State of Iowa v. Allen Robert Allensworth , 823 N.W.2d 411 ( 2012 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 12–0811
Filed November 30, 2012
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
ALLEN ROBERT ALLENSWORTH,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D.
Huppert, Judge.
Defendant serving prison sentence appeals order denying earned-
time credit for period spent on supervised probation before his
incarceration. AFFIRMED.
Joseph P. Vogel of The Law Office of Turner & Vogel, PLLC,
Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
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WATERMAN, Justice.
This appeal involves a dispute over the application of the probation
credit recognized in Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2011). The
fighting issue is whether an offender accrues earned time under Iowa
Code section 903A.2 (2011) while on supervised probation before his
incarceration. Defendant, Allen Allensworth, initially received suspended
sentences for drug offenses and two years of probation. He was
incarcerated after his probation was revoked. Allensworth contends the
Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) erroneously withheld his earned-
time credit for the probationary period, which would entitle him to
release from prison on February 5, 2013. IDOC argues earned-time
credits are only earned while the offender is incarcerated and calculates
his tentative discharge date to be December 4, 2013.
The district court ruled IDOC correctly calculated his discharge
date because earned-time credits are only earned while the offender is
incarcerated. We agree, based on the unambiguous language of the
earned-time statute, which limits accrual of earned-time credit to
inmates who are incarcerated. Id. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s order denying earned-time credit for the time Allensworth spent
on supervised probation.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The facts are undisputed. In our prior opinion in this case, we set
forth the circumstances of Allensworth’s arrest and search of his vehicle
in April 2006 that yielded twenty-five grams of methamphetamine hidden
in the steering column. State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 790–91
(Iowa 2008). He was charged with one count of possession of a
controlled substance (more than five grams) with intent to deliver, in
violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2005), and a second
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count of failure to possess a tax stamp, in violation of sections 453B.3
and 453B.12. He pled guilty to both charges after we reversed the
district court order suppressing evidence of the methamphetamine. On
October 31, 2008, the district court imposed suspended sentences of ten
years (Count I) and five years (Count II) to run consecutively, and two
years of supervised probation with the department of correctional
services.
His probation did not go well. On September 14, 2009,
Allensworth stipulated to probation violations at a revocation hearing.
On February 1, 2010, the district court conducted a dispositional
hearing and extended his probation by three years and ordered him to
complete an in-jail treatment program. On December 1, Allensworth
stipulated to additional violations. The district court conducted a
contested probation disposition hearing on December 22. The district
court specifically found Allensworth had continued his drug usage and
failed to comply with the terms of his drug treatment program. The next
day, the court entered its order revoking his probation and imposing his
original prison sentences totaling fifteen years. He currently is an inmate
at the Clarinda Correctional Facility.
On July 29, 2011, we filed our opinion in Anderson recognizing a
probation credit under Iowa Code section 907.3(3) (2007). Anderson, 801
N.W.2d at 5. On October 31, Allensworth filed a “request for time,”
challenging the IDOC’s calculation of his tentative discharge date. The
district court entered an order setting the matter for hearing and
directing the IDOC to respond. The IDOC filed a response. The district
court held an unreported hearing on March 22, 2012, and issued its
ruling the next day. The ruling outlined the respective positions of the
parties as follows:
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The parties agree on the raw numbers applicable to
the calculations in question, as well as the defendant’s
status to receive credit for his time on supervised probation,
as required by Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa
2011). Their only point of contention is the order in which
the applicable credits are calculated; the defendant takes the
position that earned time should be calculated before his
probation credit under Anderson, while the Department of
Corrections argues the order should be reversed. The
significance of the argument is that if earned time is
calculated before probation credit, the defendant’s sentence
would be shortened by an additional 300 days, as compared
to the Department’s calculations as contained in its written
response. Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)(a) (2007) (earned time
accrues at the rate of 1.2 days for each day served).
The district court ruled in favor of the IDOC, stating:
The court agrees with the Department’s calculations.
The proper order of calculation would be to reduce the
defendant’s sentence first by his probation credit, and then
by his earned time (and jail credit). This is because earned
time (as the name suggests) does not begin until the
defendant is committed to the director of the Department of
Corrections. Iowa Code § 903A.2(1) (2007). To allow him to
take earned time off his sentence prior to any reduction for
his probation credit under Anderson would be inconsistent
with this directive. It would, in essence, give him credit (in
terms of earned time) for time he never “earned;” i.e., never
served while in a DOC facility.
(Footnote omitted.)
Allensworth appealed. We retained the appeal to decide whether
Allensworth’s time on supervised probation, credited against his prison
sentence under Anderson, also accrued earned-time credit under section
903A.2.
II. Scope of Review.
We review this question of statutory interpretation for correction of
errors of law. Anderson, 801 N.W.2d at 3.
III. Analysis.
Allensworth is one of the inmates whose discharge dates were
recalculated by the IDOC after our decision in Anderson. In that case,
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we held Iowa Code section 907.3(3) (2007) required sentencing credit for
time served on supervised probation after the defendant is committed to
the judicial district department of correctional services. Id. at 5
(mandating credit against prison sentence for the offender’s time served
living at home under electronic monitoring). We applied the following
language in section 907.3(3) as written: “ ‘A person so committed who
has probation revoked shall be given credit for such time served.’ ” Id. at
4 (quoting Iowa Code § 907.3(3) (2007)).
The legislature amended section 907.3(3) in its next session
following the Anderson decision by adding the word “not” to that
sentence, thus limiting the credit to time served in alternate jail or
correctional facilities. See 2012 Iowa Acts ch. 1138, § 91 (“A person so
committed who has probation revoked shall not be given credit for such
time served. However, a person committed to an alternate jail facility or a
community correctional residential treatment facility who has probation
revoked shall be given credit for time served in the facility.” (Emphasis
added.)). This amendment became effective on the date of its enactment,
May 25, 2012. Id. § 93. The State does not claim the 2012 amendment
to section 907.3(3) applies to this appeal and agrees Allensworth is
entitled to a section 907.3(3) credit reducing his prison sentence by each
day he spent on supervised probation.
Allensworth seeks to further reduce his remaining time
incarcerated through the accrual of earned-time credit for his days spent
outside prison walls under supervised probation. The State argues he is
not entitled to earned-time credit for this probationary period. This
appeal provides the opportunity to clarify how probation credits should
be calculated. The parties agree Allensworth’s fifteen-year sentence is
reduced by three separate credits, but disagree as to the sequence in
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which each credit is applied. The source for each sentencing credit is
found in a different statutory provision: Iowa Code section 903A.2
governs earned-time credits, section 903A.5(1) governs jail-time credit,
and section 907.3(3) governs the probation credit.
Allensworth argues the earned-time credit under section 903A.2
should be applied first to reduce the full sentence, then the credits for
jail time under section 903A.5(1) and time spent on probation under
section 907.3(3) are to be applied to offset the remaining sentence. As
the district court recognized, this sequence accelerates his discharge
date by accruing earned-time credit on days he spent on supervised
probation. Conversely, the IDOC’s sequence avoids awarding
Allensworth earned-time credit for the time he spent on probation by
applying the section 907.3(3) (2007) probation credit against his sentence
first. That way, the earned-time credit only accrues for days he actually
is incarcerated.
We must decide whether earned time can be earned while outside
prison walls. We will examine the interrelated statutory provisions
together to determine the proper sequence for applying each credit. “ ‘If
more than one statute relating to the subject matter at issue is relevant
to the inquiry, we consider all the statutes together in an effort to
harmonize them.’ ” Kolzow v. State, 813 N.W.2d 731, 736 (Iowa 2012)
(quoting State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000)).
A. Earned-Time Credit. Iowa Code section 903A.2 is titled
“Earned time” and allows inmates to reduce their sentences for good
conduct. The purpose of earned-time credit “is to encourage prisoners to
follow prison rules and participate in rehabilitative programs.” Kolzow,
813 N.W.2d at 738. Section 903A.2 provides in part:
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1. Each inmate committed to the custody of the director
of the department of corrections is eligible to earn a reduction
of sentence in the manner provided in this section. For
purposes of calculating the amount of time by which an
inmate’s sentence may be reduced, inmates shall be grouped
into the following two sentencing categories:
a. Category “A” sentences are those sentences which
are not subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time
of fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under
section 902.12. . . . An inmate of an institution under the
control of the department of corrections who is serving a
category “A” sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence
equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the inmate
demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in
any program or placement status identified by the director to
earn the reduction. . . .
....
2. Earned time accrued pursuant to this section may
be forfeited in the manner prescribed in section 903A.3.
3. Time served in a jail or another facility prior to actual
placement in an institution under the control of the department
of corrections and credited against the sentence by the court
shall accrue for the purpose of reduction of sentence under
this section. Time which elapses during an escape shall not
accrue for purposes of reduction of sentence under this
section.
Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)–(3) (emphasis added).
Section 903A.2 by its terms limits eligibility for earned time to
“inmate[s] committed to the custody of the director of the department of
corrections.” Id. § 903A.2(1). Allensworth was not an “inmate” while he
was on supervised probation, nor was he “committed to the custody” of
IDOC until he began serving his prison sentence. We agree with the
district court’s conclusion that “earned time (as the name suggests) does
not begin until the defendant is committed to the director of the
Department of Corrections,” and that permitting Allensworth to accrue
earned time during his earlier probation “would be inconsistent with this
directive.”
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Allensworth is serving a category A sentence. The applicable
earned-time credit is allowed for “an inmate of an institution under the
control of the department of corrections who is serving a category ‘A’
sentence.” Id. § 903A.2(1)(a) (emphasis added). As noted, Allensworth
was not an inmate of an IDOC-controlled institution while he was
released on supervised probation. Accordingly, his probationary time is
ineligible for earned-time credit under the plain language of the
governing statute.
Moreover, the statutory mechanism for forfeiting earned-time
credit reinforces the conclusion that earned time only accrues while the
offender is incarcerated. Section 903A.2 provides: “Earned time accrued
pursuant to this section may be forfeited in the manner prescribed in
section 903A.3.” Section 903A.3 in turn provides for loss or forfeiture of
earned time for the inmate’s violation of “an institutional rule.” Specific
procedures are required for forfeiture, including the inmate’s right of
appeal to the warden or warden’s designee. No procedure is in place for
forfeiture of earned time while on supervised probation. Nor is loss of
earned time mentioned among the various penalties set forth in the
separate statute governing probation violations. See id. § 908.11.
Significantly, the earned-time-credit statute expressly provides that
earned time also accrues for “[t]ime served in a jail or another facility . . .
credited against the sentence.” Id. § 903A.2(3). No provision applicable
to Allensworth within section 903A.2 or elsewhere extends earned-time
credit to supervised probation while the offender is not incarcerated.
Accordingly, we see no textual basis for awarding earned-time credit for
time on supervised probation. As the district court correctly concluded,
earned time must be “earned” in an IDOC facility. If the legislature had
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intended earned time to accrue while the offender is on probation, it
would have said so.
B. Jail-Time Credit. Section 903A.5 governs “jail time” credit.
This statute provides in part:
An inmate shall not be discharged from the custody of the
director of the Iowa department of corrections until the
inmate has served the full term for which the inmate was
sentenced, less earned time and other credits earned and not
forfeited, unless the inmate is pardoned or otherwise legally
released. . . . An inmate shall be deemed to be serving the
sentence from the day on which the inmate is received into
the institution. If an inmate was confined to a county jail or
other correctional or mental facility at any time prior to
sentencing, or after sentencing but prior to the case having
been decided on appeal, because of failure to furnish bail or
because of being charged with a nonbailable offense, the
inmate shall be given credit for the days already served upon
the term of the sentence.
Id. § 903A.5 (emphasis added).
Section 903A.5 by its plain language provides a credit against the
prison sentence for time served in jail on the same charge. In calculating
Allensworth’s tentative discharge date, IDOC has already reduced his
prison sentence by his jail time with earned time credit accruing both for
his time in jail and in prison. Earned-time credit accrues for time served
“in a jail or another facility” when such jail time is credited against the
sentence as expressly provided in section 903A.2(3). We held in
Anderson that his “home is not a ‘jail or other correctional facility.’
Section 903A.5(1) does not entitle Anderson to sentencing credit for time
spent under home supervision and electronic monitoring.” Anderson,
801 N.W.2d at 4. Accordingly, because Allensworth’s street time falls
outside of sections 903A.2(3) and 903A.5, there is no textual basis for
extending the earned-time credit to his probationary period.
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C. Section 907.3(3) Probation Credit. The statutory source for
the probation credit is Iowa Code section 907.3(3). See Anderson, 801
N.W.2d at 5. IDOC is allowing Allensworth day-for-day credit for his time
spent on supervised street probation. But, nothing in section 907.3(3)
allows earned-time credit to accrue while on probation outside the walls
of a jail or other correctional facility. To the contrary, section 903A.2
explicitly limits earned-time accruing before placement in prison to
“[t]ime served in a jail or another facility.” Iowa Code § 903A.2(3).
Allensworth was not serving time in an eligible facility during his days on
supervised probation.
“ ‘The general rule is that, absent a specific provision allowing for
it, a court does not err by denying credit for time served on probation.’ ”
State v. Canas, 571 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Trecker v. State,
320 N.W.2d 594, 595 (Iowa 1982), superseded by statutory amendment,
1996 Iowa Acts ch. 1193, § 19, as recognized in Anderson, 801 N.W.2d at
4–5). The legislature amended section 907.3(3) in 1996 by adding the
sentence requiring credit for time spent on supervised probation. See
Anderson, 801 N.W.2d at 4–5 (“The 1996 amendment added the
statutory authorization Trecker found lacking earlier.”). The amendment
allowing a sentencing credit for probation, however, did not also
authorize accrual of earned-time credit for time spent on probation. We
will not require the IDOC to recognize an earned-time credit the
legislature did not expressly allow. See Canas, 571 N.W.2d at 25
(concluding that legislature’s failure to require a particular sentencing
credit “indicates the legislature did not intend to grant such credit”). The
probation credit found in section 907.3(3) does not entitle Allensworth to
the earned-time credit allowed in section 903A.2. We will not rewrite the
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statutes to provide a credit that is not there. As noted, the earned-time
credit accrues only while he is incarcerated.
Because the operative statutory language in section 903A.2
governing earned-time credit is unambiguous, the rule of lenity does not
apply. See Kolzow, 813 N.W.2d at 739 (finding the rule of lenity did not
apply to the unambiguous statute). Finally, we reject Allensworth’s
constitutional argument because the IDOC applied the unambiguous
language of Iowa Code section 903A.2 in calculating his tentative
discharge date and, thus, did not arbitrarily restrain Allensworth’s
liberty.
IV. Conclusion.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the district court
correctly rejected Allensworth’s claim for earned-time credit to be
accrued while he was on supervised probation. Earned-time credits are
only earned while the offender is incarcerated. We therefore affirm the
district court’s March 23 ruling.
AFFIRMED.