the various types of labor found in a business.
It is the business that is classified, not the individual employments,
occupations or operations within the business.
3Basic Manual Rule 1-D-3-f provides:
7
rules, Firestone and Titan are rubber tire manufacturers for all of its
Iowa employees. Moreover, any employees provided by a labor contractor
such as Action are required to have the same 4420 classification. In her
final ruling, the Commissioner did not address whether Chartis had
correctly followed the NCCI rates. Rather, she simply acknowledged,
“Chartis calculated the premium rate it charged Action Warehouse for
this coverage by classifying these employees under NCCI’s worker
classification rules.”
The district court affirmed the final agency order of the
Commissioner, choosing to “defer to the agency’s expertise and discretion
to interpret and apply its own statute.” The district court agreed with the
Commissioner’s conclusion that the premium rate Chartis applied to
Action workers after the reclassification to the rubber tire manufacturer
rate was “excessive and therefore prohibited by Iowa Code section
515A.1.”
Chartis appeals the ruling of the district court. We retained the
appeal.
For the reasons which will be explained later in this opinion, we
assume for purposes of this appeal that the rates charged by Chartis
following its audit complied with the NCCI rates filed with and approved
by the Insurance Commissioner. The sole issue on appeal, then, is
whether the Commissioner has the authority to determine that a specific
application of a plan approved under Iowa Code section 515A.4 violates
______________________
f. Employee Leasing, Labor Contractors and Temporary Labor Services
(1) Workers assigned to clients must be classified the same as direct
employees of the client performing the same or similar duties.
(2) If the client has no direct employees performing the same or similar
duties, leased employees are classified as if they were direct employees of the
client entity.
8
the statute’s general purpose as outlined in Iowa Code section 515A.1 by
being “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”
II. Standard of Review.
Our task in reviewing a “district court decision reviewing agency
action is to decide whether the district court correctly applied the law.”
Buckley v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 638 N.W.2d 675, 676 (Iowa 2001)
(per curiam). Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) provides that “in suits for
judicial review of agency action . . . [t]he validity of agency action must be
determined in accordance with the standards of review provided in this
section, as applied to the agency action at the time that action was
taken.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(8).
We have recently articulated our standard of review in evaluating
judicial review of agency action.
Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) governs judicial review of
agency decision making. We will apply the standards of
section 17A.19(10) to determine whether we reach the same
results as the district court. The district court may grant
relief if the agency action has prejudiced the substantial
rights of the petitioner, and the agency action meets one of
the enumerated criteria contained in section 17A.19(10)(a)
through (n).
Under Iowa Code section 17.19(10) (2007), our
standard of review depends on the aspect of the agency’s
decision that forms the basis of the petition for judicial
review.”
Burton v. Hilltop Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 255–56 (Iowa 2012) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
If an agency has been clearly vested with the authority
to make factual findings on a particular issue, then a
reviewing court can only disturb those factual findings if
they are “not supported by substantial evidence in the record
before the court when that record is reviewed as a whole.”
9
Id. at 256 (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)). Additionally, “[w]hen an
agency has been clearly vested with the authority to make factual
determinations, it follows that application of the law to those facts is
likewise vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Id.
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further,
[w]hen the application of law to fact has been clearly vested
in the discretion of an agency, a reviewing court may only
disturb the agency’s application of the law to the facts of the
particular case if that application is “irrational, illogical, or
wholly unjustifiable.”
Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m)).
We must first determine, then, if the Commissioner was vested
with the authority to make factual findings on a particular issue. Iowa
Code section 515A.5 gives the Commissioner the authority to make
factual findings in relation to whether “a filing does not meet the
requirements of this chapter.” Iowa Code § 515A.5(1). Similarly, Iowa
Code section 515A.9 allows the Commissioner “to review the manner in
which such rating system has been applied in connection with the
insurance afforded the person.” Iowa Code § 515A.9. However, the
Commissioner seeks her authority in this case under Iowa Code section
515A.1. This section, entitled “purpose of chapter,” provides no
authority for the Commissioner to make factual findings as to whether
an insurance company meets the general purpose of the chapter. See
Iowa Code § 515A.1.
We have said, “Normally, the interpretation of a statute is a pure
question of law over which agencies are not delegated any special powers
by the General Assembly so[] a court is free to . . . substitute its
judgment de novo for that of the agency and determine if the agency
interpretation of the statute is correct.” Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights
10
Comm’n, 784 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Arthur E. Bonfield,
Amendments to Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Report on Selected
Provisions to Iowa State Bar Association and Iowa State Government 62
(1998) [hereinafter Bonfield]). We further stated,
Notably, section 17A.10(c) does not require that the
discretion be “expressly” vested in the agency, but instead
uses the less restrictive term “clearly.”
“This means that the reviewing court, using its own
independent judgment and without any required deference
to the agency’s view, must have a firm conviction from
reviewing the precise language of the statute, its context, the
purpose of the statute, and the practical considerations
involved, that the legislature actually intended . . . to
delegate to the agency interpretive power with the binding
force of law over the elaboration of the provision in question.”
Id. (quoting Bonfield at 63). We cannot conclude that the language of
Iowa Code section 515A.1 clearly vested in the Commissioner this
authority. Thus, we conclude that our review of the application of Iowa
Code section 515A.1 is de novo.
III. Statutory Framework.
The Iowa Insurance Commissioner acts under the statutory
authority of Iowa Chapter 515A. The legislature articulated the purpose
of this chapter as follows:
The purpose of this chapter is to promote the public
welfare by regulating insurance rates to the end that they
shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory,
and to authorize and regulate co-operative action among
insurers in rate making and in other matters within the
scope of this chapter. . . . This chapter shall be liberally
interpreted to carry into effect the provisions of this section.
Iowa Code § 515A.1.
Iowa has created a statutory structure to protect those purchasing
workers’ compensation insurance from having to pay rates that are
“excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.” Id. To achieve this
11
statutory purpose, Iowa Code section 515A.3 explicitly requires that
when rates are made, they “shall not be excessive, inadequate, or
unfairly discriminatory.” Id. § 515A.3(1)(a). In order to assure
compliance with this directive, it has granted the Commissioner broad
authority to approve rate plans under a “rate filing” statutory scheme.
As a rate-filing state, Iowa requires that “[e]very insurer shall file
with the commissioner every manual, minimum, class rate, rating
schedule or rating plan and every other rating rule, and every
modification of any of the foregoing which it proposes to use.” Id.
§ 515A.4(1)(a). Further, after these filings occur, there is a mandatory
waiting period before it becomes effective. Id. § 515A.4(4). “A filing shall
be deemed to meet the requirements of this chapter unless disapproved
by the commissioner before the expiration of the waiting period . . . .” Id.
“An insurer may satisfy its obligation to make such filings by becoming a
member of, or a subscriber to, a licensed rating organization which
makes such filings, and by authorizing the commissioner to accept such
filings on its behalf . . . .” Id. § 515A.4(2). “No insurer shall make or
issue a contract or policy except in accordance with the filings which are
in effect for the insurer as provided in this chapter . . . .” Id. § 515A.4(7).
IV. Discussion and Analysis.
A. The Commissioner’s Authority to Review the Application of
Approved Rates to Clients. We must first evaluate whether the
Commissioner has the authority to make a determination as to whether
the rate Chartis applied to Action was consistent with the requirements
of the statute. The Commissioner urges us to find she has the authority
to evaluate this as-applied challenge, based on the statutory guidance
found under Iowa Code section 515A.1.
12
Chartis, however, argues the Commissioner exceeds her statutory
authority by using this section to conclude that Chartis’s rates, as
applied to this specific customer, are excessive. Chartis argues that the
legislature provided two specific avenues by which the Commissioner
could adjudicate challenges to the rates a workers’ compensation
insurance provider proposes to charge or has charged its customer: Iowa
Code section 515A.5 and section 515A.9.
Both the Commissioner and the district court explicitly stated they
were ruling on the rates “as applied.” They argue that the Commissioner
has broad authority under Iowa Code section 515A.1 to regulate insurers
to comply with the general purpose of the chapter, even if the method by
which they choose to do it is not specifically included in the statutory
language. In the ruling issued after remand from the district court, the
Commissioner concluded,
NCCI employee classification rules approved by the agency
for use by workers’ compensation carriers in calculating
premium rates cannot override the broad review authority
the legislature granted the Commissioner under chapter
515A to review these rates as applied. Section 515A.1
requires that rates as applied cannot be “excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.” The rate at issue as
applied under the record presented is excessive because the
actual risk of harm to the affected workers is not
commensurate with the premium Chartis assessed Action
Warehouse for the coverage in question.
The district court validated this broad interpretation of the statute
to grant the Commissioner this authority when it stated:
Chartis argues that because the premium rates NCCI filed
with the agency on behalf of Chartis have been approved by
the agency, Chartis is merely doing what it is legally entitled
to do. Chartis’s argument equates agency approval of a
premium rate filing with agency approval of the effect of that
rate as applied in a specific circumstance—even if the
application results in a rate that is excessive and therefore
prohibited by section 515A.1. This argument is
unpersuasive.
13
The district court additionally concluded that Chartis would
receive a “premium windfall” if the approved rate was applied to Action’s
workers, as Action’s workers “are physically separated from the tire
manufacturing process.” The district court found that this violated the
prohibition on excessive rates found in Iowa Code section 515A.1.
B. The Legislature Provided Specific Statutory Avenues to
Challenge Workers’ Compensation Insurance Rates in Iowa. The
legislature has given the Commissioner statutory authority to hear two
types of challenges to workers’ compensation insurance rates that have
been filed and approved in accordance with Iowa Code section 515A.4.
1. Iowa Code section 515A.5(2) provides an avenue for the
Commissioner to determine approved rates do not fulfill statutory
requirements. Iowa Code section 515A.5(2) provides, in part:
At any time subsequent to the applicable review period
provided for in subsection 1, the commissioner may hold a
hearing to determine whether a filing meets the requirements
of this chapter. The commissioner shall provide notice of a
hearing not less than ten days prior to the hearing to every
insurer and rating organization which made the filing,
specifying the matters to be considered at the hearing. If the
commissioner finds that a filing does not meet the
requirements of this chapter, the commissioner shall issue
an order specifying in what respects the commissioner finds
that the filing fails to meet the requirements of this chapter,
and stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter, the
filing shall be deemed no longer effective.
Iowa Code § 515A.5(2). We have previously described 515A.5 as
authorization for the commissioner “to disapprove workers’
compensation insurance rate filings which fail to meet the requirements
of chapter 515A.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 767 N.W.2d
646, 651 (Iowa 2009). The only option available to the Commissioner
under 515A.5(3), then, would be to provide public notice and hold a
14
hearing as described in the statute to determine whether a filing meets
the requirements of the chapter.4
Chartis used NCCI’s Basic Manual to determine the rate it would
charge Action for the employees at the Firestone and Titan warehouses.
Neither Action nor the Commissioner dispute that NCCI adhered to
Iowa’s statutory requirements for rate filing, nor does either dispute that
Chartis adhered to these requirements when it adopted NCCI’s rating
system for use in Iowa. NCCI filed its Basic Manual per the requirements
of Iowa Code section 515A.4, and Chartis exercised its right to satisfy the
requirements of section 515A.4 by adopting the Basic Manual in
assigning its insurance rates. A challenge under section 515A.5(3) was
not made, nor was one decided by the Commissioner or the district
court.
2. Iowa Code section 515A.9 provides an avenue for the
Commissioner to determine if approved rates have been appropriately
applied. Iowa Code section 515A.9 provides, in part:
Every rating organization and every insurer which makes its
own rates shall provide within this state reasonable means
whereby any person aggrieved by the application of its rating
system may be heard, in person or by the person’s
authorized representative, on the person’s written request to
review the manner in which such rating system has been
applied in connection with the insurance afforded the
person. . . . Any party affected by the action of such rating
organization or such insurer on such request may, within
thirty days after written notice of such action, appeal to the
commissioner, who, after a hearing held upon not less than
ten days’ written notice to the appellant and to such rating
organization or insurer, may affirm or reverse such action.
Iowa Code § 515A.9.
4We note also that the authority granted the Commissioner under Iowa Code
section 515A.5(3) is prospective only, so the Commissioner would not have the
authority to retroactively change the rates Chartis charged Action. See Iowa Code
§ 515A.5(2).
15
We have previously noted that Iowa Code section 515A.9
“authorizes dispute resolution procedures not only for both rates and
rating systems but also for those ‘aggrieved by the application of its
rating system.’ ” Travelers Indem. Co. v. D.J. Franzen, Inc., 792 N.W.2d
242, 247 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 515A.9). “Since premiums
are derived from rates and ratings plans, entities paying premiums ‘are
aggrieved by the application’ of the rating system. Therefore, section
515A.9 provides a procedure for premium disputes.” Id. It is thus
undisputed that the Commissioner has the authority to determine if the
application of a statutorily-approved ratings plan complies with the
terms of that plan under Iowa Code section 515A.9. Chartis has never
disputed that the Commissioner had the authority to determine whether
Chartis had complied with the Basic Manual.
However, subsequent to the remand, the Commissioner did not
consider the issue Iowa Code section 515A.9 gives her the authority to
review—“the manner in which [the approved] rating system has been
applied in connection with the insurance afforded the person.” See Iowa
Code § 515A.9. Rather, the Commissioner attempted to expand her
powers under this section 515A.9 hearing, based on her broad
interpretation of Iowa Code section 515A.1. The language of the statute
is unambiguous. See In re Det. of Johnson, 805 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Iowa
2011) (“We do not search for meaning beyond the express terms of a
statute when the statute is plain and its meaning is clear.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). The Commissioner’s authority is
limited to the “manner in which [an approved] rating system has been
applied.” See Iowa Code § 515A.9. In other words, it is limited to the
question of whether Chartis applied the proper employee classification
required by the filed and approved rating rules. The statute does not
16
contemplate a situation like the one presented here, where an insurance
company follows the statutory procedure outlined under section 515A.4
to get a rating system approved, then faithfully applies that rating
system, only to have the Commissioner decide that the approved rating
(premium) is “excessive” as applied to one specific situation. Iowa Code
section 515A.9 does not provide the proper procedure for challenging the
validity of the rating rule itself or the corresponding premium. The Iowa
legislature enacted a separate procedure for challenging rate filings. See
Iowa Code § 515A.5(3). The plain language of section 515A.5(3) confirms
that the legislature intended this code section to be the only procedural
avenue available to challenge a rate filing. Additionally, the statute
provides that any change in the rate filing is only prospective in nature.
Iowa Code § 515A.5(2) (“If the commissioner finds that a filing does not
meet the requirements of this chapter, the commissioner shall issue an
order specifying in what respects the commissioner finds that the filing
fails to meet the requirements of this chapter, and stating when, within a
reasonable period thereafter, the filing shall be deemed no longer
effective.”). Therefore, nothing in the statute contemplates a retroactive
application of an adjusted rate. Otherwise, the Commissioner would be
cloaked with virtually unlimited discretion over rates, subverting the
intent of the ratings system codified in chapter 515A. We conclude that
the legislature intended for a section 515A.9 hearing to be limited to a
review of the manner in which an approved rating system has been
applied to an insured.
After the remand, every document filed—the decision of the
Commissioner, the decision of the district court, and the briefs submitted
on appeal—centered on the issue the Commissioner identified in her
postremand brief order—whether the Commissioner had the authority to
17
consider an as-applied challenge in the event an insurer properly applies
a rate schedule approved under section 515A.4. Action, in its role as
intervenor, elected to adopt the Commissioner’s brief on appeal, and
specifically agreed to be bound by it. Action and the Commissioner do
not ask us to decide whether the rates charged by Chartis comply with
the Basic Manual. Thus, for purposes of section 515A.9, there is not a
viable dispute over “the manner in which such rating system has been
applied.” See Iowa Code § 515A.9.
3. The Commissioner does not have unlimited authority to fulfill the
general purpose of the statute in the absence of a statutorily-prescribed
avenue to do so. We have previously considered the question of whether
a statutory provision providing general guidance on the interpretation of
a statute gives the agency specific authority to resolve a dispute. In State
v. Public Employment Relations Board, we considered the question of
whether the legislature had granted the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB) the authority to remedy nonwillful violations of Iowa Code
chapter 20. 744 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Iowa 2008). We noted that Iowa Code
“section 20.10 set forth conduct that can constitute a prohibited
practice.” Id. at 361. PERB acknowledged that it did not have
enumerated authority to charge a party with nonwillful violations. Id.
Thus, PERB attempted to “rel[y] on the general statement of its ‘powers
and duties’ . . . [that] states PERB has the power and duty to ‘[f]ashion[]
appropriate remedial relief for violations of this chapter.’ ” Id. (quoting
Iowa Code § 20.1). We noted the legislature had provided specific ways
in which a party could seek relief, and that those sections “require[d] a
showing of willfulness.” Id. at 361–62. We concluded that because “the
State did not act willfully[,] . . . PERB had no authority to remedy the
State’s nonwillful violation.” Id. at 362.
 18
Similarly, we conclude that the general purpose provision of
Chapter 515A does not provide independent authority for the agency to
do anything it might deem necessary to fulfill the purpose of the statute,
particularly when the legislature has provided very specific avenues for
the Commissioner to review how the statute is being applied. As a
result, based on our de novo review, we find the Commissioner did not
have general authority under 515A.1 to decide an as-applied challenge in
the manner she attempted to do so here.
V. Disposition.
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the findings of the district
court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.