Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Steven B. Joy ( 2007 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 10 / 06-1760
Filed February 23, 2007
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
STEVEN B. JOY,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission.
Grievance Commission reports respondent has committed
numerous acts of neglect and other misconduct and recommends
suspension of respondent’s license to practice law. LICENSE
SUSPENDED.
Charles Harrington and Teresa A. Vens, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Steven B. Joy, Grand Junction, pro se.
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APPEL, Justice.
In this matter, the Grievance Commission recommends suspension
of Steven B. Joy’s license to practice law in Iowa for a period of two years
without possibility of reinstatement as a result of neglect on multiple
matters and other professional misconduct under the Iowa Code of
Professional Responsibility, which governed conduct of Iowa attorneys
prior to July 1, 2005. The Commission further recommends that prior to
any application for reinstatement, Joy undertake ethics training, obtain
an evaluation from a licensed health care professional, and pay certain
monetary amounts owed to former clients. While Joy did not participate
in the hearing and has not appealed, we review attorney disciplinary
matters de novo. After review of the entire record, we suspend Joy’s
license indefinitely, with no possibility of reinstatement for eighteen
months, and adopt as our own most of the conditions on reinstatement
recommended by the Commission.
I. Prior Proceedings.
Steven B. Joy is an Iowa attorney. He was admitted to the practice
of law in Iowa in 1990. At the time of these disciplinary proceedings, Joy
was a sole practitioner in Mechanicsville, Iowa.
On June 26, 2006, the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary
Board filed a complaint against Joy alleging five counts of ethical
violations. Counts I through III alleged neglect and other professional
misconduct in connection with three estates. Count IV alleged that Joy
had failed to properly handle tax returns for a husband and wife. Count
V alleged that Joy had failed to cooperate with the Board in connection
with its investigation of complaints made against him.
Joy filed an answer before the Board generally denying the
charges, but did not appear at the scheduled hearing on October 5,
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2006. At the hearing, the Commission heard testimony from five
witnesses. The Commission also received into evidence thirteen exhibits,
which provided extensive documentation regarding the matters which
Joy allegedly neglected as well as Joy’s nonresponsiveness to inquiries of
the Board.
On November 3, 2006, the Commission issued its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation in this matter. The
Commission found that Joy had neglected the three estates in question,
disregarded various court orders, engaged in misrepresentations to the
courts and clients, did not return unearned attorneys’ fees in one case,
and failed to cooperate with the Board on a number of occasions.
II. Standard of Review.
Review of attorney disciplinary proceedings is de novo. Iowa Ct. R.
35.10(1). In deciding the matter, the court considers the findings of fact
and disciplinary recommendation of the Commission. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Honken, 688 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Iowa
2004). The Board must prove ethical violations by a “convincing
preponderance of the evidence.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Williams, 675 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Iowa 2004). Upon review,
this court may impose a greater or lesser sanction than the Commission
recommended. Iowa Ct. R. 35.10(1).
III. Facts.
As required by Iowa Court Rule 35.10(1), we have conducted a de
novo review of the entire record in this matter.
A. Estate of Colleen M. Shulista.
Count I of the petition related to Joy’s handling of the estate of
Colleen M. Shulista. The record shows that this matter involved a simple
estate with only one small parcel of farmland. The evidence further
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established that Joy did not complete the required work in a timely
manner, which resulted in the district court clerk issuing two
delinquency notices. After unsuccessfully attempting to establish
communications with Joy through repeated phone calls and a certified
letter, the executor hired another attorney to complete the work on the
estate. The estate was open for over four years prior to closure. See
generally Iowa Code § 633.473 (2003) (requiring closure of estate within
three years unless otherwise ordered by the court).
Joy compounded his neglect by being less than candid with the
court. For example, Joy responded to one of the delinquency notices by
stating that the remaining work to be done was to obtain an income tax
acquittance, prepare the final report, and prepare and file an affidavit for
change of title. Joy failed to disclose that state and federal tax returns
had not been prepared or filed.
B. Estate of Viola Irene Krumm Williams.
Count II of the petition concerns the estate of Viola Irene Krumm
Williams. The evidence established that Joy failed to complete the work
on this estate in a timely manner. Because of his tardiness, the district
court clerk issued seven notices of delinquency, and this estate remained
open for a five-and-a-half-year period prior to closure.
In addition, the evidence established that Joy did not comply with
orders of the court in this matter. After the clerk issued its fifth
delinquency notice, Joy sought direction from the court, claiming he “had
had no contact with Fiduciaries in this estate for an extensive period of
time.” The district court set the matter for hearing, directed Joy to mail
notice to the fiduciaries and beneficiaries of the estate, and ordered Joy
to file an affidavit with the court stating that mailing of the notice had
been accomplished. On the date set for the hearing, neither Joy nor the
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fiduciaries appeared. Joy also failed to file the required affidavit
regarding notice to the fiduciaries and beneficiaries, as directed by the
district court.
Eventually, as in the Shulista matter, the executors of the estate
took matters into their own hands and filed a pro se application for a
hearing. The district court complied with their request, and on the
scheduled date, the executors, but not Joy, appeared. The district court
entered an order requiring Joy to prepare a final report no later than
July 15, 2003, or “appropriate sanctions shall be imposed.” On July 15,
Joy called the district court, stating that the final report would be mailed
that same day. It was not. When the district court subsequently
scheduled a hearing to show cause why sanctions should not be
imposed, in light of Joy’s noncompliance, Joy did not appear. The
district court rescheduled the hearing, and to ensure notice, directed the
sheriff to personally serve Joy. Joy again did not appear. An attorney
who happened to be in the courthouse on other matters, however,
advised the court that Joy was hospitalized. As a result, the district
court rescheduled the hearing yet again.
The record does not clearly indicate what happened after the
rescheduled hearing, but progress on the estate still was not made. The
executors eventually wrote the district court a letter, stating that Steven
Joy failed to appear at three hearings, and asking “where do we go from
here?” In response to the letter, the district court scheduled another
hearing, with the executors and their attorney directed to show cause
why they should not be removed due to their failure to close the estate.
Notice was sent to Joy by ordinary mail.
The executors appeared at the hearing in person, but Joy did not.
In a post-hearing order, the district court removed Joy as attorney for the
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estate. The court further ruled that Joy was not entitled to the second
half of attorneys fees paid by the estate because the final report had not
been filed and court costs not paid as required by rule 7.2 of the Iowa
Rules of Probate Procedure. As a sanction for his failure to comply with
prior court orders and for his failure to assist the fiduciaries in
administering this estate, the district court ordered Joy to return
$1,519.07 to the clerk for payment to the executors of the estate within
ten days.
The record shows that Joy did not repay the amount in ten days.
As a result, the district court entered a further order entering a
$1,519.07 judgment against Joy in favor of the beneficiaries. The estate
was finally closed after being open for a five-and-a-half-year period.
C. Estate of Scott David Boots.
Count III of the petition concerned the estate of Scott David Boots.
The record shows that a total of five delinquency notices were issued in
this estate. Again, the record demonstrates that Joy did not attend
scheduled court hearings and, on at least one occasion, failed to file an
affidavit showing that notice of a hearing had been sent to fiduciaries as
required by court order. As in the Shulista matter, the executors
ultimately took matters into their own hands. They eventually
discharged Joy and hired attorney Janette Voss to complete work on the
estate.
At a hearing attended by Joy and Voss, Joy represented to the
district court that the final report, the Iowa inheritance tax return, and
all fiduciary income tax returns (state and federal) had been prepared.
He further represented that he would deliver them to Voss within the
next several days. In light of these representations, the district court
ordered that the Iowa inheritance tax return and all fiduciary income tax
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returns be filed in short order. Joy was further directed to file a
compliance report with the clerk indicating that these actions had been
taken. Joy did not deliver the documents, however, and did not file a
compliance report as required by court order.
When the matter was set for another hearing, Joy was ordered to
appear but again did not. Joy was ordered to turn over his entire file to
successor counsel, and again failed to do so. Eventually the estate was
closed, without Joy’s further assistance, after being open for almost ten
years.
D. Tax Returns of Svobodas.
Count IV of the complaint concerned the tax representation of
Charles and Colleen Svoboda. Joy had been a family friend of the
Svobodas for years and had completed the couple’s tax returns for over a
decade. On March 13, 2002, Joy agreed to prepare the Svobodas’ state
and federal income tax returns for calendar year 2001. At that time, the
Svobodas left with Joy relevant documentation, including depreciation
schedules related to their farming business.
On April 15, Joy told the Svobodas that he was working on their
returns, but had not yet completed them. He advised that he would file
an extension that day. On April 30, Joy informed the Svobodas that he
had filed an extension. On May 7, he told the couple that the returns
would be completed the following week.
When there was no further communication from Joy, the Svobodas
attempted to contact him at his office phone, which was disconnected,
and by cell phone. On July 3, 2002, Charles Svoboda went to Joy’s
office, and saw Joy’s auto parked behind it. When there was no answer
at the office door, Charles left a note on the windshield of the car, asking
Joy to contact them as soon as possible. Two hours later, the note had
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been removed from the windshield, but Joy did not communicate with
the Svobodas. In frustration, the Svobodas paid a patron to inform them
when Joy was leaving a local bar. Eventually, the Svobodas tracked Joy
down, and the attorney promised to return the records. Joy, however,
failed to produce the records. Fortunately, the Svobodas were able to
have the returns completed by another attorney. Because Joy did not file
the extension, the Svobodas were initially penalized $1,354.23, which
was later reduced to $94.10.
E. Failure to Cooperate.
Count V of the complaint related to Joy’s failure to cooperate with
the Board. The evidence establishes that Joy received communications
from the Board regarding a number of disciplinary matters and did not
respond in a timely manner. When some of the Board’s inquiries were
sent, Joy was a resident at Teen Challenge of the Midlands, a religiously
based, intensive residential counseling program in Colfax, Iowa. Because
of his participation in the program and his lack of access to records and
files, Joy sought an extension of time in which to respond. The Board
granted him the requested extension. Joy, ultimately, left the Teen
Challenge program, but did not provide the Board with substantive
responses to its inquires. After the Board filed its complaint in this
matter, Joy filed a conclusory answer denying most of the allegations,
but did not participate in the hearing.
F. Previous Discipline.
There is no record of prior discipline related to neglect of client
matters or other professional misconduct. On January 5, 2004,
however, Joy’s license to practice law was suspended for failure to
comply with the client security and continuing legal education
requirements of this court.
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IV. Ethical Violations.
A. Neglect.
In Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman,
683 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2004), we observed that neglect has “generally
been recognized to involve indifference and a consistent failure to
perform those obligations that a lawyer has assumed, or a conscious
disregard for the responsibilities a lawyer owes to a client.” 683 N.W.2d
at 551 (citations omitted). Neglect cannot be found if the acts or
omissions complained of were inadvertent or the result of an error of
judgment made in good faith. Comm. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Rogers,
313 N.W.2d 535, 536 (Iowa 1981). In the context of estate work, this
court held that neglect occurs where a lawyer “repeatedly failed to
perform required functions as attorney for the executor, repeatedly failed
to meet deadlines, and failed to close the estate[s] within a reasonable
period of time.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2002). An attorney who neglects
legal matters violates DR 6-101(A)(3) (providing a lawyer shall not neglect
a client’s legal matter) and DR 7-101(A)(2) (providing a lawyer shall not
intentionally fail to carry out a contract of employment for professional
legal services).
The Board clearly proved by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence that Joy neglected the Shulista, Williams, Boots, and Svoboda
matters. The persistent pattern of delinquencies, missed deadlines, and
evasive and misleading statements by Joy in each of these demonstrates
neglect rather than mere inadvertence or mistake. As a result, we find
that Joy has violated DR 6-101(A)(3) and DR 7-101(A)(3) in each of these
four matters. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
10
Ruth, 656 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa 2002) (holding lawyer violated ethics rules by
failing to close estate within three years).
In addition, a lawyer who fails to meet applicable deadlines
engages in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice and
violates DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice). Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Iowa 2006); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Thomas, 495 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Iowa 1993). Joy has
repeatedly violated this canon of professional ethics as well.
B. Failure to Comply with Court Orders.
Under our disciplinary rules, a lawyer cannot disregard a ruling of
a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding. Honken, 688 N.W.2d at
820; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Daggett, 653
N.W.2d 377, 381 (Iowa 2002). An attorney who disregards a court order
violates DR 7-106(A) (a lawyer shall not disregard a ruling of a tribunal).
In this case, there is at least a question regarding whether Joy had
actual knowledge of various court orders entered in the proceedings. The
record indicates that during calendar year 2003, Joy experienced
considerable instability in his life. The evidence shows that at some time
in June 2003, for example, his office phone was disconnected. Later in
2003 it appears that he no longer resided in Mechanicsville and may
have lived temporarily with his mother in Jefferson, Iowa. The record
also establishes that for a period of time prior to January 6, 2004, Joy
resided in Colfax, Iowa, while participating in Teen Challenge of the
Midlands. Nearly all of the orders involved in these matters were sent to
post office boxes in Mechanicsville, Iowa.
The evidence shows, however, that on February 7, 2003, Joy filed
virtually identical applications for orders in the Williams and Boots
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matters seeking to explain the delinquencies and buy more time to close
the estates. Contemporaneously with the filing of these applications, Joy
filed with the district court clerk two orders which, among other things,
set a hearing date on both matters for April 11, 2003, directed Joy to
serve notice on fiduciaries and residuary beneficiaries, and ordered Joy
to file an affidavit stating that the prescribed notice had occurred. Joy
must have had knowledge of these orders, which he himself filed. The
evidence shows that Joy violated DR 7-106(A) by failing to comply with
the orders in both cases, with the predictable result that hearings had to
be rescheduled, thereby causing further delay in the already delinquent
estates.
In the Williams matter, the district court on June 13, 2003,
entered an order requiring Joy to prepare a final report no later than
July 15, 2003. This is about the time that Joy’s office phone was
disconnected. Although Joy did not attend the June 13, 2003 hearing,
Joy himself called the district court judge on July 15, 2003, thereby
demonstrating knowledge of the order and its requirements. He advised
the district court judge that the final report would be mailed that same
date. Joy violated DR 7-106(A) by not filing the final report in the
Williams matter on July 15 or any time thereafter.
In the Boots matter, the district court, after a hearing on May 30,
2003, attended by Joy and the fiduciaries’ personal attorney, ordered Joy
to provide to the fiduciaries’ personal counsel a final report, Iowa
inheritance tax return, and all fiduciary tax returns for execution and
filing. Joy was further ordered to file with the court a compliance report
by June 27, 2003, confirming that these actions had been taken. The
district court clerk mailed the order to Joy on June 2, 2003. Because it
is clear that Joy received the June 13, 2003 order, mailed to him by the
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district court in the Williams matter, we can only conclude that a similar
court order mailed to Joy two weeks earlier was also received. Joy
violated DR 7-106(A) when he failed to file the compliance report by
June 27, 2003, and by failing to take the actions required in the order.
Lastly, in the Williams matter, on January 21, 2004, the district
court ordered Joy to return within ten days of the receipt of the order
one-half of the fees held by Joy in trust, or $1,519.17, because the fees
had not been earned under Probate Rule 7.2 and as a sanction for Joy’s
lack of attention to the file. This order was sent to P.O. Box 177 in
Mechanicsville, Iowa. The record shows that on January 6, 2004, Joy
sent a handwritten letter to the Board of Professional Ethics and
Conduct stating that he no longer resided in Colfax, Iowa, and that
future correspondence should be sent to P.O. Box 177 in Mechanicsville.
On February 2, 2004, Joy signed a receipt for a certified letter sent by
the Board to that address. As a result, we conclude that Joy received the
order in the Williams case directing him to refund the fee.
Although there is no evidence in the record to show that he
converted the funds to his own use, Joy did not comply with the
January 21, 2004, order to release the funds from his trust account.
Ultimately, the district court entered judgment against Joy in favor of the
beneficiaries for this amount on February 13, 2004. Refusing to refund
the fee in violation of the court order violates DR 7-106(A) as well as DR
9-102(B)(4) (lawyer shall promptly pay or deliver to client the property in
possession of lawyer which client is entitled to receive).
C. Misrepresentations.
An attorney is prohibited from engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit. In connection with this
bedrock principle, we have stated that a “casual, reckless disregard for
13
the truth” warrants discipline. Daggett, 653 N.W.2d at 380. Statements
by an attorney which evince lack of respect for the truth violate DR 1-
102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Our ethics rules also prohibit other
conduct which reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law.
DR 1-102(A)(6).
The record in this case demonstrates that Joy engaged in a pattern
of misrepresentations designed to conceal his neglect of the files, which,
at a minimum, amounts to a reckless disregard for the truth. For
example, in the Shulista and Williams matters, Joy represented, in
response to delinquency notices, that minimal work needed to be
completed on the estates when work, such as the preparation and filing
of various tax returns, remained to be done. While an attorney is not
subject to discipline because of an honest mistake, the record here
shows that Joy engaged in an effort to minimize his lack of attention and
neglect of client matters. Honken, 688 N.W.2d at 817; Iowa Supreme Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Smith, 569 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Iowa 1997).
Joy also made false statements to his clients in the Svoboda
matter. Joy advised his clients that he had timely filed a request for an
extension to file their tax returns when he had not done so.
Misinforming a client about the status of tax returns is an ethical
violation. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Reedy, 586
N.W.2d 701, 702 (Iowa 1998).
While these statements might be viewed in isolation as mere
mistakes, the totality of facts and circumstances here convinces us that
the statements were made to mask Joy’s neglect. At a minimum, they
demonstrate a reckless disregard for the truth and, as a result, Joy
violated DR 1-102(A)(4).
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In addition, Joy made statements to the district court on two
occasions indicating that he would take prompt action in the future. In
the Williams matter, Joy advised a district court judge that he would
personally mail a final report to the district court that same day. He did
not, however, do so on that day or any other day thereafter. In the Boots
matter, Joy advised the district court that he would provide counsel for
the fiduciaries with copies of various estate documents for their
signatures in a few days. He did not do so. While it is questionable
whether statements of future intent are misrepresentations of fact, Joy’s
demonstrated unreliability violates DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice) and DR 1-102(A)(6)
(prohibiting conduct that reflects adversely on fitness to practice law).
D. Failure to Turn Over Client Papers.
A lawyer has a responsibility to turn over client papers and
property to which the client is entitled prior to withdrawal from
employment. DR 2-110(A)(2). On two occasions, clients who had
obtained the services of other lawyers requested that Joy turn over client
papers. In the Svoboda matter, Joy promised that he would provide the
tax files, but did not do so. In the Boots matter, Joy was ordered to turn
the file over to counsel for Boots, but again failed to do so. As a lawyer,
Joy has a responsibility to provide clients and successor counsel with
client papers under the circumstances presented here. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Freeman, 603 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa
1999). His failure to do so violates DR 2-110(A)(2) and also reflects
adversely on his fitness to practice law in violation of DR 1-102(A)(6).
E. Lack of Response to Board Inquiries.
At the time of the above matters, failing to timely respond to the
Board’s inquiries gave rise to an independent ethical violation.
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Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d at 293. An attorney who fails to timely respond
to the Board’s inquiries violates DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6).
The record in this case shows that Joy failed to respond to each of
the four claims investigated in this matter. The filing of a conclusory
answer, moreover, was not sufficient. The work of the Board, the
Commission, and this court has been made more difficult by the lack of
response. Under the circumstances, the record establishes that Joy
repeatedly violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6).
V. Sanctions.
In determining the appropriate sanction, this court considers “the
nature of the alleged violations, the need for deterrence, protection of the
public, maintenance of the reputation of the [bar] as a whole, and the
respondent’s fitness to continue in the practice of law.” Freeman, 603
N.W.2d at 603. The court considers both aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in setting the sanction. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Sherman, 637 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2001).
In cases involving neglect, this court has generally imposed
discipline ranging from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension,
depending upon relevant facts and circumstances. Freeman, 603 N.W.2d
at 603. An important factor is the prejudice caused by the neglect.
Under the record here, no substantive rights were lost as a result of
neglect itself.
Where neglect is compounded by other serious offenses, however,
this court has suspended the license of the offending attorney for
substantial periods of time. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
McCann, 712 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 2006) (two-year suspension for multiple
acts of neglect, misrepresentations to court, numerous accounting
failures, misuse of client funds, and failure to respond to ethics
16
investigation); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Sotak, 706
N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 2005) (two-year suspension for violations including
neglect, misrepresentations to clients, settlement and dismissal of cases
without client consent, and failure to promptly release client funds); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moonen, 706 N.W.2d 391 (Iowa
2005) (eighteen-month suspension for violations including neglect of
probate matters, self-dealing and taking fees without proper accounting,
improper tactics in proceedings, lack of proper accounting procedures,
and failure to respond to ethics investigation); Honken, 688 N.W.2d at
812 (two-year suspension for violations including multiple acts of
neglect, misrepresentations to the court, misrepresentations to client,
conflicts of interest, and failure to respond to ethics complaint); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Rauch, 650 N.W.2d 574
(Iowa 2002) (one-year suspension for violations including neglect,
misrepresentation, and improper ex parte communications); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. D’Angelo, 619 N.W.2d 333
(Iowa 2000) (three-year suspension for violations including neglect,
accepting fees without court authorization, misrepresentations,
disregarding a court order, habitually disregarding statutes and court
rules); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Jay, 606
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2000) (one-year suspension for violations including
neglect, misrepresentation of status of proceedings, and failure to refund
attorneys fees, aggravated by history of two prior disciplinary problems).
Here, Joy’s neglect is substantially compounded by his refusal to comply
with court orders, his misrepresentations to the court and clients, and
his lack of cooperation with the Board.
It is possible that there are mitigating circumstances that, while
not excusing the disciplinary violations, might have a bearing on severity
17
of sanction. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 2001) (alcoholism); Grotewold, 642
N.W.2d at 292-96 (major depression). Joy, however, chose not to
participate in the hearing and, as a result, the record is not well
developed regarding mitigating factors. While there is insufficient
evidence to significantly reduce the length of suspension, protection of
the public requires that this court receive assurance that any potential
health problem be addressed by Joy prior to any application for
readmission.
In light of all the facts and circumstances, we suspend Joy’s
license indefinitely, with no possibility of reinstatement for eighteen
months. This suspension is to run concurrently with his present
suspension for failure to comply with the client security and continuing
legal education requirements. Upon application for reinstatement, Joy
must show that he has not practiced law during the suspension period
and that he has complied with all the requirements in Iowa Court Rule
35.21. In any application for reinstatement, Joy must present an
evaluation by a licensed health care professional verifying his fitness to
practice law. Before obtaining the evaluation, Joy must submit the name
of the proposed evaluator and the nature of the proposed evaluation to
the Board for approval. Further, Joy must demonstrate in any
application for reinstatement that he has satisfied the judgment entered
in the Williams estate and that he has reimbursed the Svobodas the
penalty amount of $94.10. Finally, the costs of this action are taxed
against Joy pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.25(1).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.