In the Interest of J.J.-n., J.J.-n., and J.J.-n., Minor Children, R.N.-e., Mother, J.J., Father ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1251
Filed November 8, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF J.J.-N., J.J.-N., AND J.J.-N.,
Minor children,
R.N.-E., Mother,
Appellant,
J.J., Father
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Julie
Schumacher, District Associate Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal from the order terminating their
parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Matthew R. Metzgar of Rhinehart Law, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant
mother.
Patrick T. Parry, Sioux City, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ana Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Jessica Noll of Deck Law L.L.P., Sioux City, guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal from the order terminating their
parental rights. The mother argues termination was inappropriate because she
should have been given an additional six months to work toward reunification.
The father argues the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the circumstances leading to adjudication still exist and that the offer or receipt of
services would correct the conditions that led to adjudication. In addition, he
argues the court did not give primary consideration to the children’s best
interests.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The three children at issue were born in October 2010, November 2011,
and December 2014. The mother and children came to the attention of the Iowa
Department of Human Services (DHS) in April 2015 on a report of
methamphetamine use. The father was incarcerated at that time.
The children were adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) in
June 2015 but were placed with the mother due to her participation at the
Women and Children’s Center. The mother participated with Family Treatment
Court and Parent-Child Interaction Therapy (PCIT) in the summer of 2015.
Throughout the fall of 2015 the mother worked with a parent partner and
obtained employment. The mother also had mental-health issues, and it was
recommended she participate in therapy. In October 2015, due to a lack of
daycare, the mother indicated she would discontinue Family Treatment Court
due to her work schedule. In December, she pleaded guilty to a felony in South
Dakota and stopped participating in PCIT. She was encouraged to return to
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PCIT. The mother and children moved to Sanctuary Apartments, and the mother
also completed a parenting class.
At a dispositional hearing in May 2016, the court noted the mother was
struggling with the children’s behavior and was unmotivated to learn parenting
skills. The mother also bought a car with a high monthly payment and requested
funds from DHS to provide car seats for the children. The father was placed at a
residential-treatment facility following his release from prison in the spring of
2016. The mother indicated she hoped to move in with the father following
treatment.
At the November 2016 dispositional hearing, the mother indicated she and
the children were evicted from Sanctuary Apartments the preceding August due
to nonpayment of rent and her housing assistance had been revoked. The
mother and father admitted living together starting in August 2016. The mother
also stopped working and failed to complete a substance-abuse evaluation. Both
parents were on probation, and their probation officer reported neither was
compliant with their probation requirements. At a family team meeting in October
2016, the court stressed to the parents the importance of completing services
and complying with probation requirements. A modification hearing in January
2017 ultimately upheld the placement with the parents.1 A child-abuse
assessment completed January 11, 2017, was founded for denial of critical care
1
In a November 9, 2016 order, the court stated any exhibits for the January hearing
needed to be filed by January 13, 2017. Three exhibits entered by the State were filed
late. Both parents objected and the exhibits were not considered. The exhibits that
were admitted were not enough to sustain the modification petition.
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from both parents due to the presence of methamphetamine in the home which
was accessible by the children.
On February 9, 2017, the Woodbury County Sheriff’s Department
attempted to arrest both parents for probation violations. The father evaded
arrest by using security cameras placed around the home, but the mother was
arrested. The children were placed in protective custody. The sheriff’s
department found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the home. Hair
stat testing on the children showed all three had been exposed to
methamphetamine, and the youngest child had the highest exposure. All three
children were visibly upset upon their removal from the home. Following
placement, the oldest two children asked the foster parents if they could stay
forever. The foster parents noted significant dental issues for one child, and
another had missed seven immunization shots.
The children remained in DHS custody following the April 2017 hearing.
The mother was sentenced to prison and the father was booked in county jail in
April 2017. The termination petition was filed on July 7, 2017, and the hearing
was July 20, 2017. The district court concluded the parents’ admissions to use of
methamphetamine, substantial history of illegal substance abuse and criminal
activity, continuing presence of the issues related to the reasons for adjudication,
and failure to complete services resulted in a determination that the children
could not be returned to the parents at the time of the termination hearing or in
the reasonable future. The court also considered the removal and placement
history of the children, the foster placement, and possibility of the future
placement with a paternal aunt in Maryland when it denied the requests of both
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parents for an additional six months to work toward reunification. Both parents
appeal.
II. Standard of Review
Appellate courts review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de
novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). We give weight to the factual
findings of the district court but are not bound by them. In re Dameron, 306
N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981).
III. The Mother’s Claim
The mother’s sole argument is that the district court should have granted
her six months to work toward reunification pursuant to Iowa Code section
232.104(2)(b) (2017). In order to approve an extension, the district court must
determine “the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of the
additional six-month period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b); In re A.A.G., 708
N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). In some instances extensions are
appropriate, but judges must be particularly aware of time that is lost for children
if the plan fails. In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Iowa 1987).
The mother argues that we are presented with “two separate cases,” and
her circumstances should be considered separately from the father’s. She insists
the father’s potentially lengthy incarceration eliminates his negative presence in
her life and will allow her to reunify with the children. We acknowledge separate
claims are made, but we will not examine the mother’s history in a vacuum.2
2
The best interests of children are a vital consideration, in which a parent’s history and
past performance provide insight to the question of whether the parent is able to provide
for the child in the future. Dameron, 306 N.W.2d at 745.
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The mother has, in periods of separation from the father, maintained
sobriety and engaged with some services. She has also chosen reunification
with the father and use of illegal substances over providing an appropriate
environment for the children. The mother says the relationship with the father is
over, but we are not convinced the mother would put the children’s interests
ahead of her relationship with the father in the future. Even when the father was
incarcerated, the mother failed to complete Family Treatment Court and PCIT,
she prioritized impulsive spending, her housing was unstable, and she was
unmotivated to learn skills to appropriately engage with her children. The mother
has also relapsed multiple times and has an extensive criminal history.
The mother also argues that her expected work release in October 2017
would allow her to visit with the children if the extension were granted. This
would require the children to remain in the area for that time, delaying a possible
placement with a paternal aunt in Maryland. The children have been under the
court’s jurisdiction since April 2015, twenty-seven months at the time of the
termination order. Although the law requires patience with parents attempting to
remedy a lack of parenting skills, we do not require children to wait for a parent to
see the light. Id.; In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
While we acknowledge the mother’s periodic efforts, we agree with the
district court that an additional six months of services will not remedy the need for
removal. We affirm the district court’s denial of the mother’s request for a six-
month extension.
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IV. The Father’s Claims
The father’s rights were terminated under section 232.116(1)(d) and (i).
He appeals both grounds. A termination will be upheld if a single ground is
established. In re N.N., 692 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004). In addition, he
claims termination is not in the children’s best interests under section 232.116(2).
Proceedings to terminate parental rights follow a three-step process in
which a court must first determine whether a ground for termination exists under
section 232.116(1). P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40. If a ground exists, courts will then
consider the best interests of the children under section 232.116(2), and
exceptions to termination under section 232.116(3). Id. Appellate courts need
not discuss any steps not raised on appeal. Id. Because the father does not
raise a claim under 232.116(3), we will not address that step.
A. Grounds for Termination Pursuant to Section 232.116(1)(i)
The father specifically challenges the evidence to support the court’s
finding that section 232.116(1)(i)(3) was satisfied, specifically that “[t]here is clear
and convincing evidence that the offer or receipt of services would not correct the
conditions which led to the abuse or neglect of the child within a reasonable
period of time.” He argues both parents could have benefitted from further
substance-abuse treatment and “hoped that sobriety would be established
following their respective periods of incarceration.”3
The district court noted that over the course of proceedings the father was
offered multiple services including substance-abuse treatment, NA/AA meetings,
3
The father argues for both parents here. He does not have standing to argue for the
mother. In re K.R., 737 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).
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and hair stat testing. Despite the offer of services, the father was not successful
in addressing his substance abuse. Upon examination of the home following the
mother’s arrest in February 2017, methamphetamine was found within the reach
of the children and all three children tested positive for the substance. Also, the
father’s continuing violation of his probation requirements led to his arrest in
February 2017.
Clear and convincing evidence exists when no “serious or substantial
doubts” exist regarding legal conclusions based on the evidence. In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The law grants patience to parents who need to
learn to parent appropriately, but that patience is built into the timeline created in
chapter 232. A.C., 415 N.W.2d at 613. The statutory timeline “is to prevent
children from being perpetually kept in foster care and to see that some type of
permanent solution is provided for the children.” In re J.P., 499 N.W.2d 334, 339
(Iowa Ct. App. 1993). The State must extend reasonable efforts to reunify a
parent and child consistent with a child’s best interests. C.B., 611 N.W.2d at
493. If a service has not been offered, it is the parent’s job to demand it. In re
H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
The father’s substance abuse has been a bar to reunification with the
children, and he now argues he should be given another chance at treatment.
However, this is not a situation where treatment has not been offered. We agree
with the district court that the father has failed to address his substance abuse
despite being offered services to do so, and that granting additional time for the
father to complete treatment would cause further harm to the children by delaying
permanency. We affirm termination pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(i).
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B. Best Interests
The father’s final argument is that termination is not in the best interests of
the children as defined in section 232.116(2). Courts must give “primary
consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “It is well-settled law
that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a
ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will
learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” P.L.,
778 N.W.2d at 41.
The record reveals the father cannot provide a stable home for the
children at any time in the foreseeable future. He faces a number of criminal
charges in Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota, and he admitted at the
termination hearing there is a possibility of a fifteen-year suspended sentence
being imposed in Iowa. The father has also failed to address his substance-
abuse issues. The children are doing well in their current foster placement and
have the possibility of an adoptive placement with a paternal aunt in Maryland.
On our de novo review, we agree with the district court that termination of the
father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.