State of Iowa v. Emondre Montrel Henderson ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-2221
Filed October 11, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EMONDRE MONTREL HENDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D. Novak, Judge.
Emondre Henderson appeals from the denial of his motion to correct an
illegal sentence. SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Christopher R. Kemp of Kemp & Sease, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Emondre Henderson appeals from the denial of his motion to correct an
illegal sentence. Henderson pled guilty to robbery in the first degree and was
sentenced on July 28, 2015, to an indeterminate term of twenty-five years with a
mandatory minimum nine years of incarceration before parole eligibility.
Henderson was a juvenile at the time of the offense. Henderson filed a motion to
correct an illegal sentence on October 1, 2015, requesting an individualized
resentencing hearing to allow the district court to consider the factors enunciated
in State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa 2014), before imposing a
mandatory-minimum sentence.
Henderson was originally sentenced on July 28, 2015. Because
Henderson believed the Lyle factors were not fully considered at the time of
sentencing, he filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence.1 At the beginning
of the November 24, 2015 hearing on the motion to correct an illegal sentence,
the district court stated “the proceeding today is to give Mr. Henderson what the
court refers to as a State versus Lyle type of hearing.” In its ruling on the motion
to correct an illegal sentence, the court analyzed each of Lyle factors, denied the
motion, and upheld the original sentence, including the mandatory-minimum
nine-year term. On appeal, Henderson contends the district court improperly
applied the Lyle factors.
“An unconstitutional sentence is an illegal sentence. Consequently, an
unconstitutional sentence may be corrected at any time.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at
1
The same district court judge presided over the original sentencing hearing and the
hearing on the motion to correct an illegal sentence.
3
382 (citation omitted). “Although challenges to illegal sentences are ordinarily
reviewed for correction of legal errors, we review an allegedly unconstitutional
sentence de novo.” Id.
Since the district court’s ruling, our supreme court has further expounded
upon the Lyle factors and the constitutionality of ordering mandatory-minimum
sentences for juvenile offenders. See State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 144 (Iowa
2017) (explaining that while mandatory-minimum sentences for juvenile offenders
are not categorically unconstitutional, “the default rule in sentencing a juvenile is
that they are not subject to minimum periods of incarceration”). Although the
district court attempted to perform a Lyle resentencing hearing and reviewed
each of the Lyle factors on the motion to correct an illegal sentence in this case,
the evidence submitted on the factors was not sufficient under Roby. See 897
N.W.2d at 147 (“[T]he factors [identified in Lyle] must not normally be used to
impose a minimum sentence of incarceration without parole unless expert
evidence supports the use of the factors to reach such a result.”). Here, there
was no expert testimony on any of the Lyle factors to support the imposition of
the mandatory-minimum sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s order
denying the motion to correct an illegal sentence, vacate the sentence, and
remand for resentencing consistent with the sentencing factors as explained in
Roby.2
SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
2
See Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 145-47.