Taneia Galloway Vs. State Of Iowa , 790 N.W.2d 252 ( 2010 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–0776
Filed November 5, 2010
TANEIA GALLOWAY,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
George Stigler, Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment ruling enforcing a
parent’s preinjury releases of her minor child’s personal injury claim.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Ryan T. Beattie of Beattie Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Joanne Moeller, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
2
HECHT, Justice.
A parent signed release forms waiving her minor child’s personal
injury claims as a condition of the child’s participation in an educational
field trip. This action was filed against the State after the child was
injured during the trip. The district court granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding the releases signed by the parent
resulted in an enforceable waiver of the child’s personal injury claim. On
appeal from the summary judgment ruling, we conclude the releases
violate public policy and are therefore unenforceable.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In July of 2005, fourteen-year-old Taneia Galloway attended a field
trip to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with Upward Bound, a youth outreach
program organized by the University of Northern Iowa and the State of
Iowa. On the field trip, Galloway was injured when she was struck by a
car as she attempted to cross the street.
Before Galloway went on the field trip, her mother signed two
documents entitled “Field Trip Permission Form” and “Release and
Medical Authorization.” The first document read:
Classic Upward Bound Summer Residential Program
Field Trip Permission Form
Dear Parent(s)/Guardian(s):
Each summer the participants of the Classic Upward Bound
Program attend field trips locally and out-of-town. This form
must be completed in order for your son/daughter to
participate in said events.
As the parent/guardian of Taneia Galloway, I hereby
give my permission for him/her to participate in ALL field
trips sponsored by the University of Northern Iowa Classic
Upward Bound Program during the Summer Residential and
the Academic Year Program. Taneia Galloway understands
he/she is to follow all rules of the Classic Upward Bound
Program while participating in these field trips.
3
Furthermore, I will not hold the University of Northern
Iowa or any of its employees or agents responsible for any
accidents, losses, damages or injuries resulting from the
son/daughter’s participation in any or all the field trips. I
also release the Classic Upward Bound Program, the
University of Northern Iowa, and its employees and agents
from all liabilities.
If the student is living with both parents/guardians, both
parents/ guardians must sign this form.
Galloway’s mother signed and dated the form on June 13, 2005. She
also signed another form which read as follows.
RELEASE AND MEDICAL AUTHORIZATION
University of Northern Iowa Classic Upward Bound – Dates:
June 1, 2005 – May 30, 2006
Read Carefully –
This document is a release and authorizes medical
treatment.
Please return all copies of this form to the program staff.
Registration is not considered complete until this completed
form is filed with the University of Northern Iowa Classic
Upward Bound Program.
The student will not be allowed to participate in the Classic
Upward Bound Program if this information is not provided.
This information is not routinely provided to individuals or
organizations outside the University, except as provided by
law.
In consideration of the University of Northern Iowa granting
the student permission to participate in the Classic Upward
Bound Program, I hereby assume all risks of her/his injury
(including death) that may result from any program activity.
As parent/guardian I do hereby release and agree to
indemnify, defend and hold harmless the University of
Northern Iowa, State Board of Regents, State of Iowa, Classic
Upward Bound and its officers, employees, agents and all
participants in the program from and against all liability
including claims and suits of law or in equity for injury (fatal
or otherwise) which may result from any negligence and/or
the student taking part in program activities.
I certify that within the past year the student has had a
physical examination and that she/he is physically able to
participate in all Upward Bound activities.
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In the event of injury or illness, I hereby give my consent for
medical treatment, and permission to program staff for
supervising and performing, as deemed necessary by staff,
on-site first aid for minor injuries, and for a licensed
physician to hospitalize and secure proper treatment
(including injections, anesthesia, surgery, or other
reasonable and necessary procedures) for the student. I
agree to assume all cost related to any such treatment. I
also authorize the disclosure of medical information to my
insurance company for the purpose of this claim. I
understand each student must provide her/his own medical
insurance.
I understand that I am responsible for any medical or other
charges related to the student’s attendance at the University
of Northern Iowa Classic Upward Bound Program.
Galloway, through her mother as next friend, 1 filed suit against
various parties, including the State of Iowa. The State moved for
summary judgment, contending the releases signed by Galloway’s
mother waived any claims against it for negligence. The district court
concluded the releases constituted a valid waiver of Galloway’s claims
and granted summary judgment. Galloway appeals. 2
II. Scope of Review.
Our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment we must determine if “the
moving party has demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Huber v.
Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa 1993). “Summary judgment is proper if
the only issue is the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts.”
Id. Determining the legal effects of a contract is a matter of law to be
resolved by the court. Id. at 55–56.
1
Taneia Galloway has since reached the age of majority and has been
substituted as plaintiff.
2The district court denied the summary judgment motions of the other
defendants, but Galloway has since dismissed her claims against the remaining
defendants.
5
III. Discussion.
Galloway makes three arguments on appeal that we should
conclude the releases signed by her mother are void and unenforceable.
First, she asserts we should follow a majority of other state courts that
have concluded it is against public policy for a parent to waive liability
for a child’s injury before the injury occurs. In the alternative, she
argues an application of the factors enunciated in Tunkl v. Regents of
University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963), demonstrates it is
against public policy to enforce releases signed by a parent as a
condition of the child’s participation in an educational activity. Her final
contention is that these particular releases are insufficient to waive the
State’s liability because the intent to waive liability is not clearly
expressed.
Galloway’s primary argument is that public policy considerations
should lead this court to conclude preinjury releases executed by parents
as a condition of their children’s participation in educational activities
are incompatible with public policy and therefore unenforceable. In
particular, she contends public policy should preclude enforcement of
releases executed by parents because parents are ill-equipped to assess
in advance the nature of risks of injury faced by children while they are
participating in activities at remote locations under the supervision of
others and because parents are uninformed of the nature and extent of
the gravity of the injuries to which their children may be exposed when
the releases are executed.
The State, however, argues that public policy weighs in favor of
enforcing preinjury releases signed by parents. The State contends that
all of the arguments supporting the enforcement of preinjury releases
executed by adults waiving liability for their own injuries apply with
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equal force to releases given by parents on behalf of their minor children.
The State further contends the public policy of this state requires courts
to give deference to parents’ child-rearing choices, including the choice to
release third parties in advance for negligent injury to children.
We begin with an acknowledgment of the challenging nature of
identifying which societal values are properly included within the
purview of “public policy.” In our efforts to characterize the imprecise
boundaries of the concept, we have made reference to the broad concepts
of “public good,” In re Estate of Barnes, 256 Iowa 1043, 1051, 128
N.W.2d 188, 192 (1964), and “ ‘established interest[s] of society.’ ”
Walker v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 340 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1983)
(quoting Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 335
(Iowa 1980)). However, despite the difficulty of characterizing the exact
elements of the public interest, we have considered and weighed public
policy concerns when deciding important legal issues. For example, such
considerations were a critical aspect of our analysis when we abolished
the doctrine of immunity for charitable institutions. Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hosp. Ass’n, 241 Iowa 1269, 1274, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154
(1950) (weighing and ultimately rejecting public policy justifications for
the immunity doctrine).
We have also confronted public policy considerations in the context
of litigation between family members. Our understanding of the public
interest prompted this court to exercise its authority to abrogate the
doctrine of interspousal immunity. Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616,
620 (Iowa 1979) (relying on the fundamental public policy that courts
should afford redress for civil wrongs and rejecting the proposition that
the doctrine of interspousal immunity involved determinations of public
policy most appropriately made by the legislature). We again carefully
7
considered public policy factors in the family context when we abolished
the doctrine of absolute parental immunity and recognized a remedy for
children injured by the negligent acts of a parent. Turner v. Turner, 304
N.W.2d 786, 787–88 (Iowa 1981) (rejecting the argument that “domestic
government” and “parental discipline and control” are matters of public
policy justifying retention of parental immunity). In this case, we are
called upon to decide whether public policy considerations should lead
us to invalidate preinjury releases given by a parent purporting to waive
her minor child’s claim for personal injuries.
As the freedom to contract weighs in the balance when public
policy grounds are asserted against the enforcement of a contract, courts
must be attentive to prudential considerations and exercise caution.
Tschirgi v. Merchs. Nat’l Bank of Cedar Rapids, 253 Iowa 682, 690, 113
N.W.2d 226, 231 (1962). These considerations have led this court to
repeatedly hold that “contracts exempting a party from its own
negligence are enforceable, and are not contrary to public policy.” Huber,
501 N.W.2d at 55. Notwithstanding this well-established general rule,
Galloway urges us to join the majority of state courts who have examined
the issue and have concluded public policy precludes enforcement of a
parent’s preinjury waiver of her child’s cause of action for injuries caused
by negligence. See Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. & Junior Coll.,
630 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Penn. 1985); Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, 143
A.2d 466, 468 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958); Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349,
358 (Fla. 2008); Meyer v. Naperville Manner, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 411, 414
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381, 386
(N.J. 2006); Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 558
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970); Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber
of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Munoz v. II Jaz
8
Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207, 209–10 (Tex. App. 1993); Hawkins ex rel. Hawkins
v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 2001); Scott ex rel. Scott v. Pac. W.
Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 10–11 (Wash. 1992).
The State responds that parents’ preinjury releases of their
children’s personal injury claims are entirely consistent with legal
traditions and public policy giving deference to parents’ decisions
affecting the control of their children and their children’s affairs. To be
sure, we have noted that “a parent’s ‘interest in the care, custody, and
control of [his] children’ is ‘ “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by” ’ the United States Supreme Court.”
Lamberts v. Lillig, 670 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Iowa 2003) (alteration in
original) (quoting Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 2001)). Yet,
the deference and respect for parents’ decisions affecting their children’s
property interests is restricted to some extent by the public’s interest in
the best interests of children. For example, this court has determined
that the law will not permit a parent to compromise her child’s financial
security by waiving child support payments from the other parent in
exchange for relinquishment of visitation rights. Anthony v. Anthony,
204 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Iowa 1973). We concluded in Anthony that an
agreement to waive child support under such circumstances “makes the
child’s best interest subservient to parental self interest.” Id. at 834.
Consistent with the policy considerations noted by this court in Anthony,
a modification of a child support order “is void unless approved by the
court . . . and entered as an order of the court.” Iowa Code § 598.21C(3)
(2009).
Parents’ authority to make decisions affecting their children’s
affairs is limited in other contexts as well. If a conservator for a minor
child has not been appointed, a parent’s authority to receive money or
9
other property for his or her child under the Iowa Uniform Transfers to
Minors Act is limited to an aggregate value of $25,000. Iowa Code
§ 633.574; see also Iowa Code § 565B.7(3) (stating if a custodian has not
been nominated, or all persons nominated to serve as custodians are
unable, unwilling or ineligible to serve, a transfer may be made to an
adult member of the minor’s family unless the property exceeds $25,000
in value). Generally, a parent has no right, in the absence of
authorization from a court, to release or compromise causes of action
belonging to a minor. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child § 44, at 212
(2002). This general rule is followed in this jurisdiction, where a parent
serving as her child’s conservator adjusts, arbitrates, or compromises
claims in favor of or against the ward with approval of the court. Iowa
Code § 633.647(5).
These limitations on parents’ authority to make legally enforceable
transactions affecting the property and financial interests of their minor
children are derived from a well-established public policy that children
must be accorded a measure of protection against improvident decisions
of their parents. We conclude the same public policy demands minor
children be protected from forfeiture of their personal injury claims by
parents’ execution of preinjury releases. By signing a preinjury waiver, a
parent purports to agree in advance to bear the financial burden of
providing for her child in the event the child is injured by a tortfeasor’s
negligence. Sometimes parents are not willing or able to perform such
commitments after an injury occurs. If parents fail to provide for the
needs of their injured children, and the preinjury waiver in favor of the
tortfeasor is enforced, financial demands may be made on the public fisc
to cover the cost of care.
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Beyond the public’s pure economic interest in protecting children
against parents’ improvident decisions waiving their children’s causes of
action before injuries occur, another compelling practical reason weighs
in favor of protecting children from the harsh consequences of preinjury
releases. An adult’s preinjury release of his claim for his own personal
injuries will be enforced even if the releasing party did not read the
document before signing. “It is well settled that failure to read a contract
before signing it will not invalidate the contract. Absent fraud or
mistake, ignorance of a written contract’s contents will not negate its
effect.” Huber, 501 N.W.2d at 55 (citation omitted) (holding that an
adult’s preinjury release was valid even though he did not read the
document). While this court has found valid policy reasons supporting
the rule allowing the enforcement of releases against adults who
voluntarily, and in some cases foolishly, waive their own personal injury
claims in advance of injury, we believe the strong public policy favoring
the protection of vulnerable minor children demands a different rule
here.
As the Washington Supreme Court has noted, if a parent lacks
authority without court approval to compromise and settle her minor
child’s personal injury claim after an injury has occurred, “it makes little,
if any, sense to conclude a parent has the authority to release a child’s
cause of action prior to an injury.” Scott, 834 P.2d at 11–12; accord
Hojnowski, 901 A.2d at 387 (noting “children deserve as much protection
from the improvident compromise of their rights before an injury occurs
as [a rule requiring court approval of settlements of minor children’s
claims] affords them after the injury”); Hawkins, 37 P.3d at 1066.
We also find it significant that in the instance of an adult releasing
another party’s liability for negligence, the person reading the contract,
11
and presumably comprehending and agreeing with its terms, is the
person who will engage in the activity presenting the risk of injury for
which the release is contemplated. Thus, if an adult waives another’s
liability by executing a preinjury waiver of her own personal injury
claims, she is aware that she has done so and is on notice to be vigilant
for negligence in the course of her participation. While participating in
the activity, if she perceives an unreasonable risk of injury, the adult is
free to withdraw from it. Children tend to be vulnerable in such
situations, however, in ways adults are not. The parent who reads,
understands, and executes a waiver of liability for her child is not the
person who will participate in the activity. Accordingly, the child may or
may not understand what has been forfeited as a condition of her
participation in an activity. She may or may not have the knowledge and
experience required to assess and avoid risks of injury created by the
activity. Even if a parent exercises reasonable care in investigating the
potential risks of injury before signing a waiver and in advance of her
child’s participation, often (as in this case) the parent is not present with
the child during the subsequent activity. The parent hopes and perhaps
believes her child will be safe and properly supervised during the activity,
but if she does not participate in the activity with her child, she has no
ability to protect her child once the activity begins. And, even if the child
is uncomfortable with some aspect of the activity or senses a risk of
injury while participating in the activity, the child may or may not have
the ability to remove herself from it. The child’s ability to avoid the risk
of injury will vary greatly, depending on the age and maturity of the
child, the type of activity, her access to a phone, the personality and
competence of the people supervising the activity, and other factors.
12
We conclude for all of these reasons that the public policy
protecting children from improvident actions of parents in other contexts
precludes the enforcement of preinjury releases executed by parents for
their minor children. Like a clear majority of other courts deciding such
releases are unenforceable, we believe the strong policy in favor of
protecting children must trump any competing interest of parents and
tortfeasors in their freedom to contractually nullify a minor child’s
personal injury claim before an injury occurs.
The State urges the court to follow the decisions of a minority of
jurisdictions upholding preinjury releases executed by parents waiving
the personal injury claims of their minor children. The decisions
following the minority rule arise in litigation filed against schools,
municipalities, or clubs providing activities for children. See, e.g., Hohe
v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (Ct. App. 1990)
(upholding a preinjury release executed by a father on behalf of his minor
child waiving any claims resulting from the child’s participation in a
school-sponsored event); Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 747
(Mass. 2002) (holding a parent has the authority to bind a minor child to
a waiver of liability as a condition of a child’s participation in public
school extracurricular sports activities); Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc.,
696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998) (concluding a parent may bind a minor
child to a release of volunteers and sponsors of a nonprofit sports
activity). The State contends the California, Massachusetts, and Ohio
courts wisely determined public policy considerations justify the
enforcement of parents’ preinjury waivers of their children’s claims. If
such parental waivers are rendered unenforceable, the State posits
recreational, cultural, and educational opportunities for youths will cease
because organizations sponsoring them will be unable or unwilling to
purchase insurance or otherwise endure the risks of civil liability. Our
13
court of appeals expressed this generalized fear when it concluded the
“[p]ublic interest is served by allowing the parties the freedom to enter
into such agreements.” Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d 746,
749 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (concluding “exculpatory provisions [in releases
executed by adults waiving their own claims for personal injuries]
actually promote [the] public interest because without such releases, it is
doubtful these events would occur”).
We believe the fear of dire consequences from our adoption of the
majority rule is speculative and overstated. We find no reason to believe
opportunities for recreational, cultural, and educational activities for
youths have been significantly compromised in the many jurisdictions
following the majority rule. In the final analysis, we conclude the strong
public policy favoring the protection of children’s legal rights must
prevail over speculative fears about their continuing access to activities.
We are mindful that if we have misapprehended the public policy
considerations at work on this issue, the political branches of our
government will adopt a different rule.
Accordingly we conclude the district court erred in enforcing the
releases in this case. Having decided the releases that are the subject of
this case are not enforceable, we do not address other arguments
advanced by Galloway for reversal.
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude preinjury releases executed by parents purporting to
waive the personal injury claims of their minor children violate public
policy and are therefore unenforceable. Accordingly, we reverse the
district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except, Cady, J., and Ternus, C.J., who dissent.
14
08–0776, Galloway v. State
CADY, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Courts are, at times, capable of deciding legal issues based on
public policy. These times, however, occur when the public policy is
clear and apparent. See Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d
275, 283 (Iowa 2000) (“The need for clarity in public policy is . . .
recognized in our reluctance to search too far beyond our legislative
pronouncements and constitution to find public policy to support an
action.”). Otherwise, public policy is best left to our legislative branch of
government to decide as representatives of the people. The question
whether it is imprudent as a matter of law for a parent to waive legal
liability on behalf of a child as a condition for the child’s participation in
an educational field trip is a matter for the legislature, not judges. If the
subject of parental field trip waivers has surfaced in this state as a
matter of public concern, the legislature can properly examine the issue
and take any appropriate action.
I would affirm the decision of the district court.
Ternus, C.J., joins this dissent.