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2019-06

Alex Wayne Westra v. Iowa Department of Transportation , 929 N.W.2d 754 ( 2019 )

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               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 18–1050
Filed June 14, 2019
ALEX WAYNE WESTRA,
Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E.
Gamble, Judge.
A motorist appeals a district court ruling denying his petition for
judicial review of an agency decision suspending his driver’s license for
one year. AFFIRMED.
Matthew T. Lindholm of Gourley, Rehkemper, & Lindholm, P.L.C.,
West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Robin G. Formaker,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
2
MANSFIELD, Justice.
This case began when a driver tried to reverse course.          But it
presents the question whether our court should reverse course.
Specifically, should we overrule precedent and apply the exclusionary rule
to driver’s license revocation proceedings when an Iowa statute dictates
otherwise?
In Westendorf v. Iowa Department of Transportation,

400 N.W.2d 553

, 557 (Iowa 1987), superseded by statute as recognized by
Brownsberger v. Department of Transportation,

460 N.W.2d 449

, 450–51
(Iowa 1990), we declined to apply the exclusionary rule so long as the
enumerated statutory conditions for license revocation were met. Later,
the general assembly enacted a limited exception to Westendorf. See Iowa
Code § 321J.13(6) (2017).       This requires the Iowa Department of
Transportation (DOT) to rescind revocation of a driver’s license if there has
been a criminal prosecution for operating while intoxicated (OWI) and the
criminal case determined that the peace officer did not have reasonable
grounds to believe a violation of the OWI laws had occurred or that the
chemical test was otherwise inadmissible or invalid.       We affirmed the
limited nature of that exception in Manders v. Iowa Department of
Transportation,

454 N.W.2d 364

, 366–67 (Iowa 1990).
In the present case, a driver was pulled over by a DOT officer after
he stopped on I-80 to make unauthorized use of a median crossover in
order to turn around and head in the other direction. It turned out he had
an open container in his car and smelled of an alcoholic beverage. After
he refused all testing, his license was suspended for one year, but he was
never charged with OWI.       Adhering to our Westendorf and Manders
precedents, the DOT upheld his license suspension. Notably, the driver’s
only challenge to the stop was that the DOT officer lacked statutory
3
authority; the driver did not contest reasonable suspicion for the stop. The
district court also denied relief, leading to this appeal.
We are now asked, in effect, to expand the legislature’s post-
Westendorf statutory exception and apply the exclusionary rule to all
driver’s license revocation proceedings if there was any problem with the
stop. For the reasons discussed herein, we decline to do so and instead
adhere to the legislative boundaries of the exception when the only legal
flaw in the stop was the officer’s lack of statutory authority. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the district court upholding the license
revocation in this case.
I. Facts and Procedural History.
On May 9, 2017, at approximately 12:26 a.m., Officer Austin Wilson
of the DOT was patrolling westbound on I-80, a four-lane divided interstate
highway, in Jasper County.       At a location where there was a median
crossover marked for use by authorized vehicles only, Officer Wilson
observed an eastbound vehicle coming to a stop. It appeared the driver
was preparing to use the crossover, turn around, and head westbound.
Officer Wilson took the crossover himself and when the driver of the
eastbound vehicle decided to keep going eastbound on I-80, Officer Wilson
pulled it over using his overhead lights.
The driver of the vehicle, Alex Westra, admitted he had been about
to make a turnaround using the median crossing and knew it was a bad
idea. Officer Wilson noticed that Westra had bloodshot and watery eyes
and saw an open container of Four Loko (an alcoholic beverage) within
arm’s reach. Westra initially denied knowing there was a beverage can in
his vehicle. He refused to hand over the beverage can and refused to step
out of his vehicle.
4
When a backup officer arrived, Officer Wilson removed Westra from
his vehicle. Officer Wilson could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage
coming from Westra’s person. In addition, on inspection, the can of Four
Loko had only one-quarter of its contents remaining.
Westra declined to undergo any preliminary testing for intoxication.
Officer Wilson escorted Westra to the Jasper County jail where Westra was
read the implied consent advisory and made two phone calls. Westra then
refused to take the Datamaster chemical test.
Westra was never charged with OWI but was charged with two traffic
violations—stopping on a travelled portion of I-80 in violation of Iowa Code
section 321.354 and driving with an open container of an alcoholic
beverage in violation of section 321.284. Westra filed a motion to suppress
in the traffic case, contending that Officer Wilson of the DOT lacked
statutory authority to stop him on May 9 on I-80. See Rilea v. Iowa Dep’t
of Transp.,

919 N.W.2d 380

, 383 (Iowa 2018). The motion was overruled,
and Westra was found guilty and sentenced to pay fines of $100 and $200
respectively for the two violations. Westra appealed to the district court,
however, which found that the DOT stop was invalid and dismissed the
two citations.
Meanwhile, the DOT notified Westra that his driver’s license was
being revoked for one year under Iowa Code section 321J.9.          Westra
requested an administrative hearing, and on July 11 he received a
telephonic hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The issue at
the hearing was whether DOT Officer Wilson had statutory authority to
stop Westra’s vehicle. The ALJ entered a decision on August 15 finding
that he did. The ALJ reasoned that “Officer Wilson was operating within
his authority as a designated peace officer under [section] 321J.8(3)”
relating to enforcement of OWI laws. As the ALJ explained,
5
Although he could not have been assured that the driver of
the pickup he observed that night was impaired by alcohol or
other substances, he did see it was being operated in an
erratic or illegal manner which can be a part of a finding of
reasonable grounds for a possible violation of section 321J.2
as set out above. It is reasonable to find the Appellant’s
actions of coming to a stop on a traveled portion of a two-lane
interstate highway and doing so in a proximity to a median
cross-over lane he could not legally use were valid reasons for
Officer Wilson [to] perform a traffic stop at that time.
Westra appealed this decision to the director of the DOT.         On
September 21, the director agreed with the ALJ that Officer Wilson had
statutory authority to enforce the OWI laws as to Westra. He also found
that Westra’s argument for suppression of his refusal to take the chemical
test was immaterial because the exclusionary rule did not apply to this
driver’s license revocation proceeding.
Westra petitioned for judicial review in the Polk County District
Court. Following a hearing, the district court issued a ruling on May 17,
2018. The district court found that “Officer Wilson did not have statutory
authority to stop Westra.” However, it declined to hold under article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution that the exclusionary rule applied to
Westra’s license revocation proceeding.        It also rejected Westra’s
alternative argument that article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution (the
Due Process Clause) required exclusion of Westra’s refusal to take the
Datamaster chemical test. Westra appealed and we retained the appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
Factual findings of the DOT are reviewed for substantial evidence
unless the underlying claim is a constitutional one, in which case review
of facts is de novo. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). Both parties agree that
we do not defer to the DOT’s interpretations of Iowa Code section
321J.13(6) or, of course, to the DOT’s views on the Iowa Constitution. See
6

id. § 17A.19(10)(c);

Bearinger v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.,

844 N.W.2d 104

,
106 (Iowa 2014).
III. Legal Analysis.
A. Whether Officer Wilson Had Authority to Stop Westra. The
first question is whether Officer Wilson had statutory authority to stop
Westra on I-80 on May 9, 2017. Westra’s claim goes away if Officer Wilson
had such authority. In Rilea, we held that until new legislation became
effective on May 11, DOT officers lacked authority to issue traffic citations
unrelated to operating authority, registration, size, weight, or

load. 919 N.W.2d at 383

. However, we also clarified that Iowa Code chapter 321J
provided a separate font of authority, and “an IDOT [motor vehicle
enforcement] officer, if properly trained, can enforce chapter 321J.”

Id. at 392.

In doing so, we relied on Iowa Code section 321J.1(8)(e), which states
that a “peace officer” for purposes of chapter 321J includes “[a]ny other
law enforcement officer who has satisfactorily completed an approved
course relating to motor vehicle operators under the influence of alcoholic
beverages.”

Id. Yet we

decided another case the same day. See State v. Werner,

919 N.W.2d 375

(Iowa 2018).       Werner involved a motorist who had been
stopped by a DOT officer for speeding and who was only later determined
to have been driving under revocation in violation of Iowa Code section
321J.21.

Id. at 376.

Under these circumstances, we concluded the State
could not rely on the DOT officer’s chapter 321J enforcement authority.

Id. at 380.

We noted, “Whatever merit this argument may have in other
contexts, there is no indication Officer Glade knew or suspected Werner’s
driver’s license had been revoked for operating while intoxicated when he
made the August 18 stop.”

Id. 7 We

believe the quoted language from Werner controls here. On this
record, we are not persuaded that Officer Wilson “knew or suspected”
Westra was driving under the influence when he stopped his vehicle.
Officer Wilson’s testimony contains no inkling of this.
The DOT found that Officer Wilson could rely on his enforcement
authority in chapter 321J based on the following reasoning: “[H]e did see
[the vehicle] was being operated in an erratic or illegal matter which can
be a part of a finding of reasonable grounds for a possible violation of
section 321J.2 as set out above.” If this were a finding that Officer Wilson
was actually engaged in OWI enforcement when he stopped Westra, it
might carry the day. However, this was merely a finding that the driving
behavior Officer Wilson observed could have helped provide the basis for a
reasonable suspicion finding. Under Werner, Officer Wilson’s stop was
invalid.
B. Whether Article I, Section 8 Required Suppression of
Westra’s Refusal to Take the Chemical Test. Because we agree with the
district court that Officer Wilson lacked statutory authority to stop Westra
on I-80, we must consider whether the Iowa Constitution required
suppression of Westra’s refusal to take the chemical test and, thus, would
require us to unwind his license revocation. To do so, we will first review
the relevant statutes and caselaw relating to license revocation hearings.
Then we will address the heart of Westra’s argument.
1. License revocations in Iowa and the evidence that can be
considered.   As of 1985, Iowa law provided that a license revocation
hearing
shall be limited to the issues of whether a peace officer had
reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating
a motor vehicle in violation of section 321.281 [now section
321J.2] and either of the following:
8
a. Whether the person refused to submit to the test or
tests.
b. Whether a test was administered and the test results
indicated an alcohol concentration [above the legal limit].
Iowa Code § 321B.26(a)–(b) (1985).
In Westendorf, a case decided under this law, we held that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not apply to driver’s license
revocation

proceedings. 400 N.W.2d at 557

.      The driver sought to
challenge his license revocation on the ground that the police officer had
lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle.

Id. at 554.

The district court
agreed and overturned the revocation.

Id. We, however,

reversed and
reinstated the revocation.

Id. at 557.

We pointed out that “the statutory conditions for revocation by the
department were clearly satisfied.”

Id. at 555.

We acknowledged,
Had the evidence demonstrated that any one of the
listed statutory conditions was not present—for example that
the officer did not have “reasonable grounds to believe
Westendorf had been operating the motor vehicle in violation
of section 321.281” the department would not have been
warranted in revoking Westendorf’s driver’s license.

Id. Yet in

the absence of such a statutory ground for excluding the
evidence, we held that the driver could not challenge his license revocation
under the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 556–57.

We explained,
The benefit of using reliable information of intoxication
in license revocation proceedings, even when that evidence is
inadmissible in criminal proceedings, outweighs the possible
benefit of applying the exclusionary rule to deter unlawful
conduct. Consequently, the exclusionary rule formulated
under the fourth and fourteenth amendments was
inapplicable in this license revocation proceeding.

Id. at 557.

The following year, the general assembly amended the law to provide
drivers with certain additional grounds for challenging license revocations.
9
See 1988 Iowa Acts ch. 1214, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 321J.13(4)
(1989)). In current form, this provision reads,
b. The person shall prevail at the [license revocation]
hearing if, in the criminal action on the charge of violation of
section 321J.2 or 321J.2A resulting from the same
circumstances that resulted in the administrative revocation
being challenged, the court held one of the following:
(1) That the peace officer did not have reasonable
grounds to believe that a violation of section 321J.2 or
321J.2A had occurred to support a request for or to
administer a chemical test.
(2) That the chemical test was otherwise inadmissible or
invalid.
Iowa Code § 321J.13(6)(1)–(2) (2017).
Two years thereafter, in Manders, we upheld another driver’s license
revocation, again approving of the DOT’s refusal to consider the driver’s
claim that the stop of his vehicle lacked reasonable

cause. 454 N.W.2d at 365

. We also made clear that the 1988 amendment applied only “in the
limited situation in which an adjudication on the admissibility of evidence
relevant to the implied consent law has been made in a criminal proceeding
growing out of the same facts.”

Id. at 366.

Later that same year, in Brownsberger, we confronted the case of a
driver whose license had been revoked but who had received a favorable
ruling on his motion to suppress in the parallel criminal

prosecution. 460 N.W.2d at 450

. We concluded,
By its terms, the statute binds the DOT to certain action taken
by the district court in separate criminal proceedings arising
out of the same circumstances.          Moreover, the remedy
fashioned by the legislature is clearly exclusionary in nature.
The department must rescind any license revocation that flows
from police action which is subsequently found by the court
to be without reasonable grounds for belief that the OWI law
has been violated.

Id. at 451.

                                    10
More recently, in State v. Taeger,

781 N.W.2d 560

, 566 (Iowa 2010),
a driver claimed the State had sought “to avoid the application of Iowa
Code section 321J.13(6) by preemptively moving to dismiss the criminal
OWI action when it became clear that he would prevail on the motion to
suppress.” We reviewed the landscape as already filled in by Westendorf,
the 1988 amendment, Manders, and Brownsberger.

Id. at 565–66.

We
then made clear that a dismissal to avoid the effects of section 321J.13(6)
would not be “in the furtherance of justice” as required by Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.33(1) governing dismissals of criminal actions.

Id. at 566–67.

Westra does not dispute that the literal terms of Iowa Code section
321J.13 provide him no relief. The section expressly provides that the
revocation hearing “shall be limited to” whether a peace officer had
reasonable grounds to believe the driver was operating a motor vehicle
under the influence and whether the driver refused to submit to chemical
testing (or had an alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit). Iowa
Code § 321J.13(2). Westra does not dispute that those two preconditions
for revocation were met. Additionally, to benefit from section 321J.13(6),
Westra must have obtained a ruling “in the criminal action” that the
chemical test “was otherwise inadmissible or invalid.”

Id. § 321J.13(6)(b).

That did not occur.
Nonetheless, Westra argues that it would be incongruous to permit
challenges to the legality of a driver stop to be raised in a revocation
proceeding only when there was a parallel criminal proceeding in which a
motion to suppress is granted. As he puts it, the enactment of Iowa Code
section 321J.13(6) “seemingly erodes” Westendorf’s cost–benefit rationale.
He argues,
11
Unfortunately, what was not contemplated by the legislature
was factual scenarios like the present one where a license
holder is not afforded the protections of Iowa Code Section
321J.13(6) either because a criminal charge for OWI is not
filed or was voluntarily dismissed before a suppression ruling
could be obtained.
Regardless of the possible merits of these policy arguments, we are
not free to rewrite the statute. In Manders, which we decided only two
years after the predecessor to Iowa Code section 321J.13(6) was enacted,
we found that the statute required “an adjudication on the admissibility of
evidence . . . in a criminal proceeding growing out of the same

facts.” 454 N.W.2d at 366

. There was no such adjudication here. Westra never faced
an OWI criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, Iowa Code section 321J.13 has been amended a host
of times since 1990.    Most notably, the general assembly deleted the
provision in question in 1997, see 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 104, § 31 (removing
Iowa Code § 321J.13(4) (codified at Iowa Code § 321J.13 (Supp. 1997))),
but then restored it in 1999. See 1999 Iowa Acts ch. 13, § 22 (codified at
Iowa Code § 321J.13(6) (Supp. 1999)). This makes the argument that the
legislature didn’t realize what it was doing hard to sustain. See Welch v.
Iowa Dep’t of Transp.,

801 N.W.2d 590

, 599–600 (Iowa 2011) (“These
guiding principles are especially salient when the general assembly has
reenacted or repeatedly amended the statutory provision in question
without disturbing our previous interpretation.”).
2. Iowa Code section 804.20. Westra also observes that we have
allowed violations of Iowa Code section 804.20 to be grounds for exclusion
of a refusal to take the chemical test in driver’s license revocation
proceedings. See Didonato v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.,

456 N.W.2d 367

, 369
(Iowa 1990); Ferguson v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.,

424 N.W.2d 464

, 466 (Iowa
1988), abrogated by State v. Hicks,

791 N.W.2d 89

, 94 (Iowa 2010). But
12
this rule of exclusion is longstanding and predates Westendorf and
Manders. See Fuller v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.,

275 N.W.2d 410

, 411 (Iowa
1979) (announcing this rule).     When we decided Fuller, the first case
announcing this rule, chapter 321J’s predecessor did not expressly limit
the issues that could be raised in revocation proceedings. See Iowa Code
§ 321B.8 (1977). In 1984, the legislature amended the license revocation
law to expressly limit the issues that could be raised in license revocation
proceedings. See 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1292, § 17 (codified at Iowa Code
§ 321B.26 (1985)) (changing “its scope shall cover” to “its scope shall be
limited to”). Nonetheless, without discussing this 1984 amendment, we
later reaffirmed Fuller in Ferguson and Didonato.      See

Ferguson, 424 N.W.2d at 466

; see also

Didonato, 456 N.W.2d at 369

. In Didonato we
discussed and then expressly distinguished Manders, explaining that
section 804.20 was “broadly

applicable.” 456 N.W.2d at 369

. Hence, the
argument that Westra raises now with respect to section 804.20 was
thoroughly aired and considered by our court twenty-nine years ago.
Iowa Code section 804.20 provides the arrestee with “a limited
statutory right to counsel before making the important decision to take or
refuse a chemical test under implied consent procedures.” State v. Vietor,

261 N.W.2d 828

, 831 (Iowa 1978). Section 804.20 thus involves a right to
counsel and helps insure that the decision to refuse the test, and subject
oneself to license revocation for at least a year, is informed. See State v.
Walker,

804 N.W.2d 284

, 289–91 (Iowa 2011). Violations of section 804.20
are a simple misdemeanor. See Iowa Code § 804.20 (2017). Accordingly,
we reaffirm that the provisions of section 804.20 are “broadly applicable”
to license revocation proceedings.

Didonato, 456 N.W.2d at 369

. Still, that
does not provide a reason to overrule our precedent and disregard the
13
specific terms of section 321J.13(6) in a case where section 804.20 does
not apply.
3. Article I, section 8. We now come to Westra’s principal appellate
argument that article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution requires
suppression of his refusal to take the chemical test.       In his view, the
legislature cannot limit the scope of the license revocation hearing to
exclude such issues.
Looking outside Iowa, most states do not apply the exclusionary rule
in driver’s license revocation proceedings.      See generally Thomas M.
Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility, in Motor Vehicle License Suspension
Proceedings, of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure,

23 A.L.R. 5th 108

(1994).
Westra cites five cases to the contrary, but they appear to be based
largely on interpretation of the specific state statutes that were at issue.
For instance, in State v. Lussier,

757 A.2d 1017

, 1021 (Vt. 2000), the
Vermont Supreme Court reasoned as follows in concluding that a driver
could raise the constitutionality of the stop in a license suspension
proceeding:
[A] rational interpretation of [the Vermont license suspension
law] would permit defendants to challenge the reasonableness
of the officer’s belief based on the fact that it was derived from
an unlawful stop.          The State seeks a more narrow
interpretation, however, which would permit law enforcement
officers to make random stops of vehicles for any or no reason
at all in the hopes of detecting drunk drivers. . . . License
suspensions could follow the unlawful police conduct as long
as at any point after the stop the officer formed a reasonable
belief that the defendant was intoxicated. We cannot conceive
that the Legislature intended to insert into the civil
suspension system all of the statutory rights concerning
consent to evidentiary tests, and at the same time to dispense
with basic constitutional protections against unreasonable
governmental intrusions. Accordingly, we decline the State’s
invitation to attribute to the Legislature the intent to sanction
14
unconstitutional police conduct in the context of civil
suspension proceedings.
(Citations omitted); see also Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles
v. Hernandez,

74 So. 3d 1070

, 1079 (Fla. 2011) (“[R]eading the two statutes
together leads to the conclusion that there must be a means for
challenging the legality of the suspension when the request for a breath
test was not incident to a lawful arrest.”); People v. Krueger,

567 N.E.2d 717

, 722–23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (“[T]he issue here is . . . whether the statute
should be construed to condition the Secretary of State’s power to suspend
a driver’s license on the presence of a valid arrest.”); Schuster v. State Dep’t
of Taxation & Revenue,

283 P.3d 288

, 294 (N.M. 2012) (“[T]he requirement
in [New Mexico law] that MVD find that ‘the person was arrested’ requires
a finding that the arrest and police activity leading to the arrest were
constitutional.”); Watford v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles,

674 N.E.2d 776

, 778
(Ohio 1996) (per curiam) (relying on Williams v. Ohio Bureau of Motor
Vehicles,

610 N.E.2d 1229

, 1231 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1992), which determined
the issue as a matter of statutory construction); Pooler v. Motor Vehicles
Div.,

755 P.2d 701

, 703 (Or. 1988) (en banc) (“[W]e conclude that the
legislature must have intended a valid arrest when it used the term ‘under
arrest’ in that statute.”).     It is true some of these decisions have
constitutional elements. See

Lussier, 757 A.2d at 1025

–27 (adding in dicta
that the exclusionary rule under the Vermont Constitution applies to civil
suspension proceedings); see also

Schuster, 283 P.3d at 294

.
At the same time, a number of states have held that their state
constitutions do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through
unconstitutional    traffic   stops   in   administrative   license   revocation
proceedings.    See Nevers v. State,

123 P.3d 958

, 964 (Alaska 2005)
(rejecting the application of the exclusionary rule to administrative license
15
revocation hearings under both the Fourth Amendment and the Alaska
Constitution and stating, “[W]e do not believe that applying the
exclusionary rule for search and seizure violations would add significant
deterrence because the police are already sufficiently deterred from such
unlawful conduct by the applicability of the exclusionary rule to all
criminal cases that may result from their investigations.”); Francen v. Colo.
Dep’t of Revenue,

411 P.3d 693

, 702–03 (Colo. App. 2012) (finding that the
exclusionary rule under the United States and Colorado Constitutions
does not apply in civil revocation proceedings); Martin v. Kan. Dep’t of
Revenue,

176 P.3d 938

, 953 (Kan. 2008) (“Any additional deterrent effect
on law enforcement violation of the Fourth Amendment and [the Kansas
Constitution] to be gleaned from extension of the rule beyond the criminal
DUI setting would be minimal, and it cannot outweigh the remedial
imperative of preventing alcohol-and/or drug-impaired drivers from injury
or killing themselves or others.”), overruling on other grounds recognized
by State v. Gray,

403 P.3d 1220

, 1225 (Kan. 2017); Riche v. Dir. of Revenue,

987 S.W.2d 331

, 334 (Mo. 1999) (en banc) (declining to apply the
exclusionary rule under the United States and Missouri Constitutions to
driver’s license revocation proceedings); Jacobs v. Dir., N.H. Div. of Motor
Vehicles,

823 A.2d 752

, 755 (N.H. 2003) (rejecting the argument that the
New Hampshire Constitution requires exclusion of evidence obtained from
a constitutionally invalid stop in a driver’s license suspension proceeding).
We have never directly confronted whether article I, section 8, as
opposed to the Fourth Amendment, would require exclusion of evidence
obtained from an unconstitutional stop in a license revocation proceeding.
On the other hand, we have held that the article I, section 8 exclusionary
rule does not apply to probation revocation hearings. Kain v. State,

378 N.W.2d 900

, 902–03 (Iowa 1985). In Kain, we rejected a probationer’s
16
claim that the fruits of an illegal investigatory stop of his motor vehicle
should have been suppressed in his probation revocation hearing.

Id. In State

v. Cline,

617 N.W.2d 277

, 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner,

630 N.W.2d 601

, 606 n.2
(Iowa 2001), we declined to adopt the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule under article I, section 8, reasoning that “[t]o do so would
elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional
rights, a result not supported by any principle of constitutional law.”

Id. at 293.

  Cline, in other words, placed a high value on the courts not
condoning a violation of constitutional rights. See

id. at 292–93.

4. The stop in this case. Yet a question arises whether the stop itself
in this case was unconstitutional under article I, section 8. Westra does
not dispute he violated the traffic laws: he brought his vehicle to a halt on
the traveled portion of I-80 while preparing to make an illegal turn across
the median. Westra has not explained why a traffic stop that was merely
in excess of the officer’s statutory authority would trigger a constitutional
right to have evidence suppressed. See

Werner, 919 N.W.2d at 377

(noting
that a case challenging a DOT officer’s stop involved the suppression of
evidence “on statutory grounds”).
There are some out-of-state authorities declining to apply the
exclusionary rule in criminal cases where the only issue was the officer’s
statutory authority. In People v. Wolf,

635 P.2d 213

, 214, 218 (Colo. 1981)
(en banc), the Colorado Supreme Court declined to apply the exclusionary
rule when police arrested the defendant outside the territorial limits of
their authority. The court explained, “Despite the fact that the Denver
police violated the statutes governing their authority to arrest, the issue,
for purposes of application of the exclusionary rule, is whether the arrest
was unconstitutional.”

Id. at 217.

Because there was probable cause for
17
the arrest, it “did not offend against constitutional restraints on
unreasonable seizures,” and the court did not impose the exclusionary
rule.

Id. at 217–18;

see also State v. Green,

354 P.3d 446

, 451 (Idaho
2015) (“Because these subsequently enacted arrest standards are merely
statutory, constitutional remedies are inappropriate when those statutes
have been violated by police.    Although the Legislature could certainly
specify suppression as the remedy for police violation of one of these
statutes, because such a statutory violation is not a constitutional
violation, suppression is not warranted absent such a legislative
directive.”); State v. Gates,

145 So. 3d 288

, 304 (La. 2014) (“Even if we
assume Officer Bell acted outside of his territorial jurisdiction in the
detention of the defendant, suppression of the evidence obtained after
Mr. Gates’ detention would not be warranted. The statutory rules which
delineate the territorial zones of responsibility of various law enforcement
agencies are not designed to prevent unreasonable invasions of privacy.
There are no constitutional grounds present here to justify the
suppression of evidence.”); State v. Keller,

396 P.3d 917

, 925–26 (Or. 2017)
(finding that an unauthorized stop by a Washington police officer that
would have been legal if performed by an Oregon police officer did not
violate the Oregon Constitution and therefore the suppression of evidence
in a driving-while-intoxicated case was not required).
In Virginia v. Moore,

553 U.S. 164

, 178,

128 S. Ct. 1598

, 1608
(2008), the United States Supreme Court held that “[w]hen officers have
probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their
presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest,”
regardless of whether the procedure violates state law or not. State law,
in other words, did not affect the federal constitutional analysis. See

id. 18 We

acknowledge that in State v. Brown,

39 N.E.3d 496

, 502 (Ohio
2015), the Ohio Supreme Court held that “a traffic stop for a minor
misdemeanor offense made by a township police officer without statutory
authority to do so violates Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.”
The court reasoned,
The government’s interests in permitting an officer without
statutory jurisdiction or authority to make a traffic stop for a
minor misdemeanor offense in these circumstances is
minimal and is outweighed by the intrusion upon the
individual’s liberty and privacy that necessarily arises out of
the stop. Accordingly, the traffic stop and the ensuing search
and arrest in this case were unreasonable and violated Article
I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, and the evidence seized
as a result should have been suppressed.

Id. In that

case, a local township police officer pulled over a motorist for a
lane violation on the interstate in excess of his statutory authority,
eventually leading to a criminal conviction for possession of oxycodone.

Id. at 497–98;

see also State v. Cuny,

595 N.W.2d 899

, 903 (Neb. 1999)
(holding that an extraterritorial stop performed by Pine Ridge Reservation
police officers in Nebraska violated the Nebraska Constitution); State v.
Barker,

25 P.3d 423

, 425–26 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (holding that an out-
of-state officer’s arrest violated the Washington Constitution, which
expressly requires “authority of law”). Even these cases, however, do not
present the issue of whether the officer’s statutory authority may be raised
in a civil license revocation proceeding.
We are not persuaded that a stop by a DOT enforcement officer in
excess of his statutory enforcement authority, but based upon reasonable
suspicion and probable cause, amounts to a constitutional violation. A
constitutional violation does not occur every time a peace officer simply
fails to adhere to a statute.      Only those violations that amount to
“unreasonable seizures or searches” violate article I, section 8. In our view,
19
the main purpose of Iowa Code section 80.22 was not to protect the privacy
interests of motorists, but rather to preserve the role of the Department of
Public Safety (DPS) vis-à-vis other state agencies as the state traffic
enforcement entity on public highways.         Section 80.22 is part of the
organizational chapter dealing with DPS. It was enacted in 1939 when
DPS was formed, under the heading, “Duplication in Police Officers
Prohibited.” 1939 Iowa Acts ch. 120, § 95 (codified at Iowa Code § 80.22
(1946)). We believe its primary goal was to allocate responsibility within
state government, not to protect motorists by reducing vehicle stops.
Notably, it does not affect the ability of municipal and county officials to
enforce traffic laws on the same highways. See Iowa Code §§ 321.1(50),
.6, .485 (2017);

id. § 331.653(28);

see also State v. Snider,

522 N.W.2d 815

,
818 (Iowa 1994) (“[A] municipal police officer has authority to arrest for
state traffic violations anywhere in the state.”).
In State v. Ramirez,

895 N.W.2d 884

, 898 (Iowa 2017), we
distinguished Cline and declined to grant a motion to suppress in a
situation where constitutional rights were not at issue. There we upheld
the use in an Iowa criminal prosecution of evidence obtained by a joint
federal–state team using an anticipatory warrant that would have been
illegal under Iowa law.

Id. We said,

Although Ramirez raises article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution in his briefing, he does not claim that the search
itself would have violated the Iowa Constitution. Rather, he
maintains only that Iowa statutes do not authorize this type
of search and, therefore, it would violate the Iowa Constitution
to admit the results of the search in an Iowa court. We disagree
with that broad proposition.

Id. This language

from Ramirez has force in the present case.          We
conclude that article I, section 8 simply has no play in a license revocation
20
proceeding when the issue is whether to suppress a stop that was
supported by reasonable suspicion but exceeded the officer’s statutory
authority.
In effect, our present task requires us to reconcile two sets of
statutes. One of them, Iowa Code sections 80.22, 321.2, and 321.477, did
not allow DOT officers, before May 11, 2017, to engage in general traffic
enforcement on the public highways of the state. See Iowa Code § 80.22;

Rilea, 919 N.W.2d at 388

–89. The other, section 321J.13, limits the issues
that can be raised in a license revocation proceeding; the officer’s statutory
authority is not one of those issues. It is the legislature’s prerogative to
determine priorities as between its own statutes. 1
One final note: “In construing various provisions of chapter 321J,
we have continuously affirmed that the primary objective of the implied
consent statute is the removal of dangerous and intoxicated drivers from
Iowa’s roadways in order to safeguard the traveling public.” Welch v. Iowa
Dep’t of Transp.,

801 N.W.2d 590

, 594 (Iowa 2011).                         “[W]e have
characterized an administrative license revocation under section 321J.9
as remedial, promoting the overarching remedial purpose of chapter 321J
itself.”

Id. at 601.

   “A remedial statute, like our implied consent law,
1We do not think the rationale of Taeger applies here. In the first place, Taeger
was based on an interpretation of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(1), which limits
the circumstances under which a criminal case, once filed, can be dismissed. See

Taeger, 781 N.W.2d at 566

–67. Rule 2.33(1) does not come into play where the State never
initiated an OWI case against the defendant. We are not at liberty to rewrite the rule.
Nor is the option available to rewrite the text of Iowa Code section 321J.13 to
expand the scope of what can be raised in a license revocation proceeding. “[W]e have
repeatedly said that ‘we are bound by what the legislature said, not by what it should or
might have said.’ ” In re Marshall,

805 N.W.2d 145

, 160 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Ranniger v.
Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin.,

746 N.W.2d 267

, 270 (Iowa 2008)).
Constitutional questions may present different issues, but the question here is
one of statutory interpretation.
21
should be liberally construed consistent with its statutory purpose.” State
v. Green,

470 N.W.2d 15

, 18 (Iowa 1991).
IV. Conclusion.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the
district court denying Westra’s petition for judicial review. 2
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who files a dissenting opinion,
and Appel, J., who files a separate dissenting opinion in which Wiggins,
J., joins, and McDonald, J., who takes no part.
2Westra also argues that not allowing him to raise the lack of statutory authority
of the DOT officer in a license revocation proceeding would violate both substantive and
procedural due process under article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. Yet we do not
see what this argument adds to his exclusionary rule argument under article I, section
8. If it is permissible under article I, section 8 to introduce proof that Westra refused to
take the chemical test, such evidence also is admissible notwithstanding article I, section
9. Westra does not attack the driver’s license suspension on any basis other than the
admissibility of his chemical test.
22
#18–1050, Westra v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I think this case presents an important point
of law regarding prosecutorial conduct.
In a recent case, we found the state could not dismiss a case in order
to avoid an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress. State v. Taeger,

781 N.W.2d 560

, 567 (Iowa 2010). The rationale for that decision is that the
prosecutor cannot manipulate the system in order to ensure Iowa Code
section 321J.13(6) is not triggered.

Id. Manipulation of

the criminal
justice system undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system.
I see no difference in what the prosecutor did in this case than in
Taeger. Here the officer arrested Alex Westra. This began the criminal
process. The legislature amended the Code in 1999 with the intention to
allow a defendant to contest the stop in the criminal proceeding. 1999
Iowa Acts ch. 13, § 22 (codified as amended at Iowa Code § 321J.13(6)
(2017)).   The legislature did not anticipate the prosecutor would
manipulate the system. The prosecutor not filing the information deprived
Westra of his right to contest the stop in the criminal case.          This
manipulation by the prosecutor is no different from the manipulation in
Taeger.

See 781 N.W.2d at 566

–67. Accordingly, I would allow Westra to
attack the stop in the administrative proceeding to preserve the integrity
of the judicial system and carry out the intent of the legislature.
23
#18–1050, Westra v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.
APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.      The majority opinion in its very first
paragraph starts out on the wrong foot when it declares that the question
in this case is whether we are going to reverse direction in light of Fourth
Amendment precedent. But that is not the question at all. The question
is whether Fourth Amendment precedent is sufficiently well-reasoned for
us to follow the Fourth Amendment approach under Iowa constitutional
law.
Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons and things to be seized.
Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. This provision of the Iowa Constitution is perhaps
the most important provision of our Bill of Rights protecting Iowans from
an authoritarian state.     Early cases emphasized its protean character.
Modern pragmatic revisionists have sought, however, to dilute the strength
of search and seizure protections and to expand the scope of state
authority to search and seize. While in recent years we have resisted such
revisions, the majority opinion in this case is a step in the wrong direction.
Here is why.
I. As an Integral Part of our State Constitution’s Protection
Against Unlawful Search and Seizures, the Exclusionary Rule Applies
in Driver’s License Revocation Cases.
A. Constitutional Footing of Exclusionary Rule. First, we have
rightly held that the exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of
article I, section 8 is “an integral part of [the] state constitution’s protection
24
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Cline,

617 N.W.2d 277

, 285 (Iowa 2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner,

630 N.W.2d 601

, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001). In Iowa, then, the exclusionary rule is
substantive constitutional doctrine.
There is substantial support for the holding in Cline that the
exclusionary rule is an integral part of substantive constitutional doctrine
in Iowa law. In Reifsnyder v. Lee,

44 Iowa 101

, 102 (1876), we explained
in a civil forfeiture proceeding that a party subject to an illegal search
should be restored to the party’s position prior to the search. The notion
in Reifsnyder is that a party is entitled to a restorative remedy of being
returned to the party’s position prior to the constitutional violation. See

id. Later, in

State v. Height,

117 Iowa 650

, 661,

91 N.W. 935

, 938 (1902),
we noted that the search and seizure principles were subject to “a broad
and liberal interpretation for the purpose of preserving the spirit of
constitutional liberty.” Finally, in State v. Sheridan,

121 Iowa 164

, 168,

96 N.W. 730

, 731 (1903), the court declared that to use illegally seized
evidence to secure a conviction would “emasculate the constitutional
guaranty, and deprive it of all beneficial force or effect in preventing
unreasonable searches and seizures.” 3
For decades, there was a similar approach under the Fourth
Amendment. In Weeks v. United States,

232 U.S. 383

, 398,

34 S. Ct. 341

,
346 (1914), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio,

367 U.S. 643

, 645–55,

81 S. Ct. 1684

, 1691 (1961), the Supreme Court unanimously held that
private papers obtained through an unconstitutional search could not be
used in a criminal prosecution. In Weeks, Justice Day emphasized that
3To be sure, in State v. Tonn,

195 Iowa 94

, 100–01,

191 N.W. 530

, 533 (1923), the
court, over strong dissent, abandoned the exclusionary rule in a search and seizure case.
The approach in Tonn was, of course, rejected in Cline in favor of our earlier

precedent. 617 N.W.2d at 291

, 293.
25
the Fourth Amendment imposed on judges as well as executive officials
“limitations and restraints as to the exercise of [their] power and
authority.”

Id. at 392,

34 S. Ct. at 344. Further, Justice Day declared
that the limitations and restraints “forever secure the people, their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches
and seizures under the guise of law.”

Id. Justice Day

further emphasized
that the fruits of illegal searches “should find no sanction in the judgments
of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution.”

Id. As scholars

have pointed out, the language of Weeks makes clear
that the Fourth Amendment imposes obligations on judges, that they have
a duty to give full force and effect to the rights secured by the Amendment
for both innocent and guilty persons, and that the tendency of officials to
violate the Fourth Amendment should find no approval in the courts. See
Tracey Maclin, The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment’s
Exclusionary Rule 11–12 (2013); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth
Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, 10 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 357, 358–59 (2013).
Similarly, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,

251 U.S. 385

,
392,

40 S. Ct. 182

, 183 (1920), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared in
strong, unequivocal language,
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall
not be used at all.
Holmes thus believed not only that courts should not be tainted with
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, but that it should not be used for
any purpose.
26
And in

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 649

, 81 S. Ct. at 1688, the Supreme Court
emphasized the constitutional nature of the exclusionary rule. According
to Mapp, the exclusion of evidence under search and seizure law was a
rule “of constitutional origin.”    Id.; see also

Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 284

.
Further, the Mapp Court emphasized that its decision “gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees

him.” 367 U.S. at 660

, 81 S. Ct. at 1694.
By declaring the exclusionary rule as part of the substance of
article I, section 8, we have squarely and firmly rejected the unfortunate
innovations of search and seizure doctrine introduced to the Fourth
Amendment by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Calandra,

414 U.S. 338

, 348,

94 S. Ct. 613

, 620 (1974). In Calandra, the
Supreme Court, inconsistent with decades of past federal precedent,
downgraded Fourth Amendment protections by declaring that the
exclusionary rule was merely “a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect
. . . , rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”

Id. As noted

by one commentator, by emphasizing the deterrence function
exclusively, the Supreme Court’s approach “generates an enormous
pressure for reduction of the scope of the rule” through cost–benefit type
of analysis. See James Boyd White, Forgotten Points in the “Exclusionary
Rule” Debate,

81 Mich. L

. Rev. 1273, 1281 (1983).
By describing the exclusionary rule as a substantive part of our
constitutional protections in Cline, we recognized that constitutional
cement protected it from being washed away based on transient pragmatic
concerns   that   cannot   be      permitted   to   overrun   our   permanent
constitutional

regime. 617 N.W.2d at 285

. Our approach is consistent
with other courts. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State,

761 A.2d 807

, 818 (Del. 2000)
27
(“[T]he efficient prosecution of criminals cannot justify a deliberate
invasion of the right of the citizen to be made secure against the violation
of specific constitutional guarantee’s . . . .”) (quoting Rickards v. State,

77 A.2d 199

, 205 (Del. 1950)); State v. Guzman,

842 P.2d 660

, 672 (Idaho
1992) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally mandated
remedy for illegal searches and seizures); State v. Eserjose,

259 P.3d 172

,
178 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (noting that state exclusionary rule
accomplishes “ ‘its paramount concern [of] protecting an individual’s right
of privacy’ . . . by closing the courtroom door to evidence gathered through
illegal means” (quoting State v. Afana,

233 P.3d 879

, 884 (Wash. 2010) (en
banc))).
B. The Exclusionary Rule in Iowa is a Personal Remedy.
Second, the exclusionary rule in Iowa has long been held to provide a
remedy for a constitutional violation. In Reifsnyder, we emphasized that
under our search and seizure law, the parties should be returned to the
position they were before the unconstitutional

conduct. 44 Iowa at 102

.
In Cline, we emphasized that the exclusionary rule was a remedy for a
constitutional

violation. 617 N.W.2d at 289

. We emphatically rejected the
notion in United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897

, 906,

104 S. Ct. 3405

, 3412
(1984) (quoting

Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348

, 94 S. Ct. at 620), that the
exclusionary rule was merely “a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right.”

Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 289

.
The notion that article I, section 8 vests personal rights, of course,
is also clear by the language of the provision: “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, . . . .” Iowa Const. art.
I, § 8; see Morgan Cloud, A Conservative House United: How the Post-
28
Warren Court Dismantled the Exclusionary Rule, 10 Ohio St. J. Crim. L.
477, 480 (2013).
C. The Exclusionary Rule in Iowa Protects the Integrity of the
Judiciary.   Third, we have emphasized, among other things, that the
exclusionary rule is supported by the need to protect the integrity of the
judiciary from using unlawfully obtained evidence to support its
judgments. In Cline, we noted, “Judges would become accomplices to the
unconstitutional conduct of the executive branch if they allowed law
enforcement to enjoy the benefits of the

illegality.” 617 N.W.2d at 290

. In
State v. Hamilton,

335 N.W.2d 154

, 158 (Iowa 1983), we emphasized that
tainted evidence must be excluded because exclusion “protect[s] the
integrity of the judiciary.” Our approach in Cline thus had a solid pedigree
in Iowa caselaw, but also in federal caselaw prior to reconstruction of
Fourth Amendment doctrine that occurred in Calandra. See, e.g., Elkins
v. United States,

364 U.S. 206

, 222,

80 S. Ct. 1437

, 1447 (1960) (referring
to the “imperative of judicial integrity”); Weeks, 232 U.S. at

392, 34 S. Ct. at 344

; see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic
Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the
Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 47, 47 (2010); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Hypocrisy, Corruption, and Illegitimacy: Why Judicial Integrity Justifies the
Exclusionary Rule, 10 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 419, 474 (2013).
This case involves action of an administrative agency. Of course,
Holmes has the answer to whether illegally obtained evidence may be used
in this kind of proceeding: No! Silverthorne

Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392

, 40
S. Ct. at 183. In any event, even if this case involves a decision by an
administrative agency in the first instance, there is a right of appeal to the
courts arising out of final agency action. The need to maintain the integrity
29
of the courts by refusing to consider unconstitutionally obtained evidence
therefore applies in this case.
D. Inapplicability of Westendorf. In support of its position, the
State cites Westendorf v. Iowa Department of Transportation,

400 N.W.2d 553

(Iowa 1987), superseded by statute as recognized by Brownsberger v.
Department of Transportation,

460 N.W.2d 449

, 450–51 (Iowa 1990).
Westendorf, however, involved a challenge under the Fourth Amendment
and not under the Iowa Constitution.

Id. at 556.

     As a result, the
Westendorf court was bound to follow the diluted post-Calandra federal
precedents.       See

id. at 556–57.

          In striking contrast to Cline, the
Westendorf court did not treat the exclusionary rule as part and parcel of
the Fourth Amendment, did not regard the search and seizure provisions
as providing a personal remedy, and did not cite judicial integrity as an
important concern. 4 See

id. The method

of Fourth Amendment analysis in Westendorf is
completely different from the analysis of article I, section 8 under Cline. In
Cline, we drew upon traditional approaches, while Westendorf relied on
recent    policy-driven      innovations      in   interpretation      of   the    Fourth
Amendment by the United States Supreme Court.
E. Application of Exclusionary Rule in Civil Contexts. As noted
by Professor LaFave, courts have often applied the exclusionary rule for
4In  addition, Westendorf emphasized that there would be “little force as a deterrent
of unlawful police action because the department does not control the actions of local
police

officers.” 400 N.W.2d at 557

. In this case, however, the unlawful stop was not
made by the police, but by employees of the Iowa Department of Transportation, the very
same agency seeking to revoke Westra’s driver’s license. As noted by LaFave, even based
on Calandra, “the argument for exclusion is most compelling when the administrative
agency in question has an investigative function and investigative personnel of that
agency participated in the illegal activity for the purpose of providing information to
support administrative proceedings against the suspect.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.7(f), at 340 (5th ed. 2012). Thus, even
under federal law, the precedential value of Westendorf is doubtful for the present case.
30
search and seizure violations in administrative settings.     According to
LaFave,
Courts have held or at least assumed that the
exclusionary rule is applicable in a wide variety of
administrative proceedings, including FTC hearings to
uncover discriminatory pricing practices, SEC proceedings,
OSHA proceedings, proceedings before the public utilities
commission to terminate phone service because of illegal use,
NLRB hearings concerning labor controversies, immigration
hearings, hearings to terminate a public employee’s
government service, hearings to suspend or revoke a license
to practice a profession or to sell liquor, hearings to suspend
or revoke a driver’s license, and hearings to suspend or expel
a student from a public high school or a state university.
1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 1.7(f), at 335–36 (5th ed. 2012) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
It is not surprising that a number of courts have applied the
exclusionary rule in driver’s license settings.   For instance, in State v.
Lussier, the Supreme Court of Vermont stated in a driver’s license context,
Evidence obtained as the result of constitutional violations by
law enforcement officers may not be admitted at trial as a
matter of state law because doing so “eviscerates our most
sacred rights, impinges on individual privacy, perverts our
judicial process, distorts any notion of fairness, and
encourages official misconduct.”

757 A.2d 1017

, 1025 (Vt. 2000) (quoting State v. Badger,

450 A.2d 336

,
349 (Vt. 1982)). The Vermont court upheld exclusion “to protect the core
value of privacy” reflected in the search and seizure provisions of the
Vermont Constitution.

Id. at 1026–27.

In addition, the Vermont court emphasized the need “to promote the
public’s trust in the judicial system.”

Id. Further, the

Vermont court
emphasized that the focus of any analysis “should be on the individual
constitutional rights at stake.”

Id. at 1025.

   These observations are
31
consistent with the approach taken by this court in Cline under article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
Similarly, in Williams v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, the Ohio
court, noting that the exclusionary rule applied in civil forfeiture
proceedings, held that a lawful arrest, including a constitutional stop,
must take place before a refusal to submit to a test triggers a license
suspension.