Gregory Boyd v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2001 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Clements
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    GREGORY BOYD
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2947-99-4                JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
    APRIL 17, 2001
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
    William T. Newman, Jr., Judge
    Janell M. Wolfe for appellant.
    Shelly R. James, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Appellant Gregory Boyd was convicted in a jury trial of
    robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58.    On appeal, he contends
    the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to
    cross-examine him about the nature of his prior felony offenses.
    After examining the record, we conclude that, although the trial
    court did err, that error was harmless.    Accordingly, we affirm
    appellant's conviction.
    As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this
    case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential
    value, this opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
    disposition of this appeal.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    Boyd's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
    erred in permitting the Commonwealth to question him on
    cross-examination about the nature of his prior felony
    convictions.
    In reviewing Boyd's claim, we are guided by several
    established principles.   When a defendant testifies in his own
    defense, he puts his credibility in issue.    Smith v. Commonwealth,
    
    212 Va. 675
    , 676, 
    187 S.E.2d 191
    , 192 (1972) (per curiam).    The
    defendant's credibility may then be impeached by evidence of prior
    convictions.   Sadoski v. Commonwealth, 
    219 Va. 1069
    , 1071, 
    254 S.E.2d 100
    , 101 (1979).   The Commonwealth may ask the defendant on
    cross-examination "the number of times he has been convicted of a
    felony, but . . . not the names of the felonies, other than
    perjury, and not the nature or details thereof."   Id.; see also
    Code § 19.2-269; Jewel v. Commonwealth, 
    30 Va. App. 416
    , 425-26,
    
    517 S.E.2d 264
    , 269 (1999) (construing Code § 19.2-269 to mean
    that the Commonwealth may show the fact of defendant's felony
    convictions but not the names, other than perjury, and details
    thereof), aff'd, 
    260 Va. 430
    , 
    536 S.E.2d 905
    (2000).   Likewise,
    when the defendant "testifies on direct examination that he has
    been convicted previously of a certain number of felonies, he may
    be cross-examined only with respect to the correctness of the
    number stated and, if his answers are truthful, not with regard to
    the names or the nature of the offenses."    McAmis v. Commonwealth,
    
    225 Va. 419
    , 422, 
    304 S.E.2d 2
    , 4 (1983).    Furthermore, a
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    defendant's credibility may be impeached by evidence of his prior
    misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude.    Chrisman v.
    Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 89
    , 
    348 S.E.2d 399
    (1986).
    Here, Boyd testified on his own behalf at trial.      He
    testified on direct examination that he had been convicted of "six
    or maybe seven" felonies.    He did not identify on direct
    examination the name or nature of any of his felony convictions.
    He also testified that he had been convicted of misdemeanors
    involving moral turpitude.
    On cross-examination, the following exchange took place
    between the prosecutor and Boyd:
    Q. And defense counsel had asked you
    about your criminal record. You have
    approximately eight felony convictions. Is
    that right?
    A.   Yes, sir — I mean, yes ma'am.
    Q. Okay. And some of those are for
    lying, cheating or stealing. Is that
    correct?
    A. I wouldn't say – I wouldn't say it
    exactly like that, lying, cheating or
    stealing. They was petit larcenies. You
    know what I mean? It was grand larceny, you
    know, but now — it wasn't for lying, cheating
    and stealing. That's what you trying to say.
    Q. Lying, cheating or stealing. Let's
    focus on stealing. Were any of the felonies
    for any stealing kinds of crimes?
    A.   Yes.    It was for petit larceny, yes.
    Q. The felonies?     You know a felony is
    a more serious crime?
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    A.    Yes.
    Q. When your counsel asked you about
    felonies, do you understand what a felony is?
    A.   Yes, I do.
    Q. Now, thinking back on your record,
    were any of those felonies, the serious ones,
    for involved — did those involve stealing?
    A.    No.
    Boyd's counsel then objected, asserting that the Commonwealth
    could not ask about the nature of Boyd's previous offenses.     The
    trial court overruled the objection, ruling that the Commonwealth
    could ask Boyd if he had been convicted of a felony involving
    lying, cheating, or stealing.      The cross-examination continued as
    follows:
    Q. I'm going to ask again about the
    felonies, the serious crimes.
    A.    Yes, ma'am.
    Q. Any of those crimes, not the petit
    larcenies or misdemeanors but the serious
    crimes, has to do with stealing?
    A. No, ma'am. It was a drug offense,
    my serious charge that I went to the
    institution for.
    Q. Okay. Would it refresh your
    recollection, or do you just not remember or
    are you just saying no, I had no felony
    crimes involving stealing?
    A.    I'm not saying that.
    Q. But if you looked at your criminal
    record, might you remember if you had any
    crimes involving stealing that were serious
    crimes?
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    A. Well, okay.       Yes, I did.    Yes, I
    did. Okay.
    Q.    Do you remember now?
    A. I'm just saying for to answer your
    question correctly, you know what I mean, you
    saying did I have any felonies that is for
    lying, cheating or stealing. And as far as
    my recollection as do I have it? Yes, I do.
    Q. Okay. And do you think there is
    probably three or four of those?
    A.    It may be, yes.
    Because Boyd testified on direct examination that he had been
    convicted previously of six or seven felonies, the Commonwealth
    was permitted to question Boyd on cross-examination regarding the
    correctness of the number stated.       
    McAmis, 225 Va. at 422
    , 304
    S.E.2d at 4.   Once, however, Boyd testified truthfully that he had
    been convicted of eight felonies, the Commonwealth was not
    permitted to subsequently ask about the nature of his previous
    felony convictions.    
    Id. We hold, therefore,
    that the trial court
    erred in allowing the Commonwealth to pursue its questioning of
    Boyd regarding the nature of his previous felony convictions.
    However, our inquiry does not end there.       We must decide
    whether the error requires reversal of Boyd's conviction.       A
    non-constitutional error by the trial court is harmless if
    "it plainly appears from the record and the
    evidence given at the trial that" the error
    did not affect the verdict. An error does
    not affect a verdict if a reviewing court
    can conclude, without usurping the jury's
    fact finding function, that, had the error
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    not occurred, the verdict would have been
    the same.
    Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 1003
    , 1005, 
    407 S.E.2d 910
    , 911 (1991) (en banc) (quoting Code § 8.01-678).   "Each case
    must . . . be analyzed individually to determine if an error has
    affected the verdict."   
    Id. at 1009, 407
    S.E.2d at 913.
    In this case, it plainly appears from the record and the
    evidence given at the trial that the error did not affect the
    jury's verdict.   The victim unequivocally identified Boyd as the
    person who robbed him.   Furthermore, Boyd told the jury that he
    had eight previous felony convictions and that he had been
    convicted of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude.   The
    improperly elicited evidence was limited to Boyd's disclosure
    that, of his eight felony convictions, one was for a drug
    offense and three or four involved lying, cheating, or stealing.
    No other details of those convictions were revealed.
    Moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that
    told the jury that the evidence of other offenses could only be
    considered for impeachment of the defendant and could not be
    considered as evidence of his guilt.   When, as here, the record
    does not show otherwise, "it is to be presumed that the jury
    followed an explicit cautionary instruction."   Albert v.
    Commonwealth, 
    2 Va. App. 734
    , 741, 
    347 S.E.2d 534
    , 538 (1986).
    We can conclude, therefore, without usurping the jury's fact
    finding function, that, had the erroneously permitted questions
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    propounded to Boyd on cross-examination over defense counsel's
    objection not been asked, the verdict would have been the same.
    Accordingly, the error was harmless, and we affirm appellant's
    conviction.
    Affirmed.
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