State of Iowa v. Anthony Frank Ernst ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 18–1623
    Submitted November 17, 2020—Filed January 29, 2021
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellee,
    vs.
    ANTHONY ERNST,
    Appellant.
    On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Michael J.
    Shubatt, Judge.
    State seeks further review from court of appeals’ reversal of the
    defendant’s conviction for attempted burglary. DECISION OF COURT OF
    APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AFFIRMED.
    Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
    joined. Appel, J., filed a special concurrence.
    Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender
    (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven (argued),
    Assistant Attorney General, C.J. May III, County Attorney, and Brigit M.
    Barnes and Ry Allen Meyer, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
    2
    OXLEY, Justice.
    We have long recognized that specific intent crimes are seldom
    proved by direct evidence of the defendant’s intent, leaving the State to
    rely on inferences to be drawn from the surrounding circumstances to
    convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a
    sufficiently culpable mental state to support a conviction. In this case, the
    defendant convinced the court of appeals that his conviction could not be
    supported on the theory that the jury improperly stacked inferences on
    top of other inferences to find he attempted to burglarize a garage with the
    intent to commit a theft. We disagree and conclude the State’s evidence—
    and all reasonable inferences from that evidence—was sufficient to
    support the defendant’s conviction.
    I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
    Anthony Ernst’s parole officer lives on a dead-end gravel road in
    rural Cascade with her husband. The parole officer’s husband discovered
    the service door to their garage had been pried open while they were at
    work on August 21, 2017. The door was closed and locked when they left,
    but the door was ajar with the knob still locked when he returned home.
    The weather stripping around the door was damaged with what looked like
    pry marks near the handle and near the bottom of the door. Nothing was
    missing from the garage, and there was no indication anyone had entered
    the house through the locked interior door. The parole officer contacted
    police about the break-in, and an investigation followed.
    Video footage from a business at the top of the dead end road showed
    only one vehicle drove down the road toward the parole officer’s house that
    day that was unaccounted for by local traffic, which passed the business
    at 10:31 a.m. and returned approximately thirteen minutes later. Further
    investigation led to Ernst based on his ownership of a white police model
    3
    Crown Victoria, the same type of car observed in the footage. The parole
    officer identified the vehicle from the video footage as belonging to Ernst
    based on the distinct pattern of chipped paint on the car.
    Ernst was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary in the
    third degree with intent to commit assault and intent to commit theft. At
    the close of the State’s evidence at trial, Ernst moved for a judgment of
    acquittal. The district court granted the motion in part, concluding the
    State failed to present sufficient evidence for a jury to find he intended to
    commit an assault, but it did present sufficient evidence for the jury to
    find he intended to commit a theft. Ernst proceeded to trial on the theft
    version of burglary.
    The jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included attempted
    burglary charge. The district court entered judgment against Ernst and
    sentenced him to the maximum two-year sentence.            Ernst appealed,
    challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals reversed
    Ernst’s conviction, concluding the State’s only direct evidence showed
    Ernst in the area but the remaining circumstantial evidence was too
    speculative to support his conviction because it “require[d] a stacking of
    inferences: first the inference [Ernst] forced entry to the garage, then the
    inference he did so with intent to commit theft.” The State applied for, and
    we granted, further review to address the court of appeals’ conclusion that
    stacked inferences could not support Ernst’s conviction.
    II. Analysis.
    To prove Ernst was guilty of attempted burglary, the jury
    instructions required the State to prove he (1) attempted to enter the
    garage, (2) which was an occupied structure, (3) without permission or
    authority (4) with the specific intent to commit theft. On appeal, Ernst
    contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the
    4
    first and fourth elements. Alternatively, he argues he is entitled to a new
    trial because the weight of the evidence preponderates against his
    conviction. Finally, Ernst claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not
    challenging the admission of cell phone records and related testimony at
    trial. We address each contention in turn.
    A. Sufficiency of the Evidence. “We review the sufficiency of the
    evidence for correction of errors at law.” State v. Kelso-Christy, 
    911 N.W.2d 663
    , 666 (Iowa 2018). We consider all evidence, not just the evidence
    supporting the conviction, and view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the State, “including legitimate inferences and presumptions
    that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.”
    State v. Tipton, 
    897 N.W.2d 653
    , 692 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v.
    Williams, 
    695 N.W.2d 23
    , 27 (Iowa 2005)).
    In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether
    “the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence in the record.”
    Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d at 666 (quoting State v. Meyers, 
    799 N.W.2d 132
    , 138 (Iowa 2011)). Substantial evidence “means a person may not be
    convicted based upon mere suspicion or conjecture.” Tipton, 897 N.W.2d
    at 692. “Substantial evidence exists when the evidence ‘would convince a
    rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
    Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d at 666 (quoting Meyers, 799 N.W.2d at 138).
    Ernst contends the State failed to prove: (1) anyone attempted to
    enter the garage, (2) if someone attempted to enter the garage, that person
    was Ernst, and (3) if Ernst did enter the garage, he did so with the specific
    intent to commit theft.     We conclude the State presented sufficient
    evidence to support Ernst’s conviction.
    With respect to establishing Ernst as the perpetrator of the
    attempted burglary, the State presented evidence that Ernst was off work
    5
    on August 21 to attend a child support hearing in the afternoon. Footage
    from a traffic camera located one block from Ernst’s Dubuque home
    showed Ernst left home around 8:45 a.m. and returned around 12:28 p.m.
    Other city traffic cameras showed Ernst coming into Dubuque at 12:20
    p.m. on Highway 151. A vehicle matching Ernst’s vehicle, including its
    distinctive chipped paint pattern, was seen on video surveillance of a
    business near the crime scene driving down the dead-end road toward the
    parole officer’s house at 10:31 a.m. and driving back thirteen minutes
    later. It was the only unaccounted vehicle on the dead-end road that day.
    Ernst’s probation officer identified the car from the video surveillance as
    belonging to Ernst. The video also revealed a driver wearing a brightly
    colored sleeveless shirt, similar to the shirt Ernst was seen wearing later
    that day at his child support hearing.
    “While opportunity to commit a crime or mere presence at the scene
    ordinarily is not a sufficient corroborative circumstance from which to
    infer guilt,” substantial evidence of guilt can exist when presence is
    considered with other evidence. State v. Schrier, 
    300 N.W.2d 305
    , 309
    (Iowa 1981). Significant evidence in addition to Ernst’s presence in the
    area supports his conviction. The State presented evidence that someone
    had pried open the service door, contrary to Ernst’s argument that the
    wind or an animal caused the door to be opened. That evidence included
    testimony from both homeowners that the door was closed and locked
    when they left that morning, evidence of pry marks they testified were not
    previously on the weather stripping and doorframe, and evidence that the
    door handle was still locked although the door was ajar when the husband
    arrived home. Investigator Grant testified at trial, unchallenged, there had
    been a forced entry.
    6
    From the direct evidence that Ernst was driving the only
    unaccounted-for vehicle on the road that day, coupled with the
    circumstantial evidence that someone had pried open the service door, the
    jury could have reasonably inferred that Ernst was the one who pried open
    the door. This evidence provides substantial evidence to support the first
    three elements of the burglary charge—that Ernst entered the garage1
    without authorization.
    The State was also required to prove Ernst entered the garage with
    the specific intent to commit theft. “Specific intent is seldom capable of
    direct proof.”    State v. Walker, 
    574 N.W.2d 280
    , 289 (Iowa 1998).
    Therefore, specific intent will often “be shown by circumstantial evidence
    and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” 
    Id.
    We first note that intent to commit theft can “reasonably be inferred
    from the evidence of surreptitious entry and other circumstances.” State
    v. Sangster, 
    299 N.W.2d 661
    , 663 (Iowa 1980); see also State v. Oetken,
    
    613 N.W.2d 679
    , 686 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (“An intent to commit theft
    may be inferred from an actual breaking and entering of a building which
    contains things of value.”); State v. Erving, 
    346 N.W.2d 833
    , 836 (Iowa
    1984) (“[E]xperience teaches that, in the great majority of cases of unlawful
    breaking and entering, the act [done is] with intent to steal.” (quoting State
    v. Allnutt, 
    261 Iowa 897
    , 906, 
    156 N.W.2d 266
    , 271 (1968), overruled on
    other grounds by State v. Gorham, 
    206 N.W.2d 908
     (Iowa 1973) (en banc)));
    State v. Woodruff, 
    208 Iowa 236
    , 240, 
    225 N.W. 254
    , 255 (1929) (“People
    are not accustomed, in the nighttime, to enter the homes of others, when
    asleep, with innocent purposes. The usual object is theft, and this is the
    inference ordinarily to be drawn, in the absence of explanation, from
    1Ernst   conceded the garage was an “occupied structure,” the second element
    under the jury instructions.
    7
    breaking and entering at night, accompanied by flight upon discovery,
    even though nothing has been taken.”). In State v. Erving, we found the
    intent element satisfied from evidence the defendant removed a glass panel
    from a locked and closed pharmacy area and testimony by the pharmacist
    that “removal of the glass panel would greatly facilitate entry into the
    pharmacy and access to the various controlled substances stored there.”
    
    346 N.W.2d at 835
    .
    The jury’s finding Ernst intended to commit a theft is supported by
    substantial evidence. The State presented evidence that Ernst was in the
    area of the garage between 10:31 a.m. and 10:44 a.m., a time he had
    reason to know both homeowners would not be home. Ernst was aware
    of his parole officer’s work schedule, and Ernst’s boss testified the parole
    officer’s husband worked for a construction company that was often on
    the same worksite as Ernst. Ernst’s sister testified she and Ernst had
    previously located the parole officer’s address from incident reports
    obtained from the City of Dubuque’s website. This additional evidence—
    that Ernst knew his parole officer’s address and knew she and her
    husband would likely be away from home in the midmorning hours—
    provides sufficient additional circumstances to support the inference that
    Ernst broke into the garage with the intent to take something.           See
    Commonwealth v. Madison, 
    397 A.2d 818
    , 824 (Pa. Super. 1979) (“Another
    factor [indicating intent to commit theft] may be whether the evidence
    indicates that the defendant thought the building was unoccupied at the
    time of the entry.”).
    Additionally, “[a] false story told by a defendant to explain or deny a
    material fact against him is by itself an indication of guilt and . . . is
    relevant to show that the defendant fabricated evidence to aid his defense.”
    State v. Cox, 
    500 N.W.2d 23
    , 25 (Iowa 1993).         Ernst denied he was
    8
    anywhere near Cascade despite the video footage of a car identified as
    Ernst’s being driven down the dead-end road toward his parole officer’s
    house. Instead, he presented his sister and his mother as alibi witnesses,
    both of whom testified Ernst had visited first his sister in Bernard, Iowa,
    and then his mother in Epworth, Iowa, on the morning of August 21.
    However, his sister admitted she failed to tell Investigator Grant this
    information when he interviewed her.       Similarly, Ernst’s mother was
    confused about the timing of Ernst’s visit, and her testimony that Ernst
    drove her into Dubuque to run errands and then dropped her off was
    inconsistent with traffic camera footage showing Ernst entered Dubuque
    on Highway 151 at 12:20 p.m. and returned alone to his home in Dubuque
    at 12:28 p.m. The jury was free to disbelieve both witnesses’ testimony,
    leaving them to conclude Ernst offered a false story of his whereabouts the
    morning of August 21.
    Although Ernst was convicted of only attempted burglary because
    nothing was taken from the garage, the lack of a completed burglary does
    not negate the intent element of Ernst’s conviction. See State v. Morelock,
    
    164 N.W.2d 819
    , 822 (Iowa 1969) (holding failure to complete a breaking
    and entry does not prevent jury from finding an unlawful intent); Allnutt,
    261 Iowa at 905–06, 
    156 N.W.2d at 271
     (noting intent to steal was not
    negated merely because nothing was stolen). As it turned out, the garage
    was immaculate, with no tools or small items for Ernst to take.
    Additionally, the parole officer’s husband’s personal truck was in the
    garage, which could have caused Ernst to believe someone was home and
    to flee when he saw it. Further, the State was not required to refute every
    possible inference from the evidence. See State v. Bentley, 
    757 N.W.2d 257
    , 262–63 (Iowa 2008) (holding the State does not have the “onerous
    burden” of disproving hypotheses favorable to the defendant).
    9
    Ernst contends his conviction is not supported by substantial
    evidence because the State’s case relied on circumstantial evidence and
    that circumstantial evidence must be “wholly inconsistent with any
    rational hypothesis of his innocence,” citing State v. Schurman, 
    205 N.W.2d 732
    , 734 (Iowa 1973), overruled by State v. O’Connell, 
    275 N.W.2d 197
     (Iowa 1979) (en banc), and State v. Truesdell, 
    679 N.W.2d 611
    , 618–
    19 (Iowa 2004). He also argues the jury’s verdict relied on an improper
    stacking of inferences from circumstantial evidence, first that Ernst was
    the one who pried open the garage service door and then that Ernst did so
    with the specific intent to commit theft. See State v. Reed, 
    875 N.W.2d 693
    , 711 (Iowa 2016) (Hecht, J., concurring specially) (“[O]ur cautious
    approach to the doctrine of constructive possession should not recognize
    a stack of speculative inferences piled one on top of another as substantial
    evidence that Reed constructively possessed the drugs beyond a
    reasonable doubt.”). Ernst misconstrues our jurisprudence concerning
    circumstantial evidence.
    We readily reject Ernst’s reliance on Schurman. We eliminated the
    distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence over forty years ago
    in State v. O’Connell, 
    275 N.W.2d at
    204–05, decided after Schurman.
    Previously, a conviction supported solely by circumstantial evidence could
    stand only if the facts proved were not only “consistent with the guilt of
    the accused, but they must [have] also be[en] inconsistent with any
    rational theory of his innocence.” O’Connell, 
    275 N.W.2d at 204
     (quoting
    Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Uniform Instruction 501.13).        Recognizing this
    requirement was based on an “outmoded generality,” we joined the growing
    number of federal and state courts that treat direct and circumstantial
    evidence as equally probative. 
    Id.
     at 204–05 (collecting cases, including
    Holland v. United States, 
    348 U.S. 121
    , 140, 
    75 S. Ct. 127
    , 138 (1954) (“If
    10
    the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no
    more.”)). Indeed, that “[d]irect and circumstantial evidence are equally
    probative” is now one of the propositions our appellate rules “deem[] so
    well established that authorities need not be cited” to support it. Iowa R.
    App. P. 6.904(3)(p). Thus, contrary to Ernst’s arguments, the State need
    not discredit every other potential theory to be drawn from circumstantial
    evidence. See Bentley, 
    757 N.W.2d at 263
     (“While the absence of direct
    evidence that Bentley abducted J.G. from her house means the
    prosecution cannot affirmatively disprove the hypothesis that someone
    other than Bentley removed J.G. to the trailer, the State is not tasked with
    such an onerous burden.”).
    The same is true when a jury makes inferences from the evidence
    presented at trial. Proof of specific intent is “seldom susceptible to proof
    by direct evidence.”      State v. Finnel, 
    515 N.W.2d 41
    , 42 (Iowa 1994)
    (quoting State v. Olson, 
    373 N.W.2d 135
    , 136 (Iowa 1985)). Rather, proof
    of intent usually depends on “circumstantial evidence and inferences
    drawn from such evidence.”       
    Id.
       “The requirement of proof beyond a
    reasonable doubt is satisfied if it is more likely than not that the inference
    of intent is true.” 
    Id.
    While other conflicting scenarios can be postulated, a court
    “faced with a record of historical facts that supports
    conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not
    affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact
    resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and
    must defer to that resolution.”
    Bentley, 
    757 N.W.2d at 263
     (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    ,
    326, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2793 (1979)).
    We also reject Ernst’s reliance on Truesdell to argue that evidence
    susceptible to more than one inference is merely speculative and cannot
    support a conviction. Truesdell was convicted of possession of a precursor
    11
    with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, methamphetamine,
    after he purchased seventy boxes of cold relief medication containing
    pseudoephedrine. See Truesdell, 
    679 N.W.2d at 614
    . We held the evidence
    was insufficient to support an inference that the defendant possessed the
    cold    medication       with   the    requisite    intent    to   manufacture
    methamphetamine—as opposed to merely providing pseudoephedrine to
    allow someone else to manufacture methamphetamine. 
    Id.
     at 618–19. In
    reversing Truesdell’s conviction for lack of sufficient evidence to support
    the intent-to-manufacture element, we stated that “when two reasonable
    inferences can be drawn from a piece of evidence, we believe such evidence
    only gives rise to a suspicion, and, without additional evidence, is
    insufficient to support guilt.” 
    Id.
     Ernst argues this means the State must
    disprove   all   other    reasonable   inferences    before   inferences   from
    circumstantial evidence may be used to prove an element of an offense.
    Ernst reads too much into this isolated sentence. In Truesdell, the
    State offered a single piece of evidence—possession of a large amount of
    pseudoephedrine—from which a jury could reasonably infer either that the
    defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine or that he intended
    only to supply the precursor for another to use in manufacturing
    methamphetamine. In State v. Keeton, we distinguished Truesdell as “a
    case where proof of intent depends upon a single piece of evidence from
    which two reasonable inferences could be drawn.” 
    710 N.W.2d 531
    , 535
    (Iowa 2006) (explaining Keeton was “not [such] a case”). In Keeton, the
    defendant’s conviction for robbery with intent to commit assault was
    supported by the collective evidence, including surveillance video showing
    the defendant’s actions when a store clerk attempted to block the door and
    the clerk’s testimony that she felt there was “no way” she could stop him
    from leaving. 
    Id.
     at 534–35. While the evidence was also consistent with
    12
    defendant’s testimony he never intended to assault the clerk and was
    merely trying to flee the store following the robbery,
    [t]he success of [the defendant]’s claim at trial hinged on the
    facts as viewed by the fact-finder, and it is not for us to
    interfere with the finding made when supported by
    substantial evidence, even though the evidence may have also
    supported a finding favorable to the defendant.
    
    Id. at 535
    .
    Likewise, this is not a case where inferences to establish each of the
    contested elements of Ernst’s conviction are dependent “upon a single
    piece of evidence from which two reasonable inferences could be drawn.”
    
    Id.
     Truesdell does not change our analysis.
    Finally, we reject Ernst’s argument that his conviction was premised
    on an improper stacking of inferences. The rule “that a conviction cannot
    be sustained if obtained by ‘piling inference on inference[,]’ . . . is oft cited,
    [but] it begs ready definition.” United States v. Summers, 
    414 F.3d 1287
    ,
    1294 (10th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting United
    States v. Dunmire, 
    403 F.3d 722
    , 724 (10th Cir. 2005)). An example of
    inference stacking was recently addressed by the Colorado Supreme Court
    in People v. Donald, where the defendant was charged with violating bail
    bond conditions that precluded him from leaving the state without
    permission.    
    461 P.3d 4
    , 5–6 (Colo. 2020) (en banc).            To prove the
    defendant had actual knowledge of the bond conditions, the state
    presented evidence about the “jail’s regular practice of having prisoners
    sign bond paperwork before they are released,” which supported the
    inference that the defendant in that case had in fact signed the bond
    paperwork. Id. at 6. However, the state offered no additional evidence
    that the defendant read the bail conditions, even if he did sign the
    paperwork. Id. Rather,
    13
    to find that Donald had actual knowledge of the conditions,
    the jury would have had to make inferences (e.g., that Donald
    was afforded the opportunity to read the bond paperwork and
    did so either when he signed it or thereafter) that rested on
    another inference (i.e., that Donald had signed the bond
    paperwork consistent with the jail’s routine practice).
    Id. at 7.
    The Colorado Supreme Court concluded a strict prohibition against
    inference stacking was inconsistent with its previous adoption of the
    substantial evidence test, which treated circumstantial evidence as equally
    probative as direct evidence.      Id. at 8–9.   The court explained “the
    inference-upon-inference prohibition was premised on now-outdated law
    requiring the prosecution to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other
    than guilt in cases premised solely on circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 9.
    Instead, the court adopted the reasoning of those courts that
    have concluded that although inference stacking is not
    absolutely prohibited, the reliance on stacked inferences is
    pertinent to the analysis of a sufficiency of the evidence claim
    because a chain of inferences can become so attenuated that
    reliance on it to sustain a conviction would be unreasonable
    and would amount to speculation.
    Id. (collecting cases).
    Juries must necessarily make inferences when finding facts based
    on circumstantial evidence. Cf. Southworth v. Commonwealth, 
    435 S.W.3d 32
    , 46 (Ky. 2014) (“[T]he modern trend is to abandon rules limiting the use
    of circumstantial evidence, including an inference upon an inference.”)
    (emphasis omitted) (quoting Eyal Zamir et al., Seeing is Believing: The Anti-
    Inference Bias, 
    89 Ind. L.J. 195
    , 199 (2014)). We agree with the Colorado
    Supreme Court that a strict prohibition against stacking inferences to be
    drawn from circumstantial evidence is inconsistent with our current
    formulation of substantial evidence. See Donald, 461 P.3d at 9; see also
    United States v. Shahane, 
    517 F.2d 1173
    , 1178 (8th Cir. 1975) (“It is too
    14
    much to say, however, that an inference is necessarily invalid or
    impermissible because it is based on a fact established in whole or in part
    by a preceding inference.”). The relevant inquiry is not whether a fact
    finding is based on an inference drawn from another inference. Rather,
    the relevant inquiry is whether a fact finding is a legitimate inference “that
    may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” Tipton,
    897 N.W.2d at 692 (quoting Williams, 
    695 N.W.2d at 27
    ). Allowing a jury
    to rely on stacked inferences becomes problematic only when a jury’s
    ultimate fact finding is based on speculation rather than on evidence in
    the record. See Summers, 
    414 F.3d at 1295
     (“[T]he chance of error or
    speculation increases in proportion to the width of the gap between
    underlying fact and ultimate conclusion where the gap is bridged by a
    succession of inferences, each based upon the preceding one.” (quoting
    Shahane, 
    517 F.2d at 1178
    )); see also Walls v. Jacob N. Printing Co., 
    618 N.W.2d 282
    , 286 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (“[I]nferences can assist in
    establishing a basic fact, but they cannot in and of themselves create
    evidence.” (quoting In re Est. of Kerndt, 
    251 Iowa 963
    , 968, 
    103 N.W.2d 733
    , 736 (1960))).
    Thus, like the Colorado Supreme Court, we do not categorically
    prohibit stacking of inferences but consider whether the inferences are
    supported by such evidence as to “convince a rational fact finder the
    defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”          Kelso-Christy, 911
    N.W.2d at 666 (quoting Meyers, 799 N.W.2d at 138).
    Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    jury’s verdict, including reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, we
    conclude Ernst’s conviction for attempted burglary with intent to commit
    theft is support by substantial evidence.
    15
    B. Weight of the Evidence. Alternatively, Ernst argues the district
    court should have granted a new trial because the jury verdict is against
    the weight of the evidence. “We generally review rulings on motions for
    new trial asserting a verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence for
    an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ary, 
    877 N.W.2d 686
    , 706 (Iowa 2016).
    The State claims this argument is inconsistent with Ernst’s
    sufficiency of the evidence claim. “In contrast to a motion for new trial
    brought under the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a motion for new
    trial brought under the weight-of-the-evidence standard essentially
    concedes the evidence adequately supports the jury verdict.” 
    Id.
     A new
    trial is appropriate under a weight-of-the-evidence challenge “only in the
    extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against
    the verdict rendered.” 
    Id.
    While the weight-of-the-evidence standard allows the district court
    to make its own credibility determinations, a district court may grant a
    motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence “only if more
    evidence supports the alternative verdict as opposed to the verdict
    rendered.” 
    Id.
     “The question for the court is . . . whether ‘a greater amount
    of credible evidence’ suggests the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of
    justice.” 
    Id.
     (quoting State v. Ellis, 
    578 N.W.2d 655
    , 658 (Iowa 1998)).
    We agree with the State that Ernst merely repackaged his
    sufficiency-of-the-evidence   challenge   into   a   weight-of-the-evidence
    challenge. Similar to his argument to the district court, Ernst fails to
    identify any specific evidence that preponderates so heavily in favor of
    acquittal that we can say the district court abused its discretion in denying
    his motion for a new trial. Ernst offered the testimony of his sister and his
    mother as alibi witnesses to refute the State’s evidence showing he was in
    the area of the attempted burglary. But that uncorroborated testimony
    16
    was not so credible to require the district court to overturn the jury’s
    verdict. Ernst’s sister’s trial testimony that Ernst visited her the morning
    of the attempted burglary was contradicted by her failure to tell the
    investigator Ernst was at her house that day when she was previously
    interviewed.    Ernst’s mother’s testimony was contrary to the timing of
    traffic photos showing Ernst returning to Dubuque alone around
    12:20 p.m. Both witnesses’ testimony was contrary to the surveillance
    video showing Ernst’s vehicle—and a person wearing clothing similar to
    what Ernst wore later in the day—drive toward the location of the
    attempted burglary at the time the alibi witnesses claimed Ernst was with
    them.
    On this record, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion
    in denying Ernst’s motion for a new trial on the basis his conviction is
    against the weight of the evidence.
    C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Finally, Ernst objects to the
    State’s introduction of evidence related to his cell phone records. The State
    elicited testimony from Investigator Grant about his use of cell tower
    records to create a map indicating the cell towers Ernst’s phone pinged
    when he received calls from his mother and whether the records and map
    indicated Ernst was near the attempted burglary site outside Cascade, his
    sister’s residence in Bernard, or his mother’s residence in Epworth. The
    State also introduced phone records identifying the two calls Ernst’s
    mother made to him at 11:44 a.m. and 11:48 a.m., during the time she
    testified he was with her.
    Since Ernst did not object to Investigator Grant’s testimony about
    cell tower data, the map he created from that data, or the cell phone
    records admitted at trial, he raises his claims through the ineffective
    assistance of counsel framework.           He argues his trial counsel was
    17
    ineffective for: (1) failing to object to the admission of testimony and the
    accompanying map relying on historical cell site data from a witness not
    qualified as an expert and (2) failing to object to the admission of cell phone
    records as hearsay not fitting an exception.
    We recently considered a similar challenge to an officer’s testimony
    about the defendant’s general location based on a map created from cell
    tower records, concluding that “the line between lay and expert testimony
    involving historical cell site data [depends] on the underlying information
    supporting the testimony.” State v. Boothby, 
    951 N.W.2d 859
    , 876, (Iowa
    2020) (adopting the approach of the growing majority of jurisdictions).
    Here, the State does not argue the testimony did not require an expert
    witness, instead arguing only that Investigator Grant could likely meet the
    expert requirements on a more fully developed record. Given the state of
    the current record and the fact that the parties did not have the benefit of
    our Boothby opinion, we conclude that Ernst’s ineffective assistance
    claims are better left for postconviction-relief proceedings. See State v.
    Harrison, 
    914 N.W.2d 178
    , 208–09 (Iowa 2018) (preserving claims for
    postconviction-relief proceedings “so an adequate record of the claim can
    be developed and the attorney charged with providing ineffective
    assistance may have an opportunity to respond to defendant’s claims”
    (quoting State v. Soboroff, 
    798 N.W.2d 1
    , 8 (Iowa 2011))).
    III. Conclusion.
    Ernst’s conviction for attempted burglary is affirmed.
    DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF
    CONVICTION AFFIRMED.
    All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially.
    18
    #18–1623, State v. Ernst
    APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).
    The court diligently examines the evidence in a light most favorable
    to the jury’s verdict. I write separately to emphasize that the approach of
    the court applies with equal force in civil contexts such as tort or
    employment cases. For example, the notion that specific intent is rarely
    shown by direct evidence is equally true in both criminal and civil settings.
    The same may be said about the court’s approach to “stacking of
    inferences.” At some point, of course, inferences become so remote or
    attenuated that they simply cannot be sustained.         But it is not mere
    stacking but the overall remoteness or attenuation that matters. In other
    words, what might be characterized as the stacking of reasonable
    inferences does not necessarily prevent a jury from reaching a verdict
    based upon them.
    Although I regard this case as a close one, I agree that, as explained
    by the majority, the inferences cumulatively provide sufficient evidence to
    permit the jury to return the verdict it did in this case.