State of Iowa v. Juan Daniel Salcedo ( 2019 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 18–1353
Filed November 8, 2019
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JUAN DANIEL SALCEDO,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Patrick R.
Grady, Judge.
A defendant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Sean P. Spellman and Mary K. Spellman of Spellman Law, P.C., West
Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, Janet M. Lyness, County Attorney, and Elizabeth Beglin,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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CHRISTENSEN, Justice.
The defendant was stopped for violating Iowa Code section
321.297(2) (2017). That section provides, “Any vehicle proceeding at less
than the normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the
conditions then existing shall be driven in the right-hand lane then
available for traffic upon all roadways . . . .” The deputy asked defendant
and his passenger questions and found their answers suspicious. In
response to drug interdiction questions, defendant indicated, “You can do
what you got to do.” The deputy sought further permission for a consent
search. Within fourteen minutes of being pulled over, he consented.
After conducting a full search of defendant’s car, the deputy located
over eighty pounds of marijuana in the trunk. Defendant was arrested
and charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence stemming from the stop.
The district court denied defendant’s motion in its entirety.
We granted defendant’s application for discretionary review. On
review, defendant raises four issues: (1) whether the deputy obtained
reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity in order to permit the
prolonged detention, (2) whether his consent to search was voluntary,
(3) whether Iowa Code section 321.297(2) is void for vagueness, and
(4) whether probable cause existed for the traffic stop.
Upon review, we reverse the district court’s judgment as to whether
the deputy developed reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity before
unreasonably prolonging the stop. Consequently, we need not address the
other issues.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Deputy Sherriff Cody O’Hare of the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office
was traveling eastbound on Interstate 80 in response to a reported reckless
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driver. It was approximately 9:00 p.m. on November 2, 2017, when Deputy
O’Hare—en route to that call—encountered a different car traveling in the
left lane of Interstate 80’s two eastbound lanes. Deputy O’Hare’s attention
was drawn to this car because, despite the deputy’s approach, the car did
not move to the right-hand lane to let him pass. Deputy O’Hare testified
he approached the car in the left lane, the same lane as his direction of
travel. Deputy O’Hare was informed by dispatch that the car was a rental.
The posted speed limit on this stretch of interstate was seventy miles per
hour. Deputy O’Hare was traveling about seventy-five miles per hour in
response to the dispatch call. He estimated the car was traveling
approximately sixty miles per hour in the seventy miles-per-hour zone.
Deputy O’Hare testified he was forced to move to the right-hand
lane. He paced the car for three miles at approximately two car lengths
behind the car. The car remained in the left most lane throughout the
duration of Deputy O’Hare’s pacing, even when Interstate 80 became three
eastbound lanes. No other traffic, weather, or condition made it unsafe
for the car to move to the right-hand lane.
Deputy O’Hare switched back to the left most lane, followed the car
for a moment, and then initiated a traffic stop for violation of Iowa Code
section 321.297(2). The car complied without difficulty. At approximately
9:05 p.m., Deputy O’Hare approached the passenger side of the car. He
explained he initiated the stop for driving too slow in the left-hand lane
and asked the driver for his license and rental car agreement. Due to the
loud interstate traffic and cold November weather, Deputy O’Hare asked
the driver to accompany him back to the patrol car. The driver indicated
he had no weapons on him and allowed Deputy O’Hare to conduct a pat-
down search when requested to do so. Following that pat-down, the driver
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let himself into the unlocked front seat passenger door of the patrol car.
It was approximately 9:06 p.m.
The driver identified himself as Juan Salcedo. Deputy O’Hare
initiated a conversation with Salcedo and asked about his travel plans.
Salcedo explained he was driving back from California after visiting his
girlfriend. Salcedo further explained his home was New York City and he
and the passenger, who Salcedo identified as his cousin, were traveling
together. Deputy O’Hare repeatedly thumbed through the rental car
agreement. In response to Salcedo’s questioning about the reason for the
stop, Deputy O’Hare said there was no reason for Salcedo to be driving in
the fast lane. The conversation continued while Deputy O’Hare again
quickly and repeatedly flipped through the rental car agreement. Salcedo
stated he initially flew from New York to Florida and then flew from Florida
to California. Salcedo and his cousin rented a car in California to drive
back to New York City. It appeared, based on the body camera footage,
that Deputy O’Hare put forth no effort to process the traffic infraction.
Within seven minutes of Salcedo being pulled over, another patrol
car arrived and Deputy O’Hare exited his car to speak with Deputy Lenz.
Salcedo remained in the front seat of Deputy O’Hare’s car. Deputy
O’Hare’s body camera leaves no doubt that he was quite disappointed to
learn a drug dog was not available. He briefly explained Salcedo’s travel
plans to Deputy Lenz, indicated he was going to ask for a consent search,
and then asked Deputy Lenz to watch Salcedo while he verified the travel
details with the passenger.
Deputy O’Hare asked for the passenger’s identification, which the
passenger provided, and identified him as Jairo Rodriguez. Rodriguez
confirmed the travel plans outlined by Salcedo but indicated Salcedo’s
girlfriend, who was not present, actually signed the rental agreement.
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Deputy O’Hare noted the presence of three cell phones for a car containing
only two people. He also observed the back seat of the rental car contained
“a lot of luggage.” Deputy O’Hare asked Rodriguez if all of their personal
property was situated in the back seat, to which Rodriguez responded it
was. At the suppression hearing upon cross-examination, Deputy O’Hare
testified he noticed these red flags “right away” from his initial observation
of the rental car but only further inquired about them while speaking with
Rodriguez.
Rodriguez remained in the passenger seat of the rental car while
Deputy O’Hare returned to his patrol car to speak with Salcedo. Deputy
O’Hare asked further questions about the rental car, and Salcedo clarified
it was his girlfriend who signed the rental agreement because it was more
cost effective to rent the car to someone over the age of twenty-five.
Salcedo explained more of his travel details and then Deputy O’Hare asked
Salcedo if he was transporting any weapons of mass destruction. Salcedo
answered in the negative and stated, “No. You can do what you got to do.”
Salcedo was also asked if he was transporting any marijuana. He
answered, “No. You can go . . . you can go do what you got to do.” Deputy
O’Hare testified he understood Salcedo’s answers to mean Salcedo was
allowing a search of the rental car. Deputy O’Hare continued and asked
about the presence of heroin, methamphetamine, and large amounts of
cash. Salcedo answered no to each, except that he was carrying $300 in
cash. Deputy O’Hare asked, “You said we can search the vehicle then?”
Salcedo responded, “Yeah, you can do what you got to do. There is no
reason . . . I don’t have no reason to . . . .”
Salcedo remained in the passenger seat of the patrol car while
Deputy O’Hare approached the rental car. It was approximately 9:19 p.m.,
fourteen minutes after Salcedo was pulled over. Deputy O’Hare advised
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Rodriguez of Salcedo’s consent to the search and asked Rodriguez to step
out of the car. Rodriguez also consented to the search of his personal
property when asked by Deputy O’Hare, and he remained outside the
rental car.
Deputy O’Hare conducted a full search of the rental car, and in the
trunk he found garbage bags containing eighty-two pounds of marijuana.
Salcedo and Rodriguez were then arrested.
The State’s two-count trial information charged Salcedo and
Rodriguez with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in violation
of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(d) and failure to affix drug tax stamp in
violation of Iowa Code chapter 453B.
Salcedo entered a plea of not guilty and later filed a motion to
suppress all evidence stemming from the stop. His motion asserted
Deputy O’Hare lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the stop,
Iowa Code section 321.297 is unconstitutionally void for vagueness, his
continued and prolonged detention violated Federal and Iowa
Constitutions, and his consent to search was not voluntarily given.
Deputy O’Hare testified at the suppression hearing. Videos from his
body camera and patrol car camera were admitted into evidence. Deputy
O’Hare explained his drug interdiction training courses. As a result of this
training, Deputy O’Hare knew California was a common entry point for
illegal drugs. With respect to drug runners, he also knew “[a] lot of times
you see them using rental cars.” Deputy O’Hare testified that it would take
him “[p]robably anywhere from 10 to 20, 25 minutes” to complete a run-
of-the-mill traffic stop. He further admitted, throughout the duration of
Salcedo’s traffic stop, he never asked Salcedo any specific questions about
the traffic infraction.
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Deputy O’Hare admitted that it was his intention to investigate
issues other than the traffic infraction. He based this view on the fact that
“it was a rental vehicle, the three phones, luggage in the back seat, and it
becoming a third-party rental.” Deputy O’Hare explained generating traffic
citations required entering information into the computer. In response to
whether he had ever entered Salcedo’s information into the computer,
Deputy O’Hare stated, “No. I was never—never entered information into a
traffic citation.”
After the suppression hearing, the district court denied Salcedo’s
motion to suppress. It determined section 321.297(2) was not vague and
found reasonable and articulable suspicion existed that a traffic law was
violated. It also found the stopping deputy received a valid consent to
search the stopped car.
Salcedo sought discretionary review of the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress. We granted his application for
discretionary review.
II. Standard of Review.
A district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based on the
depravation of a constitutional right is reviewed de novo. State v. Coleman,
890 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa 2017). “This review requires ‘an independent
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire
record.’ ” State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v.
Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001)). “In doing so, we give deference
to the factual findings of the district court due to its opportunity to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, but are not bound by such
findings.” State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 2007).
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III. Analysis.
Salcedo raises several challenges to the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. First, Salcedo argues the scope and duration of his
stop were impermissibly extended absent reasonable suspicion of other
criminal activity. Second, Salcedo maintains he did not voluntarily
consent to the search of his car. Third, Salcedo claims Iowa Code section
321.297(2) offends due process because it is impermissibly vague. Lastly,
Salcedo contends he did not violate Iowa Code section 321.297(2) and
there was no probable cause for the stop. We address these issues as
necessary.
We first address Salcedo’s challenge to the scope and duration of his
traffic stop. Salcedo argues the scope and duration of his stop were
impermissibly extended by questions unrelated to the purpose of the
underlying traffic infraction. He raised his claim under the Federal and
Iowa Constitutions in the district court and urges this court to construe
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution in a “broad and liberal spirit.”
He contends any request for a consent search, absent reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, is in violation of the Iowa Constitution. The
State argues Deputy O’Hare developed reasonable suspicion at the start of
the traffic stop, permitting expansion of its scope and duration.
Article I, section 8 guarantees the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it contains language nearly
identical to the Fourth Amendment counterpart. See State v. Short, 851
N.W.2d 474, 500–01 (Iowa 2014). Compare Iowa Const. art. I, § 8, with
U.S. Const. amend. IV. “When both federal and state constitutional claims
are raised, we may, in our discretion, choose to consider either claim first
in order to dispose of the case, or we may consider both claims
simultaneously.” State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010).
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In this case, we need not reach Salcedo’s challenge to the scope and
duration of the stop based on article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
See In re Prop. Seized from Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 391 & n.6 (Iowa 2015).
Deputy O’Hare failed to obtain individualized suspicion of other criminal
activity before unreasonably prolonging the stop. The unreasonableness
of the stop was in violation of Salcedo’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The detention of an individual during a traffic stop, even if brief and
for a limited purpose, is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). This
seizure, consistent with the constitutional requirement, must be
reasonable under the circumstances. Id. “[I]t is well settled that a traffic
violation, however minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop a
motorist” and is therefore a reasonable seizure. State v. Aderholdt, 545
N.W.2d 559, 563 (Iowa 1996). We assume without deciding that Salcedo’s
failure to yield the left-hand lane, which is conduct prohibited by Iowa
Code section 321.297(2), provided probable cause to initiate the stop.
Thus, the initial detention of Salcedo was reasonable.
Once lawfully stopped, inquiries reasonably related to the mission
of addressing the traffic infraction “and attend[ing] to related safety
concerns” are permissible. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___,
___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407,
125 S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005); Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d at 563–64. This court
has recognized, “[A] reasonable investigation includes asking for the
driver’s license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol
car, and asking the driver about his destination and purpose.” Aderholdt,
545 N.W.2d at 563–64 (quoting United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910,
915 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc)); see United State v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d
407, 414–15 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 245 (2017); see also
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Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (“Beyond determining
whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary
inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S. Ct. at 837)); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 658–59, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1398–99 (1979) (license and registration
checks ensure safe operation of vehicles). Ultimately, the mission of the
stop is to address the traffic infraction and “may ‘last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’ ” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135
S. Ct. at 1614 (alteration in original) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
The reasonable investigation, however, may be expanded to satisfy
suspicions of criminal activity unrelated to the traffic infraction based
upon responses to reasonable inquires. Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d at 564.
“But the officer must identify ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts,’ amount to reasonable
suspicion that further investigation is warranted.” Murillo-Salgado, 854
F.3d at 415 (quoting United States v. Woods, 829 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir.
2016)). We evaluate the existence of reasonable suspicion based on the
totality of circumstances confronted by the officer. See State v. McIver,
858 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Iowa 2015).
This is not to say law enforcement may prolong a stop indefinitely.
They clearly may not. See Pardee, 872 N.W.2d at 397. Our decision in
Pardee applied recent Supreme Court precedent to address whether,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an Iowa trooper “developed
reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity—if at all—only by
prolonging the initial stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to
execute the traffic violation warnings.” Id. at 391. Pardee compared and
contrasted a number of federal circuit court cases weighing reasonable
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suspicion. See id. at 393–96 (discussing in order United States v. Briasco,
640 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2015); and
United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2008)). We determined
individualized suspicion of criminal activity did not exist at the outset of
the stop when the trooper first encountered the vehicle’s occupants. Id. at
395. We then concluded the twenty-five minute traffic stop was prolonged
within the meaning of Rodriguez. Id. at 396. Lastly, we held reasonable
suspicion did not exist within the time necessary to address the traffic
infraction. Id. at 396–97.
Pardee reiterated the rule set forth in Rodriguez: “Authority for the
seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or
reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at 392 (quoting Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614). Rodriguez made clear the Fourth
Amendment will tolerate certain unrelated investigations that do not
extend the roadside stop, but the stop will remain lawful only “so long as
[unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (alteration in original)
(quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788
(2009)). Addressing the traffic infraction is the purpose of the stop and “it
may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’ ” Id. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (alteration in original) (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at
500, 103 S. Ct. at 1325).
Salcedo argues his stop was prolonged beyond what was reasonably
necessary to resolve his traffic infraction, absent reasonable suspicion of
other criminal activity. The State asserts Deputy O’Hare developed
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity while speaking with Salcedo and
points to a number of factors in support of its position. We conclude
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Deputy O’Hare failed to develop individualized suspicion of other criminal
activity before unreasonably prolonging the stop.
At the outset of the stop, Deputy O’Hare knew Salcedo’s car was a
California rental. However, it is not clear when Deputy O’Hare observed
the three cell phones and luggage. Initially, Deputy O’Hare stated he
viewed the “red flags” on his second trip to the rental car but then later
clarified that he observed them “right away.” Regardless, even assuming
Deputy O’Hare was aware of the red flags when he first approached the
rental car, they do not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
See Beck, 140 F.3d at 1137 (car rented by a third party not present,
licensed in California, presence of fast-food wrappers, no luggage in
passenger compartment, nervous demeanor of motorist, trip from drug-
source state to drug-demand state, and disbelief of travel plans did not
generate reasonable suspicion).
The same lack of reasonable suspicion persisted after Deputy O’Hare
initially conversed with Salcedo. Salcedo explained he was driving back to
New York after flying to California. Deputy O’Hare noted Salcedo’s travel
plans were odd and another potential red flag of drug trafficking. During
the conversation, Salcedo asked why he was pulled over, and Deputy
O’Hare indicated there was no reason to drive in the fast lane. Meanwhile,
Deputy O’Hare continued to quickly and repeatedly thumb through
Salcedo’s rental agreement but did not inquire about the party that signed
the agreement. Interestingly, the body camera revealed Deputy O’Hare’s
surprise when he learned from Rodriguez that the rental agreement was
signed by a nonpresent third party. Only after Rodriguez explained the
rental agreement did Deputy O’Hare return to Salcedo a second time and
inquire into the agreement. At the conclusion of the first conversation with
Salcedo, the only additional factor Deputy O’Hare developed as a possible
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red flag of other criminal activity was Salcedo’s odd travel plans. This
factor, combined with the previous factors, did not provide Deputy O’Hare
with reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. See Beck, 140 F.3d
at 1137; cf. Briasco, 640 F.3d at 860 (reasonable suspicion created by
luggage in back seat, strong odor of air freshener, back of vehicle squatting
from excessive weight, one-way rental car, nervousness of motorists). We
cannot conclude Deputy O’Hare developed reasonable suspicion of other
criminal activity after his first conversation with Salcedo.
Absent reasonable suspicion after Salcedo’s first conversation, we
must now determine whether Deputy O’Hare unreasonably prolonged the
stop. It was approximately 9:05 p.m. when Deputy O’Hare initiated
Salcedo’s traffic stop. Shortly after 9:06 p.m., Salcedo let himself into the
patrol car to speak with Deputy O’Hare. It is permissible for Deputy
O’Hare to make reasonable inquires to address the traffic infraction and
“attend to related safety concerns.” See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct.
at 1614. In fact, “an officer may detain the occupants of a vehicle during
a traffic stop ‘while the officer completes a number of routine but
somewhat time-consuming tasks related to the traffic violation.’ ” Murillo-
Salgado, 854 F.3d at 415 (quoting Peralez, 526 F.3d at 1119). An officer
may “run[] a computerized check of the vehicle’s registration and
insurance; run[] a similar check of the occupants’ identification
documents and criminal histories; prepar[e] the traffic citation or warning;
and ask[] the occupants about their ‘destination, route, and purpose.’ ” Id.
(quoting Peralez, 526 F.3d at 1119). However, absent reasonable
suspicion of other criminal activity, the officer’s mission is to address the
traffic infraction and that mission may take no longer than is necessary.
See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
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What becomes immediately apparent is Deputy O’Hare’s complete
lack of effort to address Salcedo’s specific traffic infraction. Six minutes
elapsed from the time Salcedo entered the patrol car to the time Deputy
O’Hare departed to speak with Deputy Lenz. Deputy O’Hare admitted that,
throughout the duration of the stop, he did not ask Salcedo questions
regarding the traffic infraction. The body camera revealed Deputy O’Hare
repeatedly thumbing through the rental agreement. There does not appear
to be any attempt to gain understanding of the document. To the contrary,
the incessant page flipping appears to be a stalling tactic to keep the
conversation going until a drug dog arrived. During this time, he did not
attempt to run a check of Salcedo’s identifying documents or criminal
histories, and he did not prepare a traffic citation or warning. Deputy
O’Hare admitted, “I was never—never entered information into a traffic
citation.”
The body camera further supports Salcedo’s position that Deputy
O’Hare was stringing along the stop until a drug dog arrived. Shortly after
Salcedo entered the patrol car, Deputy O’Hare requested assistance.
When Deputy Lenz arrived, Deputy O’Hare was immediately disappointed
to learn a drug dog was not available. Deputy O’Hare also testified at the
suppression hearing that he knew from the time of the stop that he would
be investigating issues other than the traffic infraction.
We conclude the constitutionally permissible traffic stop became
unlawful when it was unreasonably prolonged. See Peralez, 526 F.3d at
1120 (holding stop was delayed because of trooper’s questions, “not
because of anything related to the investigation or processing of the traffic
violation”). Deputy O’Hare’s mission is to address Salcedo’s traffic
infraction and it may last no longer than is reasonably necessary to
complete the mission. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. The
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Fourth Amendment will tolerate certain unrelated investigations that do
not extend the roadside stop, but the stop will remain lawful only “so long
as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
stop.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. (alteration in original) (quoting
Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, 129 S. Ct. at 788). After speaking with Salcedo,
it appeared Deputy O’Hare was no closer to completing the mission of the
traffic stop than he was prior to inviting Salcedo into his patrol car. The
delay of Salcedo’s stop was measurable, unreasonable, and in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. See id.
IV. Conclusion.
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the district court’s
judgment as to whether the deputy developed reasonable suspicion of
other criminal activity before unreasonably prolonging the stop. Because
we reverse the district court’s judgment denying Salcedo’s motion to
suppress, we need not address the other issues.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.