State of Iowa v. Reuben Anthony Stigler ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1495
Filed August 16, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
REUBEN ANTHONY STIGLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.
Lekar, Judge.
Reuben Stigler appeals from his convictions for attempted murder, willful
injury, going armed with intent, domestic abuse assault with intent to cause
serious injury, domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, and false
imprisonment. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Reuben Stigler appeals from his convictions after a bench trial for
attempted murder, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.11 (2015); willful injury,
in violation of section 708.4; going armed with intent, in violation of section 708.8;
domestic abuse assault with intent to cause serious injury, in violation of section
708.2A(2)(c); domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, in violation of section
708.2A(2)(b); and false imprisonment, in violation of section 710.7. Stigler
asserts the district court erred in finding Stigler possessed the requisite specific
intent during the commission of the crimes and overruling Stigler’s motion for
judgment of acquittal. Stigler also contends the district court erred in allowing the
admission of hearsay statements. Because we find the district court did not err in
either respect, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
On the evening of March 23, 2015, Officer Greg Kemp responded to the
home where Stigler and his significant other, Angelina O’Connell, were living.
Sherry Johnson—O’Connell’s friend who was staying at the residence—called
911 to report she believed Stigler was trying to kill O’Connell. When Officer
Kemp entered the house, he located Stigler and O’Connell in a bedroom.
O’Connell’s clothing was very bloody, and she appeared to have stab wounds.
At the hospital, it was confirmed O’Connell had fifteen stab wounds to her face,
torso, chest, side, and legs. Stigler cooperated with Officer Kemp and admitted
he had stabbed O’Connell. As stated by the district court, during an interview
with investigators at the police department following the assault:
3
Stigler gave a highly detailed description of the events and history
leading up to this incident, as well as a detailed description of how
he had stabbed, cut, and hit Ms. O’Connell. Stigler asserted the
incident came about because he believed Ms. O’Connell was not
telling him the truth. In the recording of the interview, Mr. Stigler
repeatedly states he intended to kill her if she did not tell him the
truth.
The bench trial commenced on April 13, 2016. Stigler raised the
diminished responsibility defense.1 Stigler called two expert witnesses—Dr.
Arthur H. Konar and Dr. Thomas Gratzer—in support of his argument he did not
possess the mental capacity to form specific intent at the time of the crimes.
In its July 8, 2016 order, the district court determined the State established
the elements of all the crimes charged, including specific intent, and found Stigler
guilty on all counts. Stigler appeals.
II. Analysis.
A. Diminished Responsibility. Stigler first contends the district court erred
in overruling the motion for judgment of acquittal because there is insufficient
evidence to establish Stigler had the requisite specific intent.2
We review claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for
corrections of errors at law. State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 2005).
1
“The diminished responsibility defense is a common law doctrine that permits proof of
a defendant’s mental condition on the issue of the defendant’s capacity to form a specific
intent in those instances in which the State must prove a defendant’s specific intent as
an element of the crime charged.” State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000).
2
We note Stigler asserts on appeal that “the State failed to disprove [Stigler’s] assertion
that he lacked specific intent due to his compromised mental state.” However,
[a] defense of diminished responsibility does not “requir[e] the State to
disprove the defense as an additional element of its case. . . . [E]vidence
raising a theory of defense like diminished responsibility is simply to be
considered by the jury in determining whether the State met its burden to
prove the element involved.”
State v. Rinehart, 283 N.W.2d 319, 320 (Iowa 1979) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
4
On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court is required to
approach the evidence from a standpoint most favorable to the
government, and to assume the truth of the evidence offered by the
prosecution. If on this basis there is substantial evidence justifying
an interference of guilt, the motion for acquittal must be denied.
State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 192 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. Ellis, 578
N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa 1998)). “‘Evidence is substantial if it would convince a
rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’
Substantial evidence must do more than raise suspicion or speculation.”
Williams, 695 N.W.2d at 27 (citations omitted).
At trial, Stigler testified he was subjected to childhood abuse and believed
he exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Stigler also stated that
prior to his arrest he consumed about one gram of methamphetamine per day.
Stigler testified he had not slept for six or seven days prior to March 23, 2015.
Stigler asserts the evidence shows he did not have the mental capacity to
form specific intent due to his mental health, substance abuse, and lack of sleep.
In support of this argument, Stigler relies on the expert testimony presented at
trial and his own testimony regarding his heavy methamphetamine use 3 and lack
of sleep in the days prior to his assault on O’Connell. Although the experts
opined Stigler’s mental health issues, substance abuse, and lack of sleep could
have affected his capacity to form specific intent, their testimony did not
3
Stigler and O’Connell both also testified Stigler believed officers were present in the
home before officers were actually there, and Stigler contends this fact shows he was
not of sound mind at the time of the assault.
5
unequivocally establish Stigler could not form specific intent under the particular
circumstances.4
The district court carefully analyzed the facts regarding specific intent as
evidenced by its July 8, 2016 order. The court held:
The court finds Mr. Stigler did have specific intent and
specific purpose in committing the actions at issue in this case,
even when considering the defense of diminished responsibility.
The court finds Mr. Stigler was aware of his actions at the time he
committed them. His description of the events remained consistent
from his initial admission in the back of the patrol car, to his
interview with [investigators], and finally, to his visit with his father
at the jail four days after the incident. His description of events,
including his recollection of the injuries inflicted and the weapons
used, are consistent with the evidence found at the scene, the
injuries Ms. O’Connell sustained, . . . and the credible portions of
Ms. O’Connell’s testimony. Further, Mr. Stigler informed police he
was not under the influence of any illegal drugs at the time he
committed the acts involved in this case, and the videos with police
following the incident do not suggest he was hallucinating or under
the influence.
The defense argued Mr. Stigler believed the cops were in
the house well before the time the officers actually arrived at the
residence, meaning he must have been in some sort of
hallucinogenic state. However, according to his testimony, Mr.
Stigler heard Ms. O’Connell yell for Ms. Johnson to call the police,
and Mr. Stigler knew Ms. Johnson was in the house when this
incident occurred. As a result, when Ms. O’Connell acknowledged
officers were in the house, it is reasonable he could have believed
the scenario to be true. . . .
4
Based on his diagnosis that Stigler had amphetamine abuse and dependence, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and depressive disorder, Dr. Konar opined Stigler could have
been hallucinating during the commission of the crimes. However, Stigler denied ever
having hallucinations or delusions. Dr. Konar also agreed people who abuse
methamphetamine are not necessarily removed of their ability to engage in purposeful
and intentional behavior.
Dr. Gratzer did not meet with or evaluate Stigler personally, but provided analysis
based on a hypothetical given to him using the facts of the case. Dr. Gratzer believed it
was possible Stigler was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the assault resulting
from his substance abuse and lack of sleep. However, Dr. Gratzer testified people with
psychosis are still capable of forming specific intent. Both experts relied upon the
amount of drug use and number of days without sleep as stated by Stigler without
independent verification.
6
Finally, Mr. Stigler attacked Ms. O’Connell in at least three
separate incidents, with pauses in between, resulting in [fifteen]
lacerations. This, combined with his repeated statements that he
would kill her if she kept lying, which were admitted by Mr. Stigler
and confirmed by both Ms. O’Connell and Ms. Johnson, suggest he
was aware of his actions. He intended for those actions to cause
the death of Ms. O’Connell.
The court properly considered the diminished responsibility defense and
determined the State met its burden to prove the element of specific intent. On
our review of the record, we agree with the conclusions reached by the district
court that there is substantial evidence establishing Stigler’s specific intent to
commit the crimes considering the evidence most favorable to the State. We find
the court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
B. Hearsay Evidence. Stigler next contends the district court erred in
allowing hearsay statements by O’Connell over defense counsel’s objection.
Specifically, the State played a recording of an interview with O’Connell taken at
the hospital on March 23, 2015, in which O’Connell stated Stigler had stabbed
her, kicked her, and hit her with a hammer. At trial, O’Connell stated she did not
recall the hospital interview. The State was permitted to admit the evidence as a
recorded recollection.
We review hearsay claims for correction of errors at law. State v.
Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2009). “This standard of review extends to
determining whether statements come within an exception to the general
prohibition on hearsay evidence . . . .” Id.
Stigler argues proper foundation was not laid for admission of the hearsay
statements because O’Connell testified listening to the recording did not refresh
her recollection and she had no memory of the interview. Iowa Rule of Evidence
7
5.803(5) defines a recorded recollection as: “A record that (A) is on a matter the
witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and
accurately; (B) Was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh
in the witness’s memory; and (C) Accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge.” If
admitted, the recorded recollection may be read or, as in this instance, played for
the jury but not received as an exhibit. Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(5).
Stigler does not question the accuracy of the recording but rather the
accuracy of O’Connell’s statements during the interview due to the fact she had
suffered a trauma just prior to making the statements. This is not the standard
for the recorded-recollection exception. See State v. Thompson, 397 N.W.2d
679, 683 (Iowa 1986) (“The rule seeks to assure that there has been an accurate
recordation of a past recollection, reasonably contemporaneous with the event,
to use as a substitute for the nonexistent present recollection of the event.”).
At trial, O’Connell testified:
Q. Now, Ms. O’Connell, I know we talked about this once
before, but having reviewed the audio recording of the interview at
the hospital on the night of this incident, you still don’t remember
that interview occurring? A. No, I don’t.
Q. You do recognize your voice? A. Yes, I do.
Q. And you don’t have any reason to dispute the accuracy of
the recording? A. No.
The recording was properly admitted as a recorded recollection. See id.
at 682-83 (noting “a witness must be shown to have an incomplete recollection in
order to invoke rule [5.]803(5)”). O’Connell once knew of the hospital interview
as she was a participant, and she testified she no longer remembers the
interview. Also, the interview occurred at the hospital directly following the
incident and was therefore made when the events were fresh in O’Connell’s
8
memory. O’Connell testified it was her voice on the recording and she had no
reason to dispute the accuracy of the recording. Even if the recording was not
properly admitted under the recorded-recollection exception, its admission would
constitute harmless error as the evidence is cumulative to other evidence
presented at trial.5 See Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a) (“A party may claim error in a
ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of
the party . . . .”); State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 19 (Iowa 2006) (“[E]rroneously
admitted hearsay evidence will not be considered prejudicial if substantially the
same evidence is properly in the record.”).
III. Conclusion.
Because we find the record contains substantial evidence of Stigler’s
specific intent, we conclude the district court did not err in denying the motion for
judgment of acquittal. We further conclude the hearsay evidence was properly
admitted and did not result in prejudice. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.
5
Specifically, the recording of Stigler’s interview with investigators on March 23, 2015,
was admitted into evidence in which Stigler recounts the injuries he inflicted on
O’Connell in great detail.