State of Iowa v. Martin Leon Morales ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-0524
Filed July 16, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARTIN LEON MORALES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van
Marel, District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals from his judgment and sentence for operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense, and driving while barred.
AFFIRMED.
Andrew J. Boettger of Hastings, Gartin & Boettger, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and Mary Howell Sirna, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
Martin Morales appeals his judgment and sentence for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated, third offense, and driving while barred. He contends his
trial attorney was ineffective in (1) only making a cursory motion for judgment of
acquittal on the operating while intoxicated charge and in (2) failing to renew the
motion at the close of all the evidence.
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Morales must show the breach
of an essential duty and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). While such claims are generally preserved for
postconviction relief, “[a] claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on
the failure of counsel to raise a claim of insufficient evidence to support a
conviction is a matter that normally can be decided on direct appeal.” State v.
Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Iowa 2004). We find the record adequate to
decide the issues.
I. It is well settled that a motion for judgment of acquittal must specify
grounds for the motion. State v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164, 174 (Iowa 2011);
Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d at 615. Absent specificity, error is not preserved. See
Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d at 615.
Morales’s attorney did not specify the grounds for his motion. He simply
asserted, “I’d just move for judgment of acquittal.” His general motion failed to
preserve error. Accordingly, we are obligated to review Morales’s present
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of guilt
under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel rubric. Within that framework,
3
if the record in this case fails to reveal substantial evidence to
support the convictions, counsel was ineffective for failing to
properly raise the issue and prejudice resulted. On the other hand,
if the record reveals substantial evidence, counsel’s failure to raise
the claim of error could not be prejudicial. Consequently, the claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel in this case can and should be
addressed on direct appeal.
Id. at 616.
The jury was instructed that the State would have to prove the following
elements of operating while intoxicated: “(1) On or about the 18th day of
December, 2011, the defendant operated a motor vehicle. (2) At that time, the
defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or other drug or a
combination of such substances.” Morales admitted he operated a motor
vehicle. With respect to the second element, a reasonable juror could have
found the following facts. A woman traveling to Ames came up to a truck and
trailer that was driving forty-five miles per hour in a seventy mile per hour zone
and was weaving in and out of its lane. The woman followed the vehicle as it
exited the highway. In the exit lane, the truck came within a foot of striking
another vehicle. The woman contacted the Ames Police Department, which
dispatched an officer to the scene. The officer stopped the vehicle, identified the
driver as Morales, noticed that he had bloodshot and watery eyes and slurred
speech, and administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which showed
impairment. The officer arrested Morales. When asked about the basis for the
arrest, the officer responded as follows:
Based on a call with the witness seeing the vehicle driving back,
the driving behavior, and then when I found the vehicle it had its left
turn signal on was an indicator of impairment. Proceeded to drive
forward after I was behind it and had to use my horn, that was an
additional indicator, the smell of alcohol, the bloodshot watery eyes,
4
the confusing answers, the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, as
well as the balance displayed during the instructional stage of the
walk and turn tests.
A reasonable juror could have found from these facts that Morales was driving
under the influence of alcohol. While Morales testified and provided several
explanations for his erratic behaviors, a reasonable juror could have credited the
State’s evidence over his testimony. See State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 556
(Iowa 2006).
Because there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding of
guilt on the operating while intoxicated count, Morales’s attorney did not breach
an essential duty in failing to articulate specific grounds to support his motion for
judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, Morales’s first ineffective assistance of
counsel claim fails.
II. Morales also contends his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to
renew his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence. Renewal
is no longer required. See State v. Holderness, 293 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa
1980) (“[W]e will no longer have cases in which a defendant fails on appeal
because he overlooked renewing his motion at the end of all the evidence. Thus
he may rely on his unrenewed motion in posttrial motions and on appeal.”). But
even if it were, our determination that the jury’s finding of guilt was supported by
substantial evidence means counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to
renew the motion. Accordingly, his second ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim fails.
5
We affirm Morales’s judgment and sentence for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated.
AFFIRMED.