Judicial Branch and State Court Administrator v. Iowa District Court for Linn County , 800 N.W.2d 569 ( 2011 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 10–0163
Filed July 15, 2011
JUDICIAL BRANCH and
STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT
FOR LINN COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Casey D.
Jones, District Associate Judge.
The Judicial Branch and the State Court Administrator seek
certiorari contending the district court acted illegally when it ordered a
criminal case that ended in dismissal to be removed from the electronic
court docket entries on the Iowa Court Information System and the
website Iowa Courts Online. WRIT SUSTAINED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Pamela D. Griebel,
Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiffs.
Raphael M. Scheetz, Cedar Rapids, and D. Lew Eells of Eells &
Tronvold, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for defendant.
2
MANSFIELD, Justice.
It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes
existing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with each
other, and neither of them containing any repealing clause
or expression. In such a case, it is the province of the courts
to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation.
The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
In this proceeding, we are asked to determine whether either Iowa
Code section 692.17 (Supp. 2009) 1 or the Iowa Constitution requires the
Iowa Judicial Branch to remove from its statewide computerized docket
system all information regarding any criminal cases that have been
resolved in favor of the defendant. Although the matter is not entirely
free from doubt, because there appear to be conflicting statutory
provisions, we conclude that section 692.17 does not require removal of
this information. We also hold the Iowa Constitution has not been
violated. Therefore, we sustain the requested writ of certiorari.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In February 2009, J.W. 2 was arrested and charged with operating
while intoxicated, first offense, along with three accompanying traffic
offenses. After J.W. prevailed on a motion to suppress evidence, the
State moved to dismiss the four criminal charges. On July 20, the
district court granted the motion and dismissed the charges with costs
assessed to the State.
1During the 2009 legislative session, the General Assembly added internal
numbering to Iowa Code sections 692.17 and 692.18. See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 24, § 4;
id. ch. 133, § 174. Since this numbering and other nonsubstantive changes from the
2009 session do not affect our analysis, we will refer to the current, renumbered
sections of the law unless specifically noted otherwise.
2We will refer to J.W. by his initials only.
3
On November 18, J.W. filed a motion to exclude and expunge any
information pertaining to the four dismissed criminal charges pursuant
to Iowa Code section 692.17, which provides:
1. Criminal history data in a computer data storage
system shall not include arrest or disposition data or
custody or adjudication data after the person has been
acquitted or the charges dismissed . . . .
2. For the purposes of this section, “criminal history
data” includes the following:
a. In the case of an adult, information maintained by
any criminal justice agency if the information otherwise
meets the definition of criminal history data in section 692.1,
except that source documents shall be retained.
J.W. specifically requested that the information be removed from
the Iowa Court Information System (ICIS), including the website Iowa
Courts Online, and the computer data storage systems for the Linn
County Sheriff, the Cedar Rapids Police, the Iowa Division of Criminal
Investigation, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
On December 28, the district court granted J.W.’s request to
expunge the four dismissed criminal charges from the computer data
storage systems for the Department of Public Safety and its Division of
Criminal Investigation, the Linn County Sheriff’s Office, the Linn County
Attorney’s Office, and the Cedar Rapids Police Department. 3 The court
denied the request as to the FBI. The court then went on to find that the
“computer data storage systems” for the state judicial branch included
the electronic docket entries on ICIS and the website Iowa Courts Online
and ordered information relating to the four dismissed criminal charges
to be removed from those repositories.
3Those agencies did not challenge the order and have not appealed.
4
J.W. did not ask that any action be taken with respect to the hard
copy records of his dismissed criminal case maintained by the Linn
County District Court.
On January 19, 2010, the Iowa Attorney General, appearing on
behalf of the Iowa Judicial Branch and the Iowa State Court
Administrator, filed a petition to vacate the order, for a new hearing, and
for a stay. The attorney general argued the computerized information
pertaining to J.W.’s charges kept by the state judicial branch consisted of
court docket entries that met the definition of “public records” under
Iowa Code section 692.18(1). That section provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit the public from
examining and copying the public records of any public body
or agency as authorized by chapter 22. 4
Id. § 692.18(1). The attorney general also argued that the judicial
branch’s computerized docket was a “source document” whose retention
was required by section 692.17(2)(a). 5
J.W. opposed the attorney general’s petition. He argued that
section 692.17 required removal of the information from the state
judiciary’s computer systems, and even if it did not, the Equal Protection
Clause of Article I section 6 of the Iowa Constitution compelled the same
4Section 22.7(9) of chapter 22 further provides that “criminal history data shall
be public records.”
5Section 692.17(2) states that “criminal history data” generally includes
information maintained by any criminal or juvenile justice agency. Section 692.1(7)
(2009) defines “criminal or juvenile justice agency” as any agency or department “which
performs as its principal function the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication,
incarceration, or rehabilitation of criminal or juvenile offenders.” (Emphasis added.)
The attorney general did not dispute, either in his filings below or in his briefing in this
court, that the state judicial branch was a “criminal or juvenile justice agency.” Cf.
Iowa Code § 692B.2(1)(g)(1)(a) (Supp. 2009) (defining the term “criminal justice agency”
to include “courts” for purposes of the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact
Act). Since the attorney general has not argued the point, we do not reach the question
whether the state judicial branch is a “criminal or juvenile justice agency” for purposes
of chapter 692, but simply assume for purposes of this appeal that it is.
5
result. In support of his constitutional argument, J.W. maintained that
individuals whose criminal cases had terminated in their favor should
receive at least the same degree of record expungement as persons who
had been convicted and received deferred judgments. The district court
denied the attorney general’s requests on January 21.
On January 25, the attorney general petitioned for a writ of
certiorari and requested a stay. Our court denied the requested stay, but
granted the petition for writ of certiorari.
II. Issues on Appeal.
This case presents two questions: (1) Does Iowa Code section
692.17 require the removal of acquitted or dismissed criminal charges
from the court docket entries on ICIS and the website Iowa Courts
Online? (2) If the court docket entries are not removed from ICIS and the
website Iowa Courts Online, is the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa
Constitution violated because defendants who plead guilty and are
granted deferred judgments under section 907.3 may have their records
expunged under section 907.9, but defendants who are acquitted or have
their charges dismissed continue to have their records open to the
public?
III. Standard of Review.
In a certiorari case, our review is for the correction of errors at law.
Johnson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 756 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 2008). We may
examine only the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality of its
actions. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401; Barnhill v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 765 N.W.2d
267, 272 (Iowa 2009). An illegality exists when the district court’s
factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence or when the
district court has not properly applied the law. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct.,
750 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 2008).
6
IV. Statutory Analysis.
This case requires us to reconcile the following statutory
provisions: (1) Iowa Code section 692.17(1), which provides that
“[c]riminal history data in a computer data storage system shall not
include . . . disposition data . . . after the person has been acquitted or
the charges dismissed”; (2) section 692.17(2)(a), which requires “source
documents [to] be retained” for cases involving adults; (3) section
692.18(1), which provides that “[n]othing in this chapter shall prohibit
the public from examining and copying the public records of any public
body or agency as authorized by chapter 22”; (4) section 22.7(9), which
provides that “criminal history data shall be public records”; and, finally,
(5) section 602.8104, which requires clerks of court to keep a “record
book which contains the entries of the proceedings of the court and
which has an index referring to each proceeding in each cause . . . .”
Our task appears on its face to be somewhat difficult, involving
more than just the harmonization of two conflicting statutes as described
by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78. Instead, we have one law (section
692.17(1)) that requires disposition data to be removed from computer
data storage systems when the defendant has been acquitted or had
charges dismissed, another law (section 692.17(2)(a)) that requires
“source documents” to be kept, another law (section 692.18(1)) that
requires public access to public records, including criminal history data
(section 22.7), and still another law (section 602.8104) requiring dockets
to be maintained.
Before we try to reconcile these enactments, we will discuss their
background and purposes in more detail.
A. Chapter 692. In the 1960’s, the FBI decided to create a
computer system that would centralize crime information from every
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state and provide that information to law enforcement throughout the
nation. The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) resulted and was
launched in January 1967. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation: National
Crime Information Center, History and Milestones, www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ncic/ncic_history (last visited July 15, 2011).
In response to the formation of NCIC, the General Assembly
enacted the Criminal History Data Act in 1973. See 1973 Iowa Acts ch.
294 (originally codified at Iowa Code ch. 749B (1975) and now codified at
ch. 692 (2009 and Supp. 2009)). The purpose of the Act was twofold:
(1) “to control the dissemination of all informational data centrally
collected by the Department [of Public Safety]”; and (2) “to establish
standards for the use of the crime computer system by all agencies with
access to that system.” Note, The Dissemination of Arrest Records and
the Iowa TRACIS Bill, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 1162, 1172 (June 1974)
[hereinafter Note].
The law defined three general types of informational data: criminal
history data, intelligence data, and surveillance data. See Iowa Code
§ 692.1(5) (defining “criminal history data”), 692.1(14) (defining
“intelligence data”), and 692.1(16) (defining “surveillance data”).
“Criminal history data” consist of information that will largely mirror
court filings, and include “[a]rrest data[, c]onviction data[, d]isposition
data[, c]orrectional data[, a]djudication data[, and c]ustody data.” Id.
§ 692.1(5)(a)–(f) (2009).
In the wake of this legislation, the Department of Public Safety
(DPS) established a statewide system known as the Iowa on-line warrants
and articles (IOWA) criminal justice information system. See id.
§ 692.14; Iowa Admin. Code r. 661—8.101.
8
The IOWA system provides access to databases from
various state agencies within Iowa, from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC),
and from the motor vehicle departments of other states
nationally through the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System (NLETS). Information on an
international basis is also provided by NCIC and NLETS
through interfaces to Canadian Police Information Centre
and to INTERPOL. The NLETS system also provides
administrative message traffic between Iowa criminal justice
agencies and criminal justice agencies throughout the
United States.
The IOWA system allows criminal justice agencies to:
1. Access nationwide computerized banks of
information such as wanted, missing, and unidentified
persons; stolen vehicles; stolen articles; stolen boats; stolen
guns and stolen securities.
2. Access driver license and motor vehicle information
in-state as well as out-of-state.
3. Exchange criminal history information on a
national basis.
4. Communicate by use of administrative messages
with other criminal justice agencies worldwide.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 661—8.102. The IOWA system is accessible to
criminal justice agencies through secure terminals authorized by the
DPS. Iowa Code § 692.14; Iowa Admin. Code r. 661—8.104.
From its enactment in 1973, the Criminal History Data Act has
provided that criminal history data in a computer data storage system
will not include “[a]rrest or disposition data after the person has been
acquitted or the charges dismissed.” See 1973 Iowa Acts ch. 294, § 17.6
6The law originally provided that criminal history data “does not include” arrest
and disposition data when the person has been acquitted or the charges dismissed.
See 1973 Iowa Acts ch. 294, § 17. In 1978, the General Assembly changed “does not
include” to “shall not include.” See 1978 Iowa Acts ch. 1029, § 43. This appears to be
a clarification that the legislature intended to direct an outcome, rather than simply
describe a state of affairs. See Note, 59 Iowa L. Rev. at 1178–79 (pointing out the
confusion that existed under the “does not include” language).
9
It is undisputed that information about J.W.’s court case has been
removed from the IOWA system.
B. Court Dockets in Iowa. The question this case presents is
whether information about J.W.’s case must also be removed from the
computerized docket maintained by the Iowa Judicial Branch. A
“docket” is the official record of all the proceedings and filings in a court
case. Black’s Law Dictionary 517 (8th ed. 2004). Dockets are created
and maintained by each of the clerks of the district courts. Iowa Code
§§ 602.6604(1), 602.8102(3). For each case, the docket is indexed and
contains
the title and nature of the action, the place of hearing,
appearances, and notations of the documents filed with the
judicial officer, the proceedings in the case and orders made,
the verdict and judgment including costs, any satisfaction of
the judgment, whether the judgment was certified to the
clerk of the district court, whether an appeal was taken, and
the amount of any appeal bond.
Id. § 602.6604(1). Iowa Code section 602.8104(2) is framed in
mandatory terms. It provides:
2. The following books shall be kept by the clerk:
a. A record book which contains the entries of the
proceedings of the court and which has an index referring to
each proceeding in each cause under the names of the
parties, both plaintiff and defendant, and under the name of
each person named in either party.
Id. § 602.8104(2) (Supp. 2009).
Although the foregoing provision was adopted by the legislature in
1983, see 1983 Iowa Acts ch. 186, § 9104, dockets are as old as our
state itself. Under the first laws of our state, dockets were manually
created by the clerks of the district courts and consisted of “the original
papers constituting the causes adjudicated or pending in th[e] court, and
the books [for the business of the court].” Iowa Code § 144 (1851).
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These books included a “record book,” a “judgment docket,” a “fee book,”
and a “sale book.” Id. § 145(1)–(4). These original dockets were open to
the public for examination. See Woods v. Mains, 1 Greene 275, 281
(Iowa 1848) (characterizing the judgment docket as “a public record
book”).
Historically, dockets were hard-copy books. Beginning in October
1991, though, a transition was made to electronic dockets on ICIS. By
September 1997, all counties were using ICIS for their dockets. ICIS and
the website Iowa Courts Online are now the official electronic dockets for
the court system for the State of Iowa. See Iowa Judicial Branch, Online
Docket Records, http://www.iowacourts.gov/Online_Court_Services/
Online_Docket_Record/ (last visited July 15, 2011). Electronic dockets
are becoming increasingly commonplace. See United States v. McKenzie,
539 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that electronic docket could be
used to prove defendant’s prior state convictions and commenting that
“electronic docket records are increasingly the norm in today’s world”).
As an official record of judicial proceedings that clerks of court are
required to keep by law, dockets are “public records” under both
statutory and common law. See Iowa Code § 22.1(3) (Supp. 2009)
(defining “public records” to include “all records, documents, tape, or
other information, stored or preserved in any medium, of or belonging to
this state . . . or any branch [of state government]”); Linder v. Eckard,
261 Iowa 216, 220, 152 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1967) (setting forth the more
restrictive common law definition of “public record” as a record “an
officer is required by law to keep or which is intended to serve as a
memorial and evidence of something written, said, or done by the officer
or public agency”); see also Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d
83, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2004) (listing cases that extend First Amendment
11
protection to the public’s right to access certain court documents); Des
Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493, 501 (Iowa
1976) (holding “a jury list is a public record”). The importance of dockets
and the public’s access to them has been described by a federal district
court as follows:
The collection of judicial records even in the less busy
courthouse is substantial. Throughout the courts a
sprawling amalgam of papers reflects action in connection
with judicial proceedings. It is not misleading to think of
courthouse papers as comprising a vast library of volumes
which docket sheets are the table of contents. Without the
card catalogue provided by alphabetical indices, a reader is
left without a meaningful mechanism by which to find the
documents necessary to learn what actually transpired in
the courts. The indices thus are a key to effective public
access to court activity. And the importance of public access
to the proper functioning of our judicial system cannot be
overstated.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp. 89, 94 (D. Mass. 1993).
C. The Section 692.17(2)(a) “Source Documents” Exception to
Iowa Code Section 692.17(1). Although section 692.17(1) provides that
criminal history data in a computer data storage system shall not include
disposition or adjudication data after the person has been acquitted or
the charges dismissed, section 692.17(2)(a) makes clear that “source
documents shall be retained” in the case of an adult.
This language was not part of the original legislation. In 1993, the
General Assembly amended section 692.17 to provide that criminal
history data “includes the source documents of the information included
in the criminal history data.” See 1993 Iowa Acts ch. 115, § 8 (emphasis
added). Two years later, the legislature changed course and amended
section 692.17 to provide that “source documents shall be retained” in
the case of an adult. See 1995 Iowa Acts ch. 191, § 46. This provision
12
remains in the law to this day. Until now, we have not been called upon
to interpret it.
D. The Section 692.18(1) “Public Records” Exception to Iowa
Code Section 692.17(1). As we have noted above, Iowa Code section
692.18(1) states that nothing in chapter 692 “shall prohibit the public
from examining and copying the public records of any public body or
agency as authorized by chapter 22.” This language was part of the 1973
legislation. See 1973 Iowa Acts ch. 294, § 18. However, the section as a
whole has undergone considerable change. That is, the next sentence
originally read, “Criminal history data and intelligence data in the
possession of the department or bureau, or disseminated by the
department or bureau, are not public records . . . .” Id. In 1996, the
legislature revised this language entirely. Chapter 22 and chapter 692
were amended to make clear that criminal history data are public
records. See 1996 Iowa Acts ch. 1150, §§ 1, 8. This court has not
previously construed section 692.18(1) either.
E. Harmonizing the Statutes. As the foregoing discussion
indicates, we have a law dating to 1973 that requires removal of arrest or
disposition data from criminal history data in a computer data storage
system; an exception to that law enacted in 1996 that criminal history
data are public records and must be accessible to the public; another
exception to that law adopted in 1995 that source documents are to be
retained; and yet another law dating back to at least 1983 requiring
dockets to be kept.
Our job is to consider a statute as a whole, rather than isolated
parts. Thoms v. Iowa Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 715 N.W.2d 7, 13 (Iowa
2006). When construing a statute, we “must be mindful of the state of
the law when it was enacted and seek to harmonize the statute, if
13
possible, with other statutes on the same subject matter.” State v. Dann,
591 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Iowa 1999).
[S]tatute[s] should be construed as to give meaning to all of
them, if this can be done, and each statute should be
afforded a field of operation. So, where the enactment of a
series of statutes results in confusion and consequences
which the legislature may not have contemplated, the courts
must construe the statutes to reflect the obvious intent of
the legislature and permit the practical application of the
statutes.
Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Hawkeye State Tel. Co., 165 N.W.2d 771, 774–75
(Iowa 1969) (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 366, at 810–12 (now found at
82 C.J.S. Statutes § 476, at 619–20 (2009))).
Putting these provisions together, we do not believe the legislature
has directed the judicial branch to purge from its official docket all
criminal cases that ended in the defendant’s favor. The computerized
docket on ICIS and Iowa Courts Online is not replicated elsewhere. It is
the only docket. Therefore, by erasing information from that docket, the
judicial branch would be acting at odds with section 602.8104(2)(a) that
requires a docket to be kept of “each proceeding in each cause.” See
Iowa Code § 4.7 (2009) (specific statute prevails over general statute in
the event of irreconcilability); Burton v. Univ. of Iowa Hospitals & Clinics,
566 N.W.2d 182, 189 (Iowa 1997) (same).
Also, because there is no other version of the docket, the docket is
potentially a “source document” whose retention is required by section
692.17(2)(a) (Supp. 2009). It is true that the docket is, generally, a
compilation of information that can be gleaned by examining the original
court filings. In that sense, other documents are the “source” of the
docket. But the docket in Iowa has independent legal significance and is
the “source” of other things, such as the record on appeal. See Iowa Rs.
App. P. 6.801, 6.802(1) (providing that the certified copy of the docket is
14
part of the record on appeal and requiring the district court clerk to
transmit certified copies of “the docket entries in the district court
proceeding” when an appeal is taken). We think an appropriate analogy
is to the table of contents or the index to a book. One might or might not
consider these items “source documents” depending on the context.
They are derived from the main text of the book, and they are based on
that text. On the other hand, when contrasted with a reprint of the
entire book, they would be deemed part of the source.
The legislature also directed in 1996 that regardless of section
692.17(1), the public should have access to the public records of public
bodies and agencies, including criminal history data. See Iowa Code
§ 692.18(1). We interpret this amendment to mean that public access to
official records must be preserved, even if a defendant is acquitted or has
the charges dismissed. That is, computerized files in the custody of
individual criminal justice agencies should be deleted pursuant to
section 692.17(1), but not in a way that defeats public access to existing
court records, including the docket. See City of Cedar Rapids v. James
Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2005) (stating that “an
amendment to a statute raises a presumption that the legislature
intended a change in the law”). This interpretation also gives a
meaningful scope to both provisions. Copies of certain criminal history
data stored on the computer and used for internal agency purposes
would be removed, but the public would continue to have access to the
official docket.
One can argue that the public still has access to the hard copy
court file on J.W.’s dismissed criminal case at the Linn County
Courthouse. But without a docket, the access would be more theoretical
than real. Someone would have to know already what to look for, such
15
as a case number. Moreover, this argument ignores the point that the
docket itself is part of the official record to which the public is
guaranteed access.
The original version of chapter 692 was passed during the
Watergate era, in 1973. At that time, the public did not have computers;
they were largely a monopoly of the government and business. Thus, the
legislature’s concern, when it enacted the Criminal History Data Act,
appears to have been the potential for error and misuse of a DPS
computer system that was being developed to be incorporated in the
NCIC. See Note, 59 Iowa L. Rev. at 1171–72 (discussing the
contemporary concerns that led to the enactment of the law).
Hence, the General Assembly did not require all arrest or
disposition data to be removed when a criminal case was resolved in the
defendant’s favor, but only such data as were “in a computer data
storage system.” Since then, computers have become ubiquitous and the
judicial branch has shifted from hard copy to computerized dockets. But
in the meantime, the legislature has passed laws requiring complete
dockets to be maintained, source documents to be preserved, and the
public to have access to criminal history data. We think that giving a
reasonable effect to all these laws leads to the conclusion that the
judicial branch need not alter its official docket.
At present, Iowa’s court systems are transitioning to an electronic
data management system (EDMS) whereby all court records—not only
the docket—will be maintained electronically. If J.W.’s position were
taken to its logical conclusion, arguably court files themselves would
have to be removed whenever the proceeding ended in the defendant’s
favor, because those files would constitute “[c]riminal history data in a
16
computer data storage system.” We are reluctant to embrace a view that
the legislature intended to require the courts to rewrite historical events.
Finally, we need to emphasize that this case is not about whether
criminal cases that ended in dismissals or acquittals should be publicly
available on Iowa Courts Online. While that is undoubtedly J.W.’s
concern, he frankly admits—and we agree—that section 692.17(1) must
be interpreted as an all-or-nothing proposition. If that provision requires
case information to be removed, it requires it to be removed for everyone,
including judges and other court personnel. While there might be
reasons to limit public rather than judicial access to this information,
J.W.’s construction of the statute does not allow for that possibility.
Instead, it would require the official court docket as accessed by anyone
to have all traces of this information removed.
That is not what happens with respect to deferred judgments. A
deferred judgment is not erased from the official record; rather, under a
specific provision of law, a separate confidential docket is maintained of
those judgments, which is accessible to certain officials within the
judicial and the executive branches but not to the general public. See
Iowa Code § 907.4 (2009).
V. Equal Protection.
In the alternative, J.W. asserts that if section 692.17 does not
require removal of his case information from ICIS (including Iowa Courts
Online), then the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution has
been violated. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 6 (“All laws of a general nature
shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to
any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”). J.W. argues that it
is unfair to treat recipients of a deferred judgment, whose criminal cases
17
are not accessible to the public, more generously than individuals who
were not convicted of a crime.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that “similarly situated
persons be treated alike under the law.” In re Det. of Williams, 628
N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 2001); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 320
(1985).
The first step in determining whether a statute violates equal
protection is to determine whether the statute distinguishes
between similarly situated persons. If the statute treats
similarly situated persons differently, the court must then
determine what level of review is required—strict scrutiny or
rational basis. A statute is subject to strict-scrutiny
analysis—the state must show the classification is narrowly
tailored to a compelling state interest—when it classifies
individuals “in terms of their ability to exercise a
fundamental right or when it classifies or distinguishes
persons by race or national origin.” All other statutory
classifications are subject to rational-basis review in which
case the [challenging party] must show the classification
bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government
interest.
Wright v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 747 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Iowa 2008) (quoting
Williams, 628 N.W.2d at 452) (citations omitted).
Assuming for present purposes that Iowa law with respect to the
public availability of court records treats similarly situated persons
differently, we nonetheless believe a rational basis review applies here7
and that the law passes that test. Persons who have had criminal
proceedings terminated in their favor are not a suspect class. Nor do we
believe that making records of court proceedings available burdens a
fundamental right. The legislature could rationally determine that
deferred judgments should not be accessible to the public but dismissals
7J.W.’s counsel conceded at oral argument that a rational basis review applies
here.
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and acquittals should be. The legislature could rationally have
concluded that denying public access to criminal proceedings that result
in a deferred judgment serves the legitimate governmental purposes of
promoting rehabilitation and incentivizing defendants to meet the terms
of their accompanying probation. On the other hand, the legislature
could have rationally concluded that denial of public access to dismissals
and acquittals is not needed because the public can see for themselves
that the charges were resolved in the defendant’s favor.
VI. Conclusion.
This case illustrates the impact of the internet on our daily affairs.
Dockets always have been public records, but until the Iowa state court
dockets became computerized and available on-line, it was not easy for
the public to use them. Now, one can learn of any person’s past
involvement with Iowa’s court system by making a few mouse clicks and
a few strokes at a keyboard.
We are mindful of J.W.’s concerns about on-line public access to
criminal cases that were terminated in the defendant’s favor. Our
decision does not foreclose steps by the judicial branch to address these
concerns. We hold only that Iowa Code section 692.17(1) does not
require criminal cases that ended in dismissal or acquittal to be removed
from ICIS or the website Iowa Courts Online. In addition, making such
information available to the public, while withholding public access to
deferred judgments, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Iowa Constitution.
WRIT SUSTAINED.