State Of Iowa Vs. Chad Lavern Enderle ( 2007 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 79 / 03–2085
Filed November 16, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
CHAD LAVERN ENDERLE,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, David E.
Schoenthaler and Mark J. Smith, Judges.
Defendant appeals from conviction for first-degree murder and
willful injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.2(1), 707.2(2), and
708.4(1) (2001). AFFIRMED.
Kent A. Simmons, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant
Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Michael J.
Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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LARSON, Justice.
Chad Enderle was convicted of first-degree murder and willful
injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.2(1), 707.2(2), and 708.4(1)
(2001). He appealed, claiming numerous errors, including the court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a
material-witness warrant and denial of his motion for judgment of
acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
The defendant’s convictions arose out of the death of Gregory
Harris, whose body was found in Davenport, Iowa, on March 10, 2003.
Enderle became a person of interest to the police when they found his
cell phone number stored in the victim’s cell phone memory. When the
police contacted that number, the person answering denied he was
Enderle. Within minutes after the police called, Enderle had his
cell phone number changed. Believing Enderle would be uncooperative
and might become unavailable for questioning, the police obtained a
material-witness warrant pursuant to Iowa Code section 804.11.
Pursuant to that warrant, Enderle was arrested and questioned at the
police station.
II. The Ineffective-Assistance Claims.
Enderle’s counsel did not object to the admission of most of the
evidence about which Enderle now complains, so he relies on ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel principles to raise the issue on appeal. A
defendant claiming ineffective assistance must prove (1) that counsel
failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) he was prejudiced by his
counsel’s errors. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001).
To prove prejudice, a defendant must show a “reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
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would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698 (1984). “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id.
The defendant bears the burden of proving both elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 141–42, but it is
not necessary that the court address both elements. If a defendant does
not show prejudice, the case can be decided on that issue alone without
the additional inquiry into whether counsel’s performance was deficient.
Id. at 142.
III. The Material-Witness Warrant.
Iowa Code section 804.11 provides, in pertinent part:
When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to
believe that a person is a necessary and material witness to
a felony and that such person might be unavailable for
service of a subpoena, the officer may arrest such person as
a material witness with or without an arrest warrant.
We upheld the constitutionality of section 804.11 in State v. Hernandez-
Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 2002). In doing so, we acknowledged
that material-witness warrants “serve a vital and useful public purpose
in the prosecution of felony offenses,” and “are in widespread existence
throughout this country.” 639 N.W.2d at 236.
Section 804.11 requires that there be probable cause to believe (1)
a person is a necessary and material witness to a felony, and (2) such
person might be unavailable for service of a subpoena. In this case, the
application for the warrant stated:
On 3/10/03 the Davenport Police Dept. started a
homicide investigation after finding the victim dead in his
home at 326 W. 10th St. During the subsequent
investigation detectives learned that Chad Enderle was
involved with the victim, and visited him on a regular basis.
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One witness saw an M/W subject matching Enderle’s
description leaving the victim’s residence around the time
the victim would have been killed.
The Davenport Police Dept. has made several attempts
at locating Enderle and talking with him about this case.
Detectives reached Enderle on a cell phone he used, but that
he put in his girlfriend’s name. Enderle lied about his name
and told the Detective he didn’t know the victim and refused
to talk to him. Since this conversation the cell phone has
been shut off. Detectives obtained cell phone records and
discovered Enderle called the victim’s residence 20 times
over a very short period around the time the victim was
killed. Again, on 03/18/03 Detectives tried to locate Enderle
and were unable to. Detectives again went to Enderle’s
residence and knocked on the door, and no one answered.
Upon looking in a front window Detectives saw a female we
believe is Enderle’s mother sitting in the living room only feet
away from the front door. The female refused to come to the
door.
We believe the material-witness warrant, based on this application, was
supported by probable cause to believe both that Enderle was “a
necessary and material witness to a felony” and “might be unavailable for
service of a subpoena,” as required by Iowa Code section 804.11.
Even if Enderle’s counsel breached a duty to challenge the
warrant, Enderle has failed to show he was prejudiced. Statements
made by Enderle during the questioning did not amount to a confession,
nor did they lead to other evidence of guilt. Enderle stated that the last
time he had seen Harris was on March 5, 2003, and possibly the
morning of March 6, 2003, the date the State claims the victim was
killed. This evidence was merely cumulative of other evidence that
placed Enderle at the victim’s home at about the time of death. See State
v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 383 n.2 (Iowa 2007) (“The independent source
doctrine removes the taint of a prior illegality if the police obtained the
same information or evidence through means independent of the illegal
conduct.”).
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The strongest evidence of Enderle’s connection to the crime was
his fingerprints. Fingerprint samples were obtained from Enderle during
this questioning under the material-witness warrant. However, his
fingerprints could have been obtained, and ultimately were obtained,
under a nontestimonial identification application under Iowa Code
section 810.6. We conclude that Enderle was not prejudiced by his
furnishing of fingerprint examplars or statements about his being at the
victim’s residence because this evidence was merely cumulative.
Other issues are raised concerning Enderle’s interrogation under
the material-witness warrant: (1) he was intimidated and promised
leniency; (2) the videotaped interview contained a prejudicial statement
by Enderle that he was a drug user; (3) Enderle was denied his statutory
right to see a family member; and (4) the videotape, played to the jury at
trial, included statements by the police to Enderle that they believed he
had killed the victim.
Enderle’s claim of intimidation is belied by the record—primarily
the videotape of the questioning. The district court, David Schoenthaler,
J., made detailed findings of fact regarding the interrogation, including
the following:
The Defendant’s entire time at the Davenport police
station during the evening of March 18, 2003, was captured
on the interview tape (Exhibit 1) except for the first few
minutes when he was read the warrant, fingerprinted, and
photographed outside of the interview room. The Defendant
is a 30 year old high school graduate who appears to be of at
least average intelligence. The officers’ testimony as to what
happened that evening is credible and is confirmed by the
tape. The Defendant was fairly calm throughout most of the
interview. He made numerous references to wanting to see
his woman. He was never threatened, deceived or promised
favors or leniency; he was alert; he never complained of
being tired or hungry and never asked for food, water, or to
use the bathroom. The officers gave the Defendant a Pepsi
following their denial of his request for a cigarette break.
The Defendant was able to walk around the interview room
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in his stocking feet without any apparent difficulty after his
shoes and orthotic device for one of his shoes were taken for
testing. There is no evidence that during the Defendant’s
brief contact with Detective Martin and Detective Thomas
outside the interview room that he was mistreated, given any
improper promises, deceived or in any way subjected to
anything that would affect the voluntariness of his
statements.
The main question is the interaction between Detective
Thomas and the Defendant as shown on the tape. Some of
Detective Thomas’s questions irritated the Defendant which
resulted in each of them shouting at the other one. Their
voices could be heard outside the interview room. When the
Defendant stood up and started to head for the door,
Detective Thomas also stood up because he did not want the
Defendant either standing over him or to go out the door.
Tempers flared and it appears they bumped chests. They
both calmed down and the interview continued.
The court did not err in denying Enderle’s intimidation argument.
The “promise of leniency” relied on by Enderle was simply a
statement by one of the officers that he would “see what he could do” to
get the material-witness warrant “lifted” and get Enderle released after
the conclusion of the interview. This does not amount to a promise of
leniency that would present problems regarding receipt of other evidence,
such as a confession.
The portion of the videotape in which Enderle admitted to using
drugs was merely cumulative of a large amount of evidence from other
sources to the same effect. Also, the district court engaged in a detailed
weighing of the probative value of this evidence against the possible
prejudice in it, as required by Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b) and our
case law. See State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1988). The
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
Enderle also contends the evidence obtained under the material-
witness warrant must be excluded because the police, at the time of the
interview, violated Iowa Code section 804.20. Under that section,
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[a]ny peace officer or other person having custody of
any person arrested or restrained of the person’s liberty for
any reason whatever, shall permit that person, without
unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to
call, consult, and see a member of the person’s family or an
attorney of the person’s choice, or both.
Enderle requested to see his girlfriend, but a girlfriend is obviously
not a member of his family. He now complains that he was also denied
the right to see his son, who was under two years of age at the time.
Even if we assume the police were required to allow Enderle to contact
his son, Enderle’s requested remedy—exclusion of evidence obtained at
questioning—is not required. As we have previously noted, any evidence
obtained as a result of the interview was merely cumulative.
During Enderle’s interview, the police said they thought he was
being untruthful, and the videotape of the interview, including those
statements, was played to the jury. Enderle contends his trial counsel
was ineffective because he failed to move for redaction of the comments,
which he claims amounted to an impermissible comment on Enderle’s
credibility. See State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Iowa 1986) (“No
witness should be permitted to give his opinion directly that a person is
guilty or innocent, or is criminally responsible . . . .”). Similar claims
have been made and rejected in other cases, primarily on the basis that
statements by police officers during interrogations are not “testimony”
given by witnesses at trial and were not offered at trial to impeach the
defendant, but to provide context for his responses. See, e.g., Dubria v.
Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1148
(2001); State v. Demery, 30 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Wash. 2001). The
effectiveness of Enderle’s argument on this point is further diminished by
the fact he raised it in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel,
and he must therefore establish prejudice. He is hard-pressed to do so
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because he chose to rely on those statements to show that he had been
intimidated during the interview. We reject his argument that the police
comments amounted to an impermissible comment on his credibility.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
The standard of review for insufficient-evidence claims
is for correction of errors of law. The jury’s findings of guilt
are binding on appeal if the findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence that
could convince a rational trier of fact that a defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including
legitimate inferences and presumptions which may fairly and
reasonably be deduced from the evidence in the record.
State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 212–13 (Iowa 2006) (citations
omitted).
The State provided the following evidence linking Enderle to
Harris’s death. Enderle was present at Harris’s house on the evening of
March 5, 2003, the day before the State claims Harris died. In addition,
Enderle admitted that he may have been present at Harris’s house on the
morning of March 6, 2003, and made a phone call from there to a drug
dealer named “Bill.” The most significant evidence was that Enderle’s
fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime. His fingerprints were
found at the murder scene on a walking stick found at the victim’s home
and spotted with the victim’s blood. Enderle’s fingerprints were also
found on a cigarette box that had been spattered with the victim’s blood.
Enderle bought new boots just days after the murder, he was nervous
when he was speaking with the police on the telephone, he lied about his
identity in the telephone conversation, lied about his acquaintance with
the victim, and lied about the last time he was in Davenport. Enderle
changed his cell phone number just forty-five minutes after he spoke
with the police. According to telephone records, Enderle did not attempt
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to call the victim after March 5, 2003, strongly suggesting Enderle did
not expect the victim to be able to answer the telephone. The district
court properly refused Enderle’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
AFFIRMED.