Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Yawa Tameklo ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0222
Filed November 12, 2015
TYSON FOODS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
YAWA TAMEKLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
A worker’s compensation claimant appeals from a district court ruling on
judicial review. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
H. Allan Sturgeon, Sioux City, for appellant.
Timothy A. Clausen of Klass Law Firm, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
In this appeal of a workers’ compensation decision, we must determine
whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Yawa Tameklo sustained a work-related injury to her right shoulder while
trimming dirty meat off cow carcasses as they proceeded down an assembly line
at Tyson Foods, Inc. After conservative treatment failed to alleviate her pain,
Tameklo underwent surgery, known as “subacromial decompressive
acromioplasty with bursectomy.” Within eleven days, she was placed on light-
duty work. Tameklo returned to full-duty work eight weeks after the surgery.
The pain in Tameklo’s right shoulder did not abate. In fact, she
experienced more pain than she did pre-surgery. Eventually, a physician
diagnosed her with “avascular necrosis,” described in part as a narrowing of the
joint space with particulate debris.
Tameklo petitioned for workers’ compensation benefits. Tyson countered
that the necrosis was not work-related. Following an arbitration hearing, a
deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found “that the avascular necrosis
condition [was] related to [Tameklo’s] work injury.” The deputy awarded Tameklo
healing period benefits. On intra-agency appeal, the commissioner upheld the
award, as well as the deputy’s findings, applications of law to fact, and
conclusions of law. A subsequent application for rehearing was denied.
Tyson sought judicial review. The district court reversed the agency
decision, finding insubstantial evidence to support the commissioner’s
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determination of a causal connection between the injury and Tameklo’s
employment. Tameklo appealed.
II. Substantial Evidence
Our resolution of this appeal is controlled by our standard of review, which
all concede is for substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f) (2011).
While we are obligated to conduct a
fairly intensive review of the record to ensure that the [agency’s]
fact finding is itself reasonable, . . . [w]e do not . . . engage in a
scrutinizing analysis, for if we trench in the lightest degree upon the
prerogatives of the commission, one encroachment will breed
another, until finally simplicity will give way to complexity, and
informality to technicality.
Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 525 (Iowa 2012) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). It is true the Iowa Administrative Procedure
Act requires us to judge agency fact findings “in light of all the relevant evidence
in the record cited by any party that detracts from that finding as well as all of the
relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that supports it.” Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(f)(3). However, we are not allowed to make a determination “as to
whether evidence trumps other evidence or whether one piece of evidence is
qualitatively weaker than another piece of evidence.” Arndt v. City of Le Claire,
728 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Iowa 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To receive workers’ compensation benefits, a claimant must prove the
injury arose out of and in the course of the claimant’s employment. See St.
Luke’s Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Iowa 2000). An injury “arises out of”
employment if there is a causal connection between the employment and the
injury. Id.
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As noted, the commissioner—through his adoption of the deputy
commissioner’s arbitration decision—found a causal connection between
Tameklo’s avascular necrosis and her employment. The commissioner cited the
following evidence: (1) an opinion from the physician who performed the prior
surgery that he believed Tameklo’s “current problem” was “linked to her work
related injury,” but further investigation and management was required, (2) an
opinion from a second physician stating “[i]t is difficult to know if [the avascular
necrosis] is related to her work related injury or not,” and (3) medical literature
proffered by a physician who conducted an independent medical examination.
Tyson argues the first two physicians did not conclusively find a causal
connection and the findings in the article presented by the third physician were
based on a different surgery than Tameklo underwent, involving patients with
different underlying medical issues. We agree. But, our agreement does not
mandate reversal.
The first physician, Dr. Sherman, diagnosed possible avascular necrosis
just eight months after the surgery and stated, “[w]e need to obtain a diagnosis to
see whether this is related to her surgical intervention and her injury at work or
whether it is not.” He ruled out other possible causes such as a fall, injections,
illness, or other joint problems. His subsequent opinion did not foreclose a
causal connection between the injury and work.
The second physician, Dr. Johnson leaned toward an “idiopathic” or
personal cause of the injury.1 However, like Dr. Sherman, he did not conclusively
1
“Idiopathy” is defined as “1. a disease of unknown origin or cause; a primary disease.
2. A disease for which no cause is known.” The American Heritage Dictionary 639 (2d
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rule out a causal connection with Tameklo’s employment, notwithstanding
multiple opportunities to do so.
We are left with the independent medical evaluation performed by the third
physician, Dr. Bansal. His opinion that Tameklo’s avascular necrosis was work-
related was not based on the journal article alone. After reviewing and
summarizing the pertinent medical records, he found a cumulative aggravation of
her original work-related shoulder injury when she returned to full-duty work. He
stated,
In this case, you have an individual that presents with avascular
necrosis shortly after arthroscopic surgery to only that shoulder.
There was no evidence of the avascular necrosis at the time of the
surgery. The avascular necrosis did not occur to any other parts of
the body, including the opposite shoulder. . . . The dots seem to
connect pretty convincingly in my medical opinion.
Setting aside the journal article, these statements amount to substantial evidence
in support of the agency’s finding of a causal connection. See Hill v. Fleetguard,
Inc., 705 N.W.2d 665, 671-73 (Iowa 2005) (“If the finding was excised from the
commissioner's decision, there are still numerous factual findings to support his
conclusion. The use of one unsupported finding was not prejudicial to Hill's
substantial rights.”). Indeed, neither Dr. Sherman nor Dr. Johnson refuted these
portions of Dr. Bansal’s opinion.
We conclude the agency’s finding of a causal connection between
Tameklo’s avascular necrosis and her employment was supported by substantial
evidence. To the extent the determination involves application of law to fact, we
conclude it is not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. See Iowa Code
College ed. 1985). “Generally injuries resulting from risks personal to the claimant are
not compensable.” Koehler Elec. v. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2000).
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§ 17A.19(10)(m); Lakeside Casino v. Blue, 743 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 2007).
We reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for entry of a judgment
affirming the commissioner’s decision.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.