In RE the Detention of Anthony Geltz Anthony Geltz , 840 N.W.2d 273 ( 2013 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 12–0647
Filed December 6, 2013
IN RE THE DETENTION OF ANTHONY GELTZ
ANTHONY GELTZ,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, David H.
Sivright Jr., Judge.
Respondent appeals his adjudication and civil commitment as a
sexually violent predator. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR
DISMISSAL.
Michael H. Adams, Chief Public Defender, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John B. McCormally,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
2
WATERMAN, Justice.
This appeal presents the narrow question of whether a juvenile
adjudication of delinquency on a charge of sexual abuse can serve as a
predicate conviction to adjudicate the offender as a “sexually violent
predator” (SVP) under Iowa Code section 229A.2(11) (2011). The district
court ordered Anthony Geltz, then age eighteen, confined as an SVP at
the Civil Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders at the Cherokee Mental
Health Institute, based on an offense Geltz committed at age fourteen.
Geltz was charged as a juvenile and adjudicated delinquent for that
offense in 2008, but has never had an adult conviction. He cannot be
committed as an SVP without a qualifying prior conviction.
We must apply unambiguous operative statutory language as
written without second-guessing the policy choices of the legislature.
Iowa Code section 232.55(1) expressly provides that a juvenile
adjudication “shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime,” and chapter
229A nowhere states that a juvenile adjudication can substitute for the
predicate conviction required to commit an offender as an SVP. As
further explained below, other Code provisions explicitly mention both
convictions and juvenile adjudications together when the legislature
chooses to impose the same consequences for each category of offense.
Accordingly, we hold that a juvenile adjudication does not constitute a
conviction within the meaning of section 229A.2(11). We therefore
reverse the judgment and order of the district court that committed Geltz
as an SVP.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Geltz was born in 1993. As a child, he was sexually abused by his
mentally handicapped sister and by two adult men, one of whom lived in
the family home. Geltz in turn abused his stepsister and other
3
neighborhood children. At age twelve, Geltz was sent to live at the Annie
Wittenmyer Home in Davenport. Two years later, Geltz escaped from
Wittenmyer and went to a Chuck E. Cheese’s® restaurant, where he
sexually abused a child. Geltz was prosecuted as a juvenile and
adjudicated delinquent for sexual abuse in the second degree. He was
placed in the State Training School for Boys in Eldora and has remained
institutionalized. At Eldora, he was disciplined a dozen times for
infractions involving sexual misconduct.
After Geltz turned eighteen, the State petitioned on June 7, 2011,
to have him declared an SVP. After hearing conflicting expert testimony,
the district court evaluated Geltz under Iowa Code section 229A.2(11),
which defines “sexually violent predator” as
a person who has been convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in
predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not
confined in a secure facility.
The district court ruled Geltz’s juvenile adjudication constituted a
conviction and found he is an SVP. The district court therefore ordered
him committed to the Cherokee facility. This appeal followed.
II. Scope of Review.
Geltz raises one issue in his appeal: whether the district court
erred by ruling that his juvenile adjudication constitutes a conviction
within the meaning of section 229A.2(11). We review the district court’s
construction of this chapter for correction of errors at law. In re Det. of
Swanson, 668 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa 2003).
III. Analysis.
Geltz argues that Iowa Code section 232.55(1) prohibits the State
from using his juvenile adjudication as the conviction required under
4
section 229A.2(11). The State argues that the term “convicted” in Iowa
Code section 229A.2(11) should be read broadly to include juvenile
adjudications. We must decide this question of first impression as to the
meaning of “convicted” in section 229A.2(11).
When interpreting chapter 229A and related statutes, “our primary
goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.” In re Det. of
Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 2006). We look “first and
foremost to the language it chose in creating the act.” Swanson, 668
N.W.2d at 574. “We read the statute as a whole and give it its plain and
obvious meaning, a sensible and logical construction, which does not
create an impractical or absurd result.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “ ‘If more than one statute relating to the
subject matter at issue is relevant to the inquiry, we consider all the
statutes together in an effort to harmonize them.’ ” Kolzow v. State, 813
N.W.2d 731, 736 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d
540, 542 (Iowa 2000)).
We begin with the history of chapter 229A. In 1998, the Iowa
legislature enacted a new chapter entitled “Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators,” placed within the Code subtitle pertaining to mental
health. See 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1171 (codified as amended at Iowa Code
ch. 229A (1999)). The legislative findings in chapter 229A state:
The general assembly finds that a small but extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators exists which is
made up of persons who do not have a mental disease or
defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary
treatment pursuant to the treatment provisions for mentally
ill persons under chapter 229 . . . . The general assembly
finds that sexually violent predators’ likelihood of engaging
in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high and that
the existing involuntary commitment procedure under
chapter 229 is inadequate to address the risk these sexually
violent predators pose to society.
5
The general assembly further finds that the prognosis
for rehabilitating sexually violent predators in a prison
setting is poor . . . . Therefore, the general assembly finds
that a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and
treatment of the sexually violent predator is necessary. . . .
The procedures should . . . reflect the need to protect the
public, to respect the needs of the victims of sexually violent
offenses, and to encourage full, meaningful participation of
sexually violent predators in treatment programs.
Iowa Code § 229A.1 (2011). We have recognized these findings “reveal
the legislature’s intent in creating the act: to ensure public safety and to
provide ‘treatment of the committed individual rather than
punishment.’ ” Swanson, 668 N.W.2d at 576 (quoting In re Det. of
Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000)). “This legislative intent guides
our resolution of the issues presented.” Id.; see also In re Det. of Blaise,
830 N.W.2d 310, 318, 322 (Iowa 2013) (analyzing section 229A.2(10)(g)
in light of the legislative intent expressed in section 229A.1).
The State argues the commitment of Geltz under chapter 229A
furthers the legislative goals of protecting the public and ensuring he
gets the long-term treatment he needs. The State notes that Geltz is now
an adult and the SVP definition is based on behavior and mental state
rather than age. The State predicts that upon his release from his
current detention, Geltz will promptly reoffend. We share that concern,
but are constrained by the language of the statutes. “ ‘Ours not to
reason why, ours but to read, and apply. It is our duty to accept the law
as the legislative body enacts it.’ ” Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1, 1
(Iowa 2011) (quoting Holland v. State, 253 Iowa 1006, 1011, 115 N.W.2d
161, 164 (1962)).
Against this backdrop, we focus now on the operative statutory
language. Section 229A.2(11) defines “sexually violent predator” as
a person who has been convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
6
abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in
predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not
confined in a secure facility.
Iowa Code § 229A.2(11) (emphasis added). The parties disagree on the
meaning of the term “convicted” in this definition.1 As we have
previously recognized, “ ‘conviction’ may have different meanings within
different contexts.” State v. Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1986);
see also State v. Hanna, 179 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 1970) (“The word
‘conviction’ is of equivocal meaning, and its use in a statute presents a
question of legislative intent.”).
We read the SVP statute in tandem with Iowa Code section
232.55(1). Found in the juvenile justice chapter of the Iowa Code,
section 232.55 is entitled, “Effect of adjudication and disposition.”
Subsection 1 states:
An adjudication or disposition in a proceeding under this
division shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime and
shall not impose any civil disabilities or operate to disqualify
the child in any civil service application or appointment.
Iowa Code § 232.55(1). This subsection was enacted in 1978. See 1978
Iowa Acts ch. 1088, § 35 (codified at Iowa Code § 232.55 (1979)). Geltz
argues that section 232.55(1) applies generally to limit the definition of
“convicted” in chapter 229A to exclude juvenile adjudications. We agree.
The plain language of section 232.55(1) unambiguously provides
that juvenile adjudications are not convictions. “When a statute is plain
and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning
beyond its express terms.” State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa
1The State does not contend Geltz can be classified an SVP under the “or
charged with” alternative in section 229A.2(11). Section 229A.4(2) provides that
without a conviction, someone merely “charged with . . . a sexually violent offense” can
be committed under this chapter only if found insane or incompetent to stand trial.
Iowa Code § 229A.4(2)(b)–(c) (2011). Geltz was not found insane or incompetent to
stand trial.
7
1998). Interpreting the term “convicted” in section 229A.2(11) to include
juvenile adjudications would contradict the statutory command of
section 232.55(1). We must read section 229A.2(11) together with
232.55(1), and we hold juvenile adjudications are not convictions for the
purposes of committing an individual as an SVP. See Christiansen v.
Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179, 189 (Iowa 2013) (“[T]he
more specific provision controls over the general provision.”); State v.
Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1978) (“[S]tatutes will be
construed in such a manner as to be consistent with each other.”).
The State nevertheless cites our caselaw interpreting the term
“conviction” broadly under certain circumstances, arguing such a broad
interpretation is appropriate here. “While we have construed the word
‘conviction’ to have a relatively narrow and technical meaning where it
appears in statutes used to enhance punishment, we have accepted a
broader definition when protection of the public has been at stake.”
Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372. Of course, protection of the public is a key
goal of chapter 229A.
We have interpreted “conviction” to include deferred judgments in
several cases—each of which involved an adult defendant who entered a
guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011)
(“[A] deferred judgment constitutes a conviction for purposes of [the felon
in possession statute,] where the defendant (as here) has not completed
his term of probation.”); Schilling v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d
69, 73 (Iowa 2002) (holding deferred judgment constitutes a conviction
for driver’s license revocation purposes); Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372
(holding deferred judgment is a conviction for purposes of restitution
law). None of these cases involved a juvenile adjudication. Our cases
that broadly construe “conviction” to include deferred judgments for
8
adult offenses are inapposite here in light of section 232.55(1), which
expressly provides that juvenile adjudications are not convictions. “[W]e
are bound to follow the legislature’s definitions and may not add words
or change terms under the guise of judicial construction.” Iowa Dep’t of
Transp. v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 2002) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
We also reject the State’s argument that section 232.55(1), enacted
in 1978, should not apply to limit the term “convicted” as used in
chapter 229A, enacted twenty years later. The State accurately asserts
the 1978 legislature that enacted section 232.55(1) did not contemplate
how to define an SVP. The problem with the State’s position is that we
must presume that the 1998 legislature, as it enacted chapter 229A, was
aware of the existing Code provision providing that juvenile adjudications
do not constitute convictions. Cf. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d at 434 (“The
legislature is presumed to know the existing state of the law at the time
of the enactment of a new statute.”). The legislature has amended
section 229A.2(11) numerous times and yet has not chosen to revise the
definition of “sexually violent predator” to include juvenile adjudications.
The State next contends it is significant that juvenile adjudications
are considered convictions for the purposes of the sex offender registry
chapter. See Iowa Code § 692A.101(7) (2011). In the sex offender
registry chapter, “convicted” is defined to mean
found guilty of, pleads guilty to, or is sentenced or
adjudicated delinquent for an act which is an indictable
offense in this state or in another jurisdiction including in a
federal, military, tribal, or foreign court, including but not
limited to a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent,
but whose juvenile court records have been sealed under
section 232.150, and a person who has received a deferred
sentence or a deferred judgment or has been acquitted by
reason of insanity.
9
Id. The State argues that, because the sex offender registry and the SVP
statute serve “nearly identical” purposes, we should read the definition of
“convicted” from chapter 692A into chapter 229A. See State v. Finders,
743 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Iowa 2008) (noting purpose of sex offender registry
“is to reduce the high risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders”).
We conclude the State’s argument cuts against its position. The
sex offender registry provision illustrates that the legislature is aware
that the term “convicted” does not include juvenile adjudications, and for
that reason, section 692A.101(7) expressly mentions juvenile
adjudications as an additional trigger for registration requirements. By
contrast, section 229A.2(11) makes no mention of juvenile adjudications.
Our conclusion is reinforced by a number of other statutes in the Code in
which the legislature expressly includes the term “juvenile adjudication”
in addition to “conviction” in order to provide the same collateral
consequences for both.2 A notable example is Iowa Code section
724.26(1), which prohibits the possession of a firearm by “[a] person who
is convicted of a felony in a state or federal court, or who is adjudicated
delinquent on the basis of conduct that would constitute a felony if
2See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 81.2(1), (4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.)
(effective July 1, 2014) (requiring certain individuals to submit DNA samples, with
separate subsections for those with convictions and those adjudicated delinquent); Iowa
Code § 321.213 (2011) (applying to license suspensions, stating “[n]otwithstanding
section 232.55, a final adjudication in a juvenile court . . . constitutes a final conviction
. . . .”); id. § 670A.1(2) (“As used in [the forcible felon liability] chapter, . . . ‘[c]onvicted’
means a finding of guilt, irrespective of imposition or execution of any sentence; a final
and valid admission of guilt or a guilty plea; an entry of judgment of conviction; an
adjudication of delinquency . . . .”); id. § 901A.1(2) (“As used in [the sexually predatory
offenses] chapter, the term ‘prior conviction’ includes a plea of guilty, deferred judgment,
deferred or suspended sentence, or adjudication of delinquency . . . .”); id. § 915.42
(requiring, under certain conditions, those convicted or adjudicated delinquent for
sexual assault to submit to an HIV test); see also State v. Schweitzer, 646 N.W.2d 117,
120 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (“We believe that section 321.213 carves out a specific
exception to the general rule set forth in section 232.55 prohibiting a juvenile
adjudication from being later used in an adult criminal proceeding.”).
10
committed by an adult.” This subsection did not originally mention
juvenile adjudication, but only included “[a]ny person who is convicted of
a felony in any state or federal court.” 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 2426
(codified at Iowa Code § 724.26 (1979)). The legislature added the
juvenile adjudication language in 1997. See 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 126,
§ 47 (codified at Iowa Code § 724.26 (1999)).
We find these differences in statutory language significant. Cf.
State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 647 (Iowa 2012) (noting “only a
conviction or deferred judgment will trigger section 902.14 [to enhance a
sentence], not an adjudication of juvenile delinquency”). The legislature’s
failure to explicitly include a juvenile adjudication as a basis for an SVP
commitment when that term appears in other statutes is itself evidence
of legislative intent to omit such offenses from chapter 229A. Cf. Oyens
Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 194 (Iowa 2011)
(reasoning that legislature’s omission of a phrase selectively incorporated
in related provisions showed omission was intended). If the legislature
wished to base an SVP commitment on a juvenile adjudication, it would
have expressly included that term in section 229A.2(11), as it did
elsewhere.
Additional statutory language in chapter 229A confirms that the
legislature intended only to use an adult conviction to commit an SVP.
The legislative findings state “the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually
violent predators in a prison setting is poor, because . . . the treatment
modalities for this population are very different from the traditional
treatment modalities available in a prison setting.” Iowa Code § 229A.1
(2011) (emphasis added). Section 229A.3 then provides that the SVP
assessment process begins at least ninety days prior to
11
[t]he anticipated discharge of a person who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense from total
confinement, except that in the case of a person who is
returned to prison for no more than ninety days as a result
of revocation of parole, written notice shall be given as soon
as practicable following the person’s readmission to prison.
Id. § 229A.3(1)(a) (emphasis added). Juveniles who are adjudicated
delinquent do not serve time in prison, they may be sent to detention or
shelter care facilities. See Iowa Code §§ 232.44, .47(11), .52. Reading
the SVP chapter as a whole, the references to prison—without any
mention of juvenile facilities—show the legislature developed the SVP
commitment process to detain and treat adult offenders who reach the
end of their criminal sentences, not juveniles who age out of state
facilities.
Our holding today is in accord with appellate decisions interpreting
similar statutes. In United States v. Huggins, the Third Circuit applied a
similar analysis to hold that a Pennsylvania juvenile adjudication did not
constitute a “prior conviction” to enhance the sentence of a repeat drug
offender. 467 F.3d 359, 361–62 (3d Cir. 2006). The Huggins court noted
that under the applicable Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, the adjudication of
delinquency is not considered to be a conviction. Id. at 361 (citing 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 6354(a) (2004)). The court further noted that Congress
expressly mentions juvenile adjudications in certain statutes, but not the
one at issue. Id. at 361. Accordingly, the court declined to consider the
defendant’s juvenile adjudication to enhance his federal sentence. Id. at
362.
The supreme courts of Arkansas, Florida, and Kansas have
reached similar conclusions. In State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 110 (Fla.
2002), the Florida Supreme Court was presented with a juvenile justice
statute much like Iowa Code section 232.55(1). That statute read,
12
“ ‘Adjudication of delinquency shall not be deemed a conviction, nor shall
it operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from a
conviction.’ ” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 985.233(4)(b)
(1999)). Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court held that “an
adjudication of delinquency does not trigger the sexual predator status
provisions of the Predator Act” because “upon a plain reading of the
controlling statutes, it is apparent that an adjudication of delinquency
does not fall under the definition of a felony criminal conviction required
under the Act.” Id.
The Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant could not
be classified as an habitual child sex offender because his juvenile
adjudication could not be considered a “conviction” for the purposes of
that statute. Snyder v. State, 965 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Ark. 1998). The
court noted, “[t]he General Assembly has recognized that there is a
difference between a conviction and an adjudication.” Id.
Likewise, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that juvenile
adjudications cannot be considered in determining whether an individual
is a “persistent sex offender,” emphasizing that “when [the legislature]
wants to include juvenile adjudications as a consideration, it is perfectly
capable of doing so explicitly.” State v. Boyer, 209 P.3d 705, 711 (Kan.
2009) (pointing to another statutory provision in which the legislature
specifically included juvenile adjudications).
We recognize that other state legislatures have chosen to include
juvenile adjudications as a ground to commit sex offenders.3 Doing so
3See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 394.912(2) (2013) (“ ‘Convicted of a sexually violent
offense’ means a person who has been . . . [a]djudicated delinquent of a sexually violent
offense after a trial, guilty plea, or plea of nolo contendere.”); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat.
207/5(f) (2013) (“ ‘Sexually violent person’ means a person who has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense, [or] has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent
offense . . . .”); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6401 (2013) (“This chapter establishes rights and
13
makes sense from the standpoint of public safety. See Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 264, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2410, 81 L. Ed. 2d 207, 217 (1984)
(“[C]rime prevention is a ‘weighty social objective,’ and this interest
persists undiluted in the juvenile context.” (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 363 (1979))). Yet,
there are also differences between juvenile and adult offenders that
rationally explain the legislature’s decision to treat juvenile adjudications
differently than convictions. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570,
125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1, 22 (2005) (“[T]he character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits
of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”); Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 647
(“By limiting section 902.14 to convictions as opposed to adjudications of
delinquency, the legislature has attempted to avoid enhancing the
punishment of less culpable offenders.”).
While there are sound policy reasons to include juvenile
adjudications with convictions for the commitment of SVPs to protect the
public and ensure treatment of youthful offenders who otherwise may be
doomed to reoffend, “[p]olicy arguments to amend the statute should be
directed to the legislature.” In re Estate of Whalen, 827 N.W.2d 184, 194
(Iowa 2013). We cannot judicially revise the Iowa Code in the guise of
interpretation. See id. “[W]e are bound by what the legislature said, not
______________________
procedures for the civil commitment of sexually violent delinquent children . . . .”); S.C.
Code Ann. § 44-48-30(6) (2012) (“ ‘Convicted of a sexually violent offense’ means a
person has . . . been adjudicated delinquent as a result of the commission of a sexually
violent offense.”); Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.030(1) (2013) (“A petition may be filed
alleging that a person is a sexually violent predator and stating sufficient facts to
support such allegation when it appears that . . . a person found to have committed a
sexually violent offense as a juvenile is about to be released from total confinement.”);
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2) (2013) (“A petition filed under this section shall allege that all of
the following apply to the person alleged to be a sexually violent person: . . . The person
has been found delinquent for a sexually violent offense.”).
14
by what it should or might have said.” Soward, 650 N.W.2d at 571. We
must apply the statutory language as written and, therefore, hold Geltz
cannot be committed as an SVP solely on the basis of his juvenile
adjudication for the offense he committed at age fourteen.
IV. Disposition.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment and order of the
district court that committed Geltz as an SVP. We remand this case for
an order dismissing the State’s petition.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL.