Jacob Lee Schmidt v. State of Iowa ( 2018 )


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  •                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
                                      No. 15–1408
    
                                Filed March 23, 2018
    
    
    JACOB LEE SCHMIDT,
    
             Appellant,
    
    vs.
    
    STATE OF IOWA,
    
             Appellee.
    
    
    
             On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
    
    
    
             Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Edward
    
    A. Jacobson, Judge.
    
    
    
             A defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
    
    affirming summary dismissal/summary judgment of his postconviction-
    
    relief   action.      DECISION    OF   COURT    OF   APPEALS   VACATED;
    
    DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
    
    
             Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey,
    
    Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    
    
    
             Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich, Assistant
    
    Attorney General, for appellee.
                                         2
    
         Erica A. Nichols Cook of the State Public Defender’s Office,
    
    Des Moines, for amicus curiae Exoneration Project at the University of
    
    Chicago Law School.
    
         Lance W. Lange, Jesse Linebaugh, and Mitch G. Nass of Faegre
    
    Baker Daniels, LLP, Des Moines, for amici curiae The Innocence Network
    
    and The Innocence Project of Iowa.
                                              3
    
    WIGGINS, Justice.
    
           An applicant filed a postconviction-relief action claiming he was
    
    actually innocent although he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to
    
    the charged crimes.          He based his actual-innocence claim on a
    
    recantation by the victim. The district court granted the State’s motion
    
    for summary dismissal/summary judgment, ruling the applicant cannot
    
    use the recantation to attack his knowing and voluntary guilty pleas
    
    because the recantation was extrinsic to the pleas.                  The applicant
    
    appealed, and we transferred the case to our court of appeals. The court
    
    of appeals affirmed.       The applicant sought further review, which we
    
    granted.
    
           On further review, we overrule our cases holding that defendants
    
    may only attack the intrinsic nature—the voluntary and intelligent
    
    character—of their pleas.        We now hold the Iowa Constitution allows
    
    freestanding claims of actual innocence, so applicants may bring such
    
    claims to attack their pleas even though they entered their pleas
    
    knowingly and voluntarily. Accordingly, we adopt a freestanding claim of
    
    actual innocence that applicants may bring under our postconviction-
    
    relief statute. 1 Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals,
    
    reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case to the
    
    district court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
    
           I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    
           On December 19, 2006, the State filed a trial information charging
    
    Jacob Lee Schmidt with sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of
    
           1We   do not think Class v. United States, 
    583 U.S.
    ___, 
    138 S. Ct. 798
     (2018),
    affects our decision today. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held a guilty
    plea does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging on direct appeal the
    constitutionality of the statute of conviction. Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 803–05. Our
    decision involves an actual-innocence claim under the Iowa Constitution based on
    newly discovered evidence.
                                         4
    
    Iowa Code section 709.4(1) (2005). On March 23, 2007, the State moved
    
    to amend the trial information to charge Schmidt with two additional
    
    counts of sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of section
    
    709.4(2)(b) (counts II and III) and one count of incest in violation of
    
    section 726.2 (count IV). The district court granted the motion.
    
          The minutes of testimony attached to the original trial information
    
    and the police offense report reveal that witnesses would provide the
    
    following testimony.      On February 25, 2006, Schmidt, then age
    
    seventeen, visited the home of his stepfather, Peter, and his newly turned
    
    fourteen-year-old half-brother, B.C., with whom Schmidt shares the
    
    same mother. Peter is B.C.’s father. Peter left Schmidt and B.C. alone at
    
    the house to visit his girlfriend. Upon Peter’s departure, Schmidt ordered
    
    B.C. into the bedroom and forced him to get on his knees on the
    
    mattress with his pants down. B.C. complied. Schmidt then removed
    
    his own pants, got on his knees behind B.C., and attempted anal sex.
    
          Peter realized he had forgotten his cigarettes and went back home
    
    to retrieve them. Once inside, he saw neither Schmidt nor B.C. in the
    
    living room, where they had been up until his departure. Peter thought
    
    this was strange, so he looked around the home and eventually opened
    
    the bedroom door and saw Schmidt attempting to penetrate B.C. anally.
    
    Peter yelled, “What the hell are you doing!” and told Schmidt to “get the
    
    hell out of the house.”    Schmidt left the house, and Peter called the
    
    police.
    
          Officers Todd Ferry and Kevin Heineman responded. Officer Ferry
    
    took Peter out to the squad car to interview him while Officer Heineman
    
    spoke to B.C. inside the home. Because Peter could not write or spell
    
    well, Officer Ferry used the in-car camera to record Peter’s interview.
                                             5
    
           Meanwhile,    B.C.    recounted       what   had   happened   to    Officer
    
    Heineman.     B.C. stated he was “not afraid,” and Schmidt had only
    
    threatened   him    on   a   previous    occasion     when   Schmidt      actually
    
    penetrated him approximately two or three months ago.            Schmidt had
    
    told B.C. not to tell anyone unless B.C. wanted to get hurt. B.C. defined
    
    “penetrate” as “when he actually went inside his anal area.” B.C. stated
    
    he was “positive” Schmidt did not penetrate him this time and “no part of
    
    his body hurt.”     All B.C. wanted was for the police to arrest Schmidt.
    
    Officer Heineman asked B.C. to fill out a witness statement and realized
    
    B.C. had difficulty with spelling and writing. Officer Heineman did not
    
    have B.C. continue writing the witness statement after B.C. had written
    
    three or four words.
    
           Peter’s home landline phone rang, and Officer Heineman answered
    
    it.   Shanna, Schmidt and B.C.’s mother, was on the other end of the
    
    phone. She stated Schmidt had come to her home and she was going to
    
    take him to Mercy Hospital because he was having suicidal thoughts. At
    
    the hospital, Shanna advised Officer Ferry that Schmidt said Peter was
    
    lying about the whole incident.
    
           Officer Christopher Groves followed up on the case. He asked to
    
    interview Schmidt who declined on the advice of his lawyer.                Officer
    
    Groves described B.C. as “lower functioning” and stated he did not
    
    interview him because it was “very evident” he could “lead him [to]
    
    answers.” Officer Groves thus scheduled B.C. for an interview with the
    
    Child Advocacy Center, which conducted a videotaped interview on
    
    March 2.
    
           During the March 2 interview, B.C. told the interviewer “[Schmidt]
    
    tried to molest him.” B.C. stated Schmidt had penetrated him on at least
    
    one occasion, and “it hurt and he tried to escape.” He was thirteen at the
                                          6
    
    time. B.C. stated he had sucked Schmidt’s penis before but could not
    
    say how many times this occurred.
    
              On April 2, 2007, Schmidt entered into a plea agreement.         He
    
    agreed to plead guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, an
    
    aggravated misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11
    
    (amended count I) and incest (count IV). The State agreed to dismiss the
    
    two other counts of sexual abuse in the third degree (counts II and III)
    
    given the district court sentenced Schmidt according to the plea
    
    agreement.
    
              That same day, during the combined plea and sentencing hearing,
    
    the court reviewed the consequences of pleading guilty with Schmidt.
    
    Schmidt informed the court he understood the rights he was giving up
    
    and wished to plead guilty to the charges. Schmidt acknowledged the
    
    minutes of testimony accurately described what he did.             The court
    
    reviewed the factual basis for each count, and Schmidt confirmed he
    
    understood. The court accepted Schmidt’s pleas and convicted him of
    
    assault with intent to commit sexual abuse and incest. Pursuant to the
    
    plea agreement, the court entered sentences of incarceration to run
    
    consecutively for a total term not to exceed seven years. Schmidt did not
    
    appeal this decision.
    
              On June 23, 2014, Schmidt filed an application for postconviction
    
    relief under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(d) (2014).        In support of his
    
    application, he contended B.C. recanted his story by “com[ing] forward
    
    with the truth.” Schmidt further claimed, “I was not guilty. I was scared
    
    so I pled guilty [be]cause I was fac[ing] over [fifty] years.” Schmidt alleged
    
    the victim’s recantation was new evidence supporting postconviction
    
    relief.     In its answer, the State denied “each and every ground for
    
    postconviction relief.”
                                         7
    
           On May 14, 2015, the State filed a motion for summary
    
    dismissal/summary judgment, making two arguments. First, the State
    
    argued the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Iowa Code
    
    section   822.3   procedurally   barred    Schmidt’s   postconviction-relief
    
    application.
    
           Second, on the merits, the State asserted Schmidt’s “application
    
    [was] in direct contradiction to the record as well as in direct
    
    contradiction to his voluntary and knowing plea[s] of guilty.” It claimed
    
    Schmidt pled guilty after an extensive colloquy, knowing his involvement
    
    or noninvolvement in the alleged sexual act and the evidence against
    
    him.
    
           On May 28, Schmidt filed a resistance, arguing B.C.’s recantation
    
    was “new evidence [that] prevented earlier filing [of his postconviction-
    
    relief application] and [that] establishes actual innocence.”          Schmidt
    
    included B.C.’s affidavit. In his affidavit, B.C. stated under oath,
    
           When I was 21 years old, I told other people that [Schmidt]
           had never touched me in a sexual way or sexually abused
           me. I didn’t tell anyone before that date that nothing had
           really happened, and so [Schmidt] couldn’t have known
           before then. I decided to tell people when I turned 21 since I
           was a full adult at that time.
    
           On July 30, the district court granted the State’s motion for
    
    summary dismissal/summary judgment. It did not rule on the statute of
    
    limitations. Rather, relying on an unpublished court of appeals decision,
    
    it stated that “newly discovered exculpatory evidence does not provide
    
    grounds to withdraw a guilty plea unless intrinsic to the plea itself.” In
    
    other words, the court decided Schmidt waived his claim of actual
    
    innocence by pleading guilty. Schmidt appealed.
    
           We transferred the case to the court of appeals.       Affirming the
    
    district court’s grant of summary dismissal/summary judgment, the
                                        8
    
    court of appeals reasoned the alleged recantation was not intrinsic to
    
    Schmidt’s guilty pleas.    It therefore concluded, “[B]ecause Schmidt’s
    
    convictions were entered following his guilty pleas, he cannot challenge
    
    those convictions in a [postconviction-relief] action on the basis of newly
    
    discovered evidence in the form of his alleged victim’s recantation.”
    
    Schmidt filed an application for further review, which we granted.
    
          II. Scope of Review.
    
          “[T]he principles underlying [a] summary judgment procedure
    
    apply to motions of either party for disposition of an application for
    
    postconviction relief without a trial on the merits.”   Manning v. State,
    
    
    654 N.W.2d 555
    , 560 (Iowa 2002).        In other words, for a summary
    
    disposition to be proper, the State must be able to prevail as if it were
    
    filing a motion for summary judgment in a civil proceeding. Castro v.
    
    State, 
    795 N.W.2d 789
    , 793 (Iowa 2011) (“The standards for summary
    
    judgment in postconviction[-]relief actions are analogous to summary
    
    judgment in civil proceedings.”).
    
          We review summary dismissals of postconviction-relief applications
    
    for errors at law. Id. at 792. Applying summary judgment principles,
    
    summary disposition is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
    
    interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
    
    any, show . . . there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the
    
    moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”       Davis v.
    
    State, 
    520 N.W.2d 319
    , 321 (Iowa 1994) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c),
    
    now r. 1.981(3)). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no
    
    material fact exists. C & J Vantage Leasing Co. v. Wolfe, 
    795 N.W.2d 65
    ,
    
    73 (Iowa 2011). We view the record in the light most favorable to the
    
    nonmoving party. Eggiman v. Self-Insured Servs. Co., 
    718 N.W.2d 754
    ,
    
    758 (Iowa 2006).     We also draw all legitimate inferences from the
                                         9
    
    evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. C & J Vantage, 795 N.W.2d at
    
    73.
    
          III. Analysis.
    
          A.    Whether Schmidt’s Guilty Pleas Preclude Him from
    
    Pursuing His Actual-Innocence Claim.          The broad issue we must
    
    decide is whether Schmidt’s pleas preclude him from pursuing a
    
    postconviction-relief action.   The narrow issue we must address is
    
    whether Schmidt’s pleas preclude him from bringing his actual-
    
    innocence claim because such a challenge is extrinsic to his pleas.
    
          Under our current law,
    
          [w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open
          court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is
          charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims
          relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that
          occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only
          attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty
          plea . . . .
    
    State v. Utter, 
    803 N.W.2d 647
    , 651 (Iowa 2011) (alteration in original)
    
    (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 
    411 U.S. 258
    , 267, 
    93 S. Ct. 1602
    , 1608
    
    (1973)). It is on this basis the district court dismissed and the court of
    
    appeals affirmed the dismissal of Schmidt’s postconviction-relief action.
    
    The time has come to reevaluate this law in regards to an actual-
    
    innocence claim. We now turn to the first issue and begin our analysis
    
    by examining our postconviction-relief statute.
    
          Iowa Code section 822.2 provides, “Any person who has been
    
    convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense and who claims any of the
    
    following may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under
    
    this chapter to secure relief.” Iowa Code § 822.2(1).
                                         10
    
          We have previously discussed the meaning of the term “conviction”
    
    under section 822.2 in Daughenbaugh v. State, 
    805 N.W.2d 591
    , 597–99
    
    (Iowa 2011). There we said,
    
          We begin our discussion of Iowa law by examining our
          approach to statutory interpretation of the term “conviction.”
          Like many other jurisdictions, we have emphasized that
          “conviction” has an “equivocal meaning” that depends upon
          the context in which it is used. Like many other states, we
          have said that, when the word is used in its general and
          popular sense, conviction means the establishment of guilt
          independent of judgment and sentence. On the other hand,
          when the term “conviction” is used in its technical legal
          sense, it requires a formal adjudication by the court and the
          formal entry of a judgment of conviction.
    
    Id. at 597 (citations omitted). We then stated our postconviction statute
    
    uses the word conviction in its “ ‘strict legal sense’ and not in its broader
    
    popular context.” Id. at 598–99. Thus, the technical legal sense of the
    
    word conviction requires adjudication of guilt and the entry of a
    
    judgment. Id. at 599.
    
          In another case, we stated the acceptance by the court of a
    
    defendant’s plea “constitutes a conviction of the highest order” and
    
    authorizes the court to sentence the defendant as though the factfinder
    
    returned a guilty verdict. State v. Kobrock, 
    213 N.W.2d 481
    , 483 (Iowa
    
    1973). That is what happened here: Schmidt entered his pleas, the court
    
    accepted his pleas, and sentenced him accordingly.         In doing so, the
    
    court adjudicated him guilty and entered judgment.         Adjudication and
    
    entry of judgment constitute conviction, and conviction is a requirement
    
    for filing a postconviction-relief action under section 822.2.           See
    
    Daughenbaugh, 805 N.W.2d at 599.           Thus, Schmidt’s pleas do not
    
    preclude him from filing a postconviction-relief action.
                                         11
    
             The second issue is whether Schmidt faces any other barriers to
    
    filing his postconviction-relief action after pleading guilty.   Specifically,
    
    the issue is whether Schmidt may attack his pleas by bringing an actual-
    
    innocence claim even though such a challenge is extrinsic to his pleas.
    
    First, we discuss the current state of our caselaw regarding challenges to
    
    pleas.     Second, we examine the implication of State v. Alexander,
    
    
    463 N.W.2d 421
     (Iowa 1990), on the possibility of challenging a plea in a
    
    postconviction-relief action based on newly discovered evidence. Third,
    
    we discuss the phenomenon of pleading guilty despite actual innocence.
    
    Lastly, we examine our legislature’s codification of section 81.10, which
    
    allows postconviction-DNA testing.
    
             A valid plea “waive[s] all defenses and the right to contest all
    
    adverse pretrial rulings.” State v. Morehouse, 
    316 N.W.2d 884
    , 885 (Iowa
    
    1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kress, 
    636 N.W.2d 12
    , 20
    
    (Iowa 2001). However, the defendant may attack his or her plea when
    
    the plea itself contains intrinsic irregularities or the trial information
    
    charges no offense. See State v. Mattly, 
    513 N.W.2d 739
    , 740–41 (Iowa
    
    1994); Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d at 885.
    
             We fashioned the general rule precluding extrinsic challenges to
    
    pleas on the premise that “[a] defendant plead[s] guilty in open court,
    
    with assistance of counsel, knowingly and understandingly.” State v.
    
    Delano, 
    161 N.W.2d 66
    , 73 (Iowa 1968). Thus, the defendant waives his
    
    or her rights “with respect to conduct of criminal prosecution and any
    
    objection to prior proceedings which may include a violation of his [or
    
    her] rights.” Id. This waiver could preclude certain postconviction-relief
    
    actions under section 822.2(1)(a), which provides relief for a “conviction
    
    or sentence [that] was in violation of the Constitution of the United
    
    States or the Constitution or laws of this state.” Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a).
                                         12
    
          It does not preclude relief under section 822.2(1)(d), which
    
    provides relief when “[t]here exists evidence of material facts, not
    
    previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction
    
    or sentence in the interest of justice.” Id. § 822.2(1)(d); accord Alexander,
    
    463 N.W.2d at 423 (referring to Iowa Code section 663A.2(4) (1989), now
    
    codified at section 822.2(1)(d) (2014)).
    
          In Alexander, the defendant pled guilty to going armed with a
    
    dangerous weapon. 463 N.W.2d at 421. After his plea and sentencing,
    
    the defendant filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
    
    evidence in the form of witness testimony supporting a theory of
    
    justification or self-defense. Id. at 422. We examined then rule 23(2)(a)
    
    of our rules of criminal procedure. That rule stated,
    
          The application for a new trial . . . shall be made not later
          than forty-five days after plea of guilty [or] verdict of
          guilty, . . . but in any case not later than five days before the
          date set for pronouncing judgment, but where based upon
          newly discovered evidence may be made after judgment as
          well.
    
    Id. (quoting Iowa R. Crim. P. 23(2)(a), now r. 2.24(2)(a) (emphasis added)).
    
          We reasoned “[l]ogic would suggest that the concept of new trial
    should have as its predicate the existence of a former trial.” Id. Based
    
    on the legislative history, we then concluded inclusion of the phrase
    
    “plea of guilty” in rule 23(2)(a) was inadvertent and erroneous, and
    
    therefore held rule 23(2)(a) as written did not allow for a new trial
    
    following a guilty plea. Id. at 422–23. We buttressed this conclusion by
    
    stating,
    
                 We are confident that the legislature did not intend to
          give admittedly guilty persons the unfettered right to recant
          their admission and proceed to trial on the ground of newly
          discovered evidence or any other ground not intrinsic to the
          plea.
                                         13
    
    Id. at 423.
    
          We reasoned “[n]otions of newly discovered evidence simply have
    
    no bearing on a knowing and voluntary admission of guilt.”               Id.
    
    However, we noted the defendant was not without a remedy.          Id.   We
    
    stated the remedy the defendant sought was available under Iowa Code
    
    section 663A.2(4) (1989), now codified at section 822.2(1)(d) (2014), when
    
    challenging his plea based on newly discovered evidence. Id. Thus, in
    
    Alexander, we left the door open for challenging a plea in a
    
    postconviction-relief action based on newly discovered evidence.
    
          We now examine the phenomenon of actually innocent people
    
    pleading guilty.     The National Registry of Exonerations reported that
    
    seventy-four exonerations in 2016 arose from pleas.           The National
    
    Registry      of   Exonerations,   Exonerations   in   2016    2    (2017),
    
    www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2
    
    016.pdf.
    
          We have stated “criminal cases in general, and guilty pleas in
    
    particular, are characterized by considerable uncertainty[.]”      State v.
    
    Carroll, 
    767 N.W.2d 638
    , 642 (Iowa 2009).
    
          [T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in
          frequently involves the making of difficult judgments. All the
          pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses
          are examined and cross-examined in court. Even then the
          truth will often be in dispute. In the face of unavoidable
          uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel must make their
          best judgment as to the weight of the State’s case. Counsel
          must predict how the facts, as he understands them, would
          be viewed by a court. If proved, would those facts convince a
          judge or jury of the defendant’s guilt? On those facts would
          evidence seized without a warrant be admissible? Would the
          trier of fact on those facts find a confession voluntary and
          admissible? Questions like these cannot be answered with
          certitude; yet a decision to plead guilty must necessarily rest
          upon counsel’s answers, uncertain as they may be. Waiving
          trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations
                                                14
           of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be
           mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court’s
           judgment might be on given facts.
    
    Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 
    397 U.S. 759
    , 769–70, 
    90 S. Ct. 1441
    , 1448 (1970)).
    
           Pleading     guilty    despite    actual     innocence      is   not   limited    to
    
    uncertainty. One of our recent cases recognizes that actually innocent
    
    people plead guilty for many different reasons.                See Rhoades v. State,
    
    
    880 N.W.2d 431
    , 436–38 (Iowa 2016).
    
           People have been known to confess to crimes they did not commit
    
    during police interrogations 2 and such confessions bleed into their
    
    decisions to plead guilty. “A false coerced confession may undermine the
    
    accuracy of a guilty plea . . . .” Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady
    
    Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 651, 656
    
    (2007). Because such a confession increases the chances of conviction
    
    at trial, defendants face pressure to plead guilty even when they are
    
    actually innocent. Id.; see also Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent:
    
    Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 
    2006 Wis. L
    . Rev. 739, 796 (2006)
    
    [hereinafter Uphoff] (“The difficulty of overcoming so-called confessions
    
    and of successfully attacking a positive eyewitness identification are just
    two of a host of factors that may push a defendant into a guilty plea
    
    regardless of his or her actual innocence.”).
    
           Moreover, innocent defendants plead guilty for reduced charges
    
    and shorter sentences. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
    
    Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1034 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow];
    
           2A   number of factors contribute to a false confession, such as “duress,”
    “coercion,” “intoxication,” “diminished capacity,” “mental impairment,” “ignorance of the
    law,” “fear of violence,” “the actual infliction of harm,” “the threat of a harsh sentence,”
    [and] “misunderstanding the situation.”          Innocence Project, False Confessions or
    Admissions, https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/false-confessions-admissions/
    [https://perma.cc/66JM-T4L9].
                                              15
    
    see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
    
    101 Yale    L.J.   1909,    1912     (1992)    [hereinafter    Scott   &   Stuntz]
    
    (“Defendants accept bargains because of the threat of much harsher
    
    penalties after trial; they are thus forced to give up the protections that
    
    the trial system’s many formalities provide.”).               The reality of plea
    
    bargaining is that “[defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose
    
    receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might
    
    think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books
    
    largely for bargaining purposes.” Barkow, 58 Stan. L. Rev. at 1034.
    
           Simply put, in economic terms, defendants engage in a cost–benefit
    
    analysis.   Entering into a plea agreement is not only rational but also
    
    more attractive than dealing with the uncertainty of the trial process and
    
    the possibility of harsher sentences.          Indeed, “even with competent
    
    counsel, going to trial can be incredibly risky business.”                 Uphoff,
    
    
    2006 Wis. L
    . Rev. at 799. We stated in Rhoades that “[w]hen the deal is
    
    good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether
    
    one believes the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
    
    and regardless of whether one is factually innocent.”              880 N.W.2d at
    
    436–37 (alteration in original) (quoting Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal
    Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the Variable Standard of
    
    Proof, 
    63 Fla. L
    . Rev. 431, 450 (2011)); accord Jed S. Rakoff, Why
    
    Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 20, 2014),
    
    www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-
    
    guilty/ [https://perma.cc/LT8T-XKAV] (“If [the defendant’s] lawyer can
    
    obtain a plea bargain that will reduce his likely time in prison, he may
    
    find it ‘rational’ to take the plea.”).
                                              16
    
           A plea does not weed out the innocent. Rather, a plea is an explicit
    
    agreement 3 between the prosecutor and the defendant that “establishes a
    
    ‘going rate.’ ”    John L. Kane, Plea Bargaining and the Innocent, The
    
    Marshall          Project       (Dec.          26,     2014,         1:05        PM),
    
    https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/26/plea-bargaining-and-
    
    the-innocent       [https://perma.cc/R5FU-Y3T4].               Specifically,    “[t]he
    
    anticipated sentence is the central concern in the negotiation[,]” but
    
    “[t]he problem . . . is that both innocent and guilty defendants are placed
    
    in the same pot and the goal is to achieve the appearance of justice, not
    
    the realization of it.” Id.; see also Missouri v. Frye, 
    566 U.S. 134
    , 144,
    
    
    132 S. Ct. 1399
    , 1407 (2012) (“In today’s criminal justice system . . . the
    
    negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is
    
    almost always the critical point for a defendant.”). Pleading guilty does
    
    not automatically mean the defendant is actually guilty. Sometimes, an
    
    innocent defendant is choosing the lesser of two evils: pleading guilty
    
    despite his or her actual innocence because the odds are stacked up
    
    against him or her, or going to trial with the risk of losing and the
    
    prospect of receiving a harsher sentence.
    
           Innocent defendants may also plead guilty in the face of pressure
    
    from prosecutors and even their own defense counsels.                   Today, “our
    
    criminal justice system is almost exclusively a system of plea bargaining,
    
    negotiated behind closed doors and with no judicial oversight.” Jed S.
    
    Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 20,
    
    2014).    Behind these closed doors, prosecutors have broad discretion:
    
    “the   prosecutor-dictated       plea   bargain      system,   by    creating    such
    
    inordinate pressures to enter into plea bargains, appears to have led a
    
           3Two scholars have gone as far to describe the plea bargaining process as “horse
    trading.” Scott & Stuntz, 101 Yale L.J. at 1912.
                                          17
    
    significant number of defendants to plead guilty to crimes they never
    
    actually committed.”     Id.; see also Innocence Project, Why Are People
    
    Pleading Guilty to Crimes They Didn’t Commit? (Nov. 25, 2015),
    
    https://www.innocenceproject.org/why-are-people-pleading-guilty-to-
    
    crimes-they-didnt-commit/ [https://perma.cc/3CEX-WEW2].
    
            H. Lee Sarokin, a former federal judge, described the plea
    
    bargaining process as involving “intimidation by the prosecution and
    
    incompetence by the defense.” H. Lee Sarokin, Why Do Innocent People
    
    Plead      Guilty?,    HuffPost     (May      29,    2012,     4:39       PM),
    
    https://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/innocent-people-
    
    guilty-pleas_b_1553239.html       [https://perma.cc/6PSQ-6QW4].            He
    
    illustrated,
    
            The defendant, frightened, most often poor, uneducated, a
            minority member is advised that a trial is likely to end with a
            conviction and a long sentence, whereas a plea will
            guarantee a much shorter sentence.                Despite his
            protestations of innocence, the defendant seeks guidance
            frequently from an over-worked, underpaid defense lawyer
            who would much prefer a quick deal rather than a long
            drawn out trial. Of course, not all defense counsel fit that
            description. Many do not, but even the best and most
            devoted are required to put this draconian choice to their
            clients—a guaranteed short sentence versus a potentially
            long one—possibly life in prison.
    
    Id. We again emphasize the prosecutor’s promise of a shorter sentence is
    
    more attractive than going to trial and possibly losing. Defendants, even
    
    those who are actually innocent and especially those who are indigent,
    
    have more to lose by going to trial than by pleading guilty.
    
            Finally, we review the current legislative policy regarding guilty
    
    pleas and actual innocence.       In 2005, in passing Iowa Code section
    
    81.10, the legislature recognized a person who pleads guilty could be
    
    actually innocent. See 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, § 10 (codified at Iowa
                                                18
    
    Code § 81.10).       Section 81.10 allows a convicted defendant to make a
    
    motion that, if granted, would require DNA testing “on evidence collected
    
    in the case for which the person stands convicted.” Iowa Code § 81.10
    
    (2014). The motion must state the following:
    
                b. The facts of the underlying case, as proven at trial
          or admitted to during a guilty plea proceeding.
    
                   ....
    
                h. The type of inculpatory evidence admitted into
          evidence at trial or admitted to during a guilty plea
          proceeding.
    
                   ....
    
                 l. Why the DNA evidence would have changed the
          outcome of the trial or invalidated a guilty plea if DNA
          profiling had been conducted prior to the conviction.
    
    Id. § 81.10(2)(b), (h), and (l) (emphases added).
    
          After the convicted defendant files the motion and the county
    
    attorney files an answer to the motion, the court may order a hearing on
    
    the motion. Id. § 81.10(3), (6). The court must grant the motion if all of
    the requirements of section 81.10(7) apply.              One of the requirements
    
    recognizes     the     applicability   of   DNA      exoneration    to   pleas.   Id.
    
    § 81.10(7)(d). Section 81.10(7)(d) provides, “The evidence subject to DNA
    
    analysis is material to, and not merely cumulative or impeaching of,
    
    evidence included in the trial record or admitted to at a guilty plea
    
    proceeding.”    Id. (emphasis added).            This legislation reaffirms the fact
    
    that even actually innocent persons do in fact plead guilty and should
    
    have a chance for exoneration.
    
          In   light      of   these   recent   developments,      we   hold    convicted
    
    defendants can attack their pleas when claiming actual innocence even if
    
    the attack is extrinsic to the pleas. We know people plead guilty for all
                                             19
    
    sorts of reasons. Many of these reasons are unrelated to whether the
    
    defendant actually committed the crime. Additionally, the legislature has
    
    set the policy that the state should not incarcerate actually innocent
    
    people if DNA evidence exonerates them, regardless of their pleas. We
    
    see no reason why we should treat people exonerated by DNA evidence
    
    differently from people exonerated by other reliable means. For example,
    
    when the court determines the police planted evidence, such as drugs,
    
    why should that defendant remain in prison simply because he or she
    
    pled guilty to a reduced charge in light of the overwhelming evidence of
    
    his or her guilt?
    
           What kind of system of justice do we have if we permit actually
    
    innocent people to remain in prison? See Engesser v. Young, 
    856 N.W.2d 471
    , 484 (S.D. 2014) (“Punishment of the innocent may be the worst of
    
    all injustices.”    (quoting Jenner v. Dooley, 
    590 N.W.2d 463
    , 471 (S.D.
    
    1999))); see also In re Kaufmann, 
    157 N.E. 730
    , 733 (N.Y. 1927) (noting
    
    that in circumstances in which a convicted individual establishes his
    
    innocence, “the administration of justice would be subject to reproach if
    
    an implacable law of remedies were to close the door forever upon the
    
    hope of vindication”). 4 It is time that we refuse to perpetuate a system of
    
    justice that allows actually innocent people to remain in prison, even
    
    those who profess guilt despite their actual innocence.
    
           Accordingly, we overrule our cases that do not allow defendants to
    
    attack their pleas based on extrinsic grounds when they claim actual
    
    
    
    
           4We   acknowledge these two cases involved defendants who went to trial. We
    discuss this distinction later in the opinion. In any event, we believe the principles
    reflected in Engesser and In re Kaufmann apply equally to defendants who claim actual
    innocence following trial and those who claim actual innocence following a guilty plea
    proceeding.
                                        20
    
    innocence.   Therefore, we hold Schmidt’s pleas do not preclude his
    
    actual-innocence claim merely because he pled guilty to the charges.
    
          B. An Actual-Innocence Claim Under Iowa Law. We have never
    
    addressed whether, under our postconviction-relief statute, a claim of
    
    actual innocence constitutes a gateway claim or a freestanding claim
    
    implicating the Iowa Constitution.        Additionally, we have neither
    
    discussed the standard courts must apply when confronted with actual-
    
    innocence claims nor the vehicle defendants may use to bring such
    
    claims.
    
          1. Freestanding claim versus gateway claim. In the federal system,
    
    a habeas petitioner may overcome a procedural bar to habeas review by
    
    bringing a gateway claim of actual innocence such that the petitioner
    
    may obtain review of the underlying constitutional merits of his or her
    
    procedurally defaulted claim.     Herrera v. Collins, 
    506 U.S. 390
    , 404,
    
    
    113 S. Ct. 853
    , 862 (1993); see also In re Davis, 
    557 U.S. 952
    , 955,
    
    
    130 S. Ct. 1
    , 3 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). “Federal habeas review of
    
    state convictions has traditionally been limited to claims of constitutional
    
    violations occurring in the course of the underlying state criminal
    
    proceedings.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 416, 113 S. Ct. at 869. The United
    
    States Supreme Court has declined to stretch the reach of federal habeas
    
    review to freestanding claims of actual innocence when there is a state
    
    avenue to provide for pardons. Montoya v. Ulibarri, 
    163 P.3d 476
    , 482
    
    (N.M. 2007); People v. Cole, 
    765 N.Y.S.2d 477
    , 484 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
    
          To overcome a procedural bar to federal habeas review, a petitioner
    
    must generally show “cause for the default and prejudice from the
    
    asserted error.” House v. Bell, 
    547 U.S. 518
    , 536, 
    126 S. Ct. 2064
    , 2076
    
    (2006). “Cause” turns on the question of “whether the prisoner can show
    
    that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s
                                         21
    
    efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.”     Murray v. Carrier,
    
    
    477 U.S. 478
    , 488, 
    106 S. Ct. 2639
    , 2645 (1986).         The United States
    
    Supreme Court has vaguely defined “prejudice” but “prejudice” at least
    
    entails an “actual prejudice” standard that requires a showing that “is
    
    ‘greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct
    
    appeal.’ ” Engle v. Isaac, 
    456 U.S. 107
    , 134–35, 
    102 S. Ct. 1558
    , 1575
    
    (1982) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 
    431 U.S. 145
    , 154, 
    97 S. Ct. 1730
    ,
    
    1736–37 (1977)).
    
          Absent the showing of cause and prejudice,
    
          a court may not reach the merits of: (a) successive claims
          that raise grounds identical to grounds heard and decided
          on the merits in a previous petition, . . . ; (b) new claims, not
          previously raised, which constitute an abuse of the writ, . . . ;
          or (c) procedurally defaulted claims in which the petitioner
          failed to follow applicable state procedural rules in raising
          the claims[.]
    
    Sawyer v. Whitley, 
    505 U.S. 333
    , 338, 
    112 S. Ct. 2514
    , 2518 (1992)
    
    (citations omitted).
    
          The procedural default doctrine arises from the principles of comity
    and finality, and the conservation of judicial resources. House, 547 U.S.
    
    at 536, 126 S. Ct. at 2076.     However, in certain circumstances, such
    
    principles “must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally
    
    unjust incarceration.” Id. (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495, 106 S. Ct. at
    
    2649); see Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S 436, 454, 
    106 S. Ct. 2616
    , 2627
    
    (1986) (holding the miscarriage-of-justice exception allows successive
    
    claims given the petitioner shows “under the probative evidence he has a
    
    colorable claim of factual innocence”); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.
    
    Ct. at 2649 (holding “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
    
    violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
    
    innocent,” the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim could be reached).
                                            22
    
    For purposes of this appeal, we focus on the fundamental-miscarriage-of-
    
    justice, or actual-innocence, exception.
    
          In Schlup v. Delo, in considering a petitioner’s actual-innocence
    
    claim accompanied by an assertion of constitutional violations at trial,
    
    the Supreme Court explained what constitutes a gateway claim and
    
    articulated the gateway standard. 
    513 U.S. 298
    , 315–17, 326–27, 
    115 S. Ct. 851
    , 861–62, 867 (1995).          The Court defined the petitioner’s
    
    gateway claim of actual innocence as “not itself a constitutional claim,
    
    but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to
    
    have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”
    
    Id. at 315, 115 S. Ct. at 861 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S. Ct.
    
    at 862). In other words, the petitioner’s claim of actual innocence does
    
    not alone provide a basis for a court to vacate his conviction. See id.
    
    Rather, his claim of actual innocence depends on the validity of his
    
    underlying constitutional claims. See id.
    
          Schlup    held   a   petitioner   asserting   a   gateway   claim   must
    
    demonstrate that in light of all the evidence, including the new evidence,
    
    “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found
    
    petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 327, 115 S. Ct. at
    
    867 (adopting “the Carrier ‘probably resulted’ standard”); accord Kenfield
    
    v. State, 
    377 P.3d 1207
    , 1211–12 (Mont. 2016); Berry v. State, 
    363 P.3d 1148
    , 1155 (Nev. 2015); In re Personal Restraint of Weber, 
    284 P.3d 734
    ,
    
    740 (Wash. 2012) (en banc).             This more-likely-than-not standard
    
    “ensures that petitioner’s case is truly ‘extraordinary,’ . . . while still
    
    providing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a manifest
    
    injustice.”    Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S. Ct. at 867 (quoting
    
    McCluskey v. Zant, 
    499 U.S. 467
    , 494, 
    111 S. Ct. 1454
    , 1470 (1991)).
    
    The petitioner does not need to establish with absolute certainty that he
                                         23
    
    or she is innocent.    House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S. Ct. at 2077.       In
    
    declining to adopt a clear and convincing standard, the Court stated that
    
    actual-innocence claims “pose less of a threat to scarce judicial resources
    
    and to principles of finality and comity than do claims that focus solely
    
    on the erroneous imposition of the death penalty.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at
    
    324, 115 S. Ct. at 865.
    
          Based on the foregoing, we carefully distinguish between the two
    
    forms of an actual-innocence claim: a gateway claim of actual innocence
    
    with an underlying constitutional challenge and a freestanding claim of
    
    actual innocence that is itself the substantive basis for relief.
    
          2.   Freestanding claims of actual innocence in Iowa.         Schmidt
    
    argues the “in the interest of justice” language of Iowa Code section
    
    822.2(1)(d), unlike federal habeas, gives a substantive basis for actual-
    
    innocence claims.     Schmidt states section 822.2(1)(a) also provides a
    
    means to raise a freestanding claim of actual innocence because “[i]f a
    
    person is convicted of a crime he did not commit[,] such a conviction
    
    violates the Iowa Constitution.”    Thus, Schmidt contends, because his
    
    claim of actual innocence is itself a substantive claim, it does not need to
    
    pass through the actual-innocence gateway.
    
          The federal circuit courts of appeals remain unsettled on the
    
    question of whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence exists.
    
    John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a
    
    Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State
    
    Constitutional Right in New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(1)(G-1)?,
    
    76 Alb. L. Rev. 1453, 1464–65 nn.83–95 (2013) (citing cases).          If a
    
    freestanding claim of actual innocence exists, it would have to overcome
    
    an “extraordinarily high threshold.” Id. at 1464 & n.85 (collecting cases);
    
    see also Carriger v. Stewart, 
    132 F.3d 463
    , 476 (9th Cir. 1997)
                                                 24
    
    (“Requiring affirmative proof of innocence is appropriate, because when a
    
    petitioner makes a freestanding claim of innocence, he is claiming that
    
    he is entitled to relief despite a constitutionally valid conviction.”).
    
            At the state level, a number of jurisdictions acknowledge
    
    freestanding claims of actual innocence. Engesser, 856 N.W.2d at 481
    
    n.3 (collecting cases and statutes that allow freestanding claims of actual
    
    innocence).         States that do recognize freestanding claims of actual
    
    innocence apply varying standards.                Compare People v. Washington,
    
    
    665 N.E.2d 1330
    , 1337 (Ill. 1996) (holding the defendant must present
    
    new evidence that is “ ‘of such conclusive character’ as would ‘probably
    
    change the result on retrial’ ” (quoting People v. Silagy, 
    507 N.E.2d 830
    ,
    
    834 (Ill. 1987))), with State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 
    102 S.W.3d 541
    , 548
    
    (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (holding the petitioner must “make a clear and
    
    convincing showing of actual innocence that undermines confidence in
    
    the correctness of the judgment”).
    
            In Washington, the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly addressed
    
    whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on new evidence
    
    implicated         the   due   process   clause     of   the   Illinois    Constitution.
    
    665 N.E.2d at 1335–37. In regards to procedural due process, the court
    
    reasoned “to ignore such a claim would be fundamentally unfair.” Id. at
    
    1336.
    
            In    terms      of    substantive    due    process,     the      court   stated
    
    “[i]mprisonment of the innocent would also be so conscience shocking as
    
    to trigger operation of substantive due process.”                Id.      It stated, “The
    
    [United States] Supreme Court rejected substantive due process as
    
    means to recognize freestanding innocence claims because of the idea
    
    that a person convicted in a constitutionally fair trial must be viewed as
    
    guilty.”     Id.    In declining to adopt the reasoning of the United States
                                          25
    
    Supreme Court, the court stated, “The stronger the claim—the more
    
    likely it is that a convicted person is actually innocent—the weaker is the
    
    legal construct dictating that the person be viewed as guilty.”         Id.
    
    Because “no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of life or
    
    liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence[,]” the court held
    
    the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution gives credence to
    
    freestanding claims of actual innocence and affords convicted defendants
    
    additional process. Id. at 1336–37.
    
          In Montoya, the New Mexico Supreme Court held the New Mexico
    
    Constitution, specifically the due process clause and the prohibition
    
    against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, provides protection
    
    to actually innocent people.     163 P.3d at 484.    The court reasoned it
    
    would be “fundamentally unfair” to convict, incarcerate, or execute an
    
    innocent person. Id. The court further reasoned “the incarceration of an
    
    innocent person [fails to] advance[] any [acceptable] goal of punishment,
    
    and . . . the punishment is indeed grossly out of proportion to the
    
    severity of the crime.” Id.
    
          We now turn to the Iowa Constitution.         First, we note the Iowa
    
    Constitution vests authority to grant pardons with the Governor. Iowa
    
    Const. art. IV, § 16; State v. Ragland, 
    836 N.W.2d 107
    , 118 (Iowa 2013).
    
    Thus, the incarceration of an actually innocent person in Iowa does not
    
    violate the Federal Constitution.     See Montoya, 163 P.3d at 482; Cole,
    
    765 N.Y.S.2d at 484.          We therefore address the possibility of a
    
    freestanding claim of actual innocence pursuant to Iowa constitutional
    
    jurisprudence.
    
          The Iowa Constitution affords individuals greater rights than does
    
    the United States Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 
    854 N.W.2d 378
    ,
    
    395 (Iowa 2014) (noting “we expanded the reach of the Supreme Court’s
                                         26
    
    reasoning in a trilogy of juvenile justice cases decided under the Iowa
    
    Constitution”).   Moreover, we have discretion to construe the Iowa
    
    Constitution in such a way as to “provid[e] greater protection for our
    
    citizens’ constitutional rights.”   Nguyen v. State, 
    878 N.W.2d 744
    , 755
    
    (Iowa 2016). Because we “jealously” safeguard our authority to interpret
    
    the Iowa Constitution on our own terms, we do not employ a lockstep
    
    approach in following federal precedent although United States Supreme
    
    Court cases are “persuasive.” See State v. Ochoa, 
    792 N.W.2d 260
    , 267
    
    (Iowa 2010).
    
          Article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution prohibits the
    
    deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Iowa Const. art. I, § 9
    
    (due process clause). We have enforced “the due process clause of article
    
    I, section 9 . . . in a wide variety of settings.”        Godfrey v. State,
    
    
    898 N.W.2d 844
    , 871 (Iowa 2017).          In fact, “[t]he Iowa constitutional
    
    provision regarding due process of law is . . . not a mere hortatory
    
    command, but it has been implemented, day in and day out, for many,
    
    many years.” Id. We see no reason why article I, section 9 would not be
    
    enforceable for purposes of vindicating defendants who prove they are
    
    factually innocent and believe their incarceration triggers the due
    
    process clause.
    
          An innocent person has a constitutional liberty interest in
    
    remaining free from undeserved punishment. Holding a person who has
    
    committed no crime in prison strikes the very essence of the
    
    constitutional guarantee of substantive due process.              See Cole,
    
    765 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (holding “the conviction or incarceration of a
    
    guiltless person violates elemental fairness, deprives that person of
    
    freedom of movement and freedom from punishment[,] and thus runs
    
    afoul of the due process clause of the [New York] State Constitution”).
                                        27
    
          Even if defendants allege substantive due process violations, they
    
    must meet the demanding actual-innocence standard to prove the
    
    validity of their actual-innocence claims—a standard we articulate in the
    
    next section. Thus, there are limits on actual-innocence claims.
    
          Moreover, actually innocent people should have an opportunity to
    
    prove their actual innocence.    Montoya, 163 P.3d at 484 (holding “the
    
    conviction, incarceration, or execution of an innocent person violates all
    
    notions of fundamental fairness” and thus actually innocent people
    
    “must be permitted to assert a claim of actual innocence”).             The
    
    incarceration of actually innocent people therefore implicates procedural
    
    due process.
    
          Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibits cruel and
    
    unusual punishment.       Iowa Const. art. I, § 17 (cruel and unusual
    
    punishment).    This prohibition “embraces a bedrock rule of law that
    
    punishment should fit the crime.”        Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 384 (quoting
    
    State v. Bruegger, 
    773 N.W.2d 862
    , 872 (Iowa 2009)); accord Roper v.
    
    Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    , 560, 
    125 S. Ct. 1183
    , 1190 (2005) (“[T]he Eighth
    
    Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to
    
    excessive sanctions.”).    Applying this bedrock principle, we believe
    
    “punishing an actually innocent person is disproportionate to the crime
    
    (or lack of crime) committed and violates the cruel and inhuman
    
    treatment clause.” Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485; accord Herrera, 506 U.S.
    
    at 431, 113 S. Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting punishment
    
    “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime” is unconstitutional
    
    and excessive (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 
    433 U.S. 584
    , 592, 
    97 S. Ct. 2861
    , 2866 (1977) (plurality opinion))).
    
          Furthermore, we agree with Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Herrera
    
    that “it is crystal clear that the execution of an innocent person is ‘at
                                              28
    
    odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency.’ ” 506 U.S.
    
    at 431, 113 S. Ct. at 876 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 
    468 U.S. 447
    , 465,
    
    
    104 S. Ct. 3154
    , 3165 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v.
    
    Florida, 
    577 U.S.
    ___, ___, 
    136 S. Ct. 616
    , 621 (2016)).                 We believe
    
    Justice Blackmun’s reasoning also applies to the conviction and
    
    incarceration of an innocent person because “the basic concept
    
    underlying the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment ‘is
    
    nothing less than the dignity’ of humankind.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 384
    
    (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 
    356 U.S. 86
    , 100, 
    78 S. Ct. 590
    , 597 (1958)).
    
           We reject the notion that the rationale used in cases involving
    
    trials cannot be applied to those involving pleas. 5 We find these cases
    
    informative because the same policy reason informs convictions based
    
    after trials as those based on pleas. See Ex parte Tuley, 
    109 S.W.3d 388
    ,
    
    391–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also People v. Tiger, 
    48 N.Y.S.3d 685
    ,
    
    700–01 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 393)
    
    (holding a defendant’s plea does not bar the defendant from bringing a
    
    freestanding claim of actual innocence). This policy reason is protecting
    
    against violations of constitutional principles.
    
           The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals permits freestanding claims
    of actual innocence even if the applicant pled guilty.              Ex parte Tuley,
    
    109 S.W.3d at 393.        In Tuley, the applicant pled guilty to aggravated
    
    sexual assault.        Id. at 390.       Years later, the applicant pursued
    
    postconviction relief when the complainant recanted her allegation. Id.
    
    The court sought to answer the question of whether the applicant’s plea
    
    precluded his freestanding actual-innocence claim. Id. It reasoned the
    
    
           5For example, the following cases involved convictions after trials: Washington,
    665 N.E.2d at 1331; Montoya, 163 P.3d at 478; In re Kaufmann, 157 N.E. at 731;
    Engesser, 856 N.W.2d at 473.
                                             29
    
    policy behind allowing freestanding actual-innocence claims was to
    
    protect   innocent   individuals       from   punishment.      Id.   at   390–91.
    
    Specifically, the court reasoned, this policy “is the same for an applicant
    
    regardless of whether his case was heard by a judge or jury or whether
    
    he [pled] guilty or not guilty.” Id.
    
          The court further reasoned that “[c]onvicting courts should . . . give
    
    great respect to knowing, voluntary, and intelligent pleas of guilty.” Id. at
    
    391. However, “we should not foreclose relief because a defendant [pled]
    
    guilty when the policy behind granting relief on a bare innocence claim is
    
    the same.” Id. Moreover, “[t]here is nothing equitable about permitting
    
    an innocent person to remain in prison when he produces new evidence
    
    that unquestionably shows that he did not commit the offense for which
    
    he is incarcerated.” Id. at 392. Thus, the court held an applicant must
    
    “show[] by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of
    
    guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found
    
    the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence.” Id. We agree with the
    
    Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that the same rudimentary policy
    
    reason—safeguarding       against      violations   of   due   process—form    a
    
    substratum for claims of actual innocence, regardless of whether
    
    defendants pled guilty or went to trial.
    
          Therefore, we now find the Iowa Constitution permits freestanding
    
    claims of actual innocence. Furthermore, freestanding claims of actual
    
    innocence permitted by the Iowa Constitution are available to applicants
    
    even though they pled guilty.
    
          3. The standard to apply to freestanding actual-innocence claims.
    
    States that have adopted freestanding actual-innocence claims require a
    
    higher burden than that of a gateway claim for an applicant to succeed.
    
    We again note the United States Supreme Court adopted a more-likely-
                                               30
    
    than-not standard in proving gateway claims of actual innocence.
    
    Schlup, 513 U.S at 327, 
    115 S. Ct. 851
     at 867.
    
           In Jamison v. State, a case involving newly discovered evidence
    
    that would allegedly support an applicant’s self-defense theory, the
    
    South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a stringent standard. 6                         
    765 S.E.2d 123
    , 130 (S.C. 2014).
    
           There the court held,
    
           [W]hen a [postconviction-relief] applicant seeks relief on the
           basis of newly discovered evidence following a guilty plea,
           relief is appropriate only where the applicant presents
           evidence showing that (1) the newly discovered evidence was
           discovered after the entry of the plea and, in the exercise of
           reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered prior to
           the entry of the plea; and (2) the newly discovered evidence is
           of such a weight and quality that, under the facts and
           circumstances of that particular case, the “interest of justice”
           requires the applicant’s guilty plea to be vacated. In other
           words, a [postconviction-relief] applicant may successfully
           disavow his or her guilty plea only where the interests of
           justice outweigh the waiver and solemn admission of guilt
           encompassed in a plea of guilty and the compelling interests
           in maintaining the finality of guilty-plea convictions.
    
    Id. (emphasis added).
    
           We believe the standard the South Carolina Supreme Court has
    
    adopted is not only amorphous but also impractical. What does it mean
    
    for the “interests of justice” to outweigh the guilty plea waiver?                   The
    
    permutations are endless.           The standard set by the South Carolina
    
    Supreme Court does not appear to be any different from altogether
    
    barring an applicant’s postconviction-relief action.
    
           Similarly, the California Supreme Court requires applicants to
    
    meet a high burden such that the evidence “undermine[s] the entire
    
           6We  realize this case did not involve an actual-innocence claim but rather a self-
    defense theory. We think it is nevertheless informative in constructing a standard for
    freestanding actual-innocence claims in Iowa.
                                          31
    
    prosecution case and point[s] unerringly to innocence or reduced
    
    culpability.” In re Clark, 
    855 P.2d 729
    , 739 (Cal. 1993); accord In re Bell,
    
    
    170 P.3d 153
    , 157 (Cal. 2007).
    
          The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals originally adopted a very
    
    burdensome standard, requiring applicants claiming actual innocence to
    
    demonstrate “based on the newly discovered evidence and the entire
    
    record before the jury that convicted him, no rational trier of fact could
    
    find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State ex rel. Holmes v.
    
    Honorable Ct. of Appeals, 
    885 S.W.2d 389
    , 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
    
    (en banc), overruled by Ex parte Elizondo, 
    947 S.W.2d 202
    , 206 (Tex.
    
    Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
    
          However, in lowering the burden of proof, the court in Ex parte
    
    Elizondo stated the Holmes standard was too high because it would be
    
    “theoretically impossible” to attain relief. Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d
    
    at 205. The court reasoned “exculpatory evidence can never outweigh
    
    inculpatory evidence under [the] standard” set in State ex rel. Holmes. Id.
    
    Thus, the court adopted a clear and convincing standard requiring “the
    
    petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
    
    juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 209.
    
          A number of states apply the Elizondo clear and convincing
    
    standard.    See, e.g., Roper, 102 S.W.3d at 548; Montoya, 163 P.3d at
    
    486; Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 486; Miller v. State, 
    340 P.3d 795
    , 796 (Utah
    
    Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam); see also Miller v. Comm’r of Corr., 
    700 A.2d 1108
    , 1130–31 (Conn. 1997) (adopting a clear and convincing standard
    
    and also requiring the petitioner to show that “no reasonable fact finder
    
    would find the petitioner guilty”).
    
          Other jurisdictions have codified freestanding claims of actual
    
    innocence.    The Maryland statute uses a standard of “substantial or
                                        32
    
    significant possibility that the result may have been different.”      Md.
    
    Code. Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-301(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch.1–4
    
    2018 Reg. Sess.). The statute gives the court discretion to “set aside the
    
    verdict, resentence, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence.” Id. § 8-
    
    301(f)(1).   The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, however, held a
    
    defendant who has pled guilty could not petition for a writ of actual
    
    innocence. Yonga v. State, 
    108 A.3d 448
    , 460 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015),
    
    aff’d 
    130 A.3d 486
    , 492 (Md. 2016).
    
          In discussing freestanding claims of actual innocence, the District
    
    of Columbia statute explicitly assigns different remedies upon meeting
    
    the respective standards.    D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4135 (West, Westlaw
    
    through Feb. 20, 2018). If the court determines “it is more likely than
    
    not that the movant is actually innocent of the crime,” the remedy is to
    
    grant a new trial. Id. § 22-4135(g)(2). If the court determines “by clear
    
    and convincing evidence that the movant is actually innocent of the
    
    crime,” the remedy is to vacate the conviction. Id. § 22-4135(g)(3). Thus,
    
    the District of Columbia statute requires a more stringent standard to
    
    vacate a conviction but fashions this stronger remedy upon the movant
    
    meeting his or her burden of proof. Moreover, “[i]f the conviction resulted
    
    from a plea of guilty, and other charges were dismissed as part of a plea
    
    agreement, the court shall reinstate any charges of which the defendant
    
    has not demonstrated that the defendant is actually innocent.” Id. § 22-
    
    4135(g)(4). Thus, the District of Columbia statute minimizes unfairness
    
    to the government by counterbalancing the movant’s interest—vacating a
    
    wrongful conviction and ensuring a factually innocent person is not
    
    incarcerated—and the government’s interest—allowing reinstatement of
    
    charges the government otherwise would have pursued if the movant had
    
    not pled guilty.
                                        33
    
          After reviewing the differing standards our sister states have
    
    adopted, we find that after pleading guilty, applicants claiming actual
    
    innocence must meet the clear and convincing standard. We reach this
    
    conclusion for a number of reasons.        In House, the United States
    
    Supreme Court mentioned the required proof to establish actual
    
    innocence as a freestanding claim is greater than that required to
    
    establish a gateway claim of actual innocence.          547 U.S. at 555,
    
    126 S. Ct. at 2087; accord In re Weber, 284 P.3d at 741 (“[A]ny standard
    
    by which a free-standing actual innocence claim must be proved will be
    
    higher than that applied in the gateway context.”).
    
          In light of House, a clear and convincing standard is the
    
    appropriate burden of showing a freestanding claim of actual innocence.
    
    This standard is heavier than the more-likely-than-not standard
    
    governing gateway claims of actual innocence. It makes sense to have a
    
    lower standard for gateway claims because such claims have underlying
    
    claims that allege constitutional defects in the trial or plea colloquy.
    
    However, an applicant bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence
    
    is claiming he or she is factually and actually innocent, despite a fair,
    
    constitutionally compliant trial or plea colloquy free of constitutional
    
    defects.
    
          Additionally, a clear and convincing standard balances the interest
    
    of an innocent defendant and that of the state. Although the interests of
    
    both parties are important, we believe “it is far worse to convict an
    
    innocent person than to acquit a guilty one” such that “the scale tips in
    
    favor of the [defendant’s] interest.” Miller, 700 A.2d at 1133. Thus, we
    
    simultaneously vindicate this principle and recognize the interest of the
    
    state in finality of criminal litigation by adopting a clear and convincing
    
    standard.
                                        34
    
          Finally, the higher burden answers the problems posed by the
    
    Colorado Supreme Court regarding claims of newly discovered evidence
    
    after a defendant has pled guilty.       In People v. Schneider, the court
    
    stated,
    
          In the circumstance in which there never was a trial on the
          charges, the trial court is hampered in that assessment.
          Furthermore, there must be some consequence attached to
          the decision to plead guilty. A defendant who voluntarily and
          knowingly enters a plea accepting responsibility for the
          charges is properly held to a higher burden in demonstrating
          to the court that newly discovered evidence should allow him
          to withdraw that plea.
    
    
    25 P.3d 755
    , 761–62 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (emphasis added). However,
    
    by adopting a higher burden of proof—a clear and convincing standard—
    
    we account for the differences.
    
          We now adopt the clear and convincing standard to prove a
    
    freestanding actual-innocence claim. For an applicant to succeed on a
    
    freestanding actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear
    
    and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the
    
    conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the
    
    crimes for which the sentencing court found the applicant guilty in light
    
    of all the evidence, including the newly discovered evidence.
          4. Vehicle to bring freestanding actual-innocence claims. We now
    
    address whether our postconviction-relief statute provides a means to
    
    raise a freestanding claim of actual innocence. Outside of our current
    
    statutory scheme in chapter 822, we need not decide or specify other
    
    vehicles applicants may use to bring their freestanding actual-innocence
    
    claims as independent actions. We emphasize sections 822(1)(a) and (d)
    
    are not the exclusive vehicles to bring freestanding actual-innocence
    
    claims because applicants may file such claims independently of chapter
                                        35
    
    822.   However, at this point, the legislature has provided the present,
    
    appropriate vehicle in chapter 822. The Code provides,
    
                  1. Any person who has been convicted of, or
           sentenced for, a public offense and who claims any of the
           following may institute, without paying a filing fee, a
           proceeding under this chapter to secure relief:
    
                  a. The conviction or sentence was in violation of the
           Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws
           of this state.
    
                 ....
    
                 d. There exists evidence of material facts, not
           previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the
           conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.
    
    Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a), (d).
    
           The Iowa Constitution gives a floor to bring freestanding claims of
    
    actual innocence under our postconviction-relief statute, specifically
    
    sections 822.2(1)(a) and (d).     Cf. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1337
    
    (holding the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution provides a
    
    footing to assert freestanding actual-innocence claims based on newly
    
    discovered evidence under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).             A
    
    conviction of an innocent person violates the Iowa Constitution,
    
    specifically the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction
    
    of cruel and unusual punishment.         Thus, section 822.2(1)(a) is one
    
    vehicle to bring an actual-innocence claim. Additionally, conviction of an
    
    innocent person infringes upon the “interest of justice” precisely because
    
    it violates the Iowa Constitution.       Therefore, section 822.2(1)(d) is
    
    another vehicle to assert an actual-innocence claim.
    
           In sum, we hold subsections 822.2(1)(a) and (d) provide avenues
    
    for freestanding actual-innocence claims.
                                         36
    
          IV. Application of Legal Principles.
    
          We first address the statute of limitations issue and then the
    
    question of how to proceed under our new standard.
    
          A. Statute of Limitations.          Our postconviction-relief statute
    
    specifies its own limitations of action.      The Iowa Code provides in
    
    relevant part,
    
          All . . . applications must be filed within three years from the
          date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an
          appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.
          However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or
          law that could not have been raised within the applicable
          time period.
    
    Iowa Code § 822.3.
    
          Thus, to avoid the three-year statute of limitations contained in
    
    section 822.3, an applicant must show he or she could not have raised
    
    the ground of fact within the applicable time period.        Additionally, “a
    
    postconviction-relief applicant relying on the ground-of-fact exception
    
    must show the ground of fact is relevant to the challenged conviction.”
    
    Harrington v. State, 
    659 N.W.2d 509
    , 521 (Iowa 2003). This is the nexus
    
    requirement. Id. at 520. We made it clear a ground of fact is “relevant” if
    
    it is the type of fact “that has the potential to qualify as material evidence
    
    for purposes of a substantive claim under section 822.2.” Id. at 521.
    
          We explicitly and “specifically reject[ed] any requirement that an
    
    applicant must show the ground of fact would likely or probably have
    
    changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a
    
    limitations defense.” Id. The ultimate determination as to whether the
    
    applicant is entitled to relief “must await an adjudication, whether in a
    
    summary proceeding or after trial, on the applicant’s substantive claim
    
    for relief.” Id.   In other words, we do not reach the merits of a claim
                                         37
    
    based on a new ground of fact in deciding whether the exception to the
    
    three-year statute of limitations applies.
    
          Here, B.C.’s recantation was not available to Schmidt within the
    
    three-year period following the date of his conviction and Schmidt could
    
    not have discovered the recantation earlier than he did in the exercise of
    
    due diligence. Additionally, the recantation has the potential to qualify
    
    as material evidence that probably would have changed the outcome of
    
    Schmidt’s case. See id. at 521 (holding the undisclosed police reports
    
    and the recantations “are the type of facts having the potential to qualify
    
    as material evidence that probably would have changed the outcome of
    
    [the defendant’s] trial”).
    
          We ultimately decided Harrington based on the withheld police
    
    reports in order to resolve the due process issue of whether the
    
    prosecution suppressed material evidence that was favorable to the
    
    defendant. Id. at 521–25. As for the statute-of-limitations analysis, we
    
    held both the recantation evidence and the police reports were sufficient;
    
    and thus, the defendant was not time barred from bringing his action.
    
    Id. at 521.
    
          Based on the foregoing, section 822.3 does not time bar Schmidt’s
    
    freestanding claim of actual innocence.
    
          B. Application of Standard Regarding Schmidt’s Freestanding
    
    Actual-Innocence Claim.       The district court ruled on Schmidt’s case
    
    after the State filed a motion for summary dismissal/summary judgment.
    
    Section 822.6 allows for a summary disposition. The statute states in
    
    relevant part,
    
                The court may grant a motion by either party for
          summary disposition of the application, when it appears
          from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
          and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
                                        38
          affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of
          material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
          a matter of law.
    
    Iowa Code § 822.6.
    
          At the time the court ruled on the State’s motion, it decided the
    
    case as a matter of law relying on our jurisprudence that defendants who
    
    knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty cannot attack their pleas with
    
    challenges extrinsic to the pleas. Today, we have reversed this line of
    
    cases and created a new standard for freestanding actual-innocence
    
    claims.
    
          Generally, when we create a new standard, we remand the case to
    
    the district court to apply the standard. See McQuistion v. City of Clinton,
    
    
    872 N.W.2d 817
    , 819–20 (Iowa 2015) (adopting a new standard for the
    
    evaluation of a pregnancy claim and remanding the case to the district
    
    court to apply that standard); cf. State v. Ary, 
    877 N.W.2d 686
    , 707 (Iowa
    
    2016) (remanding the case to the district court to apply the appropriate
    
    standard when it initially applied the wrong standard).
    
          Here, we have created a new standard. Thus, the proper result is
    
    to remand the case to the district court to apply the standard to the
    
    State’s motion for summary dismissal/summary judgment.           The court
    
    should allow the parties to supplement the record, if a party so desires,
    
    to provide other evidence or affidavits to support their respective
    
    positions.   See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5) (setting forth the methods to
    
    present evidence in a summary judgment proceeding).
    
          We are not commenting on the merits of Schmidt’s claim.
    
    Contrary to the other opinions filed in this case, both parties are entitled
    
    to their day in court to litigate their positions under the new standard we
    
    have adopted today. We will address any unanswered questions when a
    
    party presents the court with actual cases raising those issues. That is
                                        39
    
    how the law progresses in this state. We do not issue advisory opinions.
    
    See Linn v. Montgomery, 
    903 N.W.2d 337
    , 344 (Iowa 2017).
    
          It is for the district court to determine whether the recantation, in
    
    light of any other evidence that meets the requirements of rule 1.981,
    
    creates a genuine issue of material fact.    We are not in a position to
    
    decide the merits of this case by assuming that certain evidence, which
    
    may or may not comply with the requirements of rule 1.981, shows there
    
    is no genuine issue as to any material fact in order to affirm the
    
    summary disposition in favor of the State. Prohibiting the parties here
    
    from the benefit of the procedural processes provided to litigants is no
    
    better than incarcerating an innocent person.
    
          Only after the parties develop a record in a summary proceeding
    
    can the court decide if a genuine issue of material fact exists. If it does,
    
    then a trial may be necessary to resolve Schmidt’s claim.
    
          V. Disposition.
    
          We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the
    
    judgment of the district court granting the State’s motion for summary
    
    dismissal/summary judgment. We remand the case to the district court
    
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    
          DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
    
    COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
    
          Cady, C.J., Hecht and Appel, JJ., join this opinion.      Cady, C.J.,
    
    files a special concurrence. Waterman, J., files a dissenting opinion in
    
    which Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join.      Mansfield, J., files a separate
    
    dissenting opinion in which Waterman and Zager, JJ., join.
                                          40
                                                  #15–1408, Schmidt v. State
    CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
    
          The process of justice must always be fair. This case stands tall as
    
    the embodiment of this fundamental principle of law. It is a substantial
    
    step forward in our constitutional march to become better.       Innocent
    
    people should always have a forum to prove their innocence.        I fully
    
    concur in the opinion of the court.
    
          Yet, the actual process of justice available to Schmidt to now
    
    pursue the new claim given to him must also be fair. This fairness is the
    
    reason the case must be remanded to the district court for it to decide if
    
    summary adjudication should be granted.       I write separately only to
    
    explain this important part of the case more fully and why the actual-
    
    innocence claim cannot now be decided on appeal.
    
          Going forward, when an actual-innocence claim based on the
    
    recantation of a witness is brought in our courts, summary judgment will
    
    remain a viable procedural vehicle for the state to ask the court to
    
    resolve the claim. Consistent with all summary judgment proceedings,
    
    the legal issue will be whether the moving party is entitled to summary
    
    judgment, under a set of facts assumed to be undisputed for the
    
    purposes of the motion, because a reasonable juror could still conclude
    
    the defendant is guilty of the crime.        For purposes of summary
    
    adjudication of witness recantation claims, the undisputed facts needed
    
    to support the motion will normally center on the remaining evidence of
    
    guilt from other witnesses found in the minutes of testimony. In many
    
    cases, the remaining evidence may support summary judgment, as a
    
    reasonable juror could still convict the defendant based on the surviving
    
    evidence.
                                        41
    
          In this case, the assumed undisputed facts, at this time, may
    
    support   summary      judgment.      In   his   plea   colloquy,   Schmidt
    
    acknowledged the minutes of testimony were true and accurate.
    
    Significantly, the minutes included a witness who was an eyewitness to
    
    the assault. With only the recantation evidence offered by Schmidt at
    
    this point to prove his innocence, a reasonable fact finder could still
    
    conclude Schmidt committed the crime.
    
          Nevertheless, it would be unfair to Schmidt for us to apply the new
    
    standard to the existing record to decide the actual-innocence claim now
    
    on appeal.     At the time the State brought its motion for summary
    
    judgment in this case, it argued Schmidt’s claim was barred by the
    
    three-year statute of limitations under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2014)
    
    and the recantation evidence identified in his petition for postconviction
    
    relief was discoverable within the limitation period.    Thus, at the time
    
    Schmidt resisted the summary judgment motion, the legal issue before
    
    the court was whether the recantation was discoverable within the three-
    
    year period.   The district court granted the summary judgment after
    
    concluding the exculpatory evidence was extrinsic to the plea and could
    
    not be grounds for relief.
    
          Although Schmidt claimed his actual innocence in the summary
    
    judgment proceedings, the legal issue he was responding to was whether
    
    the recantation evidence was discoverable within the three-year statute
    
    of limitations. He was not responding to a substantive claim by the State
    
    that his recantation evidence would still be insufficient as a matter to law
    
    to support a claim of actual innocence. In fact, recantation as a claim of
    
    innocence has still not been teed up by the State, and Schmidt has not
    
    been alerted to the requirement to submit all evidence of innocence in
    
    direct response to such claim. Thus, the record does not show Schmidt
                                         42
    
    has had a full and fair opportunity to present all new evidence to resist
    
    summary judgment.
    
           Likewise, the State has not had a full and fair opportunity to
    
    specifically identify its evidence to support summary adjudication under
    
    the actual-innocence standard. See Iowa Code § 822.6. Even though the
    
    state asked the district court in the summary judgment proceedings to
    
    take judicial notice of the complete record in the case, the state must still
    
    identify those portions of the record it relies on to support summary
    
    judgment. See id.
    
           The case needs to be remanded to the district court so the State
    
    can amend its motion for summary judgment to claim Schmidt has failed
    
    to bring a claim of actual innocence that survives summary adjudication.
    
    The district court needs to consider the motion after Schmidt has filed an
    
    amended response. This procedure is required to ensure the process of
    
    justice is fair.
                                              43
                                                            #15–1408, Schmidt v. State
    WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).
    
           I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court’s
    
    summary judgment and the court of appeals decision affirming it under
    
    our long-standing precedent enforcing the legal effect of guilty pleas. I
    
    join Justice Mansfield’s separate dissent. This year, the United States
    
    Supreme Court resoundingly reiterated a fundamental legal tenet: a valid
    
    guilty plea waives the defendant’s constitutional right to trial and right to
    
    confront witnesses and “relinquishes any claim that would contradict the
    
    ‘admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.’ ”
    
    Class v. United States, 
    583 U.S.
    ___, ___, 
    138 S. Ct. 798
    , 805 (2018)
    (quoting United States v. Broce, 
    488 U.S. 563
    , 573–74, 
    109 S. Ct. 757
    ,
    
    764 (1989)). A guilty plea precludes a defendant from a later challenge in
    
    which he would “deny that he engaged in the conduct to which he
    
    admitted.” Id. All nine justices agreed with that proposition. See id. at
    
    ___, 138 S. Ct. at 815 (Alito, J., dissenting). 7 When Schmidt confessed in
    
    open court and pled guilty, he closed the door to his subsequent claim
    
    that he is factually innocent, that is, that he really did not do what he
    
    admitted doing. The majority today errs by relying on cases in which the
    
    defendant steadfastly maintained his or her innocence through trial and
    
    all subsequent appeals.
    
           7The  Class Court held the defendant’s guilty plea alone did not bar his challenge
    to his conviction on grounds the statute of conviction was unconstitutional. ___ U.S. at
    ___, 138 S. Ct. at 803 (majority opinion). Iowa appears to recognize the same exception
    because we allow the defendant who pled guilty to later assert that the indictment or
    information charges no offense. See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 
    639 N.W.2d 564
    , 567 (Iowa
    2001). This is a matter intrinsic to the plea because it does not require resort to
    anything other than the trial information and the plea of guilty.
             Schmidt makes no such constitutional challenge to the statutes he pled guilty to
    violating. The Class Court made clear that a defendant who pleads guilty waives any
    right to later contest his factual guilt, challenge the evidence against him, or retreat
    from factual admissions in the guilty plea. 
    583 U.S.
    at___, 138 S. Ct. at 804, 805–06;
    id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 812–13 (Alito, J., dissenting.
                                           44
    
          I would also affirm summary judgment based on the statute of
    
    limitations because Schmidt knew what really happened in the bedroom
    
    and knew when he pled guilty whether his victim, B.C., and the
    
    eyewitness, Peter, were lying. Schmidt knowingly and voluntarily waived
    
    his right to challenge their allegations when he pled guilty in a detailed
    
    colloquy with the court while represented by effective defense counsel.
    
    Iowa law has always provided innocent people a forum to prove their
    
    innocence—through a trial.      Schmidt is an admittedly guilty man who
    
    chose to give up his right to trial.
    
          The majority undermines the finality of guilty pleas and eviscerates
    
    the three-year statute of limitations for postconviction-relief (PCR)
    
    actions. Today’s decision will have bad consequences, as counsel for the
    
    State warned, including fewer plea bargains, renewed turmoil for victims
    
    and their families years after the crime, and a flood of PCR applications.
    
    The majority, by remanding this case instead of itself applying its new
    
    standard on the existing record, needlessly leaves district courts in the
    
    dark on whether evidentiary hearings or new trials will be required
    
    whenever a victim or other witness recants years after a defendant, ably
    
    represented by competent counsel, formally confessed to the crime in
    
    open court through a guilty plea devoid of legal error. Soon, we will see
    
    PCR applications by defendants who pled guilty to domestic assault and
    
    now bully the survivors into recanting.
    
          Courts    appropriately    regard     recantations   with   the   utmost
    
    suspicion—especially those involving intrafamily sexual abuse.          In my
    
    view, summary judgment can and should be affirmed on the existing
    
    record after remand under the majority’s newly adopted test for actual
    
    innocence.     This is because Schmidt cannot show, despite B.C.’s
    
    “recantation,” that no reasonable juror could convict him based on
                                               45
    
    Peter’s unrecanted eyewitness account of catching Schmidt in the act
    
    and   B.C.’s      contemporaneous         statements      and    forensic    interview
    
    describing the sexual assault.              Indeed, Iowa juries, even without
    
    eyewitness testimony, have convicted defendants charged with domestic
    
    abuse based solely on what the victim said happened right after the
    
    abuse, disbelieving the victim’s subsequent recantation at trial. 8 B.C.’s
    
    quasi-recantation essentially can be paraphrased as, “I said it happened
    
    back then, but now that my much bigger brother is getting out of prison
    
    I’m telling people it didn’t happen—you guess which story is true.” This
    
    equivocal recantation should be insufficient to vacate Schmidt’s guilty
    
    plea. I would wait for a better test case to adopt a standard for relief
    
    under an actual-innocence theory.
    
         I. The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment
    Based on Schmidt’s Guilty Plea.
    
          The majority is unable to find fault with the manner in which
    
    Schmidt pled guilty.         Schmidt raises no claim that his counsel was
    
    ineffective and alleges no defect or constitutional infirmity in connection
    
    with his guilty plea.       The majority, nevertheless, allows Schmidt, and
    
    presumably any other convicted offender, to belatedly challenge a guilty
    
    plea based solely on someone’s subsequent recantation.                   The majority
    
    thereby upends Iowa law on the finality of guilty pleas and does so
    
    without acknowledging the many built-in protections our legal system
    
    employs to ensure the validity of plea-based convictions and without
    
    quoting Schmidt’s in-court colloquy showing those safeguards were
    
    followed to the letter in his case.
    
    
    
    
          8See,   e.g., State v. Smith, 
    876 N.W.2d 180
    , 183–84, 190 & n.4 (Iowa 2016).
                                         46
    
          Until today, it had been “well settled that a plea of guilty ‘waives all
    
    defenses or objections which are not intrinsic to the plea itself.’ ” State v.
    
    Alexander, 
    463 N.W.2d 421
    , 422 (Iowa 1990) (quoting State v.
    
    Morehouse, 
    316 N.W.2d 884
    , 885 (Iowa 1982), overruled on other grounds
    
    by State v. Kress, 
    636 N.W.2d 12
    , 20 (Iowa 2001)). I would honor stare
    
    decisis and affirm Schmidt’s conviction under the foregoing precedent.
    
                 Generally, a criminal defendant waives all defenses
          and objections to the criminal proceedings by pleading guilty
          ....    One exception to this rule involves irregularities
          intrinsic to the plea—irregularities that bear on the knowing
          and voluntary nature of the plea.
    
    Castro v. State, 
    795 N.W.2d 789
    , 792 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted)
    
    (addressing when ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes an
    
    irregularity intrinsic to the plea by rendering it involuntary or
    
    unknowing). Schmidt does not dispute the district court’s finding that
    
    his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and he has never alleged
    
    ineffective assistance of counsel.
    
          “A plea colloquy that covers the specific ground subsequently
    
    raised in a postconviction relief application would normally support
    
    summary judgment on those grounds.” Id. at 795. The district court
    properly considered Schmidt’s admissions in his plea colloquy and the
    
    legal effect of his guilty plea in granting the State’s motion for summary
    
    disposition of the PCR action. See id. Schmidt was not entitled to an
    
    evidentiary hearing on the veracity of B.C.’s recantation without first
    
    establishing that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary.          It is
    
    undisputed that Schmidt pled guilty and admitted to the crimes in the
    
    plea colloquy. The legal effect of his guilty plea is a question of law the
    
    district court correctly decided by summary judgment on the existing
    
    PCR record. See id. at 793, 795–96.
                                        47
    
          Nothing B.C. says now or said in 2006 may be regarded as an
    
    irregularity intrinsic to Schmidt’s guilty plea.      “Any subsequently-
    
    discovered deficiency in the State’s case that affects a defendant’s
    
    assessment of the evidence against him, but not the knowing and
    
    voluntary nature of the plea, is not intrinsic to the plea itself.” State v.
    
    Speed, 
    573 N.W.2d 594
    , 596 (Iowa 1998). “Notions of newly discovered
    
    evidence simply have no bearing on a knowing and voluntary admission
    
    of guilt.” Alexander, 463 N.W.2d at 423. New exculpatory evidence does
    
    not alter “a defendant’s understanding of what a plea means.” Speed,
    
    573 N.W.2d at 596 (distinguishing the “defendant’s tactical rationale for
    
    pleading guilty”). Thus, “[a] guilty plea is normally understood as a lid
    
    on the box, whatever is in it, not a platform from which to explore further
    
    possibilities.” Kyle v. State, 
    322 N.W.2d 299
    , 304 (Iowa 1982) (quoting
    
    United States v. Bluso, 
    519 F.2d 473
    , 474 (4th Cir. 1975)). I would keep
    
    the proverbial lid on the box. When a tenable claim of actual innocence
    
    comes along, we will know it. This is not such a case.
    
          The majority upends our long-standing precedent on guilty pleas.
    
    I find it astounding that neither the majority nor the special concurrence
    
    ever mentions stare decisis, the doctrine that provides stability,
    
    predictability, and legitimacy to our law.   Just months ago, our court
    
    unanimously reiterated, “From the very beginnings of this court, we have
    
    guarded the venerable doctrine of stare decisis and required the highest
    
    possible showing that a precedent should be overruled before taking
    
    such a step.” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    902 N.W.2d 811
    , 817 (Iowa 2017)
    
    (quoting McElroy v. State, 
    703 N.W.2d 385
    , 394 (Iowa 2005)); see also Bd.
    
    of Water Works Trs. v. Sac Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 
    890 N.W.2d 50
    , 61
    
    (Iowa 2017) (“Legal authority must be respected . . . because it is
    
    important that courts, and lawyers and their clients, may know what the
                                          48
    
    law is and order their affairs accordingly.” (quoting State v. Liddell, 
    672 N.W.2d 805
    , 813 (Iowa 2003))). We may overrule a decision found to be
    
    “clearly erroneous” when “compelling reasons exist” to do so.        State v.
    
    Williams, 
    895 N.W.2d 856
    , 859–60 (Iowa 2017) (overruling State v. Wing,
    
    
    791 N.W.2d 243
     (Iowa 2010)). In Wing, a divided court had overturned
    
    long-standing Iowa precedent and adopted a new interpretation of the
    
    speedy indictment rule that proved unworkable in practice; by overruling
    
    Wing, our court restored the prior long-standing Iowa rule that worked
    
    well.    See id. at 867–68 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring).          The
    
    Williams majority devoted a section of the opinion to stare decisis. See
    
    id. at 859–60 (majority opinion).          The dissent lectured about the
    
    importance of the doctrine and pointedly “call[ed] for the restoration of
    
    the principle of stare decisis in Iowa jurisprudence.” Id. at 870 (Wiggins,
    
    J., dissenting). Yet today the same members of this court say nothing
    
    about stare decisis and overrule countless decisions without showing
    
    that our guilty plea precedent was clearly erroneous or unworkable.
    
            Iowa law requires a detailed guilty plea colloquy to satisfy the court
    
    that the defendant’s plea is knowing and voluntary and that there is a
    
    factual basis for the crime. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b); see also Diaz
    
    v. State, 
    896 N.W.2d 723
    , 732–34 (Iowa 2017) (vacating guilty plea based
    
    on ineffective assistance of counsel because plea colloquy failed to
    
    address     the   postdeportation    immigration    consequences      of   the
    
    conviction). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8 requires the court to
    
    determine “the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a
    
    factual basis.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). Before accepting a plea, the
    
    court must address the defendant in open court and determine if he or
    
    she understands
                                         49
                 (1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is
          offered.
                (2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and
          the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute
          defining the offense to which the plea is offered.
                (3) That a criminal conviction, deferred judgment, or
          deferred sentence may affect a defendant’s status under
          federal immigration laws.
                 (4) That the defendant has the right to be tried by a
          jury, and at trial has the right to assistance of counsel, the
          right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against the
          defendant, the right not to be compelled to incriminate
          oneself, and the right to present witnesses in the defendant’s
          own behalf and to have compulsory process in securing their
          attendance.
                (5) That if the defendant pleads guilty there will not be
          a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty the
          defendant waives the right to a trial.
    
    Id. The court also must inquire “whether the defendant’s willingness to
    
    plead guilty results from prior discussions between the attorney for the
    
    state and the defendant or the defendant’s attorney” and disclose the
    
    plea agreement on the record.        Id. r. 2.8(2)(c).   Schmidt alleges no
    
    violation of rule 2.8 in this PCR action.
    
          Here, the district court fully complied with rule 2.8 in accepting
    
    Schmidt’s guilty plea.     The district court described the legal rights
    
    Schmidt would have if he withdrew the plea and went to trial, and
    
    Schmidt informed the court he understood his rights and wished to plead
    
    guilty to the charges.    The court reviewed the factual basis for each
    
    count.     The prosecutor recited the elements of assault with intent to
    
    commit sexual abuse and the maximum and minimum penalties for that
    
    offense.     After confirming Schmidt understood, the court inquired
    
    whether the minutes of testimony were accurate concerning this offense:
    
                THE COURT: . . . What I am trying to find out is with
          regard to the elements of this crime, I’m talking about
          assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, and we have
          described those elements to you, in connection with those
                                 50
    elements, do the Minutes of Testimony, that is what the
    witnesses would say at trial, do they accurately and
    truthfully tell us what you did?
          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
          ....
          THE COURT: Just tell me what you did that makes
    you think you are guilty.
          THE DEFENDANT: I grabbed a child and tried to
    perform a sex act against his will.
          ....
          THE COURT: Is [B.C.] the person you tried to commit a
    sex act with?
          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
         THE COURT: Did      this   occur   on    or        about
    February 25th, 2006, in Woodbury County, Iowa?
          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
          THE COURT: Do you understand that by grabbing
    him, the state alleges you assaulted him by that grabbing?
    Do you understand that?
          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
          THE COURT: The state claims that by grabbing him
    and making this attempt, that this was offensive to [B.C.].
    Do you agree that [B.C.] could have found this grabbing
    offensive?
          THE DEFENDANT: Probably, sir.
          THE COURT: The state claims that when you grabbed
    him, you did so with the specific intent to commit a sex act,
    and you said that you did grab him in an attempt to commit
    a sex act; is that correct?
          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
         THE COURT: So was that your specific intent? That
    was your intention at the time?
          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
          THE COURT: Now, a sex act in this case, the state
    alleges that you were attempting to make contact between
    your penis and anus of [B.C.].      That’s what they are
    claiming. Is that what happened?
          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
          ....
           THE COURT: Mr. Schmidt, are you telling me you are,
    in fact, guilty to this crime of assault with intent to commit
    sexual abuse?
                                         51
                   THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
    
          Next, the prosecutor recited the elements of incest and the
    
    maximum        and    minimum   penalties.   After   confirming   Schmidt
    
    understood, the court engaged in another colloquy:
    
                THE COURT: . . . With regard to the elements of this
          crime of incest, do these summaries of what the witnesses
          would say with regard to the elements of that crime,
          truthfully and accurately describe what you did?
                THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I performed the sex act—Yes,
          sir. Those are accurate.
                   ....
                 THE COURT: Now I need to have you tell me in your
          own words what you did that makes you think that you are
          guilty of this charge.
                   THE DEFENDANT: I performed a sex act on a minor
          child.
                   ....
                THE COURT: The state claims that the sex act that
          you performed was contact between your penis and [B.C.’s]
          anus. Do you agree that that was the contact that was
          performed?
                   THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
                   ....
                THE COURT: Do you agree that at the time that you
          performed the sex act upon [B.C.] that he was your brother?
                   THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
    
          Schmidt told the court he was satisfied with the services of his
    
    counsel. The court accepted Schmidt’s guilty plea, finding the plea was
    
    “made voluntarily and intelligently” and Schmidt “underst[ood] the legal
    
    rights that he [was] giving up by pleading guilty to each of these two
    
    charges.” Schmidt does not challenge those findings, which the district
    
    court and court of appeals correctly determined required the summary
    
    dismissal of his PCR action.
    
          A plea must “be a genuine one, by a defendant who is guilty; one
    
    who understands his situation, his rights, and the consequences of the
                                        52
    
    plea, and is neither deceived nor coerced.” State v. Hinners, 
    471 N.W.2d 841
    , 843 (Iowa 1991) (quoting State v. Whitehead, 
    163 N.W.2d 899
    , 902
    
    (Iowa 1969)). A guilty plea is effectively a confession of committing the
    
    crime made under judicial oversight with representation by defense
    
    counsel. See Woods v. State, 
    379 P.3d 1134
    , 1141 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).
    
    That is what we have here.     As the United States Supreme Court has
    
    held, “A plea of guilty is more than a voluntary confession made in open
    
    court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution
    
    need b[e] advanced . . . . It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending
    
    controversy.” Boykin v. Alabama, 
    395 U.S. 238
    , 242 n.4, 
    89 S. Ct. 1709
    ,
    
    1712 n.4 (1969) (alteration in original) (quoting Woodard v. State, 
    171 So. 2d 462
    , 469 (Ala. Ct. App. 1965)); see also Class, 
    583 U.S.
    at ___,
    
    138 S. Ct. at 804 (majority opinion) (“The plea of guilty is, of course, a
    
    confession of all the facts charged in the indictment, and also of the evil
    
    intent imputed to the defendant.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Hinds, 
    101 Mass. 209
    , 210 (1869))).    For this reason, the United States Supreme
    
    Court and, until today, our court has upheld knowing and voluntary
    
    guilty pleas. See Brady v. United States, 
    397 U.S. 742
    , 757, 
    90 S. Ct. 1463
    , 1473 (1970) (“A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea
    
    merely because he discover[ed] long after the plea has been accepted that
    
    his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely
    
    penalties attached to alternative courses of action.”); Speed, 573 N.W.2d
    
    at 597 (“The fact that an accused may elect to plead guilty to a lesser
    
    offense when he is also charged with a more serious offense does not
    
    make his plea coerced.” (quoting State v. Lindsey, 
    171 N.W.2d 859
    , 865
    
    (Iowa 1969))).
    
          Schmidt relies on People v. Whirl, which allowed postconviction
    
    claims to proceed to challenge a conviction resulting from a guilty plea
                                        53
    
    following a confession coerced by police torture.      
    39 N.E.3d 114
    , 117
    
    (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). That case is inapposite because Schmidt claims no
    
    torture, coercion, or other constitutional violation in connection with his
    
    guilty plea.
    
           [W]hen a defendant pleads guilty, the case is effectively
           closed. The [prosecutor] believes that he or she will no
           longer need to develop the case for presentation to a jury,
           and investigation and witness identification ceases.
           Similarly, victims believe that the case is over. Unlike a
           conviction by trial, which the defendant can appeal and
           continue to contest vigorously, when a defendant enters a
           plea, he or she admits wrongdoing.
    
    People v. Schneider, 
    25 P.3d 755
    , 760 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); see also
    
    Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
    539 A.2d 399
    , 401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
    
    (“After a defendant has entered a plea of guilty the only cognizable issues
    
    in a [postconviction] proceeding are the validity of the plea of guilty and
    
    the legality of the sentence.”). The State should be able to rely on the
    
    finality of guilty pleas such as Schmidt’s entered in compliance with Iowa
    
    law.   As Justice Alito observed, “Roughly 95% of felony cases in the
    
    federal and state courts are resolved by guilty pleas.        Therefore it is
    
    critically important that defendants, prosecutors, and judges understand
    
    the consequences of these pleas.” Class, 
    583 U.S.
    at___, 138 S. Ct. at
    807 (Alito, J., dissenting).
    
           The majority’s holding undermines the value of guilty pleas. “One
    
    of the benefits to the state from a plea bargain is finality.” Rhoades v.
    
    State, 
    880 N.W.2d 431
    , 447–49 (Iowa 2016) (holding guilty plea barred
    
    recovery for wrongful imprisonment).          Other “factors favoring pleas
    
    include risk avoidance, conservation of prosecution and court resources,
    
    efficiency, and timeliness of disposition.”     Id. at 449.   The State (and
    
    victims) can no longer rely on the finality of guilty pleas. If Schmidt had
    
    gone to trial in 2007, the State presumably would have proven its case
                                         54
    
    then, and trial testimony would have been preserved for any retrial. Not
    
    so when trial preparation is short-circuited by a guilty plea and no trial
    
    takes place. See id. (noting the lack of a trial record when the defendant
    
    pleads guilty).
    
          The majority fails to confront the proof problems that arise when a
    
    defendant is allowed to renege on a guilty plea years later and there is no
    
    prior trial record because of his guilty plea.     Other courts avoid such
    
    problems by enforcing the guilty plea. See Weeks v. Bowersox, 
    119 F.3d 1342
    , 1355 (8th Cir. 1997) (Loken, J., concurring) (acknowledging the
    
    “inherent paradox in the notion that someone who has stood in open
    
    court and declared, ‘I am guilty,’ may turn around years later” and claim
    
    postconviction relief); Norris v. State, 
    896 N.E.2d 1149
    , 1153 (Ind. 2008)
    
    (noting the difficulty in “harmoniz[ing] th[e] new position taken by the
    
    defendant with the fact that he originally admitted to committing the
    
    crime by his guilty plea,” given that “[b]oth his confession and his new
    
    claims cannot be true”); Yonga v. State, 
    108 A.3d 448
    , 461–63 (Md. Ct.
    
    Spec. App. 2015) (explaining that new evidence cannot be compared to a
    
    nonexistent trial record), aff’d 
    130 A.3d 486
    , 492 (Md. 2016) (concluding
    
    “that a person who has pled guilty may not later avail himself or herself
    
    of the relief afforded by the Petition for a Writ of Actual Innocence”).
    
          The district court correctly granted the State’s motion for summary
    
    judgment. Relying on the court of appeals recent decision in Walters v.
    
    State, the district court found that “newly-discovered exculpatory
    
    evidence does not provide grounds to withdraw a guilty plea ‘unless it is
    
    intrinsic to the plea itself.’ ” No. 12–2022, 
    2014 WL 69589
    , at *3 (Iowa
    
    Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2014) (quoting Speed, 573 N.W.2d at 596). The court of
    
    appeals correctly affirmed the district court’s summary judgment
    
    dismissing Schmidt’s PCR action.          The court of appeals found “the
                                           55
    
    analysis and reasoning in Walters to be spot-on” and held that “because
    
    Schmidt’s convictions were entered following his guilty pleas, he cannot
    
    challenge those convictions in a PCR action on the basis of newly
    
    discovered evidence in the form of his victim’s alleged recantation.”           I
    
    agree.
    
             Nothing in today’s majority opinion should preclude the State from
    
    introducing     Schmidt’s   guilty   plea   colloquy   into   evidence   at   the
    
    postremand hearing. In my view, Schmidt’s admissions of guilt in 2007
    
    entitle the State to summary dismissal of his PCR claims. See Castro,
    
    795 N.W.2d at 795.
    
          II. B.C.’s “Recantation” Is Insufficient to Vacate Schmidt’s
    Guilty Plea.
    
             We have never vacated a guilty plea based on the victim’s
    
    recantation. The majority fails to mention that “[w]e have repeatedly held
    
    that a witness’ recantation testimony . . . is looked upon with the utmost
    
    suspicion.”     Jones v. State, 
    479 N.W.2d 265
    , 275 (Iowa 1991).              Our
    
    skepticism of recantations is widely shared.       Haouari v. United States,
    
    
    510 F.3d 350
    , 353 (2d Cir. 2007) (“It is axiomatic that witness
    
    recantations ‘must be looked upon with the utmost suspicion.’ ” (quoting
    Ortega v. Duncan, 
    333 F.3d 102
    , 107 (2d Cir. 2003))); see also Yonga,
    
    108 A.3d at 475 (noting “post-trial recantation[s] of witnesses are looked
    
    on with the utmost suspicion” (quoting Carr v. State, 
    387 A.2d 302
    ,
    
    305–06 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 
    397 A.2d 606
    
    (Md. 1979))); Addai v. State, 
    893 N.W.2d 480
    , 483 (N.D. 2017) (“This
    
    Court reviews recanting testimony with suspicion and disfavor.”).
    
             This is because recantations “upset[] society’s interest in the
             finality of convictions, [are] very often unreliable and given
             for suspect motives, and most often serve[] merely to
             impeach cumulative evidence rather than to undermine
             confidence in the accuracy of the conviction.”
                                          56
    
    Haouari, 510 F.3d at 535 (alterations in original) (quoting Dobbert v.
    
    Wainwright, 
    468 U.S. 1231
    , 1233–34, 
    105 S. Ct. 34
    , 36 (1984)
    
    (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
    
          Our distrust is heightened when the recanting victim is a child
    
    sexually abused by a family member. See, e.g., State v. Kostman, 
    585 N.W.2d 209
    , 210 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam) (“The victim further admitted
    
    he once recanted the allegations because he and Kostman ‘went camping
    
    together and always had fun and [he] didn’t want to see nothing happen
    
    to him and it was just—[he] was just kind of scared.’ ” (Alteration in
    
    original.)). In State v. Tharp, the defendant’s stepdaughter recanted her
    
    testimony that he had sexually abused her. 
    372 N.W.2d 280
    , 282 (Iowa
    
    Ct. App. 1985). The district court denied his motion for new trial. Id.
    
    The court of appeals affirmed, observing,
    
                 A witness’ recantation of her testimony is looked upon
          with the utmost suspicion, and does not necessarily entitle
          the defendant to a new trial. The trial court must make its
          decision based on the facts of the whole trial and those in
          conjunction with the motion. The victim was a 15 year old
          stepdaughter of defendant. In cases of this type, where
          families are torn apart, there is great pressure on the child to
          “make things right.”
    
    Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
          This view too is widely shared. See United States v. Provost, 
    969 F.2d 617
    , 621 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Recantation is particularly common when
    
    family members are involved and the child has feelings of guilt or the
    
    family members seek to influence the child to change her story.”); Myatt
    
    v. Hannigan, 
    910 F.2d 680
    , 685 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he child’s
    
    recanting of her statement to family members is not atypical in sex abuse
    
    cases.”); Schneider, 25 P.3d at 763 (“Skepticism about recantations is
    
    especially applicable in cases of child sexual abuse where recantation is
    
    a recurring phenomenon.”); State v. Gallagher, 
    554 A.2d 221
    , 225 (Vt.
                                               57
    
    1988) (allowing hearsay exception for child victims of sex crimes because
    
    of “the high probability of a child victim recanting a statement about
    
    being abused sexually”); see also Norris, 896 N.E.2d at 1155 (Boehm, J.
    
    concurring) (viewing recantation of victim’s mother as “inherently
    
    somewhat suspect, coming as it does after the fact and from [a] relative[]
    
    of the defendant”). 9
    
           Recantations are especially common with victims of domestic
    
    violence. See State v. Smith, 
    876 N.W.2d 180
    , 187–88 (Iowa 2016) (citing
    
    authorities concluding many victims of domestic violence recant); id. at
    
    194 (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“The rate of recantation among domestic
    
    violence victims has been estimated between eighty and ninety percent.”).
    
    After today, we can expect that offenders who already pled guilty will try
    
    to pressure their victims to recant.
    
           Mindful of the law’s appropriate distrust of recantations by victims
    
    of child sex abuse, I conclude B.C.’s fainthearted “recantation” is
    
    
    
    
            9One study showed twenty-two percent of children recant allegations, but
    
    ninety-two percent of those who recanted eventually reaffirmed the abuse. Teena
    Sorensen & Barbara Snow, How Children Tell: The Process of Disclosure in Child Sexual
    Abuse Cases, 70 Child Welfare 3, 11 (1991). The influence of family pressure and
    familial relationships outweighs other factors in the victim’s likelihood to recant.
    Margaret H. Shiu, Unwarranted Skepticism: The Federal Courts’ Treatment of Child
    Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 651, 674 (2009); cf.
    Lindsay C. Malloy et al., Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse
    Allegations, 46 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 162, 167 (2007)
    (“Recantation appears to reflect susceptibility to pressures from influential adults, a
    pattern that complements and extends decades of research on children’s suggestibility.
    However, whereas the latter research emphasizes the dangers of false allegations of
    abuse that can result from external pressures, our study suggests that pressures can
    lead truly abused children to recant.”). A victim may also recant to avoid confronting
    his or her abuser in the legal system. See Anoosha Rouhanian, A Call for Change: The
    Detrimental Impacts of Crawford v. Washington on Domestic Violence and Rape
    Prosecutions, 37 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 1, 37 (2017) (“[A] rape victim may recant for any
    number of reasons other than because they were lying about the rape itself. . . . [R]ape
    victims might recant . . . because they fear confronting their attackers, whether directly
    or indirectly, through legal proceedings.”).
                                          58
    
    insufficient to vacate Schmidt’s guilty plea. B.C.’s affidavit stated in its
    
    entirety:
    
                    I, [B.C.], being first duly sworn hereby depose and
             state as follows:
                   I was the victim in Woodbury County Criminal Case
             FECR054257, State of Iowa vs. Jacob Schmidt. Jacob
             Schmidt is my brother. I am currently 23 years of age, but
             was a child at the time of the criminal case. At the time of
             the original criminal case, I had told various people that
             Jacob had sexually abused me. When I was 21 years old, I
             told other people that Jacob had never touched me in a
             sexual way or sexually abused me. I didn’t tell anyone
             before that date that nothing had really happened, and so
             Jacob couldn’t have known before then. I decided to tell
             people when I turned 21 since I was a full adult at that time.
             I want to see my brother and tell him I am sorry that I
             couldn’t tell anyone before then.
    
    Notably, B.C. never stated under oath which story he told is true. Nor
    
    did B.C. claim that police or his family induced him to lie in 2007. The
    
    timing of B.C.’s new story seven years later coincides with Schmidt’s
    
    expected release from prison.      On February 25, 2006, the night Peter
    
    caught Schmidt in the act of attempting to rape B.C., Schmidt stood six
    
    foot, three inches tall and weighed between 350 and 400 pounds. B.C.,
    
    who had just celebrated his fourteenth birthday, was four feet, six inches
    
    tall and weighed between seventy-five and ninety pounds.          While B.C.
    
    may have added some pounds and inches since then, I can understand
    
    his motivation to make peace with his much larger half-brother before
    
    Schmidt’s release from prison.
    
             Perhaps an evidentiary hearing on remand will bring this matter to
    
    a swift conclusion.       “The trial court is not required to believe the
    
    recantation . . . .” State v. Compiano, 
    261 Iowa 509
    , 517, 
    154 N.W.2d 845
    , 849 (1967). To the contrary, if the court believes the recantation is
    
    false,
                                         59
          and is not reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given
          by the witness [at] trial was false, . . . it is not at liberty to
          shift upon the shoulders of another jury the responsibility to
          seek out the truth of that matter.
    
    Id.
    
          We    have   repeatedly    affirmed    denials   of   applications   for
    
    postconviction relief based on witness recantations.         See Jones, 479
    N.W.2d at 275 (affirming district court’s denial of application for PCR
    
    because “Jones’ entire claim is based upon an assumption that
    
    Coleman’s trial testimony was in fact false,” but “[t]he postconviction
    
    court is certainly not required to believe the recantation”); State v. Folck,
    
    
    325 N.W.2d 368
    , 377 (Iowa 1982) (“Recantation of trial testimony is
    
    viewed with suspicion, and the trial court has broad discretion in looking
    
    to the whole record to determine if defendant had a fair trial.”); see also
    
    State v. Frank, 
    298 N.W.2d 324
    , 329 (Iowa 1980) (noting testimony later
    
    recanted still had probative value); State v. Taylor, 
    287 N.W.2d 576
    , 578
    
    (Iowa 1980) (affirming denial of motion for new trial because a
    
    recantation is “not really based on newly discovered evidence”); State v.
    
    Jackson, 
    223 N.W.2d 229
    , 234 (Iowa 1974) (“The general rule is a
    
    witness’ recantation should be looked upon with utmost suspicion.”).
    
          When the witness’s original testimony is corroborated by other
    
    evidence supporting the conviction following a jury trial, a subsequent
    
    recantation seldom warrants relief.       See Adcock v. State, 
    528 N.W.2d 645
    , 648 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (affirming district court’s denial of
    
    postconviction relief when witness recanted because “there was other
    
    evidence connecting Adcock to the crime”); see also Frank, 298 N.W.2d at
    
    329–30 (affirming conviction when independent evidence corroborated
    
    witness’s original testimony that she later recanted). Peter’s unrecanted
    
    eyewitness account corroborates B.C.’s original contemporaneous report
                                         60
    
    to the police and forensic interviewer. Schmidt therefore is not entitled
    
    to relief from his conviction.
    
          III. Schmidt’s PCR Action Is Untimely.
    
          I would also affirm the summary judgment because Schmidt’s
    
    PCR—filed seven years after his conviction—is time-barred under Iowa
    
    Code section 822.3’s three-year statute of limitations. The majority holds
    
    it is not time-barred because Schmidt could not know within the
    
    limitations period that B.C. would later recant. But Schmidt did know
    
    what happened in the bedroom in 2006 and knew then whether the
    
    allegations made by Peter and B.C. were false.
    
          PCR actions “must be filed within three years from the date the
    
    conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date
    
    the writ of procedendo is issued.”        Iowa Code § 822.3 (2014).       An
    
    exception is made for applications claiming “a ground of fact or law that
    
    could not have been raised within the applicable time period.” Id. The
    
    three-year time-bar “limit[s] postconviction litigation in order to conserve
    
    judicial resources, promote substantive goals of the criminal law, foster
    
    rehabilitation, and restore a sense of repose in our system of justice.”
    
    Wilkins v. State, 
    522 N.W.2d 822
    , 824 (Iowa 1994) (quoting State v.
    
    Edman, 
    444 N.W.2d 103
    , 106 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989)). A corollary purpose
    
    is “ ‘to reduce injustices occurring as a result of lost witnesses’ necessary
    
    to resolve factual issues arising in postconviction proceedings and upon
    
    retrial of cases where convictions have been overturned.” Dible v. State,
    
    
    557 N.W.2d 881
    , 885 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Brewer v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    395 N.W.2d 841
    , 843 (Iowa 1986)), abrogated on other grounds by Harrington
    
    v. State, 
    659 N.W.2d 509
    , 521 (Iowa 2003).
    
          To further those goals, the exception to the three-year time-bar in
    
    section 822.3 is limited to claims in which the applicant had “no
                                         61
    
    opportunity to test the validity of the conviction in relation to [the ground
    
    of fact or law that allegedly could not have been raised within the time
    
    period].”   Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 824 (alteration in original) (quoting
    
    Edman, 444 N.W.2d at 106). An applicant may not assert a claim he or
    
    she has “at least been alerted to” in the prior action. Id. This promotes
    
    repose and conserves judicial resources.         See id. (holding second
    
    application for relief was time-barred when applicant should have been
    
    alerted to “ground of fact” in prior postconviction application); see also
    
    Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 886 (barring action when applicant was aware of
    
    ground of fact because “[a]ny other decision would result in an endless
    
    procession of postconviction actions, and the legislature’s hope to avoid
    
    stale claims and to achieve a sense of repose in the criminal justice
    
    system would not be realized”).
    
          The State filed a two-pronged motion for summary judgment to
    
    dismiss Schmidt’s PCR action, arguing that his (1) guilty plea barred
    
    relief and (2) PCR application was barred by the three-year statute of
    
    limitations. The State correctly argued B.C.’s statements were not “new
    
    evidence” that could not have been discovered through the exercise of
    
    due diligence:
    
                 Here, by the very nature of the case and the sexual
          abuse claims leveled against the applicant by his younger
          family member, there can be no doubt that he would have
          known about his own involvement or non-involvement in the
          alleged sexual acts against his family member. He would
          have known what the victim or any other witness would or
          would not testify to if the case were to proceed to jury trial.
          He would have known that the victim’s father was prepared
          to testify that he caught the applicant in the act with his
          pants down, penis exposed, and kneeling right behind the
          bare anus of the victim in the bedroom. He would have
          known that the victim had given a recorded interview to
          Mercy CAC stating that the sexual acts did in fact occur. All
          of this would have been readily available to the applicant at
          the time of his plea of guilty and subsequent conviction and
                                              62
           as such he would have known about the veracity of said
           statements.
    
    I agree.
    
           “[T]he objective of the escape clause of section 822.3 is to provide
    
    relief from the limitation period when an applicant had ‘no opportunity’
    
    to assert the claim before the limitation period expired.” Cornell v. State,
    
    
    529 N.W.2d 606
    , 611 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d
    
    at 823–24). “[T]he focus of our inquiry has been whether the applicant
    
    was or should have been ‘alerted’ to the potential claim before the
    limitation period expired.”       Id. (quoting Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 824).10
    
    Schmidt was alerted to his own actual-innocence claim and chose to
    
    abandon it by pleading guilty.            He knew when he entered his plea
    
    whether Peter and B.C. were telling the truth and gave up his right to a
    
    trial to cross-examine them.
    
           This is not a case in which a new, disinterested witness has come
    
    forward. See State v. Burgess, 
    237 Iowa 162
    , 164–65, 
    21 N.W.2d 309
    ,
    
    310 (1946) (allowing new trial based on subsequent discovery of
    
    disinterested alibi witness, a train conductor, when the defendant “was
    
    the only witness who testified at the trial that he was on the train at the
    
    time the state’s witnesses testified the crime was committed [elsewhere,
    
    because c]learly the evidence of the conductor of the train, placing the
    
    
            10Exculpatory evidence known but unavailable to the defendant at the time of
    
    his original conviction is not considered “newly discovered” when it becomes available
    years later. See Jones v. Scurr, 
    316 N.W.2d 905
    , 910 (Iowa 1982). In that case, one
    codefendant took the Fifth Amendment and another was a fugitive when Rubin Jones
    was convicted of first-degree murder in a jury trial in 1976. Id. at 906–07. Years later,
    both codefendants came forward with exculpatory evidence. Id. The district court
    denied postconviction relief, and we affirmed, holding the codefendants’ exculpatory
    statements “although unavailable, [were] known to defendant, and cannot be
    considered newly discovered.” Id. at 910. We noted Jones had failed to exercise due
    diligence to secure their testimony at his trial. Id. at 910 n.1. Similarly, Schmidt knew
    what B.C. knew and could have gone to trial and cross-examined B.C. but chose not to
    do so.
                                                63
    
    [defendant] on the train at the time of the commission of the crime, was
    
    not cumulative”).         And this is not the case of a mere he-said, he-said
    
    account without another witness to the incident. 11 Peter walked in on
    
    and witnessed Schmidt’s attempted assault on B.C.
    
            Nor has Schmidt come forward with new physical evidence or new
    
    scientific developments that were previously undiscovered. 12 See More v.
    
    State, 
    880 N.W.2d 487
    , 508 (Iowa 2016) (considering as newly discovered
    
    evidence       FBI      announcement      that     previous     testimony      on       bullet
    
    identification was “not scientifically supportable”).
    
            B.C.’s recantation is “not new evidence in the real sense.”
    
    Compiano, 261 Iowa at 517, 154 N.W.2d at 849. “On the contrary, it is
    
    but an assertion by affidavit that the former testimony given by the
    
    
            11By  contrast, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling allowing
    the defendant to withdraw his Alford plea in an unwitnessed sexual assault based on
    the victim’s recantation, which the trial court found credible in an evidentiary hearing.
    State v. Fritz, 
    755 P.2d 444
    , 446 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). “[T]he victim stated that he had
    lied about his accusations and had acted under duress from someone seeking revenge
    against the defendant.” Id. The appellate court noted that “[i]f the sole basis for the
    strength of the state’s case is the credibility of the victim, as is usually the case in non-
    witnessed sexual assaults . . . the trial court does not abuse its discretion by allowing a
    plea to be withdrawn [so] that the victim’s credibility [can] be tested in the crucible of
    trial.” Id.
            12When new DNA evidence is discovered, the defendant may proceed under Iowa
    Code section 81.10, which provides in relevant part,
                   1. A defendant who has been       convicted of a felony or aggravated
            misdemeanor and who has not been         required to submit a DNA sample
            for DNA profiling may make a motion      to the court for an order to require
            that DNA analysis be performed on        evidence collected in the case for
            which the person stands convicted.
                     ....
                    9. Results of DNA analysis conducted pursuant to this section
            shall be reported to the parties and to the court and may be provided to
            the board of parole, department of corrections, and criminal and juvenile
            justice agencies, as defined in section 692.1, for use in the course of
            investigations and prosecutions, and for consideration in connection with
            requests for parole, pardon, reprieve, and commutation.
    Id. § 81.10(1), (9).
                                           64
    
    witness was false.” Id.; see also Taylor, 287 N.W.2d at 578 (same). As
    
    the Kansas Court of Appeals stated,
    
          By entering a plea of guilty, Woods was well aware of the
          facts of the case. In fact, he knew the extent of his
          involvement in the events of the evening better than anyone
          else. Based on the preliminary hearing, the pretrial motions
          filed with the court, and the documents exchanged by the
          parties, Woods knew that at least on the planned day of trial
          . . . some witnesses were going to testify on his behalf and
          some were not. He freely and voluntarily chose not to take
          his chances with a trial. The fact that at some point on or
          after [the trial date], some—though not all—witnesses appear
          to have recanted previous incriminating statements or
          returned to original statements does not change the fact that
          Woods decided not to risk the consequences of facing a trial
          ....
    
    Woods, 379 P.3d at 1141.
    
          Our decision in Harrington, 
    659 N.W.2d 509
    , does not require a
    
    different result.    In Harrington, we stated that newly discovered,
    
    previously undisclosed police reports together with recantations by three
    
    trial witnesses qualified as a ground of fact that could not have been
    
    raised within the three-year window. 659 N.W.2d at 521. A jury found
    
    Terry Harrington guilty of murder in 1978. Id. at 514. Harrington had
    
    presented an alibi defense at trial that was undermined by several
    witnesses who placed him with accomplices on the night of the murder.
    
    Id. at 515. Over twenty years later, Harrington filed an application for
    
    postconviction relief. Id. Three witnesses had come forward, recanting
    
    their trial testimony that placed him with accomplices. Id. at 516–17.
    
    One recanting witness “claim[ed] he gave a contrary story at trial because
    
    he was pressured by the prosecutors and police.” Id. at 517. Another
    
    “said he lied [at trial] to obtain a $5000 reward . . . and to avoid being
    
    charged with the crime.” Id. Harrington’s counsel also discovered Brady
    
    violations—eight    police   reports   containing   exculpatory   information
                                              65
    
    withheld by the state. 13 Id. at 518–19. “Harrington argued this newly
    
    discovered evidence warranted vacation of his conviction.”                Id. at 518.
    
    Concluding we were bound by the district court’s factual findings, we
    
    stated,
    
          With respect to both the undisclosed police reports and the
          recantation evidence, the [district] court held, in ruling on
          Harrington’s substantive claims, that he had proved they
          were discovered after the verdict in his criminal trial and
          that they could not have been discovered earlier than they
          were discovered in the exercise of due diligence. These
          findings are clearly supported by substantial evidence, which
          we have reviewed above, and so are binding under the
          standard of review applicable to the statute-of-limitations
          issue.
    
    Id. at 521.     We concluded Harrington’s PCR application was not time-
    
    barred, see id., but went on to determine the Brady violations alone
    
    entitled him to a new trial, id. at 525.
    
          Harrington is distinguishable. Schmidt alleges no Brady violations.
    
    No unrecanting eyewitness caught Harrington in the criminal act. The
    
    district court made no finding B.C.’s recantation was newly discovered
    evidence. And B.C. makes no claim he was paid or pressured to testify
    
    falsely when Schmidt was charged. Most significantly, unlike Schmidt,
    
    Harrington did not plead guilty but steadfastly maintained his innocence.
    
    Id. at 523 & n.10.
    
          IV. Schmidt’s Actual-Innocence Claim Fails.
    
          The majority today adopts for the first time a freestanding actual-
    
    innocence claim for postconviction relief. Under this new standard,
    
          [f]or an applicant to succeed on a freestanding actual-
          innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear and
          convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt
          supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could
          convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing
    
          13See   Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 87, 
    83 S. Ct. 1194
    , 1196–97 (1963).
                                          66
          court found the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence,
          including the newly discovered evidence.
    
    In my view, Schmidt fails to meet this standard as a matter of law.
    
          The Supreme Court has stated that an applicant claiming actual
    
    innocence    must   present    “new    reliable   evidence—whether     it    be
    
    exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or
    
    critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.”       Schlup v.
    
    Delo, 
    513 U.S. 298
    , 324, 
    115 S. Ct. 851
    , 865 (1995).         Requiring new
    
    reliable evidence significantly reduces “[t]he threat to judicial resources,
    finality, and comity posed by claims of actual innocence.” Id. at 324, 115
    
    S. Ct. at 866.   Assessing reliability, “the court may consider how the
    
    timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on
    
    the probable reliability of that evidence.” Id. at 332, 115 S. Ct. at 869.
    
          Moreover, to succeed on an actual-innocence claim, the applicant
    
    also must show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in
    
    the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 
    477 U.S. 478
    , 496, 
    106 S. Ct. 2639
    , 2649 (1986). The court must therefore
    
    assess the merits of the claim, considering “ ‘all the evidence,’ old and
    
    new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would
    
    necessarily be admitted under ‘rules of admissibility that would govern at
    
    trial.’ ” House v. Bell, 
    547 U.S. 518
    , 538, 
    126 S. Ct. 2064
    , 2077 (2006)
    
    (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–28, 115 S. Ct. at 867).                Most
    
    importantly, the applicant must show it is “more likely than not that no
    
    reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new
    
    evidence.” Id. at 556, 126 S. Ct. at 2087 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in
    
    part and dissenting in part) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S. Ct.
    
    at 867).    This requires more than a showing that “reasonable doubt
    
    exists in the light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329, 115
                                         67
    
    S. Ct. at 868.     Rather, the applicant must prove “no juror, acting
    
    reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
    
    doubt.” Id. This standard is “demanding and permits review only in the
    
    ‘extraordinary’ case.”    House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S. Ct. at 2077
    
    (majority opinion) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S. Ct. at 867).
    
    Because the inquiry “involves evidence the trial [court] did not have
    
    before it, the inquiry requires the . . . court to assess how reasonable
    
    jurors would [have] react[ed] to the overall, newly supplemented record.”
    
    Id. at 538, 126 S. Ct. at 2078.
    
          Schmidt cannot show it is more likely than not in light of B.C.’s
    
    recantation that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.          Peter
    
    personally witnessed Schmidt’s attempt to sexually assault B.C., literally
    
    catching   them    with    their   pants   down.    Police   officers   took
    
    contemporaneous statements from Peter and B.C. at the scene within
    
    minutes of the incident.     The police officers could have testified as to
    
    what B.C. and Peter described minutes after the incident under the
    
    excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.       See Iowa R. Evid.
    
    5.803(2) (defining excited utterance as “[a] statement relating to a
    
    startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the
    
    stress of excitement that it caused”); see also State v. Richards, 
    809 N.W.2d 80
    , 95 (Iowa 2012) (holding domestic violence victim’s statement
    
    to daughter about choking while victim’s neck was still red was
    
    admissible as an excited utterance).       Moreover, B.C. gave a recorded
    
    forensic interview five days later in which he detailed the events of the
    
    night and disclosed Schmidt’s past assaults. That video, recorded while
    
    his memory was fresh, could be used to impeach his subsequent
    
    recantation.     See Iowa R. Evid. 5.613(b) (“Extrinsic evidence of a
    
    witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is
                                        68
    
    given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse
    
    party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice
    
    so requires.”); see also State v. Austin, 
    585 N.W.2d 241
    , 243–44 (Iowa
    
    1998) (concluding district court properly admitted videotape of child
    
    victim describing sexual abuse recorded shortly after it occurred, when
    
    defense counsel opened the door by cross-examining the child about
    
    inconsistent statements); Chambers v. State, 
    805 S.W.2d 459
    , 461 (Tex.
    
    Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (allowing jury to consider recorded statement
    
    of child discussing abuse despite child’s recantation at trial); State v.
    
    Church, 
    708 A.2d 1341
    , 1342 (Vt. 1998) (allowing state to present
    
    rehabilitating testimony from witness whom child told she had been
    
    abused after defendant attempted to show child had recanted her
    
    testimony).
    
          Schmidt’s claim of actual innocence in this PCR action must be
    
    evaluated in light of that evidence and, as the special concurrence
    
    acknowledges, Schmidt’s guilty-plea colloquy in which he admitted to the
    
    facts in the minutes of testimony establishing his crimes. See Castro,
    
    795 N.W.2d at 795 (approving use of plea colloquy in summary
    
    disposition).   Schmidt cannot succeed on his actual-innocence claim
    
    based solely on B.C.’s recantation; he cannot show no reasonable juror
    
    would convict him. I would hold that the district court properly granted
    
    the State’s motion for summary dismissal of Schmidt’s petition for
    
    postconviction relief.
    
          This case falls outside the typical categories of cases of actual
    
    innocence. In Rhoades, we reviewed a growing body of scholarship on
    
    wrongful convictions. 880 N.W.2d at 434–39. Retrospective studies of
    
    cases following DNA exonerations found the wrongful convictions “were
    
    frequently based upon false confessions obtained from the defendant
                                              69
    
    [during police interrogations], eyewitness identification that proved to be
    
    unreliable, failure of the state to turn over exculpatory evidence, use of
    
    unreliable informant testimony, and ineffective assistance of counsel.”
    
    Id. at 435–36 (footnotes omitted). Schmidt alleges none of those.
    
           Most wrongful convictions followed trials in which the defendant
    
    (unlike Schmidt) steadfastly maintained his or her innocence. 14                    Yet
    
    “[t]hirteen percent of all wrongful convictions listed in the National
    
    Registry of Exonerations are the result of guilty pleas.” Id. at 437. We
    
    stated,   “Many      scholars     now    recognize     that    at   least   in   some
    
    circumstances, an innocent person may rationally decide to plead guilty.”
    
    Id. at 436. Several of those circumstances are inapplicable to Schmidt:
    
    pleas to obtain immediate release for time served or pleas based on
    
    misunderstanding the elements of the crime or facts alleged. See id. at
    
    437. Rather, Schmidt claims he pled guilty to avoid the risk of a thirty-
    
    five-year prison sentence.         See id. at 436 (“[W]hen the deal is good
    
    enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice . . . regardless of whether
    
           14See David L. Strauss, Barbarous Souls (2010) [hereinafter Strauss], for a
    chilling example of a life ruined by a pre-Miranda interrogation. The book chronicles
    the story of Darrel Parker, who came home from work in Lincoln, Nebraska, on
    December 14, 1955, to find his wife, Nancy, strangled in their bed. Police had reason to
    suspect an ex-convict, Wesley Peery, who had installed a fence at the Parker home the
    preceding week. Id. at 34–35, 98. Nevertheless, police investigator, John Reid, was
    brought in from Chicago and interrogated the grieving Mr. Parker for hours, using
    manipulative psychological techniques until he confessed. He recanted the next day
    and steadfastly maintained his innocence thereafter, but was convicted at trial based on
    his confession. See Parker v. Sigler, 
    413 F.2d 459
    , 465–66 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding
    confession involuntary), overruled on procedural grounds by Sigler v. Parker, 
    396 U.S. 482
    , 
    90 S. Ct. 667
     (1970). Parker was released in 1970 after serving thirteen years in
    prison. Strauss, at 216. Peery ultimately confessed to the Nancy Parker murder. Id. at
    224. Parker is now an eighty-seven-year-old resident of Moline, Illinois. Id. at 245.
           The Reid interrogation techniques that prompted his false confession in 1955
    are described in the Eighth Circuit decision holding Parker’s confession to be
    involuntary, see Parker, 413 F.2d at 465, and discussed at length by the Miranda
    Court, see Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 449–58, 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 1614–19 (1966).
    Jacob Schmidt is no Darrel Parker, and today’s decision involves no counterpart to
    John Reid.
                                           70
    
    one is factually innocent.” (quoting Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt:
    
    Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the Variable Standard of Proof, 
    63 Fla. L
    . Rev. 431, 450 (2011))).         But, we previously made clear the
    
    pressure a defendant faces to plea bargain to avoid a much longer prison
    
    sentence does not render his guilty plea involuntary or justify
    
    withdrawing a plea based on newly discovered exculpatory evidence. See
    
    Speed, 573 N.W.2d at 597 (“Speed’s concern that he must choose
    
    between trial on a murder charge and pleading guilty to a lesser charge
    
    has no bearing upon the voluntariness of his plea.”). Schmidt’s is a poor
    
    test   case   to   adopt   an    actual-innocence    pathway     to     vacating   a
    
    constitutionally valid guilty plea.
    
           Accordingly, I would not use this case to decide whether to
    
    recognize a freestanding or gateway actual-innocence claim under the
    
    Iowa Constitution for postconviction-relief actions because under any
    
    such test, Schmidt cannot satisfy the showing required for procedural or
    
    substantive relief from his guilty plea.           Our court should exercise
    
    restraint today rather than trying to set the table now for a meritorious
    
    actual-innocence claim that may come to us in the future. As we stated
    
    in State v. Keeton, “fundamental principles of judicial restraint limit our
    
    role to deciding each case on the issues presented, and we refrain from
    
    deciding issues not presented by the facts.”         
    710 N.W.2d 531
    , 533–34
    
    (Iowa 2006).       I would wait for a case presenting compelling proof of
    
    actual   innocence      before    deciding   the    parameters        for   allowing
    
    postconviction challenges to defect-free guilty pleas.            As our court
    
    unanimously reiterated in Keeton,
    
           [w]e recognize the law to be an evolving process that often
           makes the resolution of legal questions a composite of
           several cases, from which appellate courts can gain a better
           view of the puzzle before arranging all the pieces. The
                                        71
          wisdom of this process has been revealed time and again,
          and we continue to subscribe to it today.
    
    Id. at 534 (quoting State v. Williams, 
    695 N.W.2d 23
    , 30 (Iowa 2005)).
    
          For all these reasons, I dissent.
    
          Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.
                                            72
                                                      #15–1408, Schmidt v. State
    MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
    
             I   respectfully   dissent.   Constitutional   interpretation   is   not
    
    Darwinian evolution, and a decision of this court today is not superior to
    
    the decisions that preceded it just because it is more recent. Whether
    
    this court is on a “constitutional march to become better” should be
    
    determined by others, not by ourselves.
    
             While it is tempting to agree that “[i]nnocent people should always
    
    have a forum to prove their innocence,” the realities of any criminal
    
    justice system are more complex. Even the majority does not take this
    
    statement literally. For example, even the majority accepts for now the
    
    limits in Iowa Code chapter 822 on claims brought by those who say they
    
    are actually innocent.
    
             I join Justice Waterman’s dissent, and write separately only to
    
    highlight several points.
    
             First, this case does not involve an actual recantation.
    
             Second, the rule that a guilty plea waives all defenses and
    
    objections which are not intrinsic to the plea is both long-standing and
    
    sound.
    
             Third, the court has provided no doctrinal basis for grounding an
    
    actual-innocence claim in the Iowa Constitution.
    
             Fourth, the court leaves many questions unanswered that will
    
    have to be sorted out by our district judges in the coming years.
    
             I. The Supposed Recantation Is Not a Recantation.
    
             Here is the so-called recantation that is launching a thousand
    
    ships:
    
             I was the victim in [case number]. Jacob Schmidt is my
             brother. I am currently 23 years of age, but was a child at
             the time of the criminal case. At the time of the original
                                           73
           criminal case, I had told various people that Jacob had
           sexually abused me. When I was 21 years old, I told other
           people that Jacob had never touched me in a sexual way or
           sexually abused me. I didn’t tell anyone before that date
           that nothing had really happened, and so Jacob couldn’t
           have known before then. I decided to tell people when I
           turned 21 since I was a full adult at that time. I want to see
           my brother and tell him I am sorry that I couldn’t tell anyone
           before then.
    
    This is hardly a recantation. Nowhere does Schmidt’s brother deny that
    
    the sexual assault actually occurred.          He merely states that he has
    
    recently been telling people it didn’t occur. Nor does the brother explain
    
    why he changed his story.
    
           Just two years ago, in Estate of Gray ex rel. Gray v. Baldi, we
    
    applied the “contradictory affidavit rule.” 
    880 N.W.2d 451
    , 463–64 (Iowa
    
    2016).    Under this rule, an affidavit that contradicts prior sworn
    
    testimony   does   not   create   an   issue    of   fact    if   it     “clearly   and
    
    unambiguously contradicts [the] earlier sworn testimony” unless the
    
    affiant offers “a reasonable explanation for any apparent contradiction.”
    
    Id.   Since the court purports to be applying civil summary judgment
    
    standards, Estate of Gray may well indicate that there is no issue of fact
    
    here, even if a change in our long-standing law on guilty pleas were
    
    appropriate.
    
          II. We Should Stand by Our Existing Law on the Finality of
    Guilty Pleas.
    
           A change in the law is not needed. Our court should adhere to its
    
    long-standing rule that “a defendant’s guilty plea waives all defenses and
    
    objections which are not intrinsic to the plea.”            State v. Carroll, 
    767 N.W.2d 638
    , 641 (Iowa 2009).
    
           A. Our Precedent Is Clear and Well-Settled.                      In Carroll, we
    
    accurately said that this rule is “well-established.”             Id.     I would not
    
    abandon our settled precedent, unanimously reaffirmed eight years ago
                                         74
    
    in Carroll and two years after that in State v. Utter. See State v. Utter,
    
    
    803 N.W.2d 647
    , 651 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Carroll with approval and
    
    explaining its significance); see also Castro v. State, 
    795 N.W.2d 789
    , 792
    
    (Iowa 2011) (“Generally, a criminal defendant waives all defenses and
    
    objections to the criminal proceedings by pleading guilty.”); State v.
    
    Mattly, 
    513 N.W.2d 739
    , 740–41 (Iowa 1994) (stating that “a valid guilty
    
    plea waives all defenses and objections (except that the information or
    
    indictment charges no offense or any irregularities intrinsic in the plea
    
    itself)”); State v. Garner, 
    469 N.W.2d 698
    , 699 (Iowa 1991) (“By pleading
    
    guilty . . . , Garner waived the right to challenge those convictions on any
    
    ground not intrinsic to the pleas.”); State v. Everett, 
    372 N.W.2d 235
    , 237
    
    (Iowa 1985) (“[A] guilty plea would have waived all defenses or objections
    
    which were not intrinsic to the plea itself.”); State v. Boge, 
    252 N.W.2d 411
    , 413 (Iowa 1977) (“[B]y entering a plea of guilty, defendant waived
    
    any defense or objection which is not intrinsic to the plea itself.”).
    
            What does “intrinsic to the plea” mean? It means a defendant who
    
    pleads guilty can later argue that the plea was “unintelligent or
    
    involuntary.” Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 642–44. This includes the situation
    
    where the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel “in
    
    connection with the plea.” Id. at 642. All such matters are intrinsic to
    
    the plea. But later-discovered evidence—by definition—is extrinsic to the
    
    plea.
    
            In State v. Speed, 
    573 N.W.2d 594
     (Iowa 1998), we specifically held
    
    that new exculpatory evidence is not intrinsic to the plea and cannot be
    
    used to challenge a guilty plea. We explained,
    
                  Speed asserts new exculpatory evidence bears upon a
            defendant’s plea because the amount of evidence the State
            has against a defendant affects the defendant’s decision to
            plead guilty. This argument fails to distinguish between a
                                        75
          defendant’s tactical rationale for pleading guilty and a
          defendant’s understanding of what a plea means and his or
          her choice to voluntarily enter the plea. Any subsequently-
          discovered deficiency in the State’s case that affects a
          defendant’s assessment of the evidence against him, but not
          the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea, is not intrinsic
          to the plea itself.
    
    Id. at 596.
          State v. Alexander, 
    463 N.W.2d 421
     (Iowa 1990), likewise reiterated
    
    that “a plea of guilty ‘waives all defenses or objections which are not
    
    intrinsic to the plea itself.’ ” Id. at 422 (quoting State v. Morehouse, 
    316 N.W.2d 884
    , 885 (Iowa 1982), overruled on other grounds by State v.
    
    Kress, 
    636 N.W.2d 12
    , 20 (Iowa 2001)). In Alexander, we relied on this
    
    rule to hold that a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
    
    evidence was not available for a defendant who had pled guilty. Id. at
    
    422–23. We said, “Notions of newly discovered evidence simply have no
    
    bearing on a knowing and voluntary admission of guilt.” Id. at 423.
    
          It is true that Alexander contains the following enigmatic sentence
    
    at the end of the opinion: “The remedy Alexander seeks is available to
    
    him in the form of postconviction relief.     See Iowa Code § 663A.2(4)
    
    (1989) [now Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(d) (2014)].” Id. The majority seizes on
    
    this single sentence to find that a defendant who pleads guilty can attack
    
    his or her guilty plea in postconviction-relief proceedings under Iowa
    
    Code section 822.2(1)(d) based on newly discovered evidence.
    
          I am not persuaded.      The one-sentence dictum from Alexander
    
    cannot be right and, indeed, is inconsistent with the rest of the
    
    Alexander opinion. See 463 N.W.2d at 422. One can attack a guilty plea
    
    on grounds extrinsic to the plea or one cannot—the case cannot stand
    
    for both propositions.   Given our many other decisions upholding the
    
    rule against extrinsic attacks on a plea, including not just Alexander but
    
    also decisions that preceded and followed Alexander, the stray sentence
                                        76
    
    from Alexander must be regarded as an error.           Certainly, it has been
    
    treated as a legal dead end. In the nearly thirty years since we decided
    
    Alexander, that sentence has never been quoted or cited by our court.
    
    Instead, for decades, until today, we have consistently followed the rule
    
    that a guilty plea waives all defenses and objections which are not
    
    intrinsic to the plea.
    
           Westlaw will be busy tracking down and flagging the decisions of
    
    our court that, after today, are no longer good law.
    
           B. Our Precedent Is Sound. The rule limiting challenges to guilty
    
    pleas is not just our precedent, it is the correct precedent, especially
    
    when one considers the interests of both defendants and the state.
    
    Although the majority in my view unfairly disparages plea agreements,
    
    painting the whole process as predatory, plea negotiations are a vital
    
    element of our justice system, and they ultimately benefit—and protect—
    
    defendants.      See Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice
    
    System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
    
    73, 114 (2015) (noting “that plea agreements are an integral part of the
    
    criminal justice system, conserving judicial resources and providing
    
    defendants the opportunity to obtain often much-needed reductions in
    
    sentences or dismissal of charges in return for a plea and the waivers of
    
    all trial rights”).
    
           I acknowledge that in the real world, defendants do at times plead
    
    guilty to offenses which, in a final reckoning, they did not commit.
    
    Typically, there are two reasons why this occurs.         One is a strategic
    
    decision by the defendant to avoid other, more serious convictions or
    
    additional, more severe penalties that would result from going to trial.
    
    See, e.g., State v. Ceretti, 
    871 N.W.2d 88
    , 89 (Iowa 2015) (noting that the
    
    defendant was charged with first-degree murder but pled guilty to
                                         77
    
    voluntary manslaughter, attempted murder, and willful injury causing
    
    serious injury). The other is when the defendant committed a crime to
    
    which she or he intended to plead guilty but the wrong crime was
    
    charged by mistake. See, e.g., State v. Nall, 
    894 N.W.2d 514
    , 525 (Iowa
    
    2017) (“Under these facts, a factual basis may exist for a charge under
    
    section 714.1(6) (theft by check), but not under section 714.1(1).”).
    
    Neither of these scenarios calls for the drastic change in the law that the
    
    majority has announced today.
    
          The majority cites one case from South Dakota and one case from
    
    New York before asking, rhetorically, “What kind of system of justice do
    
    we have if we permit actually innocent people to remain in prison?”
    
    Despite this sloganeering, the fact remains that both cases involved
    
    defendants who went to trial. See In re Kaufmann, 
    157 N.E. 730
    , 730–31
    
    (N.Y. 1927); Engesser v. Young, 
    856 N.W.2d 471
    , 473 (S.D. 2014).
    
          Before a defendant pleads guilty, the law protects that defendant in
    
    several ways. First, a detailed colloquy is required. See Iowa R. Crim. P.
    
    2.8(2)(b). The defendant is informed he or she is giving up the right to a
    
    trial and there will not be a further trial of any kind. Id. r. 2.8(2)(b)(4)–
    
    (5). Until today, those were true statements.
    
          Second, the record must show a factual basis for each charge to
    
    which the defendant is pleading guilty.     See, e.g., Nall, 894 N.W.2d at
    
    525; Rhoades v. State, 
    848 N.W.2d 22
    , 33 (Iowa 2014); State v. Gines,
    
    
    844 N.W.2d 437
    , 441 (Iowa 2014).
    
          Third, as discussed above, the plea must be voluntary and
    
    intelligent, and if counsel was ineffective in some manner that rendered
    
    the plea involuntary or unintelligent, that can be raised. See Castro, 795
    
    N.W.2d at 793–94; Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 642–43.
                                             78
    
           In my view, these safeguards serve their intended purpose. “Once
    
    a defendant has waived his right to a trial by pleading guilty, the State is
    
    entitled to expect finality in the conviction.” State v. Mann, 
    602 N.W.2d 785
    , 789 (Iowa 1999); see also State v. Straw, 
    709 N.W.2d 128
    , 138 (Iowa
    
    2006).
    
           While I expect today’s decision to lead to a new wave of
    
    applications for postconviction relief, and more work for appointed
    
    counsel, prosecutors, and the courts, I do not see the need. Why are the
    
    legal grounds already established by this court and the legislature for
    
    relief from guilty pleas not enough? 15           Certainly, the present case—
    
    involving a fishy nonrecantation by the victim (and no recantation at all
    
    by the eyewitness father)—doesn’t demonstrate the need.
    
           The     majority    underplays      the    critical   distinction     between
    
    defendants who claim actual innocence following a jury trial conviction
    
    and those who claim actual innocence following a guilty plea. Most of
    
    the decisions cited by the majority involve a defendant who was
    
    convicted after a trial.      See Miller v. Comm’r of Corr., 
    700 A.2d 1108
    ,
    
    1110–11 (Conn. 1997); People v. Washington, 
    665 N.E.2d 1330
    , 1331 (Ill.
    
    1996); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 
    102 S.W.3d 541
    , 543–44 (Mo. 2003)
    (en banc); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 
    163 P.3d 476
    , 478 (N.M. 2007); In re
    
    Kaufmann, 157 N.E. at 730–31; Engesser, 856 N.W.2d at 473.                          In
    
    
           15The  majority observes that in 2005, the general assembly enacted legislation
    that appears to authorize a defendant who has pled guilty, as well as a defendant who
    was convicted after trial, to seek a court order requiring DNA analysis to be performed
    on evidence. See 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, § 10 (codified at Iowa Code § 81.10). Yet the
    legislation nowhere indicates that a defendant who pled guilty would have a
    postconviction-relief remedy based on the outcome of such analysis. See id. To the
    contrary, this law was enacted when our precedent on finality of guilty pleas was
    already well-established. I trust in our executive branch to do the right thing in the
    event a person who pled guilty were to be fully exonerated by DNA evidence. I presume
    the legislature in 2005 had the same level of trust. This is a far cry from allowing a
    nonrecanting recantation to disturb a guilty plea.
                                         79
    
    Jamison v. State, 
    765 S.E.2d 123
    , 130 (S.C. 2014), the Supreme Court of
    
    South Carolina did open the door to actual-innocence claims by persons
    
    who had pled guilty but it established a very high burden for them—one
    
    the majority characterizes as “too stringent.” Also, in People v. Tiger, 
    48 N.Y.S.3d 685
    , 700–01 (App. Div. 2017), the court recognized an actual-
    
    innocence claim by a defendant who had pled guilty, although New
    
    York’s highest court has clearly not gone that far, see People v. Plunkett,
    
    
    971 N.E.2d 363
    , 366 (N.Y. 2012) (“Consistently, we have deemed
    
    appellate claims challenging what is competently and independently
    
    established by a plea forfeited.”); see also People v. DePerno, 
    51 N.Y.S.3d 641
    , 643 (App. Div. 2017) (finding by a different department of the
    
    appellate division that an actual-innocence claim after a guilty plea was
    
    foreclosed). The majority also discusses Ex parte Tuley, 
    109 S.W.3d 388
    ,
    
    393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), a 5–4 Texas decision that opened the door to
    
    actual-innocence claims following a guilty plea, and People v. Schneider,
    
    
    25 P.3d 755
    , 757 (Colo. 2001) (en banc), a Colorado decision that did the
    
    same.
    
            Iowa is not alone in giving finality to guilty pleas notwithstanding
    
    claims of actual innocence. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 
    530 S.W.3d 844
    ,
    
    846 (Ark. 2017) (“Williams’s argument that he is actually innocent of the
    
    offense to which he pleaded guilty does not establish a ground for the
    
    writ because it constitutes a direct attack on the judgment.”); Norris v.
    
    State, 
    896 N.E.2d 1149
    , 1153 (Ind. 2008) (rejecting an actual innocence
    
    claim and stating that “[a] plea of guilty thus forecloses a post-conviction
    
    challenge to the facts adjudicated by the trial court’s acceptance of the
    
    guilty plea and resulting conviction”); Woods v. State, 
    379 P.3d 1134
    ,
    
    1142 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (stating that a claim of actual innocence is
    
    “insufficient to override the longstanding rule that a freely and
                                           80
    
    voluntarily entered guilty plea bars a collateral attack on the sufficiency
    
    of the evidence”).
    
            One should also read the articles cited by the majority. One of the
    
    articles is written by a senior federal judge and another by a former
    
    federal judge. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev.
    
    Books (Nov. 20, 2014), www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-
    
    innocent-people-plead-guilty/[https://perma.cc/LT8T–XKAV];         H.   Lee
    
    Sarokin, Why Do Innocent People Plead Guilty?, Huffington Post (May 29,
    
    2012,      4:39      PM),    https://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-
    
    sarokin/innocent-people-guilty-pleas_b_1553239.html/[https://perma.
    
    cc/6PSQ–6ZW4]. As participants in the system, the views of these two
    
    authors deserve our consideration.           Yet neither of these authors
    
    recommends today’s solution—i.e., a freestanding claim of innocence as
    
    a way to challenge guilty pleas. To the contrary, Judge Rakoff advocates
    
    “involving judges in the plea-bargaining process,” while Mr. Sarokin
    
    insists “[t]he only solution is vigilance by all involved.”
    
            Reexamining a guilty plea years after the fact is far different from
    
    reviewing a trial. Unlike with a case that actually went to trial, no trial
    
    transcript can be relied on if the witnesses no longer are around, have
    
    forgotten the events, or no longer are motivated to remember them. See
    
    Rhoades, 880 N.W.2d at 449 (acknowledging the difficulty in accurately
    
    determining a claim of actual innocence when there has been a plea
    
    bargain and no trial record exists).
    
            Under Maryland law, convicted persons may not petition for a writ
    
    of actual innocence if they have pled guilty. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc.
    
    § 8–301 (West, Westlaw through ch. 1–4 2018 Reg. Sess.). The Maryland
    
    Court of Special Appeals has noted,
                                         81
          Under most circumstances, the facts alleged in a petition for
          postconviction relief will necessarily, in part, be drawn from
          the trial record. However, when there was a guilty plea,
          there is no detailed trial record, no witness testimony, and
          often there is only a minimal factual investigation on the
          part of the State and defense counsel. Thus, both the
          defense’s factual quest to establish innocence as well as the
          State’s attempt to refute innocence are hindered by the
          inherent gaps available in evidence in cases in which the
          petitioner pled guilty. Petitions stemming from a conviction
          following a guilty plea should thus be denied.
    
    Yonga v. State, 
    108 A.3d 448
    , 461 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (emphasis
    
    omitted)   (quoting   Nicholas    Phillips,   Comment,      Innocence    and
    Incarceration: A Comprehensive Review of Maryland’s Postconviction DNA
    
    Relief Statute and Suggestions for Improvement, 42 U. Balt. L.F. 65, 93–
    
    94 (Fall 2011) (footnotes omitted)), aff’d, 
    130 A.3d 486
     (Md. 2016).
    
          Changes in the law intended to benefit defendants can end up
    
    harming them. Now that we have allowed guilty pleas to be set aside
    
    based on newly discovered evidence, the state has a powerful incentive
    
    not to accept such pleas, despite the benefits to defendants discussed
    
    above. The advantages of a plea from the state’s perspective are that it
    
    provides certainty, closure, and finality. See Blackledge v. Allison, 
    431 U.S. 63
    , 71, 
    97 S. Ct. 1621
    , 1627–28 (1977). That is why the state is
    
    often willing to bargain down the original charges as part of a deal. Take
    
    away those advantages, and more cases may go to trial on more charges.
    
    See id. (noting that the advantages of plea negotiations to judges,
    
    prosecutors, and defendants “can be secured . . . only if dispositions by
    
    guilty plea are accorded a great measure of finality”).
    
         III. Grounding an Actual-Innocence             Claim    in   the   Iowa
    Constitution Is Highly Problematic.
    
          The majority maintains that an actual-innocence claim for those
    
    who plead guilty is required by the Iowa Constitution, specifically
    
    article I, section 9 and article I, section 17. It is noteworthy that Schmidt
                                          82
    
    barely argues Iowa constitutional law at all and then only in the
    
    supplemental brief which we invited.
    
          The majority’s constitutional reasoning is thin and, to me,
    
    unpersuasive.    I begin with article I, section 9, the Iowa due process
    
    clause. The majority initially asserts that convicting an actually innocent
    
    person violates article I, section 9’s constitutional guarantee of
    
    substantive due process.     According to the majority, it is a matter of
    
    substantive due process because the violation consists of the mere fact
    
    an innocent person has been convicted.
    
          But the majority can’t literally mean that—otherwise there would
    
    be no limits on actual-innocence claims. Thus, the majority shifts to the
    
    position that innocent people need to have an opportunity to prove they
    
    are innocent. That’s a matter of procedural due process. Yet our justice
    
    system already has many procedures in place to protect innocent people
    
    from being convicted. These include the trial, the guilty plea colloquy,
    
    the right to counsel, and so forth.
    
          So what the majority is really saying is that the Iowa due process
    
    clause requires one more procedure, i.e., the one devised today, to protect
    
    the innocent from being convicted. Why? Why is one more procedure so
    
    important as to be of constitutional dimension? The majority does not
    
    explain.
    
          Weaker still is the majority’s invocation of article I, section 17.
    
    This section prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.        Yet the issue
    
    before this court is not the punishment for Schmidt’s crime, but whether
    
    Schmidt should have a new opportunity to prove he didn’t commit that
    
    crime.     Unless we are going to ignore the fundamental distinctions
    
    among the different rights within our own constitution, article I, section
    
    17 has no bearing on today’s case.
                                          83
         IV. The     Majority    Opinion       Results   in    Many       Unanswered
    Questions.
          Having demonstrated enough self-confidence to tear up an
    
    established rule of law, the majority now claims to be too modest to tell
    
    us what today’s decision means. That’s not good enough. One way to
    
    test the soundness of a decision is to consider the implications of that
    
    decision.
    
          Here are a few questions raised by today’s decision.
    
          What does “actual innocence” mean?               The majority opinion is
    unclear and inconsistent concerning the meaning of “actual innocence.”
    
    At the end the majority states,
    
          [T]he applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence
          that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction,
          no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the
          crimes for which the sentencing court found the applicant
          guilty in light of all the evidence, including the newly
          discovered evidence.
    
          Yet earlier, the majority says, “Holding a person who has
    
    committed no crime in prison strikes the very essence of the
    
    constitutional   guarantee   of    substantive   due      process.”     The   two
    
    statements do not line up. Where are we?
    
          Obviously, at a minimum, the defendant must prove he or she did
    
    not commit the crime to which he or she pled guilty. Must the defendant
    
    also prove his or her conduct does not amount to a different crime (even
    
    a much less serious one)?         And what if the defendant pled guilty to
    
    several charges at once? Must the defendant establish that none of the
    
    incidents involve a crime committed by that defendant?
    
          What is “evidence” at the summary judgment stage? The court
    
    directs the parties to provide “other evidence or affidavits” in support of
    
    their positions, before the district court rules on the State’s motion for
    
    summary judgment. What is evidence? The majority indicates that the
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    requirements of rule 1.981 apply. In that event, do minutes of testimony
    
    count as evidence, even if the defendant did not previously acknowledge
    
    they were true?    The special concurrence seems to indicate that the
    
    minutes are treated as evidence.
    
          What is “evidence” at the trial stage?          If a claim of actual
    
    innocence gets past summary judgment, must all evidence used at the
    
    postconviction-relief trial comply with the rules of evidence?       Again,
    
    what’s the status of minutes of testimony?
    
          If the normal rules of evidence for summary judgment and
    
    trial proceedings do not apply, how does the district court handle
    
    the resulting apples-to-oranges comparisons? If minutes of testimony
    
    are allowed as evidence, what weight are they given?         How are they
    
    compared to affidavits and live testimony?
    
          Does a defendant need to do anything other than deny his or
    
    her guilt to raise an actual-innocence claim and start the process?
    
    According to the court, a freestanding actual-innocence claim can be
    
    brought under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(a). But if a claim of innocence
    
    by itself is enough, the defendant doesn’t need a recantation or other
    
    allegedly new evidence, unless the three-year time bar has passed. See
    
    Iowa Code § 822.3. A mere denial of guilt is enough to get new counsel
    
    appointed and get the ball rolling.
    
          What is the role of the defendant’s guilty plea counsel?
    
    Typically, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel waives the attorney–
    
    client privilege. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.6(b)(5). So, when the
    
    defendant claims to have received ineffective assistance in connection
    
    with a plea, former counsel can testify about his or her communications
    
    with the defendant concerning the plea.       These communications may
    
    have information bearing on the defendant’s actual innocence. Is such
                                        85
    
    testimony now off-limits, since the defendant can challenge the guilty
    
    plea without having to argue ineffective assistance of counsel?
    
          What about Alford pleas? An Alford plea “was designed to permit
    
    a defendant to make a voluntary and intelligent decision to plead guilty
    
    to a crime without admitting participation in the underlying facts which
    
    constitute the crime.”     State v. Klawonn, 
    609 N.W.2d 515
    , 520 (Iowa
    
    2000) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 37–38, 
    91 S. Ct. 160
    ,
    
    167–68 (1970)). With an Alford plea, the defendant “claim[s] innocence”
    
    but makes a “cost–benefit analysis of avoiding the risks associated with a
    
    trial.” Id. at 520–21. After today, does someone who made an Alford plea
    
    now get to raise an actual-innocence claim? That seems strange. After
    
    all, nothing has changed. Such a defendant always maintained he or she
    
    was innocent.       Or are Alford pleas now unconstitutional in light of
    
    today’s decision?
    
          If the defendant succeeds, can other charges be reinstated?
    
    Part of the established remedy when setting aside a guilty plea is to
    
    reinstate all charges dismissed as part of any plea bargain. See State v.
    
    Weitzel, 
    905 N.W.2d 397
    , 411 (Iowa 2017) (allowing the state to “reinstate
    
    any charges dismissed in contemplation of a valid plea bargain”); Gines,
    
    844 N.W.2d at 442 (“[W]e must put the State back in the position it was
    
    in before making the plea agreement.”); see also Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d at
    
    97; State v. Allen, 
    708 N.W.2d 361
    , 369 (Iowa 2006). So, if the defendant
    
    establishes actual innocence and there was a plea bargain, does the state
    
    get to reinstate other charges that were dismissed?
    
          The majority refuses to consider issues like these because it
    
    doesn’t want to get into the merits of the case. But none of these matters
    
    goes to the actual merits.       Some of them were discussed in the
    
    supplemental briefing invited by this court.     If our court is going to
                                           86
    
    change the law, it should clarify the change as much as possible and not
    
    leave it to district courts to play a game of twenty questions. In other
    
    decisions, we have given “protocols” to our district courts.    See, e.g.,
    
    State v. Harrington, 
    893 N.W.2d 36
    , 45–46 (Iowa 2017) (describing a
    
    “protocol” to use in the future); State v. Dahl, 
    874 N.W.2d 348
    , 353 (Iowa
    
    2016) (same); Fagen v. Grand View Univ., 
    861 N.W.2d 825
    , 828 (Iowa
    
    2015) (plurality opinion) (same); State v. Cashen, 
    789 N.W.2d 400
    , 403
    
    (Iowa 2010) (same), superseded by statute, 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 8, § 2
    
    (codified at Iowa Code § 622.10).
    
          V. Conclusion.
    
          From the State’s perspective, I am guessing it would have simply
    
    preferred to try Schmidt all those years ago.       In the long run, I am
    
    doubtful today’s decision will benefit defendants.      More importantly,
    
    today’s decision needlessly overturns an established rule of law that was
    
    fair to all parties and worked well.
    
          Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.