State of Iowa v. Kayla Haas , 930 N.W.2d 699 ( 2019 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 17–1798
Filed June 28, 2019
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
KAYLA HAAS,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P.
Van Marel (suppression) and James Malloy (trial and sentencing), District
Associate Judges.
A defendant appeals the judgment and sentence imposed following
her conviction for driving while barred. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith (until withdrawal), State Appellate Defender, Nan
Jennisch, Assistant Appellate Defender, and Nicholas Jones, Student
Legal Intern, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, Jessica Reynolds, Story County Attorney, and Jonathon
Holscher, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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PER CURIAM.
Kayla Haas was convicted of driving while barred. On appeal, Haas
challenges the district court’s ruling denying her motion to suppress on
the grounds she was subject to an impermissible pretextual seizure. She
also challenges the reasonable suspicion of her stop. Further, Haas argues
her counsel was ineffective and the district court improperly assessed
court costs and attorney fees. We retained Haas’s appeal.
As to Haas’s challenge of her denied motion to suppress, we affirm
the district court’s denial. “When a defendant challenges a district court’s
denial of a motion to suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or
federal constitutional right, our standard of review is de novo.” State v.
Coffman, 914 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v. Storm, 898
N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2017)). In State v. Brown, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa
2019), we determined the subjective motivations of an individual officer in
making a traffic stop under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution are
irrelevant as long as the officer has objectively reasonable cause to believe
the motorist violated a traffic law. There, consistent with precedent in
Iowa, we affirmed the district court’s determination that the subjective
reasoning in the decision to stop the motorist did not matter because the
officer objectively observed traffic violations.
We also affirm the district court judgment on Haas’s second
challenge, whether her stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The
standard of review for a constitutional search and seizure challenge is de
novo. State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Iowa 2010). We do not believe
the officers violated article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution when they
stopped Haas based on reasonable suspicion that she was driving while
barred. At the very least, the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
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Haas’s vehicle after they observed her and two other people getting into
the vehicle before leaving the area.
A traffic stop is generally reasonable, and thus constitutional under
state and federal search and seizure provisions, if the police have probable
cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the motorist violated a traffic
law. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 401–02, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690
(2014); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–810, 116 S. Ct. 1769,
1772 (1996); State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004). In Vance,
we held reasonable suspicion existed to support a traffic stop to investigate
the validity of the motorist’s driver’s license “when the officer knows the
registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license, and the officer is
unaware of any evidence or circumstances indicating the registered owner
is not the driver of the vehicle.” 790 N.W.2d at 781. In doing so, we
explained, “[I]t is reasonable for an officer to infer the registered owner of
the vehicle will do the vast amount of the driving.” Id. Thus, “it is
sufficiently reasonable to generate reasonable suspicion for an
investigatory stop to resolve the ambiguity as to whether criminal activity
is afoot.” Id. at 781–82. Yet, we also noted that reasonable suspicion
would disappear if the officer obtained information suggesting that the
driver is not the owner of the vehicle. Id. at 782.
Haas claims the police were aware of circumstances that invalidated
their assumption that Haas was driving the vehicle when they made the
traffic stop. Namely, Haas points out that the officers in this case did not
know her and observed three people enter the vehicle but did not see which
of the three was driving. However, these circumstances do not invalidate
the officers’ assumption that Haas was driving her own vehicle when they
made the traffic stop.
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Prior to initiating the traffic stop, the officers ran the license plate of
the vehicle. They identified Haas as the registered owner and discovered
that she had a suspended license. Soon after, the officers saw a woman
that “appeared to be” Haas and two males leave the residence they were
observing. Though the officers did not see who was driving the vehicle, it
was still reasonable to assume that Haas, as the registered owner of the
vehicle, would be doing “the vast amount of the driving.” Id. at 781.
We upheld the reasonableness of the search in Vance based on the
officer’s observation that the vehicle was registered to an owner with a
suspended license despite the fact that the officer did not know the owner
and “was unable to observe the sex or the identity of the driver.” Id. at
783. Likewise, the fact that the officers in this case could not observe the
driver’s sex or identity does not invalidate their assumption that Haas was
driving her vehicle. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s judgment
because there was reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop of
the vehicle Haas was operating.
Haas’s ineffective-assistance claim that her trial counsel was
ineffective for declining to challenge whether the license plate was
malfunctioning fails on the merits. We review claims of ineffective
assistance de novo. State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 187–88 (Iowa
2018). The United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution provide
defendants with the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. We generally preserve ineffective-
assistance claims for postconviction-relief proceedings so the parties can
“develop an adequate record of the claims” and counsel charged with
ineffective assistance has the chance to respond to the claims. Harrison,
914 N.W.2d at 206. Nevertheless, we may resolve these claims on direct
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appeal when the record is adequate, as is the case here since it involves
video evidence. See id.
“Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims require a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence both that counsel failed an essential duty
and that the failure resulted in prejudice.” Id. at 188 (quoting State v.
Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d 380, 388 (Iowa 2016)). The defendant must show
both prongs of this test have been met. Id. at 206. In analyzing the
defendant’s claims, we “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.’ ” Id. (quoting Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Iowa 2016)).
Counsel fails an essential duty if he or she “perform[s] below the
standard demanded of a reasonably competent attorney.” Id. (quoting
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001) (en banc)). Prejudice
results from this failure when “there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984)). A
reasonable probability exists if the probability is “sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104
S. Ct. at 2068). Ultimately, Haas must show that “absent the errors, the
fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id.
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2068–69).
Haas argues that the dash-cam video shows her vehicle had an
illuminated license plate that was not malfunctioning in any form. Iowa
Code section 321.388 requires a white, electric light to illuminate a rear
license plate to a distance of fifty feet. Iowa Code § 321.388 (2017). The
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Iowa Code also requires reflective coating on license plates. Id. § 321.35.
The absence of these equipment features serves as reasonable suspicion
to justify an investigatory stop. See State v. Lyon, 862 N.W.2d 391, 398
(Iowa 2015).
The only time Haas’s vehicle appears to have the reflective coating
is when the patrol car illuminates the vehicle’s license plate. Otherwise,
the license plate only reflects ambient light when the vehicle is away from
the lights of the police vehicle, demonstrating a malfunction. Haas’s
counsel did not breach an essential duty in declining to challenge whether
the license plate was properly illuminated since the video evidence does
not contradict the officer’s testimony that the plate light was not working.
Further, even if counsel’s decision not to challenge the functionality of the
license plate light did breach an essential duty, this decision did not result
in prejudice since the officers already had reasonable suspicion to make
the investigative stop due to their inference that Haas was driving with a
suspended license. Therefore, Haas failed to meet her burden to show
counsel was ineffective in deciding not to challenge whether the license
plate was functioning.
Finally, we reject Haas’s claim that the district court erred in
requiring her to repay the costs of her appointed attorney without
considering her reasonable ability to pay. “Our review of a restitution
order is for correction of errors at law.” State v. Klawonn, 688 N.W.2d 271,
274 (Iowa 2004). The district court may order a person to compensate the
State for the costs of court-appointed representation. Iowa Code
§ 815.9(3); id. § 910.2(2). Before doing so, the district court must
“determine the defendant’s reasonable ability to pay the attorney fees.”
State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 149 (Iowa 2018).
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The district court did contemplate Haas’s reasonable ability to pay
her court-appointed attorney fees. After Haas filed an indigent defense
notice on October 20, 2017, the district court entered judgment and
imposed a fine, surcharge, and costs that included “repayment of court
appointed attorney fees, if any.” The district court also noted, “[T]he
Defendant has the ability to re-pay court-appointed attorney fees and the
same are ordered.”
After Haas’s notice of appeal, she submitted three more indigent
defense claim forms. The district court entered an order on January 29,
2018, ordering Haas to pay a $38.50 claim for attorney fees based on its
finding that she “ha[d] the ability to pay the . . . fees.” The district court’s
statements in its orders regarding the fees contradict Haas’s claim that
“[t]he record reflects no consideration of Haas’s reasonable ability to pay.”
In any event, the district court later rescinded a legal fee assessment
of $136.50 due to Haas’s appeal, explaining that “the fees ordered should
not have been assessed at this time.” It does not appear there was a plan
of restitution in place when Haas filed her appeal, so “the court is not
required to consider the offender’s reasonable ability to pay.” State v.
Albright, ___ N.W.2d ____, ____ (Iowa 2019). We affirm the restitution part
of the sentencing order.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Cady, C.J., who concurs in result only,
and Appel and Wiggins, JJ., who dissent.
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#17–1798, State v. Haas
APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Consistent with my dissent in State v. Brown,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2019) (Appel, J., dissenting), and for the reasons
expressed below, I would vacate the decision of the district court and
remand for further proceedings.
I. Introduction.
In this case, Kayla Haas, the driver of a vehicle, challenges the
validity of a stop of her automobile made by law enforcement that resulted
in her arrest for driving while barred. Haas asserts the evidence that arose
from the stop—namely that she was driving the vehicle—should be
suppressed because the real purpose of the stop was not traffic safety but
rather to engage in a warrantless search and seizure of the vehicle for an
investigative purpose unrelated to the rationale for the traffic stop. The
district court denied Haas’s motion to suppress and found her guilty of
driving while barred.
II. Factual and Procedural Background.
A. Background Facts. Ames police received complaints about
potential drug activity at a house. The police put the house under
surveillance beginning on or about June 2, 2017. On June 8, the police
executed a search warrant looking for drugs and stolen property. The
record does not reveal the results of that search.
On June 9, police, who were parked down the block from the
residence under surveillance, spotted a Ford Explorer parked outside the
residence. The officers ran a license plate check on the Explorer that
revealed the vehicle was owned by Haas. The police further learned that
the owner of the vehicle, Haas, had been barred from driving due to prior
violations.
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The officers observed three people loading items into the vehicle.
They further saw three people get into the vehicle but did not know who
was driving. The officers at first lost track of the vehicle but then found it
again on the road and followed the vehicle for a couple of turns. The
officers then allegedly observed that the license plate light was not
working, activated their lights, and stopped the vehicle.
After the stop, the officers identified Haas as the driver of the vehicle
and placed her under arrest for driving while barred. The vehicle was
seized and towed. Police conducted an inventory search of the contents of
the vehicle, finding nothing incriminating. Hass was subsequently
charged with driving while barred in violation of Iowa Code section 321.560
(2017).
B. Proceedings on Motion to Suppress. Haas filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained in the course of the police stop of her
vehicle. In the motion, Haas claimed she was subject to a pretextual stop
in violation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. In light of the
motion, the district court held a suppression hearing.
Ames police officer Steven Spoon testified on behalf of the State. He
said that he and his partner were members of the safe neighborhoods
team, a unit that worked in higher crime areas. Spoon noted he was one
of the officers who participated in the surveillance of the residence on the
night of June 9.
Spoon testified that the safe neighborhoods team did not typically
engage in traffic stops. Yet, in the two days prior to June 9, Spoon
participated in two traffic stops of persons entering and leaving the
residence in question.
Spoon testified that his partner ran a search on a vehicle parked in
front of the house and determined the registered owner, Haas, was barred
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from driving due to previous traffic violations. Spoon told the court that
three persons were seen coming out of the residence and entering the
vehicle. Spoon asserted the officers could not tell who was driving.
Spoon testified that the vehicle pulled away from the house and the
officers intended to follow the vehicle but lost it. Spoon noted, however,
that the vehicle soon reappeared. A video offered into evidence showed the
patrol car followed the vehicle for a couple of turns. At that point, Spoon
testified, he noticed the license plate lamp was out on the vehicle. Spoon
then initiated a stop of the vehicle.
Spoon declared he approached the vehicle and determined Haas was
the driver. Spoon placed Haas under arrest for driving while barred. After
the arrest of Haas, the vehicle was impounded and a search conducted.
During the search of the vehicle, Spoon and other officers found a
laptop computer. Spoon opened the computer and ran the serial number
through dispatch to determine if it had been stolen. Police also found
some watches, tools, and a firefighter’s jacket that the officers believed
could be valuable. An inventory prepared did not mention the watches or
firefighter’s jacket and did not list the tools that were found within the car.
The district court denied the motion to suppress. The district court
reasoned that the officers involved in the stop “probably [had] a duty to
stop somebody who they believed was committing the offense of driving
while barred.” The district court stated that although law enforcement
had information about criminal activity at the house and were “maybe even
hoping they would get the car driving away,” the district court did not think
the stop was pretextual.
In any event, the district court held that even if the stop was
pretextual, it would not be a violation of the Iowa Constitution. The district
court observed that probable cause to stop the vehicle existed for two
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reasons: driving while barred and operating a vehicle with an inoperable
license plate light.
III. Standard of Review.
This court reviews constitutional issues de novo. State v. Gaskins,
866 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2015). In engaging in de novo review, we
“independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances found in the
record.” State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Iowa 2010).
IV. Discussion.
This case is a companion case to Brown, ___ N.W.2d ___ (majority
opinion). In Brown, the appellant claimed that a traffic stop executed by
police was pretextual in nature, and as a result, the stop was
unconstitutional under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at
___.
In my dissenting opinion in Brown, I explain that a pretextual traffic
stop is unlawful under the Iowa Constitution but that the state should
have the opportunity to show the underlying traffic stop would have
occurred even without the pretextual motivation. Id. at ___ (Appel, J.,
dissenting). In this case, after a suppression hearing, the district court
concluded the stop was not pretextual, and in any event, pretextual stops
were not unconstitutional under article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution.
The district court in this case did not consider the precise factual
question of whether the traffic stop “would have” been made without the
larger pretextual investigative motive. While the district court speculated
that the officers “probably [had] a duty” to stop the vehicle based on the
possibility the driver was driving while barred, the record shows that the
police did not immediately stop the vehicle when it drove away from the
house based on a reasonable suspicion of a driving-while-barred violation.
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Instead, the officers followed the vehicle for a distance and only instigated
the stop after uncovering an alleged equipment violation related to the
license plate lights. This behavior arguably suggests that the officers,
whether right or wrong, may have believed they did not have grounds to
stop the vehicle based on Haas driving while barred. The question thus
arguably becomes whether the stop for a license plate violation would have
occurred without the pretextual investigative motivation.
In any event, I would not make the necessary factual determination
on appeal. That is the job of the district court. Because the district court
did not make a factual determination of whether the stop would have
occurred in any event, I would vacate the order denying the motion to
suppress and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
V. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, I would vacate the order denying suppression
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Wiggins, J., joins this dissent.