Lori A. Gregory Vs. Second Injury Fund Of Iowa ( 2010 )


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  •               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 07–1764
    Filed January 22, 2010
    LORI A. GREGORY,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    SECOND INJURY FUND OF IOWA,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T.
    Schemmel, Judge.
    Employee appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the
    workers’ compensation commissioner’s denial of her claim against the
    Second Injury Fund. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND
    CASE REMANDED.
    Corey J. L. Walker of Walker & Billingsley, Newton, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Greg Knoploh, Assistant
    Attorney General, Des Moines, for appellee.
    2
    HECHT, Justice.
    In this appeal, we must decide whether the workers’ compensation
    commissioner erred in concluding a claimant who sustained successive
    injuries in the course of her employment is not entitled to benefits from
    the Second Injury Fund (the Fund).         The commissioner concluded the
    Fund owes nothing in this case under Iowa Code section 85.64 (2001)
    because the first injury sustained by the claimant, Lori Gregory
    (Gregory), resulted in surgeries and functional losses to both of her arms
    and shoulders and functional limitations extending into the whole body.
    On   appeal    from   the   district   court’s   judgment   affirming   the
    commissioner’s decision, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    Gregory began working for Jeld-Wen, Inc. d/b/a Doorcraft of Iowa
    (Doorcraft) in 1999. In September 2000, she experienced bilateral upper
    extremity dysfunction. She underwent a right carpal tunnel surgery on
    December 15, 2000, and had the same surgery on the left side on
    February 19, 2001. These procedures left Gregory with a two percent
    functional impairment of her left hand and a six percent functional
    impairment of her right hand.
    In the spring and summer of 2001, Gregory underwent bilateral
    surgical procedures intended to decompress her distal clavicles and treat
    pain in her shoulders. The orthopedist who performed these procedures
    subsequently opined Gregory sustained a ten percent impairment of her
    right arm and a ten percent impairment of her left arm secondary to the
    surgical treatment of her clavicles.
    Gregory was able to continue her employment at Doorcraft after
    her recovery from the surgeries. However, she sustained a new injury in
    3
    the course of her employment on October 8, 2002, when a door end-rail
    fell, fracturing her right foot. During the ensuing months, Gregory was
    treated for persistent pain in the injured foot and in her right leg.
    Gregory filed a petition with the Iowa Workers’ Compensation
    Commissioner on July 6, 2004, seeking compensation from Doorcraft for
    the injury to her right foot. 1         The petition also asserted Gregory was
    entitled to benefits from the Fund, alleging the 2000 injury to her left
    hand constituted a first qualifying injury and the 2002 injury to her right
    foot   constituted      a    second     qualifying     injury. 2       The    industrial
    commissioner denied Gregory’s claim against the Fund, concluding the
    2000 injury did not constitute a first qualifying injury under Iowa Code
    section 85.64 because the resulting functional limitations “clearly
    extend[ed] beyond the bilateral arms and into the whole body.”                        The
    commissioner reasoned that the 2000 injury could not constitute a first
    qualifying injury because it resulted in permanent partial bilateral
    disability    to    Gregory’s    hands,      arms,    and     shoulders      for   which
    compensation was calculated as an injury to the body as a whole under
    Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(u).
    Gregory sought judicial review, and the district court affirmed the
    commissioner’s decision.
    1Although  the fracture was situated in the right foot, Gregory’s petition initially
    alleged an injury to the body as a whole because a treating physician had diagnosed
    symptoms of reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) in the right leg. The RSD symptoms
    resolved, however, and Gregory subsequently abandoned her claim that the 2002 injury
    extended permanently beyond the right foot, a scheduled member under Iowa Code
    section 85.34(2)(n).
    2Gregory’sworkers’ compensation claim against Doorcraft for the 2000 bilateral
    hand and shoulder disabilities was resolved by a special case settlement agreement
    under Iowa Code section 85.35 on July 19, 2004.
    4
    II. Scope of Review.
    An appeal of a workers’ compensation decision is reviewed under
    standards described in chapter 17A. Iowa Code § 86.26. “The agency
    decision itself is reviewed under the standards set forth in section
    17A.19(10).” Mosher v. Dep’t of Inspections & Appeals, 
    671 N.W.2d 501
    ,
    508 (Iowa 2003). The agency’s decision in this case was based on an
    interpretation of Iowa Code section 85.64. Interpretation of the workers’
    compensation statute is an enterprise that has not been clearly vested by
    a provision of law in the discretion of the commissioner.            Finch v.
    Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc., 
    700 N.W.2d 328
    , 330 (Iowa 2005).
    Thus, we will reverse the agency’s decision if it is based on “an erroneous
    interpretation” of the law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c).
    III. Discussion.
    Gregory contends the commissioner erred in concluding her 2000
    left-hand injury cannot qualify as a first injury under section 85.64. The
    Fund asserts the commissioner correctly concluded Gregory’s 2000
    injury resulting in impairment to more than one member enumerated in
    the statute, considered for purposes of workers’ compensation together
    with impairment to Gregory’s shoulders in determining disability to her
    body as a whole, cannot qualify as a first injury under the statute. A
    brief review of the Fund’s legislative history will aid our resolution of this
    issue.
    The General Assembly passed legislation establishing the Fund in
    1945. The statute originally provided in relevant part:
    If an employee who has previously lost, or lost the use of,
    one hand, one arm, one foot, one leg, or one eye, becomes
    permanently and totally disabled by a compensable injury
    which has resulted in the loss of or loss of use of another
    such member or organ, the employer shall be liable only for
    the degree of disability which would have resulted from the
    5
    latter injury if there had been no preexisting disability. In
    addition to such compensation, and after the expiration of
    the full period provided by law for the payments thereof by
    the employer, the employee shall be paid out of the “Second
    Injury Fund” created by this Act the remainder of such
    compensation as would be payable for permanent total
    disability after first deducting from such remainder the
    compensable value of the previously lost member or organ.
    1945 Iowa Acts ch. 81, § 2. The scope of the statute was extended less
    than a decade later when the General Assembly amended the law and
    eliminated the requirement that the claimant prove total permanent
    disability as a result of the second injury to establish the Fund’s liability.
    1951 Iowa Acts ch. 59, § 6 (expressing in its title the intent “to liberalize
    the provisions of the second injury fund”). Under the current version of
    section 85.64, the Fund is implicated in a workers’ compensation claim
    when an employee suffers successive qualifying injuries.
    We have noted the Fund was conceived by the legislature to
    encourage the employment of disabled persons “by making the current
    employer responsible only for the disability the current employer causes.”
    Second Injury Fund v. Shank, 
    516 N.W.2d 808
    , 812 (Iowa 1994); see also
    Second Injury Fund v. Neelans, 
    436 N.W.2d 355
    , 358 (Iowa 1989) (noting
    the purpose of second injury fund statutes “was to provide a more
    favorable climate for the employment of persons injured through service
    in World War II”); Anderson v. Second Injury Fund, 
    262 N.W.2d 789
    , 791–
    92 (Iowa 1978) (stating the purpose of second injury fund statutes is to
    encourage employers to hire disabled workers). 3               The Fund’s salutary
    3It has been suggested that this court’s decisions have mischaracterized the
    General Assembly’s primary purpose in adopting the Fund and that the primary
    purpose of second injury fund statutes is mitigation of the harsh consequences of the
    apportionment rule for employees and the full-responsibility rule for employers in
    certain cases involving successive injuries to body parts enumerated in section 85.64.
    Although mitigation of the harsh consequences of the full-responsibility rule might have
    motivated legislatures in other states as they adopted their second injury fund statutes,
    such motivation was not likely a substantial factor in Iowa. See Lee M. Jackwig, The
    Second Injury Fund of Iowa: How Complex Can a Simple Concept Become? 28 Drake L.
    6
    purpose is accomplished by an award of compensation after a second
    qualifying injury to “an employee who has previously lost, or lost the use
    of, one hand, one arm, one foot, one leg, or one eye.” Iowa Code § 85.64.
    Thus, Gregory’s entitlement to benefits from the Fund is dependent upon
    proof of the following propositions: (1) she sustained a permanent
    disability to a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye (a first qualifying injury);
    (2) she subsequently sustained a permanent disability to another such
    member through a work-related injury (a second qualifying injury); and
    (3) the permanent disability resulting from the first and second injuries
    exceeds the compensable value of “the previously lost member.”                      Id.;
    
    Shank, 516 N.W.2d at 812
    .
    Each party believes the plain language of section 85.64 supports
    its position. The Fund reads the statute to mean a first qualifying loss
    must be confined to a body part enumerated in the statute. As Gregory’s
    disability arising from the 2000 injury included not only a partial
    functional loss of her left hand but also included disabling injuries to
    both of her shoulders resulting in compensation for industrial disability,
    the State contends the commissioner correctly concluded the Fund has
    no liability in this case. Gregory views section 85.64 more broadly. She
    posits the statute must be interpreted to include within the universe of
    _________________________
    Rev. 889, 890–91 (1978–1979) (noting that under Iowa law antedating the adoption of
    Iowa’s Fund, “employers in Iowa had already been assured that if they hired a one-eyed,
    one-armed, or one-legged individual they would be liable only for any actual loss of the
    other eye or limb in a subsequent work-related injury because liability for total
    disability depended upon loss of two such organs or limbs in the same accident,” and
    suggesting the General Assembly’s purpose in establishing the Fund was providing
    disabled persons with “a means of reasonably sufficient recovery in the event [they
    sustain] a subsequent compensable injury that combines with a prior disability so as to
    result in a degree of disability that exceeds the sum of the compensable values of the
    prior and subsequent disabilities”). Although a further exegesis as to which conception
    of the General Assembly’s purpose merits the designation of “primary” could be of
    academic interest, we believe it would be of little significance to the appropriate
    disposition of this case. To be sure, “the general purpose of encouraging employers to
    hire [disabled persons] is not defeated [by the Fund].” 
    Id. at 891.
                                        7
    qualifying first losses any disability to an enumerated body part whether
    or not it coexists with one or more disabilities simultaneously sustained
    in other enumerated or unenumerated body parts. We find each of these
    interpretations to be plausible, rendering the statute ambiguous.
    When interpreting a statute, our “ultimate goal is to determine and
    effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Beier Glass Co. v. Brundige, 
    329 N.W.2d 280
    , 283 (Iowa 1983). We generally presume words contained in
    a statute are used in their ordinary and usual sense with the meaning
    commonly attributed to them. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Iowa State Bd.
    of Tax Review, 
    302 N.W.2d 140
    , 142–43 (Iowa 1981). In discerning the
    meaning of an ambiguous statute, we construe terms according to their
    accepted usage when they are not defined in the statute. State v. Bower,
    
    725 N.W.2d 435
    , 442 (Iowa 2006). We strive for “an interpretation that is
    reasonable, best achieves the statute’s purpose, and avoids absurd
    results.” 
    Id. We also
    give careful attention to the purpose of a statute as we
    engage in interpretation. Am. Home 
    Prods., 302 N.W.2d at 143
    . Workers’
    compensation statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the
    employee. Myers v. F.C.A. Servs., Inc., 
    592 N.W.2d 354
    , 356 (Iowa 1999).
    The legislature enacted the workers’ compensation statute
    primarily for the benefit of the worker and the worker’s
    dependents. Therefore, we apply the statute broadly and
    liberally in keeping with the humanitarian objective of the
    statute. We will not defeat the statute’s beneficent purpose
    by reading something into it that is not there, or by a narrow
    and strained construction.
    Holstein Elec. v. Breyfogle, 
    756 N.W.2d 812
    , 815–16 (Iowa 2008)
    (citations omitted).
    With these principles in mind, we must interpret section 85.64 to
    determine whether Gregory “lost, or lost the use of, one hand, one arm,
    8
    one foot, one leg, or one eye” as a consequence of the 2000 injury.
    Although not controlling here, our recent decision in Second Injury Fund
    v. George, 
    737 N.W.2d 141
    (Iowa 2007), is instructive. In George, the
    claimant sustained a work-related injury in 1996 resulting in a seven
    percent disability to her left 
    leg. 737 N.W.2d at 144
    . In 2000, George
    sustained another work-related injury that caused disability to both of
    her legs. 
    Id. The Fund
    contended George’s 2000 right leg injury was not
    a qualifying second injury because her left leg was also injured in the
    same incident. 
    Id. at 145.
    Affirming the commissioner’s determination
    that the bilateral nature of the 2000 injury did not preclude its
    qualification as a second injury under section 85.64, we interpreted the
    phrase “loss of or loss of use of another such member” to mean a
    subsequent loss to another enumerated member notwithstanding more
    than one enumerated member was disabled as a consequence of the
    same incident. 
    Id. at 147.
    Although George interpreted only that part of section 85.64 which
    addresses the second qualifying injury, we believe its reasoning is
    relevant here. Liability of the Fund under section 85.64 expressly turns
    on the part(s) of the body permanently injured in successive injuries. The
    focus of our analysis must therefore be on whether Gregory sustained a
    partial permanent loss of at least two enumerated members in successive
    injuries.   She clearly did.    Given our decision in George that a
    subsequent injury to an enumerated member is not disqualified as a
    second injury merely because it occurred simultaneously with an injury
    to another enumerated member, we believe it would be senselessly
    inconsistent to conclude a first qualifying injury cannot likewise occur
    simultaneously with an injury to another such member.
    9
    Our determination that Gregory’s 2000 left hand injury qualifies as
    a first injury under section 85.64 is not affected by the fact that the
    incident also caused bilateral shoulder impairment and was therefore
    compensated as an unscheduled injury under Iowa Code section
    85.34(2)(u). The plain language of section 85.64 does not support the
    Fund’s contention that it is significant to the determination of whether
    the 2000 injury is a first qualifying loss that compensation was
    calculated under “the schedule” found in Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(a)–
    (t), rather than under section 85.34(2)(u) as one of the factors bearing
    upon the nature and extent of an injured worker’s industrial disability.
    Just as a first qualifying injury need not be a work-related injury, the
    method of calculating compensation for a first qualifying injury cannot
    be controlling on this issue.          Moreover, the fact that the physical
    impairment of Gregory’s left hand was presumably considered by the
    parties when they negotiated a compromise special case settlement of
    Gregory’s claim for the 2000 injury will not impede the calculation of the
    Fund’s credit for the compensable value of the partial loss of that
    enumerated member (two percent). 4
    We recognize the statute establishing the Fund has been
    characterized by commentators as a “narrow” second injury fund regime
    and that some jurisdictions have opted for statutory formulations with
    broader reach. See Harry W. Dahl, The Iowa Second Injury Fund—Time
    for Change, 39 Drake L. Rev. 101, 103 (1989–1990). 5                 However, our
    4As  we have already noted, Gregory and Doorcraft agreed upon a lump sum
    special case settlement of the 2000 claim under Iowa Code section 85.35. Doorcraft
    paid $27,500 as a full and final settlement of that claim. The medical records
    supporting the settlement agreement approved by the commissioner evidenced Gregory
    sustained a two percent permanent impairment of her left hand as a consequence of the
    2000 injury.
    5Forexample, some other jurisdictions impose liability on their second injury
    funds without regard to whether a claimant’s previous disabling injury was situated in
    10
    determination that Gregory’s 2000 injury is a first qualifying injury
    under section 85.64 respects the General Assembly’s choice of a
    comparatively narrow statute.            The 2000 injury to Gregory’s left hand
    qualifies as a first injury only because it was situated in an enumerated
    member and was not confined to an unenumerated part of her body.
    Our decision in George and our disposition of the issues in this
    case are faithful to the well-established principle that chapter 85 is to be
    liberally construed in favor of the injured employee. In both instances,
    the Fund has advocated an interpretation of section 85.64 favoring
    claimants with fewer previously disabled body parts over claimants with
    a more complex array of disabilities.                 Our rejection of the Fund’s
    interpretation conforms to our understanding that the General Assembly
    did not intend to disadvantage claimants with histories of more complex
    combinations of enumerated and unenumerated member injuries.
    Gregory’s claim for Fund benefits alleged a 2000 injury to her left
    hand as a first qualifying injury. The uncontroverted medical evidence in
    the record establishes that this injury resulted in a two percent
    functional impairment of that hand. The fact that Gregory combined in a
    single workers’ compensation proceeding her claim for that scheduled
    loss with other scheduled and unscheduled injuries did not disqualify it
    as a first qualifying injury under section 85.64.
    _________________________
    an enumerated member. See, e.g., Christie v. Coors Transp. Co., 
    933 P.2d 1330
    , 1335 &
    n.2 (Colo. 1997) (observing 1975 amendment to Colorado’s statute expanded benefits by
    replacing a first-injury requirement that the employee “previously suffered the loss, or
    total loss of use, of one hand, one arm, one foot, one leg, or the vision of one eye” with a
    requirement of a “previous permanent partial industrial disability”); Church v. McKee,
    
    387 A.2d 754
    , 757 (Me. 1978) (stating “[t]he legislature clearly intended to expand the
    kinds of pre-existing conditions which an employee could have and still be eligible for
    compensation from the Second Injury Fund” by moving from a “one hand, one arm”
    formulation to a broader formulation); Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 
    398 N.E.2d 491
    , 495 (Mass. 1979) (concluding a previous version of Massachusetts statute
    that was analogous to Iowa’s statute “provided relief in only a limited class of cases
    where the previous personal injury resulted in the actual or functional loss of hand,
    foot, or eye, and a subsequent injury of the same type resulted in further disability”).
    11
    Our interpretation of section 85.64 permitting a loss of an
    enumerated member to qualify as a first injury for purposes of the
    Fund’s liability notwithstanding the fact the injury was combined with
    disability to one or more unscheduled body parts for purposes of
    compensation under section 85.34(2)(u) will not result in a double
    recovery for Gregory. In determining the Fund’s liability under section
    85.64, the commissioner shall consider only the extent to which
    Gregory’s earning capacity was diminished by the combined effect of the
    2000 and 2002 losses to her enumerated extremities.             See Iowa Code
    § 85.64. This new and discrete assessment by the commissioner of the
    loss of earning capacity for purposes of the Fund’s liability shall consider
    only Gregory’s disability to the left hand resulting from the 2000 injury
    and her disability to the right foot resulting from the 2002 injury.
    Accordingly, the assessment of the Fund’s liability in this case will not
    provide additional compensation to Gregory for the loss of earning
    capacity    resulting    from   any   disability   to   other   enumerated   or
    unenumerated body parts arising from the injury in 2000.
    IV. Conclusion.
    We conclude the commissioner erred in interpreting section 85.64.
    Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand this
    matter to the commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
    decision.
    DISTRICT          COURT    JUDGMENT          REVERSED       AND   CASE
    REMANDED.
    All justices concur except Cady, J., Ternus, C.J., and Streit, J.,
    who dissent.
    12
    #07–1764, Gregory v. Second Injury Fund
    CADY, Justice (dissenting).
    I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the district court. Gregory
    did not sustain a qualifying first injury.
    The majority builds its decision upon the often-repeated declared
    purpose of the Iowa Second Injury Fund statute—to encourage the
    employment of disabled persons.        Second Injury Fund v. Shank, 
    516 N.W.2d 808
    , 812 (Iowa 1994).       While this observation is a part of our
    case law, it is incorrect and has likely contributed to an overly broad
    interpretation of our Second Injury Fund statute over the years. Today’s
    decision by the majority continues this unfortunate trend.
    In truth, the Second Injury Fund concept was not conceived to
    encourage employers to employ disabled workers.           Instead, it was
    enacted to resolve a fundamental dilemma that surfaced early in the
    development of our workers’ compensation law.       This dilemma can be
    traced to a faulty assumption upon which the early compensation
    scheme was predicated. This early scheme assumed a worker, prior to a
    compensable injury, was a “normal [person], with a body and all
    members” that functioned normally. Pappas v. N. Iowa Brick & Tile Co.,
    
    201 Iowa 607
    , 609, 
    206 N.W. 146
    , 147 (1925). Of course, not all workers
    have limbs and body parts that function normally. Thus, when a worker
    with an existing disability suffers a work-related injury, the disability
    produced by combining the existing disability and the new injury can be
    “far greater than would be reflected by merely adding together the
    schedule allowances for each injury existing separately.”       5 Arthur
    Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 90.01, at
    90–2 (2009) [hereinafter Larson’s Workers’ Compensation].       A classic
    example of the successive injury problem is a leg amputee who loses a
    13
    second leg in a work-related accident. The problem, of course, is “[t]he
    loss of a leg, which would ordinarily mean only partial disability to a
    normal person, results in total disability to the man who has already,
    from whatever cause, lost the other leg.” 
    Id. This dilemma
    impacts both
    the disabled worker and the employer and is responsible for the tension
    that gave rise to the need for a Second Injury Fund statute.
    For employees faced with such successive injuries, a fair
    compensation system would include compensation for the additional
    disability produced by the combined effect of the injury to an employee
    with the existing disability. For employers faced with successive injuries
    to employees, a fair system of compensation would not impose liability
    for disability not caused by the employment. Some courts sided with the
    employee by holding the employer fully responsible for the total disability
    from successive injuries, while other courts sided with the employer by
    apportioning responsibility for successive injuries by limiting the
    responsibility of the employer to the disability caused only by the second
    injury.
    In recognizing the merits of both positions, the Second Injury Fund
    was conceived as a legislative solution to the dilemma courts were forced
    to grapple with by adopting one side or the other, or by fashioning some
    form of apportionment. One of the first cases to discuss the successive-
    injury dilemma was from the state of New York in 1915. In this case, a
    worker named Jacob Schwab had his left hand amputated in 1892 for an
    unknown reason and later suffered the severance of his right hand in a
    work-related accident.   Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co., 
    153 N.Y.S. 234
    , 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915). The court found the employer liable for
    Schwab’s total permanent disability, rejecting the employer’s argument
    that it should be responsible only for the scheduled amount for the loss
    14
    of the right hand. 
    Id. at 236.
    The next year, the New York legislature
    responded with a novel solution—the country’s prototype second-injury-
    fund law.    Harry W. Dahl, The Iowa Second Injury Fund—Time for
    Change, 39 Drake L. Rev. 101, 104 (1989) [hereinafter Dahl].            The
    New York    law    provided   second-injury-fund   compensation   for   “an
    employee who has previously incurred permanent partial disability
    through the loss of one hand, one arm, one foot, one leg, or one eye, [and
    who] incurs permanent total disability through the loss of another
    member or organ . . . .” 1916 N.Y. Laws 2045.
    As early as 1919, we confronted the successive-injury dilemma by
    holding the employer responsible for the resulting total disability.
    Jennings v. Mason City Sewer Pipe Co., 
    187 Iowa 967
    , 971, 
    174 N.W. 785
    , 786 (1919).       Yet, we subsequently interpreted two statutory
    amendments relating to the successive-injury problem by requiring the
    subsequent injury be “apportioned according to the proportion of
    incapacity and disability caused by the respective injuries.” 
    Pappas, 201 Iowa at 612
    , 206 N.W. at 148.         Importantly, we acknowledged the
    hardship this limited recovery would place on the employee, even in light
    of our rule of liberal construction of compensation statutes. 
    Id. at 613,
    206 N.W. at 149.
    At the time of these early cases, the idea of a Second Injury Fund
    in Iowa to pay for the additional disability produced by the combined
    effect of successive injuries was not a vision shared by our legislature.
    Nor did the concept become an immediate national phenomenon.            By
    1945, however, a different attitude had surfaced around the country.
    During World War II, hospital ships laden with disabled veterans
    returned to America, prompting lawmakers to examine the laws and
    programs that would aid the returning soldiers.         See Dahl at 104
    15
    (“Second injury funds became popular at the end of World War II as an
    attempt to remove obstacles facing disabled veterans who were re-
    entering the job market.”).
    Around the same time, data began to emerge from around the
    country to show handicapped workers in states that did not apportion
    responsibility for successive injuries were at a competitive disadvantage
    due to the full responsibility rule. See Larson’s Workers’ Compensation
    § 91.01, at 91–2 (stating “[a]s soon as it became clear that a particular
    state had adopted a rule requiring an employer to bear the full cost of
    total disability for loss of the worker’s remaining leg or arm, employers
    had a strong financial incentive to discharge all workers who might bring
    upon them this kind of aggravated liability”).          The competitive
    disadvantage occurred because employers did not want to become liable
    for the combined disability of successive injuries by hiring or retaining
    handicapped workers. 
    Id. Consequently, in
    those states that followed the full responsibility
    rule for employers, the Second Injury Fund statute was viewed as a
    means to encourage the employment of handicapped workers by making
    the current employer only responsible for the disability caused by a
    second injury.    
    Id. at 91–4.
      This observation is the source of the
    statutory purpose declared by the majority. Yet, in states like Iowa, that
    already protected employers from full responsibility for successive
    injuries, the Second Injury Fund statute was not needed to encourage
    the employment of handicapped workers by making the current employer
    responsible only for the disability caused by the current employment.
    See Lee M. Jackwig, The Second Injury Fund of Iowa: How Complex Can a
    Simple Concept Become?, 28 Drake L. Rev. 889, 890–91 (1978–1979)
    (recognizing that employers were not liable for the total disability of
    16
    successive injuries at the time the Second Injury Fund was adopted, but
    were only liable for the loss caused by the second injury). Instead, the
    purpose of adopting the Second Injury Fund statute in states like Iowa
    was simply to provide a remedy for inadequate awards to handicapped
    workers caused by the apportionment of disability.                
    Id. at 891
    (recognizing purpose of Second Injury Fund was to provide means to fully
    compensate a worker for the combined total of successive injuries).
    It simply makes no sense for us to continue to proclaim a false
    legislative purpose behind Iowa’s Second Injury Fund statute. Moreover,
    it is not merely an academic debate at stake. It is important to correctly
    articulate the legislative purpose of all statutes because the statutory
    purpose guides us in the interpretation of the statute.           Courts risk
    making an incorrect interpretation of a statute by failing to recognize the
    true purpose of the statute.
    If there is a single element of clarity under the statute, it is that the
    legislature did not intend to include all handicapped workers under its
    umbrella. Instead, the language of the Second Injury Fund statute only
    includes persons who had previously lost, or lost the use of, “one hand,
    one arm, one foot, one leg, or one eye.” Iowa Code § 85.64 (2001). Thus,
    the legislature clearly did not intend to include handicapped persons due
    to a disability to other parts of the body, such as the back, neck, hip, or
    shoulder. See Second Injury Fund v. Nelson, 
    544 N.W.2d 258
    , 269 (Iowa
    1995) (providing examples of unscheduled injuries).          This cannot be
    disputed.
    While there may be no clear explanation why the statute would
    give special benefits (full compensation for combined effects of successive
    injuries) to some handicapped workers and not others, such line drawing
    is not up to courts, but is done by the legislature, who is responsible for
    17
    doling out benefits based on limited resources and policy making.
    Nevertheless, the fundamental question is whether the legislature
    intended for the Second Injury Fund statute to cover handicapped
    workers with an existing disability that extended to both a specified and
    unspecified portion of the body.
    In my mind, the portion of the Second Injury Fund statute that
    provides the greatest clarity in answering this question is the language
    that requires “the compensable value of the previously lost member or
    organ” to be deducted from the Second Injury Fund award. Iowa Code
    § 85.64.   In other words, the Second Injury Fund statute makes the
    employer “liable only for the degree of disability” as if there was “no pre-
    existing disability.” 
    Id. Once the
    employer has completed making such
    payments, the statute makes the Fund responsible for paying the
    remainder of the total combined disability. 
    Id. However, since
    this total
    combined disability necessarily includes the first injury that was
    previously compensated by a workers’ compensation award if it was
    work-related (or not compensated as a nonwork-related injury or
    disability), the statute requires “the compensable value of the previously
    lost member or organ” to be deducted from the Second Injury Fund
    award to prevent double recovery. 
    Id. As such,
    the Second Injury Fund
    statute works as it should—to provide fair compensation to those
    handicapped workers chosen by the legislature to receive benefits.
    Importantly, the phrase “previously lost member or organ” in the
    deduction portion of the statute refers only to the first injury or disability
    to “one hand, one arm, one foot, one leg, or one eye,” not the back, neck,
    shoulder, or hip. See 
    id. (“If an
    employee who has previously lost, or lost
    the use of, one hand, one arm, one foot, one leg, or one eye, becomes
    permanently disabled by a compensable injury which has resulted in the
    18
    loss of or loss of use of another such member or organ . . . .” (emphasis
    added)). Thus, the statute clearly only mandates that the compensable
    value of the first injury to a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye be deducted from
    the compensation paid by the Fund.         If the statute is interpreted to
    include handicaps involving both a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye and
    another area of the body (back, neck, shoulder, or hip), there is no
    corresponding language in the statute directing the prior compensable
    value of the back, neck, shoulder, or hip to be deducted. As a result, if
    the Second Injury Fund statute is interpreted to include first injuries or
    disabilities that extend to the back, neck, shoulder, or hip, then the
    handicapped worker with such a disability will be compensated twice for
    a portion of the first injury or disability, or will be compensated for a
    nonwork-related disability. This clearly could not have been the intent of
    the legislature.
    The majority obviously recognizes the absence of any language in
    the statute that calls for the full amount of the first injury to be deducted
    from the amount of compensation payable by the Fund. They, of course,
    avoid this flaw by simply directing the commissioner to determine the
    new combined disability based on the combined effect of only the first
    and second qualifying injuries, ignoring the portion of the prior disability,
    and the new combined disability, attributable to the nonqualifying
    portion of the first injury covering the back, neck, shoulder, or hip.
    Thus, the majority lowers the threshold of the statute to include workers
    with comprehensive disabilities (handicap due to injuries to both
    qualified and nonqualified parts of the body under the statute) by simply
    directing the commissioner to apply the statute as if workers are
    burdened with a different, less severe disability.      While we strive to
    interpret workers’ compensation statutes liberally in favor of the worker,
    19
    the majority’s maneuver goes well beyond any acceptable rule of
    construction.    The majority is no longer interpreting the statute, but
    rewriting the statute.       Such an approach has serious and broad
    implications.
    Moreover, the approach adopted by the majority falls well short of
    the true goal of the statute to provide full compensation for disabled
    workers who suffer a new injury. If the commissioner must ignore the
    true nature of the first disability in applying the statute as directed by
    the majority, then the worker will likely not be fully compensated for the
    true combined disability that results when the existing disability is
    combined with the new injury. Of course, the majority is able to accept
    this result by continuing to maintain that the purpose of the statute was
    merely to encourage employment of disabled workers, instead of
    recognizing its true fundamental goal of full compensation.
    I agree the Second Injury Fund is confusing, if not outdated, and
    even perhaps unfair as it is currently written. However, it is not up to
    the courts to rewrite a statute.             Instead, the legislature is the
    governmental body that should revisit the statute and decide whether or
    not it should be extended to include handicapped workers with whole
    body injuries as the first injury. 6
    For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    Ternus, C.J., and Streit, J., join this dissent.
    6It  has been suggested that Second Injury Fund statutes in those states that
    impose low thresholds have become expensive and counterproductive.         Larson’s
    Workers’ Compensation § 91.03(8), at 91–58. Low thresholds can tend to place such
    states at a competitive disadvantage to neighboring states with high thresholds by
    requiring larger annual assessments or the imposition of other funding burdens
    thought to discourage new business. 
    Id. Many states
    have eliminated or severely
    restricted their Second Injury Funds, including Nebraska, Minnesota, and
    South Dakota. 
    Id. at 91–58.1.