State of Iowa v. Mar'yo D. Lindsey Jr. ( 2016 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
                                  No. 14–0773
    
                               Filed June 24, 2016
    
    
    STATE OF IOWA,
    
          Appellee,
    
    vs.
    
    MAR’YO D. LINDSEY JR.,
    
          Appellant.
    
    
          On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
    
    
          Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
    
    Kellyann M. Lekar (motion to suppress), David F. Staudt (trial and
    
    sentencing), Judges.
    
    
    
          A high school student seeks further review of a court of appeals
    
    decision affirming the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained
    
    from a search by a public school official.    DECISION OF COURT OF
    APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
    
    
    
          Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    
    
    
          Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant
    
    Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Peter
    
    Blink, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
                                          2
    
    APPEL, Justice.
    
          In this case, we consider whether a search of a high school
    
    student’s football equipment bag by a school official violated the
    
    constitutional limitations on searches and seizures under the Fourth
    
    Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of
    
    the Iowa Constitution. The district court found that the school official
    
    had reasonable grounds to search the bag.          The court of appeals
    
    affirmed. We granted further review. For the reasons expressed below,
    
    we affirm.
    
          I. Background Facts and Procedure.
    
          On August 30, 2013, Mar’yo Lindsey Jr. was playing football for
    
    Dunkerton High School, Dunkerton, Iowa.          The game was held in
    
    Riceville, Iowa. Lindsey brought his school-issued equipment bag with
    
    him to Riceville. Football players use their equipment bags to transport
    
    their gear to sporting events. Lindsey placed the equipment bag, which
    
    had his name marked on it, in the team’s locker room upon arrival at
    
    Riceville.
    
          Unfortunately, Lindsey was badly injured during the game.      The
    
    Dunkerton school superintendent, James Stanton, called an ambulance
    
    to take Lindsey to the hospital. While paramedics were getting Lindsey
    
    ready for transport, Lindsey told Stanton to give his bag to a friend and
    
    to not let anybody else other than his friend have the bag or “mess with
    
    it.” Lindsey repeated this admonition several times.
    
          Stanton asked head football coach Jonathan Steffen to take the
    
    bag back to Dunkerton.         Steffen placed the bag on a table in the
    
    commons area of the Dunkerton lunchroom for the superintendent.
    
    Stanton then moved the bag, placing it on the floor, and heard a metallic
    
    sound.       Stanton believed the sound was that of a firearm hitting the
                                        3
    
    surface of the floor. At this point, he unzipped the bag, found a blue
    
    backpack inside it, opened that bag, and discovered a long-barreled
    
    handgun along with a bag which appeared to contain marijuana, rolling
    
    papers, and other drug paraphernalia. The superintendent secured the
    
    bag and called law enforcement.
    
          Lindsey was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm as
    
    a felon, carrying a weapon on school grounds, carrying a weapon, and
    
    possession of a controlled substance. Lindsey pled not guilty. Lindsey
    
    filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the equipment bag. He
    
    claimed the search of his equipment bag violated his right to be free from
    
    unreasonable searches and seizures under the Iowa and United States
    
    Constitutions.
    
          A hearing was held on the motion to suppress.       At the hearing,
    
    Stanton testified about the evening of August 30. He stated that at the
    
    time of the injury, a number of people assembled on the field—the
    
    athletic directors from both Riceville and Dunkerton, the ambulance
    
    personnel from Riceville, and one of the game officials. Lindsey was put
    
    in a cervical collar and placed on a backboard to prevent further injury.
    
    At that time, Lindsey said, “[P]lease make sure that Keota gets my bag.
    
    Don’t let anybody but Keota have my bag.” Keota was a fellow student
    
    on the football team.   Stanton further testified that the school had a
    
    policy in place and posted on the two main entry doors of the school
    
    building that all bags are subject to search.   Stanton testified that he
    
    became suspicious when Lindsey stated that he did not want anyone else
    
    to take his bag.
    
          Stanton instructed Steffen to make sure that Stanton got the bag
    
    when they got back to Dunkerton.        According to Stanton, when he
    
    arrived at Dunkerton, the bag was sitting on the table in the commons.
                                         4
    
    Stanton testified that he picked up the bag and set it on the floor. When
    
    he did so, there was a “very discernable loud clunk.” Stanton testified
    
    that he had a lot of experience with firearms as a hunter and collector,
    
    and he owned one pistol. When the bag hit the ground and made the
    
    sound, Stanton testified he was “one hundred percent sure” when the
    
    bag hit the floor “[t]hat it was a gun.” Stanton testified he was aware
    
    that prior to that date Lindsey had been suspended from school for
    
    possession of drug paraphernalia and that he had some weapons
    
    charges from activities not related to school.
    
             After Stanton heard the loud clunk, he opened the equipment bag.
    
    Inside the bag was a backpack.           Inside that bag was some drug
    
    paraphernalia and the gun. Stanton inspected the gun. The gun was
    
    loaded.
    
             Coach Steffen also testified at the suppression hearing.   Steffen
    
    testified that when football players go to away games, each player has a
    
    big red equipment bag that is used to hold their shoulder pads, helmets,
    
    cleats, and other equipment.     Steffen stated that when he attended to
    
    Lindsey on the field, “it seemed that it was going to be a pretty serious
    
    injury” and that Lindsey’s statement that he wanted “a certain kid” to get
    
    the bag and that “nobody would mess with it . . . kind of raised a red
    
    flag.”
    
             Steffen testified that after Lindsey was placed in the ambulance,
    
    Stanton told him to get the bag and not let one of the kids grab it before
    
    they left. As a result, Steffen stated he grabbed the bag after the game,
    
    took it onto the school bus, and placed it on a seat next to his wife. On
    
    the bus ride home, the coach received a telephone call from Lindsey, who
    
    again inquired about his bag and directed that the bag be given only to a
    
    specific friend. Upon arrival at Dunkerton, Steffen placed the bag in the
                                              5
    
    commons area in the lunch room. When Stanton arrived, he told Steffen
    
    he planned to search the bag. Steffen later saw the results of the search.
    
    Steffen stated he was aware that Lindsey was involved with possession of
    
    firearms and that he had been “in juvenile detention or something” for a
    
    while as a result.
    
           The district court denied the motion to suppress. After canvassing
    
    the facts, the district court noted that the parties agreed that State v.
    
    Benjegerdes was the applicable Iowa appellate court decision to the issue
    
    presented in this case. 1 No. 09–1230, 
    2011 WL 3925411
     (Iowa Ct. App.
    
    Sept. 8, 2011). The district court noted that the analysis in Benjegerdes
    
    relied primarily on the United States Supreme Court case of New Jersey
    
    v. T.L.O., 
    469 U.S. 325
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 733
    , 
    83 L. Ed. 2d 720
     (1985).
    
    Benjegerdes, 
    2011 WL 3925411
    , at *3.
    
           The district court concluded that under T.L.O. the court should
    
    consider whether the search was justified at its inception and then
    
    whether the scope of the search was reasonable. According to the court,
    
    both prongs were met.            The court reasoned that the search was
    
    reasonable from the inception because of Lindsey’s unusual insistence
    
    that his bag be given to no one other than a specific friend as he lay
    
    injured on the field and in the phone call to the coach afterwards.
    
    Further, the court cited the distinctive metal sound Stanton heard when
    
    the bag hit the ground as supporting the search.                The district court
    
    concluded there was particularized suspicion under the totality of
    
    circumstances.
    
    
           1Under   Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.904(2)(c), unpublished decisions of
    the court of appeals do not constitute binding authority on appeal. The parties’
    agreement that the applicable Iowa appellate decision was Benjegerdes, however, helps
    define the issues actually before the district court and properly before us on appeal.
                                          6
    
          The court next turned to examine the scope of the search.         The
    
    court reasoned that the scope of the search was justified given the
    
    reasons that gave rise to the search in the first place. In particular, the
    
    examination of the backpack inside the equipment bag was reasonable
    
    as the likely place to find the suspected firearm.           While the court
    
    recognized Lindsey had a limited expectation of privacy in his equipment
    
    bag, such an interest was outweighed by the need to prevent the
    
    introduction of weapons into the school.
    
          Lindsey appealed. We transferred the case to the court of appeals,
    
    which affirmed. We granted further review. We now affirm.
    
          II. Standard of Review.
    
          We review alleged violations of the right to be free from
    
    unreasonable searches and seizures de novo.            State v. Tague, 
    676 N.W.2d 197
    , 201 (Iowa 2004).        In conducting our de novo review, we
    
    independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances as shown by the
    
    entire record. State v. Kurth, 
    813 N.W.2d 270
    , 272 (Iowa 2012).
    
          III. Discussion.
    
          A. Introduction.      The primary issue in this case is whether
    
    reasonable suspicion existed at the inception of the search.       Although
    
    Lindsey concedes that the district court discussed the appropriate legal
    
    concepts, he maintains the court misapplied them.               According to
    
    Lindsey, the inception of the search occurred in Riceville when the
    
    superintendent “requested that the head coach collect the defendant’s
    
    bag for search at a later time.” Lindsey asserts that the school officials
    
    did not have reasonable suspicion to seize his bag at Riceville. According
    
    to Lindsey, all he did was ask that a specific student be given his bag
    
    and that no one mess with it.       That, according to Lindsey, is simply
    
    insufficient to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.
                                         7
    
          According to Lindsey, the district court erred in its reasonable-
    
    suspicion analysis when it considered the clang of metal that occurred
    
    after the equipment bag was seized and transported to Lindsey’s home
    
    school. What happened after the seizure—specifically the metallic clang
    
    heard by Stanton—is irrelevant to the question of whether the seizure of
    
    the equipment bag in Riceville was lawful in the first place.      Lindsey
    
    claims that supporting the search based on him asserting “a number of
    
    times that he did not want anyone to ‘mess’ with his stuff” is tantamount
    
    to permitting searches whenever anyone refuses to consent to a search.
    
          The State presents a layered counter-argument.      First, the State
    
    argues that the transportation of the bag from Riceville to Dunkerton was
    
    not a seizure. According to the State, the equipment bag was moved as
    
    part of routine student activity and that the doctrine of in loco parentis
    
    authorized the school to move a student’s belongings back from an away
    
    football game. Second, the State argues the transport of the equipment
    
    bag did not violate Lindsey’s reasonable expectation of privacy or
    
    materially interfere with a possessory interest.
    
          B. Applicable United States Supreme Court Framework. Iowa
    
    is no stranger to questions regarding constitutional rights in public
    
    school settings. In State v. Bartels, we upheld the conviction of a teacher
    
    who taught German in school in violation of a statute prohibiting the
    
    teaching of any language except English to students below eighth grade.
    
    
    191 Iowa 1060
    , 1074, 
    181 N.W. 508
    , 515 (1921). The Supreme Court,
    
    relying upon Meyer v. Nebraska, 
    262 U.S. 390
    , 
    43 S. Ct. 625
    , 
    67 L. Ed. 1042
     (1923), reversed. Bartels v. Iowa, 
    262 U.S. 404
    , 409, 411, 
    43 S. Ct. 628
    , 629–30, 
    67 L. Ed. 1047
    , 1050–51 (1923). In Meyer, the Supreme
    
    Court struck down a similar Nebraska statute as violating the liberty
    
    interests of teachers and parents under the Due Process Clause of the
                                         8
    
    Fourteenth Amendment. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403, 43 S. Ct. at 628, 67
    
    L. Ed. at 1047; see also Bartels, 262 U.S. at 409, 43 S. Ct. at 629, 67
    
    L. Ed. at 1050 (addressing statutes from Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio).
    
           Almost fifty years later, the Supreme Court considered another
    
    case involving the constitutional rights of students from Iowa. In Tinker
    
    v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the United States
    
    Supreme Court reversed a district court opinion dismissing a complaint
    
    brought by students challenging a school’s prohibition of wearing black
    
    armbands on its property to protest the Vietnam War.        
    393 U.S. 503
    ,
    
    514, 
    89 S. Ct. 733
    , 740, 
    21 L. Ed. 2d 731
    , 742 (1969). In memorable
    
    language, the Supreme Court declared that “[i]t can hardly be argued
    
    that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights . . . at
    
    the schoolhouse gate.” Id. at 506, 89 S. Ct. at 736, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 737.
    
    While Tinker is a seminal case, it dealt solely with the First Amendment
    
    rights of students. Id. at 505–06, 89 S. Ct. at 736, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 737.
    
           The question of whether students were protected from unlawful
    
    searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment remained an open
    
    one for many years. The United States Supreme Court addressed this
    
    important issue in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333, 105 S. Ct. at 738, 83
    
    L. Ed. 2d at 729.    In T.L.O., a teacher discovered a student and a
    
    classmate smoking cigarettes in a school lavatory in violation of a school
    
    rule. Id. at 328, 105 S. Ct. at 735, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 726. They were taken
    
    to the principal’s office, where an assistant vice principal demanded to
    
    see the student’s purse. Id. at 328, 105 S. Ct. at 735–36, 83 L. Ed. 2d at
    
    726.   Upon opening the purse, the assistant vice principal found a
    
    package of cigarettes and rolling papers associated with smoking
    
    marijuana.   Id. at 328, 105 S. Ct. at 736, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 726.       The
    
    assistant vice principal searched the purse more thoroughly and found
                                        9
    
    some marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a substantial amount of money, an
    
    index card with a list of students who owed the student money, and two
    
    letters implicating her in marijuana dealing.     Id.    As a result of the
    
    discovered contraband and a subsequent confession, the state brought
    
    delinquency charges against T.L.O. in juvenile court.       Id. at 329, 105
    
    S. Ct. at 736, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 726.      T.L.O. sought to suppress the
    
    evidence found in her purse as well as the later confession as fruits of an
    
    unlawful search.    Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court suppressed the
    
    search, and the state appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
    
    at 330–31, 105 S. Ct. at 736–37, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 727–28.
    
          The Supreme Court first determined that the strictures of the
    
    Fourth Amendment apply to activities of civil authorities, including
    
    school officials. Id. at 336–37, 105 S. Ct. at 740, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 731. It
    
    rejected the notion that public schools merely exercise delegated parental
    
    authority conferred upon them by individual parents, but instead
    
    emphasized that school officials “act in furtherance of publicly mandated
    
    educational and disciplinary policies.” Id. at 336, 105 S. Ct. at 740, 83
    
    L. Ed. 2d at 731.
    
          The Supreme Court next turned to consider what searches by
    
    school officials might be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
    
    337, 105 S. Ct. at 740, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 731.            The Supreme Court
    
    declared that a determination of reasonableness requires “balancing the
    
    need to search against the invasion which the search entails.”          Id.
    
    (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 
    387 U.S. 523
    , 537, 
    87 S. Ct. 1727
    , 1735, 
    18 L. Ed. 2d 930
    , 940 (1967)).
    
          With respect to the student’s interest in privacy, the T.L.O. Court
    
    noted that “searches of closed items of personal luggage are intrusions
    
    on protected privacy interests.”    Id. at 337, 105 S. Ct. at 740, 83
                                        10
    
    L. Ed. 2d at 732.       The Supreme Court stated, however, that “an
    
    expectation of privacy must be one that society is ‘prepared to recognize
    
    as legitimate.’ ”    Id. at 338, 105 S. Ct. at 741, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 732
    
    (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 
    468 U.S. 517
    , 526, 
    104 S. Ct. 3194
    , 3200, 
    82 L. Ed. 2d 393
    , 402 (1984)).      The Court recognized that students in
    
    schools have legitimate interests in privacy.    Id. at 339, 105 S. Ct. at
    
    741, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733. The Court observed students might lawfully
    
    bring to school “highly personal items [such] as photographs, letters, and
    
    diaries,” but also may carry with them “articles of property needed in
    
    connection with extracurricular or recreational activities.” Id.
    
          Balanced against the student’s interest in privacy, however, the
    
    Supreme Court recognized “the substantial interest of teachers and
    
    administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school
    
    grounds.”   Id.     The Court emphasized that “maintaining security and
    
    order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school
    
    disciplinary procedures,” including “preserving the informality of the
    
    student–teacher relationship.”    Id. at 339–40, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83
    
    L. Ed. 2d at 733.
    
          Having recognized the student’s interest in privacy and the school’s
    
    interest in maintaining discipline, the Supreme Court proceeded to
    
    balance the interests. Id. at 340, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733.
    
    The Court declared that searches in the school setting require some
    
    modification of the level of suspicion required. Id. While the Court noted
    
    that “probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the
    
    reasonableness of a search . . . in certain limited circumstances neither
    
    is required.” Id. at 340–41, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733–34
    
    (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
    493 U.S. 266
    , 277, 
    93 S. Ct. 2535
    , 2541, 
    37 L. Ed. 2d 596
    , 605 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)). The
                                          11
    
    Supreme Court determined that in the school setting probable cause is
    
    not required for a search, but instead, a school search requires
    
    “reasonableness, under all the circumstances.” Id. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at
    
    742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734. In order for a search to meet this requirement,
    
    the search must be (1) justified at the time of its inception and (2)
    
    reasonable in terms of the scope of the search. Id. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at
    
    742–43, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734.
    
           Having established this framework to analyze school searches, the
    
    Supreme Court recognized that the reasonable grounds standard applied
    
    by the New Jersey Supreme Court in suppressing the evidence in the
    
    case was “not substantially different.” Id. at 343, 105 S. Ct. at 743–44,
    
    83 L. Ed. 2d at 736. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the state
    
    court’s application of the standard “reflect[ed] a somewhat crabbed
    
    notion of reasonableness.” Id. at 343, 105 S. Ct. at 744, 83 L. Ed. 2d at
    
    736.
    
           Looking at the facts of the case, the Court found two searches—
    
    one that yielded the cigarettes and a second that produced the marijuana
    
    and other evidence of involvement with drugs. Id. at 343–44, 105 S. Ct.
    
    at 744, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 736. With respect to the first search, the Court
    
    noted that T.L.O. was accused of smoking, which she denied. Id. at 345,
    
    105 S. Ct. at 744, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 737. Her purse was an obvious place
    
    to look for cigarettes. Id. at 345–46, 105 S. Ct. at 745, 83 L. Ed. 2d at
    
    737. The Court noted that the assistant vice principal’s conclusion that
    
    cigarettes   might   be   in   her   purse   was   not   an   “inchoate   and
    
    unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” but was “the sort of ‘common-
    
    sense conclusio[n] about human behavior’ upon which ‘practical
    
    people’—including government officials—are entitled to rely.” Id. at 346,
    
    105 S. Ct. at 745, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 737 (first quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
                                          
    12 U.S. 1
    , 27, 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 1883, 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    , 909 (1968); and then
    
    quoting United States v. Cortez, 
    449 U.S. 411
    , 418, 
    101 S. Ct. 690
    , 695,
    
    
    66 L. Ed. 2d 621
    , 629 (1981)).
    
          The search for cigarettes yielded not only cigarettes but also rolling
    
    papers associated with marijuana use which gave rise to the reasonable
    
    belief that T.L.O. was carrying marijuana as well as cigarettes in her
    
    purse.   Id. at 347, 105 S. Ct. at 745–46, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 738.        This
    
    suspicion justified further examination of her purse.      Id. at 347, 105
    
    S. Ct. at 746, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 738.
    
          Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented in part.
    
    Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, asserted that the only
    
    content to the reasonableness standard of the majority was that it was
    
    different from the probable cause standard established by the Fourth
    
    Amendment. Id. at 354, 105 S. Ct. at 749, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 743 (Brennan,
    
    J., concurring part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan conceded
    
    that school authorities could conduct the search of student belongings
    
    without a warrant. Id. at 355–56, 105 S. Ct. at 750, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 744.
    
    He strongly objected, however, to casting aside the probable cause
    
    requirement. Id. at 357, 105 S. Ct. at 751, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 745.
    
          Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall and in part by Justice
    
    Brennan, filed a dissent in part that took issue with the sweep of the
    
    majority opinion.   Id. at 371, 105 S. Ct. at 758, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 754
    
    (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Stevens
    
    and Marshall thought the standard enunciated by the majority would
    
    allow, for example, searches for curlers or sunglasses to enforce a dress
    
    code. Id. at 377, 105 S. Ct. at 762, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 758. Further, the
    
    New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to have applied the very same
    
    standard of the majority, and Justice Stevens argued that the state
                                        13
    
    court’s application was the correct approach. Id. at 382–85, 105 S. Ct. at
    
    764–66, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 761–63.
    
          Since T.L.O., the Supreme Court has decided only a few search and
    
    seizure cases involving students and school authorities.      In Vernonia
    
    School District 47J v. Acton, the Supreme Court upheld a high school
    
    policy authorizing random drug testing of all student athletes. 
    515 U.S. 646
    , 648, 664–65, 
    115 S. Ct. 2386
    , 2388, 2396, 
    132 L. Ed. 2d 564
    , 571,
    
    582 (1995).   The Court concluded that student athletes have a lesser
    
    expectation of privacy with respect to medical examinations and
    
    compliance with rules of conduct established for a given sport. Id. at
    
    657, 115 S. Ct. at 2392–93, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577. The Court found that
    
    legitimate privacy expectations are less for student athletes who routinely
    
    lack privacy in locker rooms and there is “an element of ‘communal
    
    undress’ inherent in athletic participation.”   Id. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at
    
    2392–93, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577 (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe Cty. Sch.
    
    Corp., 
    864 F.2d 1309
    , 1318 (7th Cir. 1988)).
    
          The decision in Vernonia emphasized a combination of factors,
    
    including the lesser expectation of privacy of student athletes and the
    
    unobtrusiveness of the particular method of drug testing at issue. Id. at
    
    657–58, 115 S. Ct. at 2392–93, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577–78.        Finally, the
    
    Court noted that the trial court found that at the high school in question,
    
    “ ‘a large segment of the student body . . . was in a state of rebellion,’
    
    that ‘[d]isciplinary actions had reached “epidemic proportions,” ’ and that
    
    ‘the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by
    
    the student’s misperceptions about the drug culture.’ ” Id. at 662–63,
    
    115 S. Ct. at 2395, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 580 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch.
    
    Dist. 47J, 
    796 F. Supp. 1354
    , 1357 (D. Or. 1992)).
                                             14
    
          Justice     O’Connor,     joined    by   Justices       Stevens     and   Souter,
    
    dissented.   Id. at 666, 115 S. Ct. at 2397, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 583
    
    (O’Connor, J., dissenting).       They objected to the policy as a general
    
    search and therefore contrary to precedent and the philosophy of the
    
    Framers. Id. at 667, 669–70, 115 S. Ct. at 2397–99, 132 L. Ed. 2d at
    
    583–85. Justice O’Connor also criticized the choice of the school to focus
    
    its suspicionless drug testing on athletes. Id. at 685, 115 S. Ct. at 2406,
    
    132 L. Ed. 2d at 595.         She found it unreasonable to target student
    
    athletes, who were selected apparently for purposes of legal strategy,
    
    without factual support in the record for that distinction. Id.
    
          A   mandatory      drug     test    of   all    students     participating     in
    
    extracurricular    activities   was      upheld      in    Board   of    Education   of
    
    Independent School District No. 92 v. Earls, 
    536 U.S. 822
    , 838, 
    122 S. Ct. 2559
    , 2569, 
    153 L. Ed. 2d 735
    , 749–50 (2002). The Earls Court stated
    
    that although students participating in extracurricular activities were not
    
    all subject to the same privacy intrusions as athletes, extracurricular
    
    activities were nonetheless subject to substantial regulation. Id. at 831–
    
    32, 122 S. Ct. at 2565–66, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 745–46.                     Because of the
    
    substantial regulation, students affected by the extracurricular drug
    
    testing policy had a diminished expectation of privacy. Id. at 832, 122
    
    S. Ct. at 2566, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 745–46.                  As in Vernonia, the Court
    
    emphasized the limited nature of the intrusion and the findings of fact of
    
    the trial court that the school in question had a drug problem. Id. at
    
    834–35, 122 S. Ct. at 2567, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 747.
    
          Justice Ginsburg, along with Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and
    
    Souter, dissented. Id. at 842, 122 S. Ct. at 2571, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 752
    
    (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).        Justice Ginsburg noted that although
    
    students participating in competitive extracurricular activities were
                                       15
    
    targeted, the underlying rationale applied to all school children. Id. at
    
    844, 122 S. Ct. at 2572, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 753–54.      She further found
    
    extracurricular activities, though voluntary, were in fact part of the
    
    schools educational program.      Id. at 845, 122 S. Ct. at 2573, 153
    
    L. Ed. 2d at 754.    Justice Ginsburg then distinguished the random
    
    provision of urine samples in Vernonia, noting that athletes have a
    
    reduced expectation of privacy and a special susceptibility to injury
    
    caused by use of illegal drugs, none of which were involved in Earls. Id.
    
    at 853–54, 122 S. Ct. at 2577, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 759.
    
           Finally, in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, the
    
    Supreme Court considered the validity of a search of the person and
    
    property of a thirteen-year-old female student suspected of possessing
    
    contraband including prescription-strength drugs. 
    557 U.S. 364
    , 368–
    
    69, 
    129 S. Ct. 2633
    , 2637–38, 
    174 L. Ed. 2d 354
    , 360 (2009).       School
    
    officials discovered a day planner belonging to Redding that contained
    
    knives and a cigarette. Id. at 368, 129 S. Ct. at 2368, 174 L. Ed. 2d at
    
    360.   Redding admitted the day planner was hers, but said she had
    
    loaned the day planner to a friend and that none of the items inside it
    
    were hers. Id. The assistant principal then confronted her with several
    
    over-the-counter pain relievers and stated he had received a report that
    
    Redding was supplying pills to students in violation of school policy. Id.
    
    Redding denied the allegations and agreed to allow school officials to
    
    search her backpack. Id. No contraband was found. Id. The assistant
    
    principal then had a female school official search Redding’s clothing and
    
    perform a strip search. Id. at 369, 129 S. Ct. at 2638, 174 L. Ed. 2d at
    
    360. No pills were found. Id.
    
           The Supreme Court applied the reasonableness standard of T.L.O.
    
    to determine the validity of the search. Id. at 375, 129 S. Ct. at 2642,
                                              16
    
    174 L. Ed. 2d at 364. The Court indicated that reliable information to
    
    support a search in the context of school authorities was information
    
    that raises “a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing,” a
    
    lesser standard than the “fair probability” required for a Terry2-type
    
    search by law enforcement. Id. at 371, 129 S. Ct. at 2639, 174 L. Ed. 2d
    
    at 362 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238, 
    103 S. Ct. 2317
    ,
    
    2332, 
    76 L. Ed. 2d 527
    , 548 (1983)).
    
           The Court found there was sufficient reliable information to justify
    
    the search of Redding’s backpack and outer clothing, but not for the
    
    strip search which exposed Redding’s breasts and pelvic area.                     Id. at
    
    373–77, 129 S. Ct. at 2641–43, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 363–65. The Supreme
    
    Court recognized that “distinct elements of justification on the part of
    
    school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and
    
    belongings” were required due to the high level of both “subjective and
    
    reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy” implicated by a
    
    strip search. Id. at 374, 129 S. Ct. at 2641, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 364.
    
           C. Court Cases Applying the Federal Framework.
    
           1. Expectation of privacy when participating in athletics.                T.L.O.
    
    generally established that the Fourth Amendment of the United States
    
    Constitution provides school students with a limited expectation of
    
    privacy in the school setting and that searches based upon individualized
    
    suspicion must be reasonable. 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83
    
    L. Ed. 2d at 734. Vernonia then clarified that in the context of random
    
    drug searches “[l]egitimate privacy expectations [of students] are even
    
    less with regard to student athletes.”           515 U.S. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at
    
    
            2Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
     (1968) (holding stop
    
    and frisk searches reasonable).
                                                17
    
    2392, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577 3 (majority opinion); see Joye v. Hunterdon
    
    Cent. Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 
    826 A.2d 624
    , 642 (N.J. 2003). Yet,
    
    Vernonia did not involve a search based on individualized suspicion, but
    
    instead a random search which was minimally intrusive in light of the
    
    communal nature of group athletic activity. 515 U.S. at 657, 115 S. Ct.
    
    at 2392–93, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577.                Thus, under the Supreme Court’s
    
    approach to the Fourth Amendment student athletes still retain some
    
    expectation of privacy, but in at least some contexts—such as random
    
    drug testing—that expectation may be diminished under all the facts and
    
    circumstances. See Gruenke v. Seip, 
    225 F.3d 290
    , 301 (3d Cir. 2000)
    
    (holding student athletes have very limited expectation of privacy).
    
           2. History of prior infractions. In this case, it was undisputed that
    
    school authorities had knowledge that the student had a prior history of
    
    drug infractions and a weapons charge. To what extent is a prior history
    
    of discipline relevant in determining the reasonableness of a search of a
    
    student bag for drugs or contraband?
    
           There is some authority for the proposition that a history of prior
    
    infractions is not, in and of itself, sufficient to support a search of a
    
    student without other factors.           See M.M. v. Anker, 
    477 F. Supp. 837
    ,
    
    841–42 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 
    607 F.2d 588
    , 589 (2d Cir. 1979). In Anker, the
    
    court indicated that mere past involvement in theft was not sufficient
    
    
    
    
           3Two    state supreme courts have declined to follow Vernonia under state
    constitutional search and seizure provisions. See Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 
    836 A.2d 76
    , 90, 96 (Pa. 2003) (invalidating school district drug and alcohol testing policy
    for extracurricular activities under article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution);
    York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 
    178 P.3d 995
    , 1006 (Wash. 2008) (en banc)
    (invalidating suspicionless drug testing under article I, section 7 of the Washington
    Constitution).
                                         18
    
    cause, in and of itself, for a strip search of the student to recover missing
    
    property. Id. at 842.
    
          Additionally, when prior infractions are used to justify a search
    
    there must be a linkage between the past violations and the wrongdoing
    
    sought to be discovered. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Damien D.,
    
    the student’s history of truancy did not provide reasonable suspicion for
    
    a search for contraband because there was no relationship between
    
    absence from the classroom and drug infractions. 
    752 N.E.2d 679
    , 683
    
    (Mass. 2001).
    
          In most cases, however, the history of prior disciplinary problems
    
    is combined with other factors to provide a reasonable basis for the
    
    search. For example, in Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No.
    
    230, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a
    
    search of a student with a past history of illicit activities when, among
    
    other things, a bus driver had smelled marijuana from the direction
    
    where the student was seated on the bus, the student had told a teacher
    
    he was constantly thinking about drugs, the student had reportedly said
    
    he was dealing drugs and would test positive for marijuana, and he had
    
    a bulge in his pants when he had previously declared that he had
    
    “crotched” drugs during a police raid of his mother’s house. 
    991 F.2d 1316
    , 1322–23 (7th Cir. 1993).
    
          Similarly, in State ex. rel. Galford v. Mark Anthony B., the court
    
    found reasonable suspicion sufficient to initially justify a search when a
    
    student with a prior history of burglary was found to have had access as
    
    a janitor’s assistant to an empty classroom where $100 had been stolen
    
    from a teacher’s purse. 
    433 S.E.2d 41
    , 42, 45 (W. Va. 1993). The scope
    
    of the search, however—which included pulling down the student’s
                                        19
    
    underwear in a bathroom for inspection—was unreasonable in light of
    
    the relatively modest danger arising from a mere theft. Id. at 48–49.
    
          Another illustrative case is Coffman v. State, 
    782 S.W.2d 249
     (Tex.
    
    Ct. App. 1989). In that case, the court upheld the search of a student—
    
    who had a history of three or four disciplinary events—who was in the
    
    hallway when he should have been in class and told the school officials
    
    that he was returning from a parking lot where there had been recent
    
    thefts. Id. at 250. When the student was confronted, he placed a book
    
    bag behind himself, and when the school officials obtained possession of
    
    the bag, he lunged after it.    Id. at 250–51.   Further, in State ex rel.
    
    Juvenile Department of Washington County v. DuBois, the court
    
    considered the search of a student known to have brought weapons to
    
    the school on other occasions. 
    821 P.2d 1124
    , 1125 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
    
    Two other students reported that they had seen the student with a gun
    
    the day before and had heard the student was bringing the gun to school
    
    on the day in question. Id. Recognizing that probable cause might be
    
    required under article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, the court
    
    found it unnecessary to reach the question because under the
    
    circumstances even the higher standard was met. Id. at 1127.
    
          3. Furtive movements or other suspicious indicia. In this case, the
    
    school authorities believed the student’s comments gave rise to a
    
    reasonable suspicion that his equipment bag might contain something
    
    he did not want school officials to find.    The question arises whether
    
    such behavior qualifies as furtive acts supporting reasonable suspicion,
    
    or whether the comments were mere assertions of the right to privacy.
    
          An illustrative case is T.S. v. State, 
    100 So. 3d 1289
     (Fla. Dist. Ct.
    
    App. 2012). In that case, a student carried her book bag in the halls
    
    during the school day, contrary to school rules. Id. at 1290. She was
                                         20
    
    allowed to leave the bag in the school counselor’s office, which she did.
    
    Id.   Several times during the day the student sought and was denied
    
    access to the bag. Id. The school counselor wondered why she wanted
    
    access to the bag and decided to conduct a search. Id.
    
           The Florida court held the search was invalid.      Id. at 1292.    It
    
    noted the student involved had no history of illegal activity, the search
    
    was based on a mere hunch, and there were many innocent explanations
    
    for the student’s behavior. Id. Several other Florida cases have reached
    
    similar conclusions under varied fact patterns. See R.S.M. v. State, 
    911 So. 2d 283
    , 284–85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (noting lack of reasonable
    
    suspicion when student reached “towards his pockets and then jerk[ed]
    
    his hands back”); S.V.J. v. State, 
    891 So. 2d 1221
    , 1222–24 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
    
    App. 2005) (holding when a student looked startled and put her purse
    
    under her arm, and there was no prior complaint about drug use or
    
    other infractions involving student, the state did not have articulable
    
    facts sufficient to support search); A.H. v. State, 
    846 So. 2d 1215
    , 1216
    
    (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding an untrained teacher’s belief that
    
    something was not right with the student was insufficient to justify a
    
    search).
    
           In In re William G., the California Supreme Court considered
    
    whether there was sufficient particularized suspicion to search a student
    
    who appeared to attempt to hide a calculator case when approached by
    
    school authorities.   
    709 P.2d 1287
    , 1289 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).          The
    
    California court declared that the student’s
    
           “furtive gestures” in attempting to hide his calculator case
           from [a school official’s] view cannot, standing alone, furnish
           sufficient cause to search. Similarly, [the student]’s demand
           for a warrant did not create a reasonable suspicion upon
           which to base the search.
                                        21
    
    Id. at 1297 (citations omitted). Further, the court noted,
    
          Such conduct merely constitutes [the student]’s legitimate
          assertion of his constitutional right to privacy and to be free
          from unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . If a student’s
          limited right of privacy is to have any meaning, his attempt to
          exercise that right—by shielding a private possession from a
          school official’s view—cannot itself trigger a “reasonable
          suspicion.”
    
    Id. at 1297–98 (emphasis added).
    
          An effort to disown property, however, might give rise to reasonable
    
    suspicion.   In In re Murray, school authorities received a tip that a
    
    student might have something in his book bag that should not be there.
    
    
    525 S.E.2d 496
    , 497 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). When asked about his book
    
    bag, the student falsely stated the bag was not his.          Id. at 498.
    
    According to the court, the false denial when coupled with the tip was
    
    sufficient to support a search of the book bag. Id. at 499. The court
    
    stated the search was based upon “the sort of ‘common-sense
    
    conclusio[n] about human behavior’ upon which ‘practical people’—
    
    including government officials—are entitled to rely.” Id. (quoting T.L.O.,
    
    469 U.S. at 346, 105 S. Ct. at 745, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 737 (majority
    
    opinion)).
    
          There are some cases, however, where furtive gestures, if
    
    sufficiently suggestive, may provide reasonable suspicion for a search of
    
    a student. In the pre-T.L.O. case of State v. Young, a student appeared to
    
    jump up and put something down and then “ran his hand in his pants.”
    
    
    216 S.E.2d 586
    , 588 (Ga. 1975). The court found this curious behavior
    
    and an “obvious consciousness of guilt” sufficient to support a search.
    
    Id. at 593. A dissent noted, however, that the furtive gestures would be
    
    insufficient to support a search based on probable cause.       Id. at 601
    
    (Gunter, J., dissenting).
                                         22
    
           D. Iowa Caselaw. The parties have not directed our attention to
    
    Iowa caselaw applying the individualized reasonable suspicion approach
    
    of T.L.O. in a school setting. We have, however, considered the validity of
    
    a random locker search in State v. Jones, 
    666 N.W.2d 142
    , 143 (Iowa
    
    2003). In Jones, the school had an annual winter break locker cleanout
    
    designed to prevent accumulation of trash and school supplies and to
    
    prevent violations of laws related to weapons and drugs.        Id. at 144.
    
    Students were provided with notice that lockers would be checked with
    
    the student present. Id. Jones, however, did not follow the protocol and
    
    failed to show up for the cleanout.       Id.   School officials opened and
    
    searched Jones’s locker and found marijuana in the outside pocket of a
    
    coat in the locker.     Id.   We held that while Jones had a legitimate
    
    expectation of privacy in his school locker, the search was not invalid
    
    under the circumstances presented. Id. at 148, 150.
    
           In sustaining the search in Jones, we determined that the
    
    approach in Earls presented the proper framework for analysis and not
    
    the individualized approach of T.L.O. Id. at 146. Under Earls, a court
    
    considers (1) “the nature of the privacy interest” at stake, (2) “the
    
    character of the intrusion,” and (3) “the nature and immediacy of the
    
    [school]’s concerns and the efficacy of the [search p]olicy in meeting
    
    them.”   Earls, 536 U.S. at 830, 832, 834, 122 S. Ct. at 2565–67, 153
    
    L. Ed. 2d at 744, 746–47 (majority opinion); Jones, 666 N.W.2d at 146.
    
    After analyzing these factors, we upheld the random search conducted
    
    pursuant to the established school district policy. Jones, 666 N.W.2d at
    
    150.
    
           E. Discussion.
    
           1. Introduction. We begin by analyzing the case under the T.L.O.
    
    framework, which the parties agreed in the district court provides the
                                               23
    
    proper framework for analysis.            In evaluating this search under the
    
    applicable framework provided by T.L.O., we must engage in a two-step
    
    process.      The first question is whether at the inception of the search
    
    “there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
    
    evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the
    
    rules of the school.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42, 105 S. Ct. at 743, 83
    
    L. Ed. 2d at 734–35. The second question is whether the scope of the
    
    search was “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
    
    excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
    
    nature of the infraction.” Id. at 342, 105 S. Ct. at 743, 83 L. Ed. 2d at
    
    735.
    
           2. Reasonableness of the search or seizure at its inception. In this
    
    case, there is a substantial issue regarding when the search or seizure of
    
    the equipment bag occurred. The State suggests that the mere loading of
    
    the bag onto the bus and transporting it back to the home high school
    
    was not a seizure because this is exactly what would have happened to
    
    the bag after Lindsey’s injury if school authorities had no suspicion of
    
    illicit activity.
    
           The State also suggests that because Lindsey was engaged in an
    
    athletic event, he had a reduced—perhaps even nonexistent—legitimate
    
    expectation of privacy in his school-issued equipment bag.                    It raises,
    
    among other things, the doctrine of in loco parentis, which, according to
    
    the State, suggests that a student athlete at an away game has no
    
    expectation of privacy in a bag used to carry athletic equipment. 4
    
           4The   Supreme Court in T.L.O. rejected the in loco parentis doctrine—which
    literally means “in place of a parent”—the theory that the Fourth Amendment does not
    apply to a school official’s search of a student through parental delegation, just as it
    does not apply to a parent’s search of their child. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336, 105 S. Ct. at
    740, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 731; see generally 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure,
                                               24
    
           Yet, we conclude there is no need to address the issue of precisely
    
    when the search or seizure began or whether Lindsey had a reduced
    
    expectation of privacy in connection with a search of an equipment bag
    
    based on individualized suspicion because he was participating in an
    
    athletic event. 5    We conclude that even if the seizure occurred when
    
    Lindsey’s equipment bag was placed on the bus by school officials, and
    
    even assuming Lindsey had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
    
    equipment bag under T.L.O. standards, school officials had a reasonable
    
    basis for the seizure and subsequent search under the Fourth
    
    Amendment as construed by the United States Supreme Court.
    
           In considering the proper result in this case, we recognize that
    
    application of the T.L.O. amorphous standards “require[] great care to
    
    avoid abuse.” 6     Gerald S. Reamey, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme
    
    _____________________
    § 10.11(a), at 593–97 (5th ed. 2012), [hereinafter LaFave]. According to LaFave, the
    doctrine “is frequently used only as a slogan” and has become “a substitute for
    analysis.” LaFave, § 10.11(a), at 597. Yet, in Vernonia and in Earls the Supreme Court,
    while not reestablishing the applicability of in loco parentis to school searches,
    nonetheless emphasized the role of educational institutions as guardians and providers
    of tutelage. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830–31, 122 S. Ct. at 2565, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 745;
    Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582.
           5While  this lessened expectation of privacy has been applied by the Supreme
    Court in the context of random drug testing of student athletes, the search of the blue
    backpack within Lindsey’s equipment bag is arguably distinguishable as it does not
    implicate exposures of the body so central in the Vernonia analysis and, additionally,
    involves a particularized individual search under T.L.O. and not a generalized search.
            6See Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 
    115 F.3d 821
    , 827 (11th Cir. 1997)
    
    (“[N]ot only does the language used by the [T.L.O.] Court to announce a legal standard
    regarding the permissible scope of a reasonable school search lack specificity but, it
    appears, purposefully so.” (Footnote omitted.)); Williams v. Ellington, 
    936 F.2d 881
    , 886
    (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the reasonableness standard of T.L.O. has left courts “either
    reluctant or unable to define what type of official conduct” is prohibited). The
    amorphous and open-ended nature of the T.L.O. analysis has been frequently noted in
    the academic literature. See Neal I. Aizenstein, Casenote, Fourth Amendment—Searches
    by Public School Officials Valid on ‘Reasonable Grounds’, 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
    898, 923 (1985) (noting the reasonable grounds standard lacks authority and promotes
    inconsistency in caselaw); David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School
    Students: Can New Jersey v. T.L.O. Solve the Problem?, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 1, 44–45 (1994)
                                              25
    
    Court’s Lesson on School Searches, 16 St. Mary’s L.J. 933, 948–49
    
    (1985). We recognize the importance of ensuring that the T.L.O. test is
    
    not applied in a fashion to give school authorities a carte blanche in all
    
    settings and circumstances. Yet, we also recognize that under T.L.O., the
    
    Supreme Court has moved away from a rule-based search and seizure
    
    jurisprudence toward a case-by-case method that will often turn on a
    
    careful and meticulous analysis of the facts of the case.                  See Konop
    
    ex rel. Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 
    26 F. Supp. 2d 1189
    , 1196 (D.S.D. 1998)
    
    (noting that the T.L.O. holding is “difficult in its application” because of
    
    its fact intensive nature).
    
           Recognizing the difficulties, we nonetheless reach the conclusion
    
    that the seizure and search in this case met T.L.O. standards. We reach
    
    this conclusion because the seizure of Lindsey’s bag was not based
    
    merely on his history of involvement with drugs and guns or merely upon
    
    somewhat suspicious or ambiguous furtive gestures.                    While there is
    
    substantial caselaw, for instance, that furtive gestures alone may not be
    
    enough to justify a search or seizure of a student bag, most of the cases
    
    with a combination of history and suspicious actions on the part of the
    
    student sustain such government action.                  It may be under some
    
    _____________________
    (noting differences among courts in applying T.L.O. standards to strip searches); Martin
    R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized
    Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 
    22 Ga. L
    . Rev.
    897, 920 (1988) [hereinafter Gardner] (noting the abandonment of rule-based search
    and seizure jurisprudence for a case-by-case analysis of reasonableness); Sunil H.
    Mansukhani, School Searches After New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Are There Any Limits?, 34 U.
    Louisville J. Fam. L. 345, 360–61 (1996) (noting T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard fails
    to provide clear test); Stephen F. Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the
    Fourth Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1991) (noting vague reasoning and a lack of
    stated standards in T.L.O.). Given the nature of the test, we recognize the words of
    caution of Judge Posner that “[t]here is almost no legal outcome that a really skillful
    legal analyst cannot cover with a professional varnish.” Richard A. Posner, Foreward: A
    Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 52 (2005).
                                         26
    
    circumstances that mere history or questionable behavior or conduct is
    
    not enough to support a search. But here, both history and suspicious
    
    conduct are present. See R.B. v. State, 
    975 So. 2d 546
    , 548 (Fla. Dist.
    
    Ct. App. 2008) (holding a history of drug use and a furtive gesture
    
    provided sufficient suspicion to justify a search).
    
          Further, the suspicious statement here was not in any way caused
    
    by school officials but was volunteered by Lindsey. This is not a case
    
    where a student, in response to an action by school officials, seeks to
    
    prevent a threatened invasion of privacy as occurred in In re William G.,
    
    709 P.2d at 1289; see also State v. Zelinske, 
    779 P.2d 971
    , 975 (N.M. Ct.
    
    App. 1989) (stating refusal to consent cannot authorize a warrantless
    
    search), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bedolla, 
    806 P.2d 588
    ,
    
    595 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gilmour, 
    901 P.2d 894
    , 896 (Or. Ct.
    
    App. 1995) (noting that “if both consent and refusal to consent provided
    
    bases for officers to conduct searches, there would be no circumstances
    
    under which officers could not search”). According to Stanton, Lindsey—
    
    when on his back at the football field—volunteered the words to the effect
    
    of “please make sure that Keota gets my bag.” Stanton further reported
    
    that Lindsey said, “Don’t let anybody but Keota have my bag.” Coach
    
    Steffen largely confirmed Stanton’s account, noting that Lindsey “was
    
    pretty concerned about his bag and making sure that . . . a certain kid
    
    would get the bag for him and that nobody would mess with it.”          As
    
    noted by Steffen, Lindsey’s unprompted concern about his bag “raised a
    
    red flag.”
    
          Unlike in In re William G. or the consent cases, here the student
    
    affirmatively and without any prompting by school officials made his
    
    request that responsibility for his bag be given to a specific student. His
    
    comments were not designed to prevent officials from taking action, but
                                        27
    
    were instead an affirmative request that officials hand over his bag to a
    
    specific student. Under the circumstances, Lindsey’s statements sought
    
    to control who gained possession of his bag, but did not assert privacy
    
    rights against an imminent threat of government intrusion as in In re
    
    William G. See 709 P.2d at 1289.
    
          Additionally, the request was not a mildly suspicious comment
    
    with lots of alternative innocuous explanations like when a student asks
    
    to retrieve a temporarily impounded bag at the administration office. See
    
    T.S., 100 So. 3d at 1290; see also S.V.J., 891 So. 2d at 1222.        Given
    
    Lindsey’s potentially serious injury on the football field, it was truly odd
    
    for him to be worried about who grabbed his equipment bag to return it
    
    to school. Lindsey’s volunteered request raised eyebrows considering his
    
    history of drug abuse and firearm violations.
    
          Under T.L.O., the standard generally applicable to support a
    
    particularized search or seizure of a student bag is not probable cause.
    
    469 U.S. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734.         Instead, a
    
    search or seizure must be reasonable under the circumstances. Id. As
    
    the Court later stressed in Redding, there must be at least “a moderate
    
    chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.” 557 U.S. at 371, 129 S. Ct. at
    
    2639, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 362 (majority opinion).
    
          Although drawing the line between a hunch and reasonable
    
    suspicion as required is often difficult, we conclude that in this case
    
    school officials were operating on a “ ‘common-sense conclusio[n] about
    
    human behavior’ upon which ‘practical people’—including government
    
    officials—are entitled to rely.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346, 105 S. Ct. at 745,
    
    83 L. Ed. 2d at 737 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S. Ct. at 695,
    
    66 L. Ed. 2d at 629). When Lindsey, a person who had been suspended
    
    from school for drug activity and had firearm charges in the past,
                                         28
    
    expressed unprompted and unusual concern about his equipment bag
    
    when lying on the football field with a potentially serious injury, school
    
    authorities reasonably saw at least a yellow flag, if not a red flag,
    
    indicating there was a fair chance that this troubled youth had drugs or
    
    guns in the equipment bag.
    
          3. Scope of search.       We now turn to the question of the
    
    reasonableness of the scope of the search. Under applicable federal law,
    
    a search is permissible in scope “when the measures adopted are
    
    reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
    
    intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
    
    infraction.”   Id. at 342, 105 S. Ct. at 743, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735.        As
    
    indicated above, school authorities had sufficient reason to believe the
    
    equipment bag might contain drugs or a gun based on Lindsey’s history
    
    of involvement in drugs and guns and his curious concern about the
    
    equipment bag when immobilized on the football field with a potentially
    
    serious injury.   When the school officials opened the bag and found
    
    another bag within, it was reasonable for school officials to look in the
    
    second bag since drugs or guns could reasonably be stored in it.
    
    Further, the fact the superintendent heard a loud thud when the bag hit
    
    the floor while the superintendent was preparing to conduct the search
    
    provided an additional reason to search in the second bag. The search
    
    was not excessively intrusive in light of the objectives of the search.
    
          It is, of course, true that the search and seizure led to the
    
    discovery of a gun in the blue backpack. Lindsey claims that the loud
    
    clunk when the equipment bag hit the floor was hardly cause for
    
    thinking a gun was within the bag and that any such conclusion would
    
    be a wildly speculative hunch, not reasonable suspicion.         The State’s
    
    alternative stand-alone argument is that even if there was not reasonable
                                          29
    
    suspicion to search the equipment bag based on the statements by
    
    Lindsey, the loud clunk—when combined with knowledge of Lindsey’s
    
    past   involvement    with    guns—gave      school   authorities    sufficient
    
    particularized suspicion at that time to search the equipment bag. The
    
    school superintendent, who owned a handgun, claimed that after he
    
    heard the noise he was “one hundred percent certain it was a gun.”
    
           The parties have cited no authority with similar facts.       We have
    
    uncovered one case that is somewhat instructive. In In re Gregory M., a
    
    school security officer heard a metallic thud when a student put a bag
    
    down on a shelf. 
    627 N.E.2d 500
    , 501 (N.Y. 1993). The security guard
    
    proceeded to feel the outside of the bag, which revealed a gun-like object
    
    in the bag. Id. A school official then opened the bag and found the gun.
    
    Id. The New York court concluded that based solely on the metallic thud,
    
    the security officer did not have reasonable suspicion under T.L.O. to
    
    search the bag but that a feel of the outside of the bag was a minimal
    
    intrusion that was reasonable even with the lack of particularized
    
    reasonable suspicion and was supportable under T.L.O. Id. Once the
    
    security officer felt the contours of the gun-like object, the security officer
    
    then at that point had sufficient particularized suspicion to support the
    
    further search of the bag. Id.
    
           In light of our resolution of this case, however, we need not reach
    
    the issue of whether the loud thud was an insufficient basis for the
    
    search or was fruit of an unlawful seizure. Instead, we conclude that
    
    reasonable suspicion under T.L.O. existed prior to the loud thud and that
    
    the loud thud merely provided additional reason to press the search into
    
    the blue backpack contained within the equipment bag.
    
           4. Applicability of analysis under the Iowa Constitution.       In this
    
    case, Lindsey cites both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 of
                                                30
    
    the Iowa Constitution in support of his claim. A conclusory reference to
    
    the Iowa Constitution was raised below.               On appeal, however, Lindsey
    
    agrees that the standard established by T.L.O. and its progeny provide
    
    the relevant framework for analysis under the Iowa Constitution.7
    
    Because Lindsey has not suggested an independent standard under the
    
    Iowa Constitution, we apply the federal framework for the purpose of this
    
    case but reserve the right to apply that framework in a fashion different
    
    from federal caselaw. State v. Lyle, 
    854 N.W.2d 378
    , 383–84 (Iowa 2014);
    
    State v. Pals, 
    805 N.W.2d 767
    , 771–72 (Iowa 2011); State v. Bruegger,
    
    
    773 N.W.2d 862
    , 883 (Iowa 2009).
    
           Obviously, the standard of reasonability is not a verbal formula
    
    that lends itself “to easy quantification, clear classification, or easily
    
    administered criteria.” Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered
    
    (Misanswered) Fourth Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer
    
    Remedies, 80 Miss. L.J. 847, 896 (2011). 8 Indeed, in T.L.O. itself, the
    
    New Jersey Supreme Court—where the case originated—used a standard
    
    very similar to that ultimately approved in T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 343, 105
    
    S. Ct. at 743–44, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 736; see State in re T.L.O., 
    463 A.2d 934
    , 942 (N.J. 1983), rev’d, T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348, 105 S. Ct. at 746, 83
    L. Ed. 2d at 738. The United States Supreme Court, however, viewed the
    
    New Jersey court’s application as manifesting a “crabbed notion of
    
    
    
    
           7Lindsey  does not cite, for instance, the dissents in T.L.O., courts of other states
    relying upon independent analysis of search and seizure requirements under state
    constitutions, or academic criticism of T.L.O. and its progeny.
           8Forcriticism of reasonability and balancing tests in search and seizure, see
    Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 
    58 Minn. L
    . Rev. 349,
    393–95 (1974) (critiquing reasonableness and balancing), and Gardner, 
    22 Ga. L
    . Rev.
    at 919–25. See also State v. Short, 
    851 N.W.2d 474
    , 485–86 (Iowa 2014).
                                              31
    
    reasonableness.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343, 105 S. Ct. at 744, 83 L. Ed. 2d
    
    at 736.
    
           In this case, the parties have litigated within the framework of
    
    federal caselaw. We find the search falls within the general parameters
    
    of reasonableness as outlined in T.L.O. Under our cases, when a party
    
    does not present an independent standard under Iowa law, we may still
    
    apply the federal standard more stringently than the federal caselaw.
    
    But the standard for whether the search of Lindsey’s equipment bag and
    
    the backpack within it was constitutionally permissible is whether the
    
    search has a moderate chance of uncovering wrongdoing. We think that
    
    standard was met.        In this case we thus do not find an independent
    
    violation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 9
    
           IV. Conclusion.
    
           For all the above reasons, the judgment of the district court is
    
    affirmed.
    
           DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF
    
    DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
    
           All justices concur except Mansfield and Waterman, JJ., who
    
    concur specially, and Wiggins, J., who dissents.
    
    
    
    
           9Other  states have found independent violations of the right to be free from
    unreasonable searches and seizures under their state constitutions. For instance, the
    Oregon Supreme Court has emphasized that under article I, section 9 of the Oregon
    Constitution, the privacy protected “is not privacy that one reasonably expects but the
    privacy to which one has a right.” See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Clackamas Cty. v.
    M.A.D., 
    233 P.3d 437
    , 441 (Or. 2010) (en banc) (quoting State v. Howard, 
    157 P.3d 1189
    , 1193 (Or. 2007)).
                                        32
    
                                                  #14–0773, State v. Lindsey
    
    MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring specially).
    
          I join the court in affirming Lindsey’s conviction and sentence and
    
    the denial of his motion to suppress.      I also join the court’s opinion
    
    subject only to the following exception.
    
          I do not agree that an argument under article I, section 8 of the
    
    Iowa Constitution has been preserved. It is true that Lindsey’s motion to
    
    suppress did mention “the Iowa Constitution” once (although not article
    
    I, section 8). However, the district court’s ruling cited only the Fourth
    
    Amendment, and Lindsey did not seek to expand that ruling. Moreover,
    
    on appeal Lindsey mentioned article I, section 8 only twice in passing in
    
    his brief and did nothing to develop a state constitutional argument.
    
    Further, at oral argument before the court of appeals, Lindsey’s counsel
    
    conceded that Lindsey’s appeal could be resolved “by examining the
    
    Fourth Amendment exclusively.” Consequently, the court of appeals did
    
    not consider article I, section 8. And in oral argument before our court,
    
    nobody talked about the Iowa Constitution.       This can be verified by
    
    listening to the publicly available recording. Accordingly, I concur in the
    
    judgment and in the court’s opinion except as noted here.
    
          Waterman, J., joins this special concurrence.
                                        33
    
                                                   #14–0773, State v. Lindsey
    
    WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
    
          As   the    majority   acknowledges,   the   federal   standard   that
    
    determines whether the search of the equipment bag violated the Fourth
    
    Amendment is the one set forth in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
    469 U.S. 325
    ,
    
    
    105 S. Ct. 733
    , 
    83 L. Ed. 2d 720
     (1985) and Safford Unified School
    
    District No. 1 v. Redding, 
    557 U.S. 364
    , 
    129 S. Ct. 2633
    , 
    174 L. Ed. 2d 354
     (2009).      For evidence obtained by public school officials to be
    
    admissible under the Fourth Amendment, the search or seizure by which
    
    it was obtained must have been “justified at its inception” because the
    
    officials had “reasonable grounds” to suspect it would produce evidence
    
    of violations of the law or school rules. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42, 105
    
    S. Ct. at 742–43, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734–35 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 20, 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 1879, 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    , 905 (1968)).             More
    
    specifically, before initiating the search or seizure, officials must have
    
    had sufficient reliable knowledge to support a reasonable belief they had
    
    a “moderate chance” of discovering evidence of wrongdoing.        Redding,
    
    557 U.S. at 370–71, 129 S. Ct. at 2639, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 361–62. When
    
    school officials claim a search or seizure was justified based on
    
    individualized suspicion of a particular student, the court must assess
    
    whether they had sufficient reliable information to support such a belief
    
    concerning the particular student before the search or seizure occurred.
    
    Id. at 373–74, 129 S. Ct. at 2641, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 363.
    
          In holding the search and seizure of Lindsey’s equipment bag was
    
    justified at its inception, the majority concludes school officials were
    
    justified in believing they had a moderate chance of discovering evidence
    
    of wrongdoing inside it based on just two facts. First, the superintendent
    
    knew Lindsey had a history of drug and gun infractions. Second, after
                                             34
    
    being badly injured during a football game, Lindsey repeatedly requested
    
    that the superintendent give his equipment bag to one of his friends on
    
    the team and not to let anyone else mess with it as he was being prepped
    
    for transport via ambulance. 10
    
           In my view, the majority fixates on Lindsey’s past to incorrectly
    
    conclude this reasonably innocuous conduct was actually suspicious
    
    conduct.     Consequently, the majority concludes reasonably innocuous
    
    conduct created the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the search
    
    and seizure of the bag under T.L.O. and Redding. In contrast, for the
    
    following reasons, I believe school officials had inadequate reasonably
    
    reliable information to believe they had a moderate chance of finding
    
    evidence of wrongdoing inside the equipment bag at the moment they
    
    seized it.
    
           First, the majority asserts the request Lindsey made to the
    
    superintendent was “truly odd” in light of his serious injury and not
    
    merely “a mildly suspicious comment with lots of alternative innocuous
    
    explanations.”     I disagree with this assessment.           Nothing about the
    
    request Lindsey made or the manner in which he made it amounted to
    
    “suspicious conduct” under the circumstances.
    
           As the Supreme Court has recognized, “schoolchildren may find it
    
    necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband
    
    items . . . onto school grounds.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339, 105 S. Ct. at
    
    741, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733. This legitimate need is in no way diminished
    
    when students participate in school activities on school grounds. In that
    
           10Despite the quotes used in the majority and concurring opinions, the
    superintendent testified that he did not remember the statements Lindsey made well
    enough to quote them. When asked what the gist of the statements Lindsey made was,
    he replied: “It was just like I said, please make sure that Keota gets my bag. Please
    make sure that nobody else gets my bag.”
                                        35
    
    context, students may need to transport “not only the supplies needed
    
    for their studies, . . . keys, money, and the necessaries of personal
    
    hygiene and grooming,” but also “articles of property needed in
    
    connection with extracurricular or recreational activities.” See id. Along
    
    with such necessary items, students may have perfectly legitimate
    
    reasons to carry with them “nondisruptive yet highly personal items as
    
    photographs, letters, and diaries.” Id.
    
          In today’s world, I would add cellphones, tablets, and laptops to
    
    the list of items students may legitimately carry on school grounds.
    
    Among high schoolers today, cell phones are particularly ubiquitous. Cf.
    
    Riley v. California, 
    573 U.S.
    ___, ___, 
    134 S. Ct. 2473
    , 2490, 
    189 L. Ed. 2d 430
    , 447 (2014). As the Supreme Court has noted, cell phones
    
    ordinarily contain “vast quantities of personal information.” Id. at ___,
    
    134 S. Ct. at 2485, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 442. Thus, many high schoolers
    
    ordinarily keep on their person or among their belongings on school
    
    grounds “a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the
    
    mundane to the intimate.” Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2490, 189 L. Ed. 2d
    
    at 447.
    
          I think the majority is incorrect to assert that Lindsey asking the
    
    superintendent to give his equipment bag to his friend and make sure
    
    nothing happened to it amounted to “suspicious conduct.”           This is
    
    particularly true in light of the fact that Lindsey had placed his backpack
    
    in his equipment bag at least for the duration of the football game. Quite
    
    simply, it appears that everything Lindsey had with him—his backpack,
    
    schoolbooks, homework, clothes, shoes, wallet, cash, keys, cellphone,
    
    etc.—was in his equipment bag when he was injured. Accordingly, in my
    
    view it would have been odd if Lindsey had not been concerned about
    
    what would happen to his equipment bag upon learning he had been
                                         36
    
    potentially severely injured and was being transported to the hospital.
    
    Whatever the equipment bag contained, it would have been perfectly
    
    natural for any high school student in his situation to want to ensure it
    
    was shielded from theft or intrusion and safely returned. Even setting
    
    aside the potentially vast quantity of personal information the equipment
    
    bag may have contained, its contents were also likely worth a great deal
    
    of money, particularly in the eyes of a high schooler.
    
          Additionally, upon assessing the injury Lindsey suffered during the
    
    football game, the ambulance attendants placed Lindsey into a cervical
    
    collar and onto a backboard to prevent his further injury. Thus, it was
    
    hardly “suspicious conduct” suggestive of wrongdoing for Lindsey to
    
    repeat his request that his equipment bag be given to his friend or fail to
    
    appreciate the potential seriousness of his injury. Given the nature of
    
    his probable injury and the context in which it occurred, 11 school
    
    officials reasonably should have understood it was unlikely Lindsey was
    
    thinking clearly before he was transported to the hospital.
    
          In short, Lindsey making the statements he made under the
    
    circumstances in which he made them did not amount to “suspicious
    
    conduct.” Therefore, I conclude school officials lacked any reliable basis
    upon which to form a reasonable suspicion that Lindsey was engaged in
    
    wrongdoing before he was loaded into the ambulance.
    
          Because the statements Lindsey made before he was loaded onto
    
    the ambulance could not reasonably have been perceived to be
    
    suspicious under the circumstances, the only basis school officials had
    
    for suspecting he might have been engaged in wrongdoing while he was
    
    
          11Football is a contact sport widely acknowledged to be associated with
    
    concussions and head injuries.
                                         37
    
    being cared for on the field was his past conduct. Standing alone, this
    
    was insufficient to justify a reasonable belief that officials had a
    
    “moderate chance” of discovering evidence of wrongdoing inside his
    
    equipment bag. And at bottom, Lindsey’s history is really all the majority
    
    relies upon to find reasonable suspicion existed in this case.           The
    
    majority opinion all but admits that, were it not for his past suspension
    
    for drug activity and past firearm charges, school officials would not have
    
    reasonably seen a yellow flag or a red flag when Lindsey sought to ensure
    
    his equipment bag was delivered to his friend. In the majority’s view,
    
    merely because he had been in trouble before, Lindsey’s being concerned
    
    about what happened to his belongings somehow indicated there was a
    
    “fair chance that this troubled youth had drugs or guns in the equipment
    
    bag.”
    
            Second, the majority supplies no adequate basis for its conclusion
    
    the affirmative requests Lindsey made were not an assertion of his
    
    constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
    
    without a warrant. There can be no denying Lindsey had an absolute
    
    right to assert his constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable
    
    search or seizure of his equipment bag without a warrant until school
    
    officials actually had reasonable suspicion to search or seize it. Lindsey
    
    had the ability to affirmatively assert that right at least until reasonably
    
    reliable information indicated school officials had a moderate chance of
    
    discovering evidence he was engaged in wrongdoing, even if he ultimately
    
    perceived a threat to his privacy at the hands of school officials only after
    
    being injured on the football field. Yet the majority suggests the validity
    
    of any assertion of that right Lindsey might have attempted to make
    
    turns on whether school officials “caused” him to make it by affirmatively
    
    threatening to invade his privacy. I believe the majority is incorrect to
                                         38
    
    distinguish the requests Lindsey made from an assertion of a
    
    constitutional right on the ground that he “volunteered” them.
    
          Instead of engaging with the content of the statements Lindsey
    
    made, the majority places too great an emphasis on the context in which
    
    he made them. On the content front, the majority analysis is thin. The
    
    majority asserts what Lindsey said did not amount to an assertion of a
    
    constitutional right in part because his statements “were not designed to
    
    prevent officials from taking action, but were instead an affirmative
    
    request that officials hand over his bag to a specific student.” But if the
    
    statements Lindsey made were not designed to prevent officials from
    
    searching his equipment bag, why were they so suspicious? And when
    
    Lindsey instructed school officials as to what he wanted done with his
    
    equipment bag, by implication did he not also instruct them as to what
    
    he did not want done with it? The majority simply fails to explain what
    
    distinguishes the “affirmative request” Lindsey repeatedly made from an
    
    effective assertion of his constitutional right not to have school officials
    
    search or seize his equipment bag without a warrant.
    
          Two potentially troubling implications follow from the majority
    
    analysis. First, the majority opinion suggests a student may invoke the
    
    right to be free from unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures
    
    only after school officials explicitly threaten to invade his or her privacy.
    
    Second, the majority opinion suggests that for a student to effectively
    
    assert the right to be free from unreasonable warrantless searches and
    
    seizures against school officials, only an explicit assertion expressed in
    
    precise terms will do.
    
          The majority implicitly acknowledges that, if the statements
    
    Lindsey made amounted to an assertion of a constitutional right, the
    
    search was unconstitutional. As the majority opinion recognizes,
                                        39
          There are many reasons why a student might assert these
          rights, other than an attempt to prevent disclosure of
          evidence that one has violated a proscribed activity. A
          student cannot be penalized for demanding respect for his or
          her constitutional rights.
    
    In re William G., 
    709 P.2d 1287
    , 1297–98 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).
    
    Nonetheless, the majority declines to provide any meaningful guidance as
    
    to just how explicit an assertion of the right to be free from unreasonable
    
    searches and seizures must be in order to be effective in this context. In
    
    contrast, in In re Warren G., the California Supreme Court concluded
    
    that right to be adequately invoked whenever a student attempts to
    
    shield a private possession from school officials:
    
          If a student’s limited right of privacy is to have any meaning,
          his attempt to exercise that right—by shielding a private
          possession from a school official’s view—cannot in itself
          trigger a “reasonable suspicion.” A contrary conclusion
          would lead to the anomalous result that a student would
          retain a right of privacy only in those matters that he
          willingly reveals to school officials.
    
    Id. Thus, if Lindsey instructed school officials to give the equipment bag
    
    to his friend because he desired to shield it from them, he arguably
    
    asserted his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
    
    and seizures without a warrant.
    
          Because I part ways with the majority on the question of whether
    
    the statements Lindsey made could have created reasonable suspicion in
    
    the minds of school officials who knew about his past conduct, I need not
    
    delve further into the question of whether his statements amounted to an
    
    assertion of his right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures
    
    without a warrant. That is because school officials seized the equipment
    
    bag when they declined to heed Lindsey’s requests that it be given to his
    
    trusted friend and teammate.
                                         40
    
          When the head coach carried the equipment bag onto the bus back
    
    to Dunkerton and placed it onto the seat next to his wife, knowingly
    
    disregarding the requests Lindsey made, the bag was unquestionably
    
    seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. “A seizure occurs
    
    even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the detention
    
    or taking, but the detention or taking itself must be willful.” Brower v.
    
    County of Inyo, 
    489 U.S. 593
    , 596, 
    109 S. Ct. 1378
    , 1381, 
    103 L. Ed. 2d 628
    , 635 (1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In this case, the
    
    facts clearly indicate the coach willfully grabbed the equipment bag and
    
    withheld it from the person Lindsey intended it to be entrusted to
    
    because the superintendent asked him to. Indeed, there is no question
    
    the coach knew Lindsey did not want him to transport the equipment
    
    bag back to Dunkerton himself, as he personally heard Lindsey ask that
    
    it be given to his friend instead.
    
          As a result, by the time the superintendent heard the metallic
    
    sound coming from within the equipment bag in the lunchroom back in
    
    Dunkerton, the bag had already been seized within the meaning of the
    
    Fourth Amendment.        It therefore makes no difference whether the
    
    superintendent reasonably believed the sound he heard was created by a
    
    firearm coming into contact with the floor through the fabric of the bag
    
    or not. Because the seizure of the equipment bag was not adequately
    
    justified at the moment of its inception, the ensuing search of the bag
    
    was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and
    
    the fruits of that search should have been suppressed. I would therefore
    
    reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.