William Neal Lawson Vs. Linda Irene Kurtzhals , 792 N.W.2d 251 ( 2010 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–1766
Filed December 3, 2010
WILLIAM NEAL LAWSON,
Appellee,
vs.
LINDA IRENE KURTZHALS,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County,
Jeffrey A. Neary, Judge.
The defendant in a tort action appeals from the district court’s
ruling granting the plaintiff’s request for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice on the fourth day of a jury trial. Plaintiff cross-appealed.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Rosalynd J. Koob and Alan E. Fredregill of Heidman Law Firm,
L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellant.
Paul W. Deck of Deck & Deck, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.
2
BAKER, Justice.
The defendant in a tort action appeals from the district court’s
ruling granting the plaintiff’s request for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice on the fourth day of a jury trial. We hold that the district court
erred in concluding it had no discretion to deny a motion for voluntary
dismissal, and find that under the facts of this case, had the court
exercised discretion in granting the voluntary dismissal, it would have
been an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s
decision granting dismissal. We, however, affirm the district court’s
ruling on defendant’s motion in limine prohibiting the admission of
evidence on damages not timely provided and its award of attorney fees.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On April 19, 2007, the plaintiff, William Lawson, was riding his
bicycle in Sioux City, Iowa, when he was struck by a vehicle driven by
the defendant, Linda Kurtzhals. Two months later, Lawson filed a
petition alleging he suffered bodily injury and property damage as a
result of Kurtzhals’s negligent and reckless driving. In response,
Kurtzhals filed an answer and jury demand. The next day Kurtzhals also
served interrogatories on Lawson. Included in these interrogatories were
two interrogatories requesting Lawson to detail the losses he incurred
and the damages he was seeking. Lawson provided the following
responses to the interrogatories. With respect to his losses, he replied,
“My clothing was destroyed (pants and underclothes).” To the
interrogatory seeking his damages claimed, he replied, “Not as yet
determined—will supplement.”
The trial was set for July 15, 2008. Lawson was deposed on
January 29, 2008. At the deposition, he was again asked about the
specific amount of compensation he was seeking from Kurtzhals.
3
Lawson responded that he had past medical bills, but that he and his
attorney had not determined the specific amount of compensation he
would seek. On April 9, Kurtzhals’s counsel wrote to Lawson’s attorney
requesting a settlement demand. Two days later, Lawson’s attorney
inquired as to Kurtzhals’s insurance policy limitations. Kurtzhals’s
attorney responded with that information the same day. Lawson’s
attorney did not respond. On May 23, Kurtzhals filed an offer to confess
judgment for $25,000. Again, Lawson did not respond.
One week before the scheduled trial date, Lawson moved for a
continuance. The motion was granted over Kurtzhals’s objection, and
the trial was rescheduled for September 23, 2008. The court’s order
continuing the trial did not allow for the extension of any deadlines
previously set, including the deadline to designate expert witnesses.
A settlement conference was held on September 17. It was
unsuccessful. On that same day, Kurtzhals filed a motion in limine
requesting that the court prohibit Lawson from presenting any evidence
of damages not previously set forth in his interrogatory responses. On
September 18, Lawson provided supplemental answers to the
interrogatories.
Kurtzhals’s motion in limine was presented to the court on the day
before trial. At that time, the court denied Kurtzhals’s motion; however,
the court preserved the issue for reconsideration later in the proceedings.
That afternoon, Kurtzhals filed a second brief in support of the motion in
limine. The court addressed Kurtzhals’s supplemental arguments in
support of her motion in limine the following morning, the day the trial
was scheduled to begin. After hearing arguments from both parties, the
court reversed its denial from the previous day, ruling that Lawson was
only allowed to present damages with regard to past medical expenses;
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all other damage evidence was precluded. At that time, Lawson’s counsel
raised the possibility of requesting a dismissal without prejudice or an
interlocutory appeal, but counsel made no formal motions.
The trial went on for three days before Lawson rested his case-in-
chief. At the close of Lawson’s case, Kurtzhals moved for a directed
verdict. The court took Kurtzhals’s motion under advisement. The
following morning, Lawson moved for a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943 (2007). Kurtzhals
resisted the motion, arguing it would severely prejudice her case. The
court concluded pursuant to case law a plaintiff has an absolute right to
dismiss the case without prejudice. The court granted the dismissal
without prejudice and taxed the costs to Lawson. 1
Lawson then immediately filed a new petition against Kurtzhals
that was essentially identical to the claim dismissed earlier that day.
Kurtzhals filed a motion for sanctions against Lawson for his late
dismissal pursuant to rule 1.413. The court found Lawson’s counsel
violated the spirit and substance of rule 1.413 and imposed sanctions for
attorney fees on counsel. The court did not assess any sanctions against
Lawson.
Kurtzhals filed a notice of appeal. Lawson cross-appealed. The
new action instituted by Lawson is still pending.
II. Discussion and Analysis.
The parties have raised two issues for our review: (1) Did the
district court err in ruling Lawson had a right to voluntarily dismiss his
tort action without prejudice on the last day of a jury trial, and (2) did
1At this time, the court also denied Kurtzhals’s motion for a directed verdict.
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the court abuse its discretion in limiting Lawson’s damages because of
his untimely disclosure?
A. Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice. Kurtzhals claims
the district court erred in concluding a plaintiff has an absolute right to
dismiss his cause of action without prejudice. 2 The trial judge granted
Lawson’s motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.943. The rule provides:
A party may, without order of court, dismiss that
party’s own petition, counter-claim, cross-claim, cross-
petition or petition of intervention, at any time up until ten
days before the trial is scheduled to begin. Thereafter a
party may dismiss an action or that party’s claim therein
only by consent of the court which may impose such terms
or conditions as it deems proper; and it shall require the
consent of any other party asserting a counterclaim against
the movant, unless that will still remain for an independent
adjudication.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943.
2Neither party has addressed whether we have jurisdiction to hear their claims.
We have previously held that a voluntary dismissal under rule 1.943 is final and
terminates the court’s jurisdiction of the action. Smith v. Lally, 379 N.W.2d 914, 916
(Iowa 1986); Witt Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 237 N.W.2d 450,
451 (Iowa 1976). After voluntary dismissal, the case is considered “nonexistent” and
the matter usually deemed “unreviewable.” See Montgomery Ward Dev. Corp. v. Bd. of
Review, 488 N.W.2d 436, 443 (Iowa 1992), overruled on other grounds by Transform,
Ltd. v. Assessor of Polk County, 543 N.W.2d 614, 617 (Iowa 1996). Where, however, the
voluntary dismissal is not as favorable as the judgment the defendant sought, the
matter is appealable. H.R. Techs., Inc. v. Astechnologies, Inc., 275 F.3d 1378, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2002); LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co., 865 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a party may appeal from the parts of a generally favorable judgment that
are unfavorable); see also Darrah v. Des Moines Gen. Hosp., 436 N.W.2d 53, 54–55 (Iowa
1989) (holding that the voluntary dismissal of an action does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction to hear motions for sanctions after the dismissal).
In this case, Kurtzhals strenuously objected to the grant of the dismissal in the
middle of trial, citing cost, delay, and the expectation that plaintiff was looking at an
adverse result or at least a diminished result because of the ruling on the motion in
limine. Lawson, on the other hand, offered no explanation for the dismissal. We find
that the dismissal was not favorable to the defendant, especially where the statute of
limitations had not run and an identical suit was filed almost simultaneously. Thus,
we determine that we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
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It is clear from the plain language of rule 1.943 that the court
lacks the discretion to deny a party’s motion to voluntarily dismiss “at
any time up until ten days before the trial is scheduled to begin.” Id.
The phrase “without order of court” indicates that this may be done at
the will of the party; thus, the court retains no discretion to prevent such
dismissal. See, e.g., Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Iowa 1994).
The meaning of the second sentence of rule 1.943 is less clear.
This sentence, which applies when the trial is scheduled to begin in ten
days or less, states that “a party may dismiss an action . . . only by
consent of the court which may impose such terms or conditions as it
deems proper.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943 (emphasis added). A review of the
legislative history surrounding voluntary dismissals reveals that, prior to
the enactment of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure in 1943, plaintiffs had
the absolute right to dismiss lawsuits at any time up to the moment
before “final submission to [the] jury or court.” Jeffords v. Stockton, 254
Iowa 273, 276, 117 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1962). In 1943, Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 215, now renumbered as rule 1.943, was enacted. The
language of the rule provided:
A party may, without order of court, dismiss his own
petition . . . at any time before trial has begun. Thereafter a
party may dismiss his action or his claim therein only by
consent of the court which may impose such terms or
conditions as it deems proper . . . .
Iowa R. Civ. P. 215 (1.943). The official comment to rule 215 provides:
This rule substantially changed the law on voluntary
dismissal. It . . . adopted the substance of Federal Rule 41.
The prior statutes allowed a voluntary dismissal at any time
before “final submission”, without prejudice. This rule
shortens the time and makes it expire when the trial has
begun.
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Id. r. 215 official cmt. The advisory committee declared “[t]he rule [was]
designed to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of actions by the parties
litigant.” Id.
The rule for voluntary dismissal was amended in 1990. The
drafters substituted “at any time before trial has begun” with “at any
time up until ten days before the trial is scheduled to begin.” Iowa R.
Civ. P. 215 (1990). When enacting this amendment, however, the
drafters backed away from some of the substantive provisions contained
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The committee declined to recommend adoption of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) and (2). The
committee concluded the federal rule was too harsh for
plaintiffs when there might be good reasons for dismissing
cases. The committee recommended allowing the plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss an action at any time up until ten days
before the trial is scheduled to begin. Thereafter the plaintiff
would have to have the approval of the court and the
dismissal could be on such terms and conditions as the
court might impose, such as the payment of costs and/or
attorney fees which might be occasioned by a late dismissal.
Id. r. 215 official cmt.
The provisions specifically disclaimed by the drafters only allow
voluntary dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or
a motion for summary judgment, or when a stipulation of dismissal is
signed by all the parties who have appeared before the court. Id.; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(1), (2). The drafters wished to make the requirements for
voluntary dismissal in Iowa more lenient. They did not, however, intend
to take away the trial court’s discretion to deny voluntary dismissal
motions. The official comment to this amendment provides:
A number of instances in which cases were dismissed
by the plaintiff at the last minute before trial or when the
plaintiff could not obtain a continuance of the trial were
brought to the committee’s attention. Some of them involved
instances where cases were dismissed as a jury was sitting
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waiting to begin selection. The committee was concerned
about the fairness of permitting a voluntary dismissal at that
late juncture.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 215 official cmt. By providing that a party must obtain
consent from the court to dismiss, the rule necessarily implies that the
court has discretion in deciding whether to grant the motion. See, e.g.,
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Pub., Inc., 583 F.3d 948,
953 (6th Cir. 2009) (“A district court’s decisions with respect to a motion
for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) are reviewed for abuse of
discretion.”). We therefore hold that anytime after ten days before the
trial is scheduled to begin the ability to seek a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice is not absolute. It is within the discretion of the trial
court. 3 Thus, we review the grant or denial of the motion for voluntary
dismissal for an abuse of discretion.
B. Abuse of Discretion. Relying on case law that predated the
1990 amendment to rule 1.943, the trial court determined that it had no
discretion to deny the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal and was
compelled to grant the dismissal. “A court abuses its discretion when it
fails to exercise any discretion.” State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 836
(Iowa 2001). Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it
granted the voluntary dismissal.
3In exercising its discretion on motions for voluntary dismissal, federal courts
consider the expense and inconvenience to the defendant, legal prejudice suffered by
the defendant, and whether terms and conditions imposed by the court can make the
defendant reasonably whole. See Miller v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 20, 21
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Conafay v. Wyeth Labs., 793 F.2d 350, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“In federal
practice, voluntary dismissals sought in good faith are ordinarily granted if the only
harm suffered by the defendant is the expense of preparing a responsive pleading, since
‘he can be made whole if dismissal is conditioned upon reimbursement by the
plaintiff.’ ” (quoting Note, Exercise of Discretion in Permitting Dismissals Without
Prejudice Under Federal Rule 41(a), 54 Colum. L. Rev. 616, 618 (1954)). The court
appears to have correctly taken these factors into consideration as it awarded
Kurtzhals’s attorney fees for trial.
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Even if the court had exercised its discretion when granting the
plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal, such action would have been
an abuse of discretion. In this instance, the jury was already empanelled
and had been hearing testimony for three full days. We believe this is
exactly the situation for which the drafters intended the trial court to use
its discretion and deny the motion.
C. Remedy. A problem, however, exists because the case is gone;
the case and the jury have both been dismissed. We cannot undo what
has already occurred. The trial cannot resume where it left off. We must
therefore fashion a remedy that would be consistent with the spirit and
intent of the rule.
We determined that granting the voluntary dismissal under the
circumstances of this case would have been an abuse of discretion. The
district court even commented that it found the defendant’s resistance to
the dismissal “compelling” and that it would be “inclined to consider
[defendant’s] argument favorably.” At a minimum, the court could have
allowed the dismissal, but only under the condition that, if refiled, the
case would be subject to the same conditions as the previous case. See,
e.g., Parker v. Freightliner Corp., 940 F.2d 1019, 1023–24 (7th Cir. 1991)
(approving the condition in the trial court’s order that any refiled action
be subject to a prior order prohibiting the use of expert testimony as a
sanction for his willful disregard of discovery orders). We therefore
remand this case to the district court with directions that an order be
issued reinstating the case and a trial be scheduled and conducted
under the prior orders and sanctions, including the ruling on defendant’s
motion in limine prohibiting the admission of evidence on damages not
timely provided. We further direct that this case be tried prior to the
refiled case.
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III. Cross-Appeal.
Lawson cross-appeals alleging that the district court erred in
granting Kurtzhals’s motion in limine seeking sanctions for Lawson’s
failure to supplement interrogatories regarding his damages claimed. In
granting the motion, the district court limited Lawson from presenting
any evidence of damages not previously set forth in his interrogatory
responses. The trial court granted Kurtzhals’s motion as a sanction for
Lawson’s failure to supplement interrogatory answers until just days
before trial.
“The district court has inherent power . . . to maintain and
regulate cases proceeding to final disposition within its jurisdiction . . . .”
Hearity v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 440 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1989). We recently
reaffirmed that trial courts have this inherent power. Keefe v. Bernard,
774 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Iowa 2009) (citing White v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of
Boone, 262 N.W.2d 812, 816 (Iowa 1978)); see also Nat’l Hockey League
v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 2781, 49
L. Ed. 2d 747, 751 (1976); Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 500 F.3d
1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that courts “have ‘inherent power’ to
exclude evidence as a sanction for [discovery] abuses”). This power
includes the authority to exclude evidence for failure to supplement
discovery. See Preferred Mktg. Assocs. Co. v. Hawkeye Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
452 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Iowa 1990). Noncompliance with discovery
requirements is often not tolerated. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Chi. & Nw.
Transp. Co., 326 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1982) (upholding the exclusion
of an expert witness as sanction for discovery rule violation). We will not
reverse the imposition of a sanction unless there has been an abuse of
discretion. Preferred Mktg. Assocs. Co., 452 N.W.2d at 393. An abuse of
discretion consists of a ruling which rests upon clearly untenable or
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unreasonable grounds. In re Gianforte, 773 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Iowa
2009).
As noted previously, Kurtzhals attempted to determine the amount
of damages claimed through both interrogatories and in a deposition of
Lawson. Both attempts were unsuccessful. Lawson also failed to
respond to a settlement demand. The discovery deadline passed with no
supplementation of Lawson’s prior answers. It was not until just days
prior to trial and after receiving a motion in limine that Lawson finally
provided the amount of damages claimed.
Confronted with this late supplementation, the court had a range
of choices beyond the one ordered. It could have allowed the
supplementation and the claim to be made for those damages at trial.
United States v. $9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d 238, 252 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting
that a trial court can admit evidence that is disclosed in an untimely
fashion if the court deems the evidence harmless). It could have offered
the defendant the option of a continuance of the trial. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 62 F.3d 24, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1995).
Dismissal of the claim may also be available in some circumstances.
Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that
dismissal is a “sanction of last resort” and available “only in extreme
circumstances”).
In determining whether the court has abused its discretion, we
must determine whether the trial court appropriately considered the
options available. “ ‘In determining whether . . . a sanction is
appropriate, the trial court should consider several factors, including:
(1) the party’s reasons for not providing the challenged evidence during
discovery; (2) the importance of the evidence; (3) the time needed for the
other side to prepare to meet the evidence; and (4) the propriety of
12
granting a continuance.’ ” 27 C.J.S. Discovery § 102, at 169 (2009)
(quoting Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 121, 133 (Tenn.
2004)). We believe that these factors provide an appropriate framework
for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in
prohibiting Lawson from presenting any evidence of damages not
previously provided in his interrogatory responses. In reviewing these
factors, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
limiting Lawson’s claim to only those damages previously disclosed.
Lawson argues his reason for failing to provide a supplemented
answer is that it was Kurtzhals’s duty to demand supplementation prior
to the imposition of sanctions. Although there may have been no formal
request for supplementation, Lawson’s argument fails for three reasons.
First, Kurtzhals did not simply serve the interrogatories and wait in the
weeds. Kurtzhals sought to determine the information both by
deposition and in a request for a settlement demand. Second, Iowa Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.503(4)(a)(3) requires a party “to supplement the
response with respect to any question directly addressed [in] any . . .
matter that bears materially upon a claim or defense asserted by any
party to the action.” See also White, 262 N.W.2d at 816 (stating the
purpose of the rule is to clarify the issues before trial, avoid surprise, and
allow the litigants to prepare). Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.503(4)(a)(3)
does not impose a duty to request supplementation—the duty is upon
the party answering the discovery request. Third, Lawson is also
required to adhere to a pretrial or scheduling order. Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.602(5) (“If a party or party’s attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a
scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a party or party’s attorney is
substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or
13
party’s attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion
or the court’s own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto
as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in rule
1.517(2)(b)(2)–(4).”). Pursuant to the Civil Trial Setting Conference
Memorandum, discovery was to be completed by June 13, 2008. In the
order continuing the trial in July, the deadlines were specifically not
extended. Therefore, under the facts of this case, we find Lawson’s
excuse to be unavailing.
The importance of the information sought is not disputed. “A party
defending a claim is clearly entitled upon appropriate pretrial request to
be informed of the amount of the claim.” Gordon v. Noel, 356 N.W.2d
559, 564 (Iowa 1984). This includes discovery of amounts claimed for
separate elements of damages. Id.
The timing of the attempted response is also a factor. The
supplementation did not occur until the eleventh hour, just days before
trial. Finally, although the court could have considered a continuance, it
is significant that a prior continuance had been granted just months
earlier.
Although other options may have been within its discretion, the
court’s order limiting Lawson from presenting any evidence of damages
not previously set forth in his interrogatory responses was not an abuse
of discretion. The supplementation came days before trial and after one
continuance. Kurtzhals was ready for trial and should not be expected to
do further discovery because of the late supplementation or endure
another continuance at that late date. We, therefore, affirm the district
court on the cross-appeal. 4
4Lawson makes a reference to the sanctions imposed on Lawson’s counsel in the
conclusion of his brief asserting that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose
sanctions after the case had been dismissed. We have inherent power to determine
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IV. Disposition.
We hold that the district court erred in concluding it had no
discretion to deny a motion for voluntary dismissal because a plaintiff
has an absolute right to dismiss a case without prejudice. We further
find that under the facts of this case, had the district court exercised its
discretion in granting the voluntary dismissal, it would have been an
abuse of discretion. We therefore remand this case to the district court
with directions to reinstate the case and conduct a new trial subject to
the court’s prior ruling limiting Lawson’s evidence of damages. We
further order that this case be tried prior to the refiled case. Finally, we
affirm the district court’s ruling on defendant’s motion in limine
prohibiting the admission of evidence on damages not timely provided
and its award of attorney fees.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
_______________________________
whether we have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case before us. Tigges v.
City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984). We have previously held that a court
retains jurisdiction to impose sanctions even after a voluntary dismissal. Darrah, 436
N.W.2d at 54–55.