Heather Joye Schott Vs. Jamie Lee Schott ( 2008 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 110 / 07-0610
Filed January 18, 2008
HEATHER JOYE SCHOTT,
Appellant,
vs.
JAMIE LEE SCHOTT,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, D.J. Stovall,
Judge.
Parties appeal district court’s decision holding it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Catherine K. Levine, Des Moines, and Carmen L. Janssen, West
Des Moines, for appellant.
Tammi M. Blackstone and Carlton J. Salmons of Gaudineer,
Comito & George, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for appellee.
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STREIT, Justice.
Jamie and Heather were in a committed relationship, which lasted
several years. They have two children. Jamie is the children’s natural
parent and Heather is their adoptive parent. After the parties ended
their relationship, Heather filed a petition requesting a determination on
child custody, physical care, and support. Before ruling on the petition,
the district court questioned whether it had subject matter jurisdiction.
The court found Heather’s adoptions of the children were contrary to
Iowa’s adoption statute and therefore invalid. Consequently, the district
court held it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on Heather’s
petition.
On appeal, we find it was inappropriate for the district court to
collaterally attack the adoptions. Heather is the children’s legal parent
and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to rule on her
petition. We remand for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Jamie and Heather began their relationship in the summer of
2000. Sometime thereafter, Jamie and her minor son Caleb moved into
Heather’s home. In November 2001, Heather adopted Caleb after the
parental rights of Caleb’s natural father were terminated. In April 2004,
Jamie gave birth to Tori. Jamie had become pregnant through artificial
insemination with an anonymous donor’s sperm. Heather adopted Tori
about six months after she was born. Jamie consented to both
adoptions and her parental rights were unaffected.
After Heather and Jamie ended their relationship, Heather filed a
petition in January 2007 seeking a determination on physical care,
custody, and support of the children. Jamie’s answer acknowledged
Heather’s status as the children’s parent. In a counterclaim, Jamie
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alleged a marriage and requested alimony and division of the parties’
assets. Heather moved to dismiss Jamie’s counterclaim on the ground
the parties were not legally married. The district court appointed Diane
Dornburg as guardian ad litem.
The district court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
and stayed all previous orders. After hearing arguments on the matter,
the district court dismissed Heather’s petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The district court held Heather’s adoptions of Caleb and
Tori were contrary to Iowa’s adoption statute and therefore invalid. The
court reasoned that because Heather was a legal stranger to the children,
the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on her petition.
The district court also found Jamie’s counterclaim improper because it
used language contained in our dissolution of marriage statute. See In re
Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 2004) (stating “[t]he rights
and remedies of chapter 598—the laws governing divorce—are not
otherwise available to unmarried persons”). The court noted Jamie was
not without a remedy; she had the option of asserting her claims under
proper legal theories. See id. (noting “potential theories to support
property claims between unmarried cohabitants [include] claims of
contract, unjust enrichment, resulting trust, constructive trust, and joint
venture”).
The parties and the guardian ad litem contested the district court’s
decision by filing a flurry of papers which need not be catalogued here.
While allowing Heather’s appeal to proceed, we remanded the case back
to the district court for the purpose of (1) establishing temporary physical
care, visitation, if applicable, and child support; (2) ruling on pending
motions to reconsider; and (3) appointing a guardian ad litem to
represent the children on appeal.
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On appeal, both parties contend the adoptions were valid and ask
us to find the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.1 Jamie does
not appeal the district court’s decision with respect to her counterclaim.
For the reasons that follow, we find it was inappropriate for the district
court to collaterally attack Heather’s adoptions of the children. The
court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine the issues relating to
the children. We need not address the parties’ alternative arguments.
II. Scope of Review.
Because this case was tried in equity, our review is de novo. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.4.
III. Merits.
Courts may raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any
time. State v. Lasley, 705 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Iowa 2005). “Subject matter
jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong, not merely the
particular case then occupying the court’s attention.” Klinge v. Bentien,
725 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 2006) (quotations omitted). The parties
themselves cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. Id.
Rather, subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution or a
statute. Id.
The Iowa district court is a court of general jurisdiction. Schrier v.
State, 573 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Iowa 1997). It is empowered by the Iowa
Constitution to hear all cases in law and equity. Iowa Const. art. V, § 6;
see Iowa Code § 602.6101 (2007) (“The district court has exclusive,
general, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and
remedies, civil, criminal, probate, and juvenile, except in cases where
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is conferred upon some other court,
1The guardian ad litem did not file a brief.
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tribunal, or administrative body.”). “The legislature may prescribe
regulations for the manner in which the jurisdiction is exercised, but it
cannot limit the court’s jurisdiction.” Schrier, 573 N.W.2d at 244.
A court of equity has inherent power and jurisdiction in all
proceedings involving the custody and care of minor children. Helton v.
Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 315, 41 N.W.2d 60, 71 (1950); see also Iowa
Code §§ 252A.3(2), 598.21(4), 598.41, 600B.1, 600B.40. However, the
district court in the present case held it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to rule on Heather’s petition because it found Heather’s
adoptions of Caleb and Tori were invalid. The court seemed to suggest
Heather did not have standing to file her petition because she was not
the children’s parent. See Northbrook Residents Ass’n v. Iowa State Dept.
of Health Office, 298 N.W.2d 330, 331 (Iowa 1980) (noting “[s]ince
standing is jurisdictional it can be raised at any time”). In any event,
whether the issue is the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction or
Heather’s standing, the ruling was premised on the court’s collateral
attack of the adoption decrees.
The district court held chapter 600, which governs adoptions, does
not allow an unmarried adult to adopt a child without terminating the
parental rights of both natural parents. See Iowa Code § 600.4 (stating
the following persons may adopt: an unmarried adult; a husband and
wife together; or a husband or wife separately if the adopting spouse is
the stepparent of the person to be adopted); § 600.13(4) (stating “[a] final
adoption decree terminates any parental rights, except those of a spouse
of the adoption petitioner, existing at the time of its issuance and
establishes the parent-child relationship between the adoption petitioner
and the person petitioned to be adopted”). Because Jamie’s rights were
not terminated, the district court held the adoptions were not valid.
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Section 600.3(2)(b) allows a child’s step-parent to commence an
action to adopt the child without first terminating the rights of the
natural parent who is also the spouse of the adoption petitioner. The
district court granting Heather’s adoptions of the children treated
Heather similar to a step-parent and expressly preserved Jamie’s
parental rights. Such a scenario is known as a “second parent
adoption.” Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 641 (Md. 2007). The
district court granting the adoptions found terminating Jamie’s rights to
each child in order for Heather to adopt would “create an absurd result
which would not be in the child’s best interests.” The court in both
decrees referred to the mandate found in section 600.1 which requires
chapter 600 to be “construed liberally” with “paramount consideration”
being “the best interest of the person to be adopted.”
Neither adoption was appealed. See Iowa Code § 600.14 (providing
the rules for an appeal from any final order or decree rendered under
chapter 600). We have repeatedly said a final judgment is conclusive on
collateral attack, even if the judgment was erroneous, unless the court
that entered the judgment lacked jurisdiction over the person or the
subject matter. See In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa
2003) (“Even though a judgment may be erroneous, if the court has
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the judgment is
conclusive on collateral attack.”); Davis v. Rudolph, 242 Iowa 589, 595,
45 N.W.2d 886, 890 (1951) (“ ‘It is also the established rule in this state
that, where the court had jurisdiction both of the person and the subject
matter, a judgment is conclusive against collateral attack, though it be
erroneous.’ ” (quoting Reimers v. McElree, 238 Iowa 791, 796, 28 N.W.2d
569, 572 (1947))). An adoption decree may also be collaterally attacked
by the child’s natural parent on due process grounds. See 2 Am. Jur. 2d
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Adoption § 148 (2004) (noting “[e]ven if there is a lack of consent and
defect of notice as to one of the real or natural parents appearing on the
face of the record, such defect constitutes merely lack of due process as
to the parent not served, and the decree may be attacked only by the
person affected by such procedural lack of due process”).
In the present case, the district court issuing the adoption decrees
had jurisdiction over the parties and the children. Because it was a
court of general jurisdiction, it necessarily had subject matter
jurisdiction to grant the adoptions. See Iowa Code § 600.3(1). Thus, the
district court considering Heather’s petition erred by invalidating the
adoptions. We need not decide whether second parent adoptions are
permissible in Iowa for purposes of this appeal. Even if the district court
who issued the adoption decrees misinterpreted Iowa’s adoption statute,
the adoptions are not void. See In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229, 246
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (stating probate courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over all adoptions and another court may not treat an
adoption decree as void simply because it questions the probate court’s
actions); Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. App. 2007)
(“Assuming without deciding that the district court erred in issuing the
adoption decree, the error was based on an erroneous construction of
statutes, and the judgment would be based on an erroneous holding of
substantive law. These errors would not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction over the adoption and would not render the decree void.”).
As we have discussed, an adoption may only be collaterally
attacked if the district court granting the adoption lacked jurisdiction
over the person or subject matter, or on due process grounds by a
natural parent. Since none of those circumstances exist, the district
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court considering Heather’s petition was wrong to declare the adoptions
invalid.
IV. Conclusion.
It was error to collaterally attack Heather’s adoption of Caleb and
Tori. Heather and Jamie are the children’s legal parents. The district
court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine their rights and
responsibilities with respect to child custody, physical care, and support.
We remand to the district court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.