Karen Lee Doren v. State of Iowa ( 2019 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 18-2155
    Filed December 18, 2019
    KAREN LEE DOREN,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, Richard D. Stochl,
    Judge.
    Karen Doren appeals the summary dismissal of her application for
    postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
    John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Gamble, S.J*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
    .
    2
    GAMBLE, Senior Judge.
    Karen Doren appeals from the summary dismissal of her application for
    postconviction relief (PCR). The district court determined she filed her application
    beyond the three-year statute of limitations provided in Iowa Code section 822.3
    (2015). We agree and affirm.
    On appeal, Doren does not challenge whether she filed her PCR application
    within three years from issuance of procedendo. Rather she argues an exception
    to the three-year limitation applies, namely that her PCR application asserted “a
    ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time
    period.”   See Iowa Code § 822.3.            She also argues PCR counsel was
    constitutionally deficient because counsel
    made no effort to present testimony about [her] general claim that
    there existed evidence of material facts, not previously presented
    and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
    interest of justice nor did he present any testimony about the more
    specific claims regarding “[d]iscovery of false information” and
    “[e]vidence withheld—witnesses.”
    “We generally review postconviction proceedings, including summary
    dismissals of postconviction-relief applications, for errors at law.” Moon v. State,
    
    911 N.W.2d 137
    , 142 (Iowa 2018). “We review claims of ineffective assistance of
    counsel de novo.” State v. Clay, 
    824 N.W.2d 488
    , 494 (Iowa 2012).
    Upon review of the record, we conclude Doren did not provide evidence of
    a “ground of fact or law that could not have been raised” before expiration of the
    three-year limitation. Her general claim that she discovered false information was
    provided to someone and certain evidence was withheld is not sufficient to apply
    the exception. She provided no evidence her discovery could not be made prior
    3
    to the expiration of the statute of limitations. See Harrington v. State, 
    659 N.W.2d 509
    , 520 (Iowa 2003).         Likewise, she demonstrated no nexus between the
    allegedly newly discovered evidence and her conviction. See 
    id. Without such
    showings, Doren cannot establish the exception to the statute of limitations
    applies. We conclude the exception to the three-year limitation does not apply and
    the district court properly dismissed her PCR application as untimely.
    Doren argues her claim was not developed before the PCR court because
    her counsel was ineffective.         To obtain relief from constitutionally deficient
    representation, Doren must establish her counsel failed to perform an essential
    duty and resulting prejudice. See 
    Clay, 824 N.W.2d at 495
    . However, her claim
    is not adequately developed for our consideration on direct appeal. Doren failed
    to present evidence of what actions counsel did or did not take to develop her claim
    and whether her discovery of the allegedly false information and withheld evidence
    could have been discovered prior to the expiration of the three years. Moreover,
    Doren presents nothing to suggest she was prejudiced by counsel’s allegedly
    deficient representation.     Because her claim is not sufficiently developed, we
    decline to consider it. See State v. Harris, 
    919 N.W.2d 753
    , 754 (Iowa 2018) (“If
    the development of the ineffective-assistance claim in the appellate brief was
    insufficient to allow its consideration, the court of appeals should not consider the
    claim, but it should not outright reject it.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-2155

Filed Date: 12/18/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/18/2019