Julian Jay Toney v. Hazel Parker, Arthur Parker and the Arthur E. Parker and Hazel Frances Parker Trust Dated 05/26/1993 ( 2021 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–2121
Submitted March 24, 2021—Filed April 16, 2021
JULIAN JAY TONEY,
Appellant,
vs.
HAZEL PARKER, ARTHUR PARKER, and the ARTHUR E. PARKER
AND HAZEL FRANCES PARKER TRUST DATED 05/26/1993,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Decatur County, Dustria A.
Relph (motion to strike and motion for summary judgment) and John D.
Lloyd (motion to vacate), Judges.
The plaintiff appeals summary judgment and ruling denying motion
to vacate. REVERSED.
Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all
participating justices joined. McDermott, J., took no part in the
consideration or the decision of the case.
James C. Larew of Larew Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Daniel R. Rockhold, Corydon, for appellees.
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WATERMAN, Justice.
In this appeal, we must decide whether the district court abused its
discretion by striking the plaintiff’s resistance to a motion for summary
judgment. The plaintiff timely filed his resistance and supporting papers
on the last day of an extended deadline, but the clerk of court rejected the
filing the next morning because of a failure to redact the plaintiff’s own
social security number. The plaintiff corrected that oversight and refiled
150 pages of resistance papers within the hour, but the district court
granted the defendants’ motion to strike the entire filing as untimely and
noncompliant due to an unsigned memorandum; a miscaptioned response
to the defendants’ undisputed facts; and a separate resistance document
initially filed, then inadvertently omitted, then refiled promptly. The
district court simultaneously granted summary judgment dismissing the
plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the judgment,
arguing the judge failed to disclose possible grounds for recusal. A
different judge rejected the recusal argument, denied the motion to vacate,
and ultimately entered judgment for the defendants on their
counterclaims, relying in part on the summary judgment. We retained the
plaintiff’s appeal.
On our review, we conclude the resistance documents were timely
filed notwithstanding their technical shortcomings, and the district court
abused its discretion by striking the entire resistance filing without any
showing of prejudice or violation of a prior court order. That error requires
a new hearing on the summary judgment motion and a new trial. We
remand the case for further proceedings by a new judge, which renders
the recusal issue moot.
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I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Ruth Parker owned real estate in Decatur County commonly referred
to as the “Y” property. The Toney family rented this parcel of
approximately twenty-four acres from the Parker family beginning in the
1970s. The parties disagree as to whether the Toneys rented the land
continuously. In 1990, Ruth died and the land was conveyed to Ruth’s
son Arthur, commonly called “Ted,” and his wife, Hazel. Ted and Hazel
transferred the property into the Arthur E. Parker and Hazel Frances
Parker Trust (the Trust), which remains the record title holder of the
Y property.
Julian Toney and his wife, Anita, sent five letters to the Parkers
asking to sell them the Y property. One was undated, another was dated
March 25, 2003, followed by three more dated October 15, October 28,
and November 2, 2015, respectively. None of the letters mentioned an
“option to purchase” or a “life time offer.” In September 2015, Toney sent
a cashier’s check in the amount of $24,000 to the Parkers’ Trust for the
land and a warranty deed prepared for the trustee’s signature; the Parkers
did not accept the tender. Toney alleges the Parkers listed the Y property
for sale in September 2016.
On November 25, 2016, the Parkers filed a forcible entry and
detainer (FED) action in Decatur County and served notice on Toney. The
next business day, November 28, Toney recorded a “Life Time Lease” to the
Y property, allegedly executed in 1974, which stated:
Life time Lease
Rental Agreement – between Parker family and Toney family.
for the Y land 27 acres 3/4 mile north of Ruth parker’s house.
on east side of road. 4 acre and 3 acre of grass and hay field.
$200.00 year.
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also a 50/50 – timber agreement after 20 year log cut
50/50 share. 50% parker 50% toney – toney brush cut & trim
– 20 acres of timber.
also a right to purchase the 27 – Y – acres after 20 year f[ro]m
the Date June 22 1974. at $575 acre. – life time offer.
The document included the signature of Julian Toney as “Renter 50/50
pastures” and the purported signature of Arthur E. Parker as “Son and
Overseer of Ruth Parker.” Ted denies that he signed the lease. The parties
dispute whether Ted would have had the authority to sign on behalf of his
mother. The Parkers argue that Ted lacked such authority because his
mother was still alive and had not authorized him to act as her agent.
They also point to a real estate contract Ruth (not Ted on her behalf)
executed with another individual in 1975.
The district court dismissed the FED action on January 4, 2017,
finding that the Parkers had failed to comply with the notice requirement
for farm tenancies in Iowa Code section 562.7. On July 6, the Parkers
served Toney a notice that the farm tenancy would terminate on March 1,
2018. In February 2018, Toney’s attorney sent a lease-purchase option
and $15,525 to the Parkers’ attorney, who rejected the offer on April 4.
Notably, this was $8475 less than Toney’s offer in September 2015;
Toney’s explanation for the discrepancy was his friendship with Ted.
On February 28, 2018, the last day of Toney’s farm tenancy, Toney
filed a petition for declaratory judgment, specific performance, injunctive
relief, and attorney fees. Toney requested a temporary and permanent
injunction protecting him from the Parkers’ “efforts to seize ownership and
control of the Y farm,” a declaratory judgment that the lifetime lease gave
Toney the right to purchase the Y farm, and specific performance.
On May 7, the Parkers filed an answer with counterclaims for
slander of title, ejectment, trespass, quiet title, and punitive damages. The
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Parkers alleged that Ted’s signature on the lifetime lease was forged. The
Parkers’ trespass and ejection claims were based on Toney failing to vacate
the property on March 1 pursuant to their notice of termination.
After six months of contentious litigation, the Parkers filed a motion
for summary judgment to dismiss Toney’s claims as time-barred, and on
grounds that no enforceable lifetime lease existed. The Parkers also
sought summary judgment on their counterclaims. At Toney’s request,
the district court extended the deadline for the plaintiff’s resistance to
December 17.
On December 17, the paralegal for Toney’s attorney filed a 2-page
resistance, a 46-page memorandum in support of the resistance, a 25-
page response to defendants’ statement of facts and plaintiff’s statement
of facts, and a 79-page appendix that included affidavits and deposition
testimony and exhibits. At 8:37 a.m. the next day, the filings, totaling 152
pages, were rejected by the clerk of court because Toney’s social security
number was shown once on page 76 of his appendix. The paralegal
redacted the social security number and refiled the documents within
forty-five minutes. The paralegal who filed the documents stated in an
affidavit that it was his “belief, based on my usual and customary
practices, that I filed the Resistance document itself as a part of that filing.”
However, the resistance was missing from that 150-page refiling; the
paralegal attached the 2-page resistance to his affidavit filed on
December 21.
The Parkers filed a motion to strike on December 20, arguing that
the filings were untimely and deficient because the supporting
memorandum was unsigned, the resistance had been omitted, and a
statement of disputed facts was miscaptioned. On February 9, 2019, the
district court granted the Parkers’ motion to strike, noting the deadline
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had already been extended once at Toney’s request, and further stating
there was
no reasonable excuse for his multiple failures to abide by the
Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to timely file an actual
resistance, for failing to sign his memorandum of authorities,
or for failing to file a clear statement of disputed facts.
The district court simultaneously granted summary judgment in favor of
the Parkers dismissing Toney’s claim for breach of contract, denied Toney’s
requests for temporary and permanent injunctive relief and for declaratory
judgment, quieted title in the Parker Trust, ordered Toney to vacate the
property within thirty days, and assessed court costs against Toney.
The district court amended its order on March 6, holding that trial
was still necessary to adjudicate the Parkers’ counterclaim for slander of
title, and to determine actual damages on their counterclaims for trespass
and ejection, and punitive damages. The district court ruled that the
findings of fact in its February 9 order were deemed established along with
additional findings set forth in the March 6 order.
On May 15, the Parkers filed an application for rule to show cause,
alleging that Toney had failed to remove his cattle and placed a new sign
on the gate intended to “discourage potential buyers of the subject
property from purchasing the land.” The district court granted that
application the same day.
Six days later, Toney filed a motion to vacate the district court’s
February 9 and March 6 orders, on the grounds that Judge Relph had
failed to disclose that her husband, Daren Relph, was the CEO for Wayne
County Hospital (the Hospital), where the Parkers’ attorney, Daniel
Rockhold, had been elected to serve on the board of trustees in November
2018. Both parties filed a July 1, 2017 agreement between Mercy Health
Network, Inc. (Mercy) and the Hospital whereby Mercy would provide
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certain management services to the Hospital, including providing a full-
time Chief Executive Officer/Administrator (CEO) for the Hospital. The
agreement explains that the board and Mercy will jointly conduct
performance reviews and provide these to the CEO’s employer. If there is
a deficiency in the CEO’s performance, the board will notify Mercy. If the
deficiency is not cured, Mercy and the Hospital will “work cooperatively to
cure such deficiencies to Hospital Board’s reasonable satisfaction or, upon
mutual agreement of the parties, to provide a replacement CEO.” Under
the agreement, the board may request the CEO’s reassignment, with or
without cause. The CEO’s employer determines whether the CEO retains
employment after reassignment or replacement. The agreement further
provides that if the board requests that the CEO be reassigned, and the
CEO is terminated, the Hospital “shall reimburse the CEO’s employer for
any severance.”
Toney also filed minutes from board meetings between February 19,
2018 and April 15, 2019. Mr. Relph and Rockhold were present at several
meetings where Mr. Relph reported to the board as CEO. At two of these
meetings, there was a closed session, after which there was a vote to
approve Mr. Relph’s compensation, which passed unanimously both
times.
The Parkers resisted the motion to vacate, noting that Mr. Relph was
not employed by the Hospital but by Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI), that
Rockhold had served on the seven-member board since January 2018,
that Mercy recommended the CEO’s compensation subject to the board’s
approval, and that if the Hospital discontinued services with Mr. Relph,
this would not terminate his employment with CHI or Mercy. Judge Relph,
stating she did not believe there was any grounds for disqualification,
nevertheless recused herself from further proceedings.
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On August 6, Judge John Lloyd denied the motion to vacate, finding
there was no basis for disqualification because Mr. Relph was not an
employee of the Hospital, his lease to the hospital was “not terminable at
will by the Hospital,” and “[t]ermination without cause could entail
substantial financial cost to the Hospital.” The district court also noted
that Rockhold “is only one vote out of seven” and a majority of board
members would have to act to change Mr. Relph’s compensation while
“both actions to set Mr. Relph’s compensation that are disclosed on this
record were unanimous.”
The case proceeded to a bench trial on October 22. Judge Lloyd
presided. On November 18, the district court entered its findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment entry. The district court began by
referencing the prior summary judgment by Judge Relph that dismissed
all of Toney’s claims and quieted title in favor of the Parkers. The district
court then adjudicated the Parkers’ counterclaims and entered judgment
against Toney and in favor of the Parker Trust, awarding $62,100 for
slander of title, $500 for trespass, and $15,000 in punitive damages. The
district court found Toney in contempt for not removing his cattle and
signs from the Y property, and sentenced him to jail time and fines totaling
$1000. The district court suspended the issuance of mittimus on the
condition that within thirty days Toney install a fence or other temporary
measure to prevent his cattle from entering the Parkers’ property, remove
his signs from the Parkers’ property, and repair any damage resulting from
their removal.
Toney appealed, and we retained the case.
II. Standard of Review.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on the
procedural requirements for resisting a motion for summary judgment.
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See Bitner v. Ottumwa Cmty. Sch. Dist., 549 N.W.2d 295, 302 (Iowa 1996);
Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 281 n.2 (Iowa 1995)
(“We believe the trial court has discretion to consider on its merits a
summary judgment motion filed later than the deadline contained in rule
[1.981(3)].”). Orders dismissing claims as a sanction are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Krugman v. Palmer Coll. of Chiropractic, 422 N.W.2d
470, 473 (Iowa 1988).
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to vacate for
correction of errors at law. State ex rel. Goettsch v. Diacide Distribs., Inc.,
596 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 1999). “We review a judge’s recusal decision
for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015)
(quoting State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Iowa 2005)).
III. Analysis.
Toney argues that the district court erred in granting the motion to
strike his summary judgment resistance filings. The Parkers argue that
the district court properly granted their motion to strike because Toney’s
filings were untimely and noncompliant. We conclude the filings were
timely and substantially compliant and that the district court abused its
discretion by granting the motion to strike.
We addressed a similar timeliness issue in Jacobs v. Iowa
Department of Transportation, 887 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 2016). Jacobs’s
driver’s license had been revoked and suspended for failure to submit to
chemical testing. Id. at 591. Jacobs contended that he did not refuse
testing. Id. at 592. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the
revocation and suspension and the Iowa Department of Transportation
(DOT) affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Id. Jacobs sought judicial review, and
on the last day of the deadline Jacobs’s counsel electronically submitted a
petition for judicial review. Id. The next morning, the clerk of court sent
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Jacobs’s counsel a message that his petition had been “Returned Not
Filed” because it had been mislabeled and his address was missing. Id.
Counsel’s firm corrected the errors and resubmitted the petition on EDMS;
the clerk of court electronically file-stamped the petition that same
morning. Id. The DOT filed a motion to dismiss based on the untimeliness
of the petition. Id. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the
petition as untimely. Id. On our review, we held
[A] resubmitted filing can relate back to the original
submission date for purposes of meeting an appeal deadline
when the following circumstances converge. First, the party
submitted an electronic document that was received by EDMS
prior to the deadline and was otherwise proper except for
minor errors in the electronic cover sheet—i.e., errors that
could have been corrected or disregarded by the clerk.
Second, the proposed filing was returned by the clerk’s office
after the deadline because of these minor errors. Third, the
party promptly resubmitted the filing after correcting the
errors.
Id. at 599. 1 We noted that to hold differently
would give no effect to the language of the rule requiring the
filer to keep track of the date and time of the original
submission[,] . . . allow district court jurisdiction to be
dependent on how a clerk exercised his or her discretion[,] . . .
erode the clarity of existing deadlines to appeal to district
court[, and] it would provide no protection to the filer if the
original submission was returned erroneously or if the clerk’s
1Iowa Court Rule 16.201(5) defines “EDMS” as “the electronic document
management system, the Iowa Judicial Branch electronic filing and case management
system.” Upon filing,
[i]f the clerk of court discovers an error in the filing or docketing of a
document, the clerk will ordinarily notify the filer of the error and advise
the filer of what further action the filer must take, if any, to address the
error.
Id. r. 16.308(2)(d)(1). Alternatively, the clerk may “correct or disregard” minor errors. Id.
r. 16.308(2)(d)(3). If the clerk returns the submission to the filer, “it is the responsibility
of the filer to keep a record of the notice EDMS generated to verify the date and time of
the original submission.” Id. r. 16.308(d)(2). The rules state that they “are not intended
to address” the issue of whether the corrected filing relates back to the original
submission. Id. However, in Jacobs, we held that such a correction would relate back to
the original submission. 887 N.W.2d at 599.
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office took a long time to process and then ultimately return a
filing.
Id. (footnote omitted). Jacobs governs the timeliness issue here.
As in Jacobs, Toney’s documents were initially submitted within the
deadline. The error at page 76 of the appendix—Toney’s own unredacted
social security number, not that of a third party—could have and should
have been redacted by the clerk of court without rejecting the entire 152
pages filed in resistance to the motion for summary judgment. The clerk
of court rejected the filings after the deadline—the next morning. Toney’s
paralegal promptly refiled the documents after redacting the social
security number, and received a notification at 9:19 a.m. that his new 150-
page filing was accepted. Importantly, the deadline for resisting a motion
for summary judgment is not jurisdictional. See id. at 597. Under Jacobs,
we hold that Toney’s documents relate back to the original submission
date and were timely filed.
The other shortcomings in Toney’s filing did not justify striking the
submission. Toney’s 2-page resistance was included in the initial filing,
but omitted when the 150 pages of documents supporting Toney’s
resistance were refiled the next morning. The memorandum and related
filings made clear Toney resisted the motion for summary judgment. The
paralegal attached the resistance itself to his affidavit on December 21.
The paralegal testified therein as to his “belief, based on my usual and
customary practices, that I filed the Resistance document itself as a part
of that filing.” Omitting the resistance in the second submission was an
excusable error and promptly corrected. Counsel’s failure to sign the
memorandum was not fatal either. The district court or the clerk of court
should have simply directed counsel to remedy that oversight by signing
it. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.413(1) (“If a motion, pleading, or other paper is
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not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant.”).
Finally, the district court elevated form over substance by faulting
Toney for not using the caption “Statement of Disputed Facts.”2 Toney
captioned that document “Plaintiff-Counterclaim Defendant Julian
Toney’s Responses to Statements of Undisputed Facts Submitted by
Defendants-Counterclaimants and Plaintiff’s Statements of Fact.” In
Bouse v. Rouse, we recognized that “[t]he designation given a pleading is
not of vital importance. Its character is to be determined largely by its
allegations and legal effect, not solely from the name given it.” 174 N.W.2d
660, 665 (Iowa 1970) (quoting Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Linwood
Stone Prods. Co., 258 Iowa 1378, 1381, 138 N.W.2d 902, 903 (1965)). In
Schulte v. Mauer, we applied this rule to a mislabeled summary judgment
filing. 219 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 1974); see also Meier v. Senecaut, 641
N.W.2d 532, 539 (Iowa 2002) (“[W]e treat a motion by its contents, not its
caption.”). Toney’s filing specifically responded to each of the eighteen
paragraphs of the Parkers’ statement of facts, indicating which he
admitted or disputed, along with objections and explanations. He then set
forth his own seventy-five numbered paragraphs of facts, citing to the
record contained in an accompanying seventy-nine-page appendix
consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony, and exhibits. His filing made
2Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981(3) provides, “The resistance shall include a
statement of disputed facts, if any, and a memorandum of authorities supporting the
resistance.” The local rules for federal courts in Iowa provide more specificity, and require
a “response to the [movant’s] statement of material facts in which the resisting party
expressly admits, denies, or qualifies each of the moving party’s numbered statements of
fact” and a “statement of additional material facts that the resisting party contends
precludes summary judgment.” N.D. & S.D. Iowa Civ. LR. 56(b). We encourage litigants
in our state courts to follow that practice in order to help the district court more easily
determine whether any genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment.
Toney did so.
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clear what facts were disputed, including whether Ted Parker had signed
the “Life Time Lease” and whether he was authorized to do so by Ruth
Parker. Toney’s response satisfied Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981(3).
Toney had not violated a prior court order compelling an earlier
response or requiring corrections. Generally, we do not affirm the sanction
of dismissal without the violation of a prior court order. See Krugman, 422
N.W.2d at 473 (surveying cases and noting the “range of discretion is
narrowed” when the chosen sanction is dismissal of the action (quoting
Postma v. Sioux Ctr. News, 393 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1986))). Dismissal
is a drastic remedy. See id. The district court, by striking Toney’s
resistance filings and granting summary judgment, effectively imposed the
sanction of dismissal for technical shortcomings without any violation of
a prior court order.
Justice is not served by taking a heavy-handed approach to
violations of [summary judgment procedural] rules. . . .
Imposing Draconian sanctions for isolated rule violations,
however, does far more than simply punish[ ] the attorneys.
Rather, such an approach destroys the vital right of the, most
likely, innocent client to have her day in Court simply because
her attorney mistakenly violates a local procedural rule.
Anderson v. Bristol, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (S.D. Iowa 2013)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Nw. Bank & Tr. Co. v. First Ill. Nat’l
Bank, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004 (S.D. Iowa 2002), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 354 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2003)).
We recently reiterated that “there is a longstanding policy in our
state favoring the resolution of legal disputes on the merits” rather than
by default. No Boundry, LLC v. Hoosman, 953 N.W.2d 696, 699–700 (Iowa
2021). Moreover, “technical mistakes will not preclude an injured plaintiff
from recovery, except where the correction of such mistakes would
materially prejudice the rights of a defendant.” Patten v. City of Waterloo,
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260 N.W.2d 840, 841 (Iowa 1977). The Parkers filed their substantive
reply to the resistance on December 22. They cannot show prejudice.
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by granting
the Parkers’ motion to strike Toney’s resistance filings. See Bitner, 549
N.W.2d at 302 (reviewing rulings on the procedural requirements for
summary judgment for abuse of discretion). With Toney’s resistance
stricken, the district court simultaneously entered summary judgment
against him effectively by default. The case then proceeded to a bench
trial on the Parkers’ counterclaims with key liability issues summarily
decided against Toney. He did not get a fair day in court. We determine
that the remedy requires a new hearing on the Parkers’ motion for
summary judgment and a new bench trial on their counterclaims and any
remaining issues.
Because we vacate the challenged rulings, “we need not and do not
reach the question whether the district judge hearing the case should have
recused herself. Instead, we simply exercise our authority to order the
case to be heard by a different judge on remand.” Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d
at 20.
IV. Disposition.
For these reasons, we reverse the ruling striking Toney’s resistance
to the motion for summary judgment, and we vacate the resulting
summary judgment and bench trial judgment. We remand the case for a
new hearing on the Parkers’ summary judgment motion and a new trial on
their counterclaims. The proceedings on remand shall be heard by a
different judge.
REVERSED.
All justices concur except McDermott, J., who takes no part.