Herman Calahan A/K/A Herman Callahan v. Jamie Philbrook ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0194
Filed October 12, 2016
HERMAN CALAHAN a/k/a HERMAN CALLAHAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JAMIE PHILBROOK,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, William C.
Ostlund, Judge.
Herman Calahan appeals the denial of his request for a jury trial and the
entry of judgment against him. AFFIRMED.
Herman Calahan, Otho, pro se appellant.
William Kevin Stoos of William Kevin Stoos, P.C., North Sioux City, South
Dakota, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
Herman Calahan filed a negligence action against Jamie Philbrook for
personal injuries sustained in a car accident. The matter was initially scheduled
for a jury trial, notwithstanding the absence of a jury demand from either side.
The district court rescheduled the matter as a non-jury trial. At this juncture,
Calahan wrote to the court and demanded reinstatement of a jury trial. The
district court issued a notice scheduling the matter for a non-jury trial. Following
trial, the court determined Calahan “failed to provide proper evidence to establish
injuries and damages [were] the result of this accident.” The court entered
judgment in favor of Philbrook.
On appeal, Calahan contends (1) the district court abused its discretion in
denying him a jury trial, and (2) the district court’s findings are unsupported by
substantial evidence.
I. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.902 governs demands for jury trial. The
rule specifies a deadline for filing a demand. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.902(2) (“A
party desiring a jury trial . . . must make written demand therefor not later than
ten days after the last pleading directed to that issue.”). Failure to comply with
the timeliness requirement results in waiver of a jury trial. Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.902(1). A separate provision permits the district court to grant a jury trial
absent a demand “for good cause.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.902(4) (“Notwithstanding
the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action . . . the court, in its discretion
on motion and for good cause shown, but not ex parte, and upon such terms as
the court prescribes, may order a trial by jury of any or all issues.”).
3
Calahan correctly notes that we review a district court’s denial of a jury
trial for an abuse of discretion, whether the denial is based on timeliness or good
cause. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., Div. of UtilCorp United Inc. v. City of Hartley,
O’Brien Cty., 497 N.W.2d 874, 876 (Iowa 1993); Schupbach v. Schuknecht, 204
N.W.2d 918, 920 (Iowa 1973). We discern no abuse.
First, no timely jury demand was made; by the time Calahan wrote to the
court requesting a jury trial, the deadline had long since expired. Second,
Calahan made no showing of good cause to support his belated request. He
simply relied on the fact the matter was inadvertently scheduled for a jury trial.
II. This brings us to the district court’s determination that Calahan failed to
prove causation and damages. See Crow v. Simpson, 871 N.W.2d 98, 105
(Iowa 2015) (noting the plaintiff “bore the burden of proving that [the defendant’s]
negligence caused his harm”); Vossoughi v. Polaschek, 859 N.W.2d 643, 654 n.6
(Iowa 2015) (“The elements of any negligence claim are (1) existence of a duty,
(2) breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.”). The record supports
this determination.
Calahan described his medical conditions but presented no evidence tying
the onset or exacerbation of those conditions to the accident, even after the court
gently prodded him to “connect the” injuries to the accident.1 Because the district
court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the court’s
judgment entry in favor of Philbrook. See Chrysler Fin. Co. v. Bergstrom, 703
1
Medical records he proffered were excluded on hearsay grounds. Calahan suggests
this and other rulings revealed bias against him. To the contrary, the district court
explained the rulings and exhibited extraordinary patience with both parties.
4
N.W.2d 415, 418 (Iowa 2005) (“The district court’s findings of fact have the force
of a special verdict and are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence.”).
AFFIRMED.