Rosalinda Valles, Individually and on Behalf of F.L., Her Minor Child v. Andrew Mueting, Joseph Liewer, Northwest Iowa Emergency Physicians, P.C., Amy Wingert and Kelly Ryder ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 19–1066
    Submitted December 15, 2020—Filed March 19, 2021
    ROSALINDA VALLES, Individually and on Behalf of F.L., Her Minor
    Child,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    ANDREW MUETING, JOSEPH LIEWER, NORTHWEST IOWA
    EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, P.C., AMY WINGERT, and KELLY RYDER,
    Appellees.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey L.
    Poulson, Judge.
    The mother of an injured child appeals summary judgment rulings
    dismissing her medical malpractice negligence action against two
    physicians and barring the recovery of certain damages as well as various
    court rulings during trial in which the jury rendered a verdict in favor of
    other defendants. APPEAL DISMISSED.
    Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
    Waterman, Mansfield, McDonald, and McDermott, JJ., joined. Appel, J.,
    filed a dissenting opinion. Oxley, J., took no part in the consideration or
    decision of the case.
    Jim Leventhal, Bruce L. Braley (argued), Brian N. Aleinikoff and
    Benjamin I. Sachs of Leventhal Puga Braley, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for
    appellant.
    2
    Nancy J. Penner (argued) of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, Cedar Rapids;
    John C. Gray and Jeff W. Wright of Heidman Law Firm, L.L.P., Sioux City;
    Kevin J. Kuhn of Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell, LLP, Denver, Colorado; and
    Christine L. Conover and Carrie L. Thompson of Simmons, Perrine,
    Moyer & Bergman, PLC, Cedar Rapids, for appellees Mueting, Liewer, and
    Northwest Iowa Emergency Physicians, P.C.
    William R. Settles (argued), Patrick G. Vipond, and Sarah M.
    Dempsey of Lamson Dugan & Murray LLP, Omaha, Nebraska, for
    appellees Wingert and Ryder.
    3
    CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice.
    A mother whose son developed severe, disabling injuries from
    bacterial meningitis brought an action for medical negligence against the
    physicians who treated her son and their employers. Various defendants
    entered settlement agreements with the mother and a few others were
    dismissed on summary judgment prior to trial. Two physicians and an
    employer of one of those physicians went to trial. A jury issued a verdict
    in their favor, finding the remaining physicians were not negligent.
    The mother appealed and presents several issues on appeal.         In
    addition to contesting these issues on the merits, the defendants maintain
    the appeal is untimely and should be dismissed under Iowa Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 6.101(1)(b) because the mother failed to timely file her
    notice of appeal. Upon our review, we conclude the appeal is untimely.
    Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal and must dismiss it.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    On April 3, 2015, Rosalinda Valles took her eleven-year-old son,
    F.L., to the emergency room at Mercy Medical Center-Sioux City (Mercy)
    because he had a fever, cough, and chills. F.L. returned to the emergency
    room two days later, on April 5, where he presented with similar
    complaints. By this time, the results of F.L.’s April 3 nasal swab were
    available and showed F.L. was positive for Influenza B. F.L. was admitted
    to the hospital for further observation, and he remained hospitalized in
    this unit until his condition deteriorated on April 8.
    On April 8, F.L. became unresponsive to verbal stimuli and was
    transferred to the intensive care unit, where a physician performed a
    lumbar puncture.     When F.L.’s lumbar puncture revealed an “elevated
    white count and decreased glucose concentration, [and] presence of
    Bandemia was indicated at 49%,” F.L. was transported by airlift at
    4
    9:40 a.m. to the pediatric intensive care unit at the Children’s Hospital
    and Medical Center in Omaha, Nebraska.                   F.L. was admitted with
    “meningitis/bacteremia.” F.L. continues to suffer severe and debilitating
    injuries and will for the remainder of his life.
    On January 28, 2016, Valles, individually and on behalf of her minor
    son, F.L., filed this lawsuit. Valles amended her petition a number of
    times. In the final petition, Valles sued Mercy and the following physicians
    for medical negligence and parental loss of consortium: Jaime Dodge, Leah
    Johnson, Joseph Liewer, Thomas Morgan, Andrew Mueting, Jesse
    Nieuwenhuis, Rex Rundquist, Kelly Ryder, Said Hasib Sana, Aruntha
    Swampillai, and Amy Wingert.           She also asserted direct and vicarious
    liability claims against Mercy; Northwest Iowa Emergency Physicians,
    P.C.; Siouxland Medical Education Foundation; and Prairie Pediatrics &
    Adolescent Clinic, P.C., doing business as Prairie Pediatrics, P.C. Between
    the filing of this lawsuit on January 28 and the commencement of trial on
    October 30, 2018, there were numerous motions, pretrial hearings,
    amended petitions, and settlements. The only remaining claims by the
    time of trial were those against Dr. Liewer, Dr. Mueting, and Northwest
    Iowa Emergency Physicians, P.C. (Defendants).1
    The jury trial commenced on October 30 and spanned several weeks.
    On November 21, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants, finding
    they were not negligent.        Since then, Valles has filed various motions,
    dismissals, requests, and appeals.            We discuss those relevant to this
    appeal.
    After trial, Valles filed a motion to extend the time for posttrial
    filings, which the district court granted on December 6 to extend the
    1Northwest   Iowa Emergency Physicians, P.C. is Dr. Liewer’s employer.
    5
    deadlines for filing bills of exceptions and posttrial motions until
    December 21. On December 20, Valles filed a motion for entry of order
    nunc pro tunc asking the district court to amend its November 21 order of
    judgment to identify specifically the defendants who were exonerated by
    the jury as opposed to settling defendants who were also in the case
    caption.    On January 25, 2019, the district court entered an order
    amending the judgment to make this clarification.
    On December 20, 2018, Valles also filed her first notice of appeal in
    our court
    from the order and judgment entered in this case on the 21st
    day of November, 2018, from the “Enlarged Finding on
    Plaintiff’s Motion for Directed Verdict on Comparative
    Negligence of Mercy Nurses” which was later filed in this case
    on the 5th day of December, 2018, and from all adverse rulings
    and orders inhering therein.
    Valles’s notice explained that she did
    not believe that this case is ripe for an appeal because
    stipulations and orders of dismissal have not yet been entered
    with respect to several of the settling defendants . . . .
    Therefore, the order and judgment entered on the 21st day of
    November, 2018, was not actually dispositive of the entire
    case. In an abundance of caution, however, Plaintiff files this
    protective notice of appeal.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Before we entered any rulings on Valles’s first notice of appeal,
    Valles filed a bill of exceptions in the district court on December 21, which
    Defendants resisted. The district court issued its order denying this bill
    on January 25, 2019, explaining it no longer possessed jurisdiction to
    address Valles’s request because Valles had filed her notice of appeal the
    day before filing her bill of exceptions.
    We entered an order on February 5, requiring Valles to “file a
    statement concerning whether this court has jurisdiction” to hear that
    6
    appeal and welcoming responses from Defendants. In response, Valles
    asked us to dismiss that appeal without prejudice and stated it “should
    not be considered an application for interlocutory review.” Defendants did
    not resist dismissal of the appeal, but they maintained there was no
    authority for dismissal without prejudice and “reserve[d] all argument and
    positions in any subsequent appeal . . . , including as to its timeliness.”
    On March 14, we issued an order treating Valles’s first notice of appeal as
    an application for interlocutory appeal, which we denied.        Procedendo
    issued on April 10.
    On April 15, Valles filed a dismissal of settling defendant Mercy in
    district court.    On April 30, she dismissed the remaining settling
    defendants. On May 28, Valles filed a motion requesting an order entering
    final judgment, noting the district court had entered judgment in favor of
    Dr. Liewer, Dr. Mueting, and Northwest Iowa Emergency Physicians, P.C.,
    and all other defendants had been otherwise dismissed from the case. The
    district court entered Valles’s proposed order the next day. Valles filed her
    second notice of appeal on June 24, and we retained the appeal. The only
    defendants who are parties to this appeal are the three defendants who
    went to trial, Dr. Liewer, Dr. Mueting, and Northwest Iowa Emergency
    Physicians, P.C., and two defendants who were dismissed by summary
    judgment prior to trial, Dr. Ryder and Dr. Wingert.
    II. Jurisdiction.
    We must deal with a threshold matter before addressing any of
    Valles’s claims on appeal, as all defendants on appeal contend Valles’s
    appeal is untimely. If they are correct, we lack jurisdiction to consider
    Valles’s appeal.   See Milks v. Iowa Oto-Head & Neck Specialist, P.C.,
    
    519 N.W.2d 801
    , 803 (Iowa 1994) (“The timeliness of a notice of appeal is
    mandatory and jurisdictional . . . .”). “[W]ant of jurisdiction of the subject
    7
    matter may be taken advantage of at any stage of the proceedings” and
    “need not be pled.” Lloyd v. State, 
    251 N.W.2d 551
    , 556 (Iowa 1977).
    All defendants on appeal maintain we have no jurisdiction to
    consider Valles’s appeal of the district court’s summary judgment rulings
    pertaining to them and challenges to the district court’s decisions during
    trial because the appeal is untimely. They contend the district court’s
    November 21, 2018 judgment in favor of Defendants following the jury’s
    November 21 verdict was the final, appealable order pertaining to them,
    and Valles failed to file a proper notice of appeal within thirty days of that
    judgment.    Alternatively, they contend that Valles’s April 30, 2019,
    voluntary dismissal of the remaining settling defendants triggered the
    thirty-day appeal deadline because it eliminated the only remaining
    defendants from the case. Again, they contend that Valles failed to file a
    timely notice of appeal after April 30.
    Under our appellate rules of procedure, “[a] notice of appeal must be
    filed within 30 days after the filing of the final order or judgment.” Iowa R.
    App. P. 6.101(1)(b).
    A final judgment or decision is one that finally
    adjudicates the rights of the parties. It must put it beyond the
    power of the court which made it to place the parties in their
    original position. A ruling or order is interlocutory if it is not
    finally decisive of the case.
    In re M.W., 
    894 N.W.2d 526
    , 532 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Johnson v. Iowa
    State Highway Comm’n, 
    257 Iowa 810
    , 812, 
    134 N.W.2d 916
    , 918 (1965)).
    In cases like this involving partial determinations made by a district court,
    rule 6.101(1)(d) provides the following additional means of appeal:
    A final order dismissing some, but not all, of the parties or
    disposing of some, but not all, of the issues in an action may
    be appealed within the time for appealing from the judgment
    that finally disposes of all remaining parties and issues to an
    action, even if the parties’ interests or the issues are severable.
    8
    Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(d).
    This rule promotes the “long followed . . . general policy against
    piecemeal appeals.” In re T.R., 
    705 N.W.2d 6
    , 10 (Iowa 2005); cf. Ahls v.
    Sherwood/Div. of Harsco Corp., 
    473 N.W.2d 619
    , 623 (Iowa 1991)
    (“Recognition of finality here, moreover, will not offend our policy against
    piecemeal appeals because there are no remaining issues to be tried or
    appealed.”). Here, the district court’s summary judgment rulings in favor
    of Dr. Ryder and Dr. Wingert and its entry of judgment in the remaining
    Defendants’ favor following trial only disposed of some, but not all, of the
    issues because other defendants remained in the action pending probate
    court approval of their proposed settlements with Valles.         The issues
    pertaining to the defendants in this appeal are severable from the interests
    of the settling defendants, so Valles had the option to pursue an
    interlocutory appeal or wait until the final disposition of the case with
    respect to all issues and parties. See Est. of Countryman v. Farmers Coop.
    Ass’n, 
    679 N.W.2d 598
    , 601 (Iowa 2004).         Consequently, Valles’s first
    notice of appeal following the November 21, 2018 entry of judgment was
    an interlocutory appeal so long as other parties remained in the case. See
    
    id. at 602
     (“In this case, the key event [in determining finality] is the date
    the last remaining claim against a party was dismissed.”); IBP, Inc. v. Al-
    Gharib, 
    604 N.W.2d 621
    , 627 (Iowa 2000) (“[A] ruling is interlocutory if it
    is not finally decisive of the case.” (quoting Recker v. Gustafson,
    
    271 N.W.2d 738
    , 739 (Iowa 1978))).
    After we denied Valles’s application for interlocutory appeal from the
    November 21 judgment, Valles filed a dismissal of settling defendant Mercy
    on April 15, 2019, and a dismissal of the remaining settling defendants on
    April 30. Then, on May 28, Valles filed a motion in district court requesting
    an order entering final judgment, noting the district court had entered
    9
    judgment in favor of Defendants and all other defendants had been
    dismissed from the case. The district court entered Valles’s proposed order
    the next day, May 29, and Valles filed her notice of appeal on June 24—
    fifty-five days after she dismissed the final settling defendants but within
    thirty days of the May 29 district court order. Ultimately, the issue of
    whether the April 30 dismissal or May 29 order constitutes the dispositive
    date of finality for appeal purposes hinges on whether the April 30
    dismissal was self-executing or whether Valles needed court approval to
    dismiss the remaining parties. Est. of Countryman, 
    679 N.W.2d at 601
    .
    Under rule 1.943 of our rules of civil procedure,
    [a] party may, without order of court, dismiss that party’s own
    petition, counterclaim, cross-claim, cross-petition or petition
    of intervention, at any time up until ten days before the trial
    is scheduled to begin.
    Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943. There was no trial date set for the remaining parties,
    so Valles had the absolute right to dismiss the settling defendants when
    she did without court approval. Thus, her April 30 dismissal was self-
    executing and marked the date of finality for appeal purposes.
    Nothing remained pending in this case after Valles dismissed the
    last of the remaining defendants on April 30. Yet, Valles waited until
    June 24—fifty-five days—to file her notice of appeal. Because Valles failed
    to file her notice of appeal within thirty days of the resolution of the last
    remaining issues before the district court, her appeal is untimely. See
    Robinson v. Safeway Ins., No. 1–09–0361, 
    2011 WL 9673430
    , at *5
    (Ill. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2011) (“[I]t is well established that when a plaintiff
    voluntarily dismisses the remaining counts of a complaint, all previously
    entered orders disposing of other counts in that complaint become
    immediately final and appealable.”); Denham v. City of New Carlisle,
    
    716 N.E.2d 184
    , 187 (Ohio 1999) (“[W]e hold that a trial court’s decision
    10
    granting summary judgment based on immunity for one of several
    defendants in a civil action becomes a final appealable order when the
    plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the remaining parties to the suit pursuant
    to [the rule governing voluntary dismissal of the remaining parties to the
    suit].”); 15A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
    § 3914, at 487–88 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the concept of cumulative
    finality); cf. Christ’s Legacy Church v. Trinity Grp. Architects, Inc.,
    
    417 P.3d 1223
    , 1226 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018) (“Indeed, if some claims (or
    parties) are not adjudicated in an interlocutory, partial summary judgment
    ruling, a voluntary dismissal of the remaining claims (or parties) is
    sufficient to render the partial summary judgment ruling final and
    reviewable, and the filing of the dismissal triggers the commencement of
    appeal time.”). Valles cannot rely on her May 28 motion requesting the
    district court enter a superfluous order of final judgment dismissing
    defendants who had already been dismissed to sidestep our appellate
    deadline.
    The dissent argues that that when Valles filed her April 30 dismissal
    of the remaining defendants under rule 1.943, it was not self-executing
    because it was not filed “at any time up until ten days before the trial is
    scheduled to begin.”    We do not believe this reading of rule 1.943 is
    plausible. A trial had occurred, but it did not involve these defendants.
    Thus, the dismissal was filed “at any time up until ten days before the trial
    is scheduled to begin” as to these defendants. Notably, Valles herself did
    not believe she needed court permission to dismiss these defendants.
    What she filed on April 30 was a unilateral “Dismiss with Prejudice” that
    did not ask for court approval. For the aforementioned reasons, we lack
    the jurisdiction to consider Valles’s untimely appeal and affirm the
    judgment of the district court.
    11
    III. Conclusion.
    For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal.
    APPEAL DISMISSED.
    Mansfield, Waterman, McDonald, and McDermott, JJ., join this
    opinion. Appel, J., files a dissenting opinion. Oxley, J., takes no part.
    12
    #19–1066, Valles v. Mueting
    APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
    I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority misinterprets the
    text of the relevant rule, fails to recognize its underlying purpose, and
    comes up with unpersuasive policy reasons to rewrite the text and
    reformulate the underlying policy.
    The live wire jurisdictional issue in this case is whether the filing of
    the voluntary motions to dismiss on April 30, 2019, were self-executing or
    whether they required judicial approval before becoming final.          If the
    voluntary dismissals were self-executing, the plaintiff’s appeal on June 28
    fifty-five days later would be time-barred.       If, however, the voluntary
    dismissals required leave of court, the appeal would be timely.
    At early common law, a plaintiff, in some instances, could take a
    nonsuit even after a verdict if the plaintiff “did not like his damages.” Note,
    The Right of a Plaintiff to Take a Voluntary Nonsuit or to Dismiss His Action
    Without Prejudice, 
    37 Va. L. Rev. 969
    , 970 (1951) [hereinafter Lipkin,
    Voluntary Nonsuit]. This regime provided the plaintiff with an advantage
    as the plaintiff could continue suing until he was satisfied with the damage
    recovery. 
    Id.
     Later, the common law limited voluntary dismissals to the
    period prior to a verdict. 
    Id.
     Modern statutes and rules have been put in
    place to regulate a plaintiff’s ability to engage in voluntary dismissals of
    lawsuits. 
    Id.
    The relevant rule is Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943. That rule
    provides, in relevant part: “[a] party may, without order of court, dismiss
    that party’s own petition . . . at any time up until ten days before the trial
    is scheduled to begin. Thereafter a party may dismiss an action . . . only
    by [leave] of the court.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    13
    A   trial   in   this   matter   occurred   with   a   jury   verdict   on
    November 21, 2018. Prior to trial, however, the plaintiffs had reached a
    settlement with some defendants that was subject to approval in probate
    court. On December 20, the plaintiffs filed a motion with the district court
    requesting that an order be entered declaring that the jury’s verdict was
    only a final judgment as to the nonsettling defendants but not a judgment
    in favor of the settling defendants. On January 24, 2019, the nonsettling
    defendants responded that they did not object to the entry of an order
    making the clarification. On January 25, the district court entered the
    requested order making clear that the jury’s verdict was not a final
    judgment against the settling defendants.
    Ultimately, Valles was able to complete the settlements.                On
    April 15, Valles filed a motion to dismiss Mercy Health Services–Iowa,
    Corporation. On April 30, Valles dismissed the remaining parties.
    On May 28, Valles asked the district court to enter a final order and
    judgment in the case.         On May 29, the district court complied.         On
    June 24, a notice of appeal was filed.
    The critical issue in this case is whether the voluntary dismissals
    filed on April 15 and April 30 were self-executing. In other words, did the
    dismissals take immediate effect and constitute a final judgment upon
    their filing with the clerk of court without the need for judicial approval. If
    they were self-executing, the plaintiff’s notice of appeal on June 24 was
    outside the thirty-day window, and this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the
    cause. If the voluntary dismissals were not self-executing, and judicial
    action was required before they became effective, the June 24 notice of
    appeal would be timely.
    The general rule is clear enough. A voluntary dismissal filed more
    than ten days before trial is self-executing and becomes final on the day it
    14
    is filed. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943. A voluntary dismissal filed within “ten days
    before the trial is scheduled to begin” is not self-executing and requires
    approval by the court. 
    Id.
     The rule goes on to state that “[t]hereafter,”
    leave of court is required for voluntary dismissals. 
    Id.
    The language “up until ten days before the trial is scheduled,” when
    coupled with the “thereafter” clause, establishes a finish line, not a
    goalpost. Were the voluntary dismissals filed within the rule’s deadline in
    this case prior to the middle of November 2018, they would be self-
    executing final dismissals and not require further court action.
    The “up until ten days” language creates a window of opportunity
    for a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the claim without prejudice.      The
    window opens with the filing of the complaint, and it closes ten days prior
    to a scheduled trial. Under the rule, the window for voluntary dismissals
    does not open again. But under the majority view, there is the opening of
    a second window not contained in the rule.
    Aside from the lack of textual support for the second window, it
    makes sense for the district court to retain jurisdiction over the matter.
    Historically, the purpose of regulating nonsuits was to prevent plaintiffs
    from engaging in late dismissals. Lipkin, Voluntary Nonsuit, 37 Va. L. Rev.
    at 970. The modern regulations were thus tailored to prevent the result
    advocated by the majority, namely, unregulated voluntary dismissal by the
    plaintiff after trial. Id. In addition, one purpose of maintaining judicial
    control over late filed dismissals is to allow the district court to consider
    whether to insist that dismissal is made with prejudice or to assess costs
    and fees against a party for engaging in unnecessary and prolonged
    litigation.   See Manshack v. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 
    915 F.2d 172
    , 174
    (5th Cir. 1990) (construing parallel provisions of Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 41(a)(2)); see also 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
    15
    Federal Practice and Procedure § 2364, at 556 (4th ed. 2020) (stating the
    purpose of rule 41(a)(2) is “to prevent voluntary dismissals which unfairly
    affect the other side, and to permit the imposition of curative conditions”)
    (quoting    Alamance   Indus.,   Inc.   v.   Filene’s,   
    291 F.2d 142
    ,   146
    (1st Cir. 1961)).
    The majority seeks to enlist in support of its position the doctrine of
    pragmatic finality.    But the leading pragmatic finality case cuts dead
    against the majority position. As will be seen, the doctrine of pragmatic
    finality is an ad hoc exception to the ordinary finality rule designed to
    encourage consideration of appeals on the merits. It cannot be used to
    defeat Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943 or our ordinary approach to
    finality.
    The seminal case of pragmatic finality cited by the majority is Ahls
    v. Sherwood/Division of Harsco Corp., 
    473 N.W.2d 619
     (Iowa 1991). In
    Ahls, one party was dismissed early in the litigation for want of personal
    jurisdiction on December 23, 1987. 
    Id.
     at 620–21. The remaining parties
    then settled on October 3, 1989, the day set for trial. 
    Id. at 621
    . On the
    same day, the district court entered an order which noted the settlements
    and assessed a late penalty. 
    Id.
     Dismissal documents implementing the
    settlement were filed on November 15.          
    Id.
     On November 27, a party
    sought to appeal the district court’s December 28 dismissal order. 
    Id. at 621, 624
    .
    The fighting issues in Ahls was whether the litigation were twofold.
    First, was the October 3 order acknowledging that the case had been
    settled a final order. 
    Id.
     at 621–22. Second, were the dismissal documents
    filed by the parties on November 15 a final order for purposes of appeal.
    
    Id.
     at 622–23.
    16
    The Ahls court dispatched the first claim quickly, noting that
    although the district court’s order announced the settlement, it did not
    amount to a final order of the court. 
    Id. at 622
    . The court then turned to
    whether the filing of the November 15 dismissals by the parties was a final,
    and therefore appealable, order. 
    Id.
    The Ahls court said no. 
    Id.
     The Ahls court noted that that the filing
    of the voluntary dismissals “was not an action by the court at all.” 
    Id.
    Quoting a federal district court case, the Ahls court declared that “[t]he
    distinction is obvious between a final decree and a stipulation upon which
    such a decree may be entered.” 
    Id.
     (alteration in original) (quoting Roemer
    v. Neumann, 
    26 F. 332
    , 334 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886)). The court went on to
    emphasize that “while [the] case was fully concluded, there was no formal
    order which may be considered a final order for purposes of appeal.” 
    Id.
    The pronouncement in Ahls is completely consistent with the position of
    the plaintiffs in this case.
    But that was not the end of the Ahls matter. The Ahls court then
    considered the doctrine of pragmatic finality that had been applied in
    federal courts.   
    Id. at 623
    .   Quoting Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
    
    809 F.2d 548
    , 554 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ahls court noted that a court “may
    treat an interlocutory order as a final order when that portion of the case
    that remained in the district court has subsequently been terminated.”
    Ahls, 
    473 N.W.2d at 623
    .
    The Ahls court noted that “there are problems inherent in
    recognizing ad hoc exceptions to our finality rule.” 
    Id.
     The Ahls court
    quoted a dissent in a federal case which stated:
    [T]he newly created exception to finality replaces with large
    elements of uncertain administration the previously certain
    and efficient rule of finality . . . The need for clear and easily
    administered rules as to the threshold adjective issue of
    17
    reviewability overrides any values of flexible case-by-case
    administration.
    
    Id.
     (quoting    Newpark Shipbuilding       & Repair,    Inc., v.   Roundtree,
    
    698 F.2d 743
    , 757 (5th Cir. 1983) (Tate, J., dissenting)).
    Thus, the Ahls court was not overturning the general rule that a
    court order was required for a final order. Instead, it permitted an ad hoc
    exception to permit appeal of an interlocutory order in the interest of
    fairness to the parties. In this case, the majority turns the shield of the
    ad hoc exception designed to promote fairness to the parties and permit
    resolution of a case on the merits into a sword that eviscerates the ordinary
    rule.
    The majority then cites a couple of authorities for the proposition
    that when a voluntary dismissal occurs for all remaining parties, prior
    interlocutory appeals become final.        See Robinson v. Safeway Ins.,
    No. 1–09–0361, 
    2011 WL 9673430
    , at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 2, 2011);
    Denham v. City of New Carlisle, 
    716 N.E.2d 184
    , 187 (Ohio 1999); Christ’s
    Legacy Church v. Trinity Grp. Architects, Inc., 
    417 P.3d 1223
    , 1226 (Okla.
    Civ. App. 2018). It is blackletter law that once voluntary dismissals are
    final, the prior interlocutory orders in a case also become final. But the
    majority has not cited—and I have not found any—passage in these cases
    that considers the question of when a voluntary settlement is self-
    executing or when it requires judicial approval under a rule like Iowa Rule
    of Civil Procedure 1.943. These cases are the proverbial boxed canyon that
    lead nowhere on the issue at hand.
    The majority drives to its result by airbrushing language out of
    rule 1.943. The majority provides a partial block quote of the rule:
    [a] party may, without order of court, dismiss that party’s own
    petition, counterclaim, cross-claim, cross-petition or petition
    of intervention, at any time up until ten days before the trial
    is scheduled to begin.
    18
    The majority, however, does not present the relevant part of the next
    important sentence of the rule. Here is the text of the rule with the omitted
    passage restored:
    [a] party may, without order of court, dismiss that party’s own
    petition, counterclaim, cross-claim, cross-petition or petition
    of intervention, at any time up until ten days before the trial
    is scheduled to begin. Thereafter a party may dismiss an
    action or that party’s claim therein only by consent of the court
    which may impose such terms or conditions as it deems proper.
    Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943 (emphasis added). The plaintiff’s dismissal occurred
    after the expiration of ten days prior to a “scheduled” trial.       And the
    plaintiff’s dismissal occurred “thereafter” the expiration of the ten-day
    period prior to a “scheduled” trial. If we were to follow the text of the
    “scheduled” clause and the “thereafter” clause, court approval would be
    required for the voluntary dismissals at issue here.
    The majority attempts to make hay out of the fact that the April 30
    dismissal did not expressly seek court approval. The majority chooses to
    read the plaintiff’s mind based on what was not said, ordinarily a dubious
    enterprise.   In any event, I see nothing in rule 1.943 that makes the
    requirement of the rule dependent on a party’s explicit ask.
    And, like its partial presentation of the text of the rule, the majority
    gives a partial history.   After the district court took no action on the
    April 30 voluntary dismissal, on May 28, the plaintiffs filed a motion
    requesting that the district court take appropriate action under rule 1.943.
    And the district court entered the requested order on May 29. If it was
    important to interpret what the plaintiff’s omission meant on April 30, it
    should be informed by what was said in the later filing.         In my view,
    however, the subjective inquiry adds nothing to the resolution of this case
    and in future cases will hopefully only be regarded as an odd observation
    19
    that does not establish a precedent for subjective interpretation of our
    rules of procedure.
    Because of the text of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943, the
    applicable underlying policies, and the applicable case law, I would hold
    that this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.