State of Iowa v. Jake Russell Giles ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0021
Filed December 23, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAKE RUSSELL GILES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Worth County, Gregg R.
Rosenbladt, Judge.
The defendant, convicted of two felony offenses as a juvenile, claims the
sentence imposed following resentencing constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. AFFIRMED.
Jonah Hammer Dyer of JHD Law, LLC, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Sharon K. Hall,
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
In June 1999, Jake Giles, a seventeen-year-old juvenile at the time of the
offenses, entered guilty pleas to second-degree robbery and attempted murder in
exchange for dismissal of theft charges. Because both offenses carried
mandatory minimum terms, the “fighting issue” at sentencing was whether the
district court would order the terms to be served concurrently or consecutively.
After a hearing, the court ordered Giles to serve up to ten years on the robbery
conviction and up to twenty-five years on the attempted murder conviction, both
convictions carrying mandatory minimums and the terms to be served
consecutively for a total of thirty-five years in prison.
In July 2014, Giles filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, seeking
resentencing under State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 398-400 (Iowa 2014), which
held “all mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for youthful offenders
are unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause” of the Iowa
constitution. The Lyle court recognized “the sentencing of juveniles according to
statutorily required mandatory minimums does not adequately serve the
legitimate penological objectives in light of the child’s categorically diminished
culpability” and also recognized “the rehabilitative objective [for juveniles] can be
inhibited by mandatory minimum sentences.” 854 N.W.2d at 398-400; see also
State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 99 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring
specially) (stating the gravity of the offense does not affect the applicability of the
juvenile’s rights under the Iowa constitution). However, the Lyle court did not
preclude a district court from sentencing a juvenile to a long term of
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imprisonment with a mandatory minimum before parole eligibility; rather, the
court found such sentences objectionable when the sentence was imposed
under a “one-size-fits-all mandatory sentencing” scheme. Id. at 402-03.
The Lyle court then set out the factors sentencing courts must consider
when sentencing or resentencing a juvenile offender: (1) The age of the offender
and the features of youthful behavior, such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the particular “family and home
environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) the circumstances of the particular
crime and all circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role in the
commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for youthful offenders in navigating
through the criminal process; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the
capacity for change. Id. at 402 n.10. The Lyle court instructed: “Clearly, these
are all mitigating factors, and they cannot be used to justify a harsher sentence.”
Id. In sum, a sentencing court may impose the maximum term, including a
imposing a mandatory minimum if warranted, upon the court’s analysis of the
Lyle factors as applied to an individual juvenile defendant. See id.
At the hearing on Giles’s motion, the State asked the court to resentence
Giles to consecutive sentences with the mandatory minimum terms. Defense
counsel urged the court to waive the mandatory minimums and order concurrent
terms so Giles would immediately be eligible for parole, pointing out the updated
PSI showed Giles had earned the “highest privilege” in prison and had lived on
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the honor unit for over eight years.1 Defense counsel claimed Giles’s behavior
over the past sixteen years contradicted the State’s expert’s opinion at the
original sentencing hearing that Giles could not be rehabilitated. Counsel also
claimed Giles’s “model behavior” confirmed the Iowa Supreme Court’s new
understanding of the developing juvenile brain. Giles made a statement to the
court, expressing remorse for his actions. After also considering the 1999
sentencing record and an updated presentence investigation report, the district
court stated its reasons for ordering Giles to serve the same sentence—
consecutive sentences carrying mandatory minimum terms.
On appeal, Giles claims the court failed to properly and fully consider
three of the Lyle factors—youthful behavior, the family and home environment,
and his capacity for rehabilitation and change. The State admits “it appears
harsh to order Giles, now thirty-four, to serve the remaining minimum term of
nine years on top of the fifteen and one-half years he has already served as a
‘model inmate’” but contends the district court considered the Lyle factors,
reasonably exercised its discretion, and properly resentenced Giles.
“Illegal sentences can be challenged at any time.” State v. Louisell, 865
N.W.2d 590, 595 (Iowa 2015). “A sentence is illegal if it amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment,” and we review such challenges de novo. Id. The sole
issue before us is whether the court unconstitutionally resentenced Giles by
failing to properly consider Lyle’s guideline factors for sentencing juveniles. After
our de novo review of the record, we conclude the resentencing court discharged
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Defense counsel also alerted the court to the fact Giles faces a ten-year prison
sentence in Virginia upon his discharge of his Iowa sentences.
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its duty to utilize “an individualized consideration” under the Lyle standards and
reasonably exercised its discretion in resentencing Giles. See State v. Ragland,
836 N.W.2d 107, 121-22 (Iowa 2014) (holding a sentencing court must utilize “an
individualized consideration”). Accordingly, the newly imposed sentence does
not amount to cruel and unusual punishment, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.