State of Iowa v. Bob Kent Knipfel ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1739
Filed June 19, 2019
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BOB KENT KNIPFEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County, Paul B. Ahlers, District
Associate Judge.
Bob Knipfel appeals his sentence for operating while intoxicated, second offense.
AFFIRMED.
Chad R. Frese of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney General,
for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and May, JJ.
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MAY, Judge.
Bob Knipfel pled guilty to operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in
violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2018). By agreement, the parties recommended
a sentence of 365 days in jail, with all but ten days suspended, and probation. The
presentence investigation report (PSI) also recommended a suspended jail term and
probation. The district court sentenced Knipfel to a term of incarceration not to exceed
two years. On appeal, Knipfel argues this sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion.
We disagree.
It is undisputed that Knipfel’s sentence fell within the statutory limits. See Iowa
Code § 321J.2(4)(a). “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence
within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only
be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.”
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “An abuse of discretion is found
only when the sentencing court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225
(Iowa 1996). Knipfel “has the burden of showing an abuse of discretion.” State v. Harris,
528 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
Knipfel does not allege the district court considered impermissible factors at
sentencing. Rather, he disagrees with the manner in which the court weighed permissible
sentencing factors and questions the court’s motivation at sentencing. He contends the
court should have fashioned a sentence tailored to provide for his rehabilitation rather
than a punitive sentence prioritizing community safety. Yet Iowa Code section 901.5
requires sentencing courts to consider what sentence “will provide maximum opportunity
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for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further
offenses by the defendant and others.” (Emphasis added). In explaining its reasons for
the sentence imposed, the court noted that the present conviction is Knipfel’s third OWI
conviction. The court observed that the punishments for Knipfel’s prior OWIs—jail time
and, in one instance, probation—had not created a sufficient deterrent. Despite those
prior sentences, Knipfel continued to endanger his community by operating a vehicle
while intoxicated. The court hoped the imposition of a more severe sentence would prove
a more effective deterrent for Knipfel moving forward. We find nothing improper in these
efforts to protect the community by reforming Knipfel’s pattern of behavior. See Iowa
Code § 901.5.
Nor do we find the court abused its discretion by placing greater significance on
certain sentencing factors than others. Cf. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725 (noting
sentencing factors include “nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age,
character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform”). The exercise of
sentencing discretion requires each sentencing judge to “act within legal parameters
according to the dictates of a judge’s own conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment of
others.” Id.Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to adopt the
recommendation contained in the PSI. State v. Headley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa
2019) (“Moreover, we have previously held any sentencing recommendations contained
in the PSI are not binding on the court.”). Nor did the court abuse its discretion by
imposing a sentence that differed from the parties’ recommendation. In his written guilty
plea, Knipfel acknowledged his understanding that the court “may reject any plea
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agreement and sentence [him] up to the maximum provided by law,” namely,
“imprisonment for not more than 2 years.” See, e.g., State v. Worby, No. 17-1832, 2018
WL 4360995, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2018) (finding court did not abuse its
discretion when it considered relevant sentencing factors and imposed a different
sentence than requested by the defendant); State v. Smith, No. 16-0700, 2016 WL
6902854, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2016) (finding court did not abuse its discretion
when the defendant merely disagreed with the imposed sentence); State v. Childs, No.
14-1950, 2016 WL 1130283, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016) (same).
The court’s careful consideration of pertinent sentencing factors shows that the
court thoughtfully and properly exercised its discretion in choosing an appropriate
sentence. We decline to “second guess” that choice. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d. at 725.
AFFIRMED.