The Estate of Mercedes Gottschalk by Co-Executors Rebecca Rassler and Richard Gottschalk v. Pomeroy Development, Inc. D/B/A Pomeroy Care Center, and State of Iowa, Pomeroy Development, Inc., D/B/A Pomeroy Care Center, Third-Party v. State of Iowa, Third-Party ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1326
Filed March 23, 2016
THE ESTATE OF MERCEDES GOTTSCHALK BY CO-EXECUTORS
REBECCA RASSLER AND RICHARD GOTTSCHALK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
POMEROY DEVELOPMENT, INC. d/b/a POMEROY CARE CENTER,
Defendant, and
STATE OF IOWA,
Defendant-Appellee.
POMEROY DEVELOPMENT, INC., d/b/a POMEROY CARE CENTER,
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Calhoun County, Thomas J. Bice,
Judge.
An estate and a nursing home appeal the district court’s decision granting
summary judgment to the State of Iowa. AFFIRMED.
Willis J. Hamilton of Hamilton Law Firm, P.C., Storm Lake, for appellant
Estate.
David H. Luginbill and Conner L. Wasson of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des
Moines for appellant Pomeroy.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Joanne Moeller, Assistant
Attorney General, Special Litigation Division, for appellee.
Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Potterfield, JJ.
2
VOGEL, Judge.
On interlocutory review, the Estate of Mercedes Gottschalk (the Estate)
and Pomeroy Development, Inc. d/b/a Pomeroy Care Center (Pomeroy) appeal
the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the State of Iowa. The
Estate and Pomeroy claim the district court erred in concluding the State had no
duty of care as a matter of law, and the Estate also claims the court erred in
determining the State had sovereign immunity. Pomeroy claims there were
genuine issues of material fact that prevented summary judgement and it was
improper for the district court to grant summary judgment when there was a
pending motion to compel discovery relevant to the issues before the court.
Because we agree the State had no duty of care as a matter of law, we affirm the
district court’s decision.1
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
William Cubbage was a convicted sex offender, who was committed to the
Civil Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (the CCUSO) on May 21, 2002.
Cubbage had previously been convicted of “assault with intent to commit sexual
abuse (in 2000), indecent contact with a child (1997 and 1991), and lascivious
acts with a child (1987).” In re Det. of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d 442, 443 (Iowa
2003). He had been diagnosed with pedophilia and a personality disorder not
otherwise specified with antisocial and narcissistic features. In 2006 while he
was committed at the CCUSO, he was also diagnosed with dementia of the
Alzheimer’s type, and his mental and physical functioning declined. It was
1
The claims asserted by the Estate against Pomeroy were not part of the summary
judgment proceeding and remain pending in district court.
3
mutually agreed between the director of the department of human services, the
attorney general’s office, and the public defender’s office that Cubbage was
unable to make further gains from his civil commitment at the CCUSO but also
agreed Cubbage was seriously mentally impaired and needed full-time custody
and care. On November 16, 2010, the district court entered an order placing
Cubbage under an Iowa Code chapter 229 (2009) civil commitment and ordered
Cubbage be placed at the Pomeroy Care Center until it was determined he no
longer needed care. In entering this order, the district court determined
Cubbage’s decision-making process was significantly impaired due to this
underlying Alzheimer’s illness and found he was a danger to himself and others
due to his dementia and executive dysfunction. With the civil commitment under
chapter 229 in place, Cubbage’s attorney filed a motion to discharge him from
the CCUSO on November 24, 2010. The district court granted the discharge the
same day. Cubbage was transferred to Pomeroy on December 8, 2010.
Prior to his arrival at Pomeroy, the treating team at the CCUSO met with
the administrative staff at Pomeroy to discuss Cubbage’s background including
his sexual offenses and his physical ailments. Cubbage’s behavior was
discussed, and the CCUSO staff advised the Pomeroy employees that Cubbage
was not likely to be a danger to others in the facility due to his diagnosis of pre-
adolescent pedophilia. The main concern was to monitor Cubbage whenever
children from the local school or day care were present in the facility.
On August 21, 2011, another resident at Pomeroy, Mercedes Gottschalk,
was sexually assaulted by Cubbage. The assault was witnessed by a staff
4
member’s child, who was walking through the hall and saw Cubbage in
Gottschalk’s room.
Gottschalk filed suit against Pomeroy, and later the State of Iowa, for
negligence. Gottschalk specifically claimed the State was negligent in failing to
prepare a safety plan for Cubbage after he was placed in the facility, in failing to
inspect and determine that appropriate safety precautions were followed, and in
decreasing nursing home oversight. After Gottschalk died, the Estate was
substituted as plaintiff in the case. Thereafter, Pomeroy asserted a cross-claim
against the State for contribution in the event it was found liable to the Estate.
The cross-claim asserted the State was negligent in failing to supervise and
monitor Cubbage while at Pomeroy, and in misrepresenting Cubbage was no
longer a risk or threat to society or the elderly prior to his admission at Pomeroy.
The State filed a motion for summary judgment against the claims
asserted by the Estate and Pomeroy on May 28, 2014, claiming it had no duty to
prepare a safety plan or inspect and follow up after Cubbage was discharged
from the CCUSO. It likewise asserted in response to Pomeroy’s cross-claim that
it had no duty to supervise or monitor Cubbage after he was discharged. Finally,
the State asserted it was immune from claims for misrepresentation under Iowa
Code section 669.14(4) (2013). The Estate filed a motion to compel discovery of
documents the State had refused to produce. The State refused production by
claiming the requested documents were protected and confidential under various
provisions of the Iowa Code, and by asserting the attorney-client privilege and
attorney-work-product doctrine. The Estate and Pomeroy also filed resistances
to the State’s motion for summary judgment.
5
The district court granted summary judgment to the State, agreeing the
State owed no duty to provide a safety plan for Cubbage because he had been
unconditionally discharged from the CCUSO in November of 2010. The court
likewise found the State owed no common law duty to Gottschalk or Pomeroy to
supervise or monitor Cubbage after he was discharged. Finally, the court held
the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented any claim of misrepresentation
against the State under Iowa Code section 669.14(4). Because the court
dismissed the claims against the State in their entirety, the court concluded the
Estate’s pending motion to compel discovery was moot.
From this ruling, both the Estate and Pomeroy filed petitions for
interlocutory appeal, which were granted by the supreme court, which then
transferred the case to this court.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
Our review of the district court’s summary judgment decision is for the
correction of errors at law. Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Iowa
2009). Summary judgment is proper “only if there is ‘no genuine issue as to any
material fact’ and ‘the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id. (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)). The district court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the party seeking
summary judgment has the burden of proof. Id. Normally, questions of
negligence are for the jury, but in exceptional cases, the issues may be decided
as a matter of law. Id.6
III. Duty of Care.
The Estate claims the State had both a duty to warn the residents and a
duty to ensure safety protocols were in place to prevent harm to the residents of
the Pomeroy Care Center. Pomeroy likewise argues the State had a duty to
Pomeroy because of the special relationship between Cubbage and the State by
virtue of Cubbage’s commitment to, and subsequent discharge from, the
CCUSO. The Estate raises a new issue on appeal, namely that the State had a
duty of care in discharging Cubbage from the CCUSO because the residents of
the Pomeroy Care Center were within a foreseeable risk of harm and the State
was aware Cubbage was a danger to himself or others, preventing the State from
generally releasing Cubbage into the community at large.
A. Error Preservation.
The State claims the Estate failed to preserve error on its claims that the
State negligently placed Cubbage in the nursing home or negligently failed to
warn the residents of his presence. Likewise, the State claims Pomeroy failed to
preserve error on its claim the State negligently discharged Cubbage from the
CCUSO. While these claims were raised in both the Estate’s and Pomeroy’s
resistances to the State’s motion for summary judgment, the district court did not
address these claims in its ruling. Neither the Estate nor Pomeroy filed a motion
under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), requesting the court to rule on
whether the State owed a duty under these claims.
“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily
be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on
appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). If the district
7
court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, that party must file a
motion requesting a ruling in order to assert the claim on appeal. Id. There is
nothing in the district court’s ruling that indicates it considered the issues of
negligent discharge, negligent placement, or failure to warn when granting
summary judgment to the State. See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 864
(Iowa 2012) (“If the court’s ruling indicates that the court considered the issue
and necessarily ruled on it, even if the court’s reasoning is ‘incomplete or sparse,’
the issue has been preserved.” (citation omitted)). We thus agree with the State
that neither the Estate nor Pomeroy preserved error on these claims.2
The State does not challenge error preservation with respect to the claims
the district court addressed in its ruling. The court concluded there was no
statutory duty to provide a safety plan because Cubbage was unconditionally
discharged from the CCUSO. The court also ruled there was no common law
duty to supervise or monitor Cubbage after he was discharged. Therefore, we
confine our opinion on appeal to these issues, which were properly preserved.
2
Even if we were to find these issues preserved, we would still find the State did not owe
a duty with respect to a negligent discharge or negligent placement claim. It was not the
State that discharged Cubbage from the CCUSO or that placed Cubbage in the
Pomeroy facility. Those were decisions made by the district court. Neither Pomeroy nor
the Estate made a claim against the district court for those decisions, and nor can they in
light of judicial immunity. See Blanton v. Barrick, 258 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Iowa 1977)
(“Few doctrines have been more settled than the absolute immunity of judges from
damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. This immunity applies even
when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly because as a matter of
policy it is in the public best interest that judges should exercise their function without
fear of consequences and with independence.”). The extent of the State’s role in
Cubbage’s discharge and placement was an agreement entered into between the
department of human services, the attorney general’s office, and Cubbage’s legal
representation that a recommendation be made to the court for Cubbage’s discharge
from the CCUSO and his placement in the Pomeroy facility. There is no allegation that
the State acted improperly in entering into this agreement.
8
B. Analysis.
Whether a duty is owed under the particular facts of a case is a matter of
law for the court’s determination. Hoyt v. Gutterz Bowl & Lounge L.L.C., 829
N.W.2d 772, 775 (Iowa 2013). Our supreme court has recently adopted the
Restatement (Third) of Torts’s articulation of the duty of care in negligence
actions: “An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the
actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.” Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 834(quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm
§ 7(a), at 90 (Am. Law Inst. Proposed Final Draft No.1, 2005)). The supreme
court noted the general duty of reasonable care will apply in most cases and the
assessment of whether there is a duty no longer depends on the foreseeability of
harm based on the specific facts of the case. Id. at 834–35. However, in
exceptional cases the court may decide there is no duty or the duty should be
modified because “an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants
denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases.” Id. at 835 (quoting
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 7(b) (Am.
Law Inst. Proposed Final Draft No.1, 2005)). This countervailing principle or
policy also does not depend on the foreseeability of harm. Id. An assessment of
foreseeability is allocated to the factfinder in its determination of whether there
was a breach of a duty, not a court’s determination of whether such duty exists.
Id.
A duty can also exist to a third party when there is a special relationship
between the actor and another. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for
Physical & Emotional Harm § 41(a) (Am. Law Inst. 2012) (“An actor in a special
9
relationship with another owes a duty of reasonable care to third parties with
regard to risks posed by the other that arise within the scope of the
relationship.”). Examples of these special relationships in which a duty can be
owed to a third party include “(1) a parent with dependent children, (2) a
custodian with those in its custody, (3) an employer with employees when the
employment facilitates the employee’s causing harm to third parties, and (4) a
mental-health professional with patients.” Id. § 41(b).
Prior to Thompson, our supreme court determined when a special
relationship existed between an actor and another person, such as between a
psychiatrist and a patient, the special relationship can give rise to a duty to either
control the behavior of the other person or to protect a third party. See Leonard
v. State, 491 N.W.2d 508, 510–11 (Iowa 1992). However, the court determined
the scope of that duty turns on the foreseeability of harm to the third party. Id. at
511. The court determined there were “strong public policy concerns about the
potential for limitless liability when an individual’s decision might affect the
general public.” Id. at 512. “We believe that the risks to the general public posed
by the negligent release of dangerous mental patients would be far outweighed
by the disservice to the general public if treating physicians were subject to civil
liability for discharge decisions.” Id. The court held “a psychiatrist owes no duty
of care to an individual member of the general public for decisions regarding the
treatment and release of mentally ill persons from confinement.” Id.While the Leonard court focused on foreseeability, a factor we no longer
are to consider when determining whether a duty exists under Thompson,
ultimately, the foreseeability discussion was part of the court’s determination that
10
there were “strong public policy concerns” with imposing potentially limitless
liability on the decision to release a mentally ill person. Id. Interpreting Leonard
in light of our supreme court’s adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts’s new
definition of duty, we conclude that the Leonard case was the exceptional case
involving “an articulated countervailing principle or policy” that warranted
“denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases.” See Thompson, 774
N.W.2d at 835 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical &
Emotional Harm § 7(b) (Am. Law Inst. Proposed Final Draft No.1, 2005)).
The negligence alleged by the Estate and Pomeroy in this case with
respect to the State was that the State owed a duty to supervise or monitor
Cubbage after he was discharged from the CCUSO so as to protect the residents
of Pomeroy.3 However, upon the unconditional discharge of Cubbage from the
CCUSO—a decision made by the district court—the special relationship between
the State and Cubbage ended.4 See Iowa Code § 229A.2(4) (“‘Discharge’
means an unconditional discharge from the sexually violent predator program. A
person released from a secure facility into a transitional release program or
released with or without supervision is not considered to be discharged.”). After
3
At the district court, the Estate also claimed the State owed a statutory duty to develop
and implement a safety plan for Cubbage. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for
Physical & Emotional Harm § 28 (Am. Law Inst. 2012) (“When a statute requires an
actor to act for the protection of another, the court may rely on the statute to decide that
an affirmative duty exists and to determine the scope of the duty.”). The district court
rejected this assertion in the summary judgment ruling, noting that the statute requiring
the implementation of a safety plan only applied to patients who were subject to
transitional release under section 229A.8A. Because Cubbage was unconditionally
discharged under section 229A.10, there was no statutory duty for a safety plan. Neither
party appeals this ruling of the district court, and we thus need not address it further.
4
As noted above, any claim that the State was negligent in entering into an agreement
for Cubbage to be discharged from the CCUSO was not ruled on by the district court and
is thus not preserved for appellate review.
11
the district court issued the discharge order, the State had no ongoing obligation
to monitor or supervise Cubbage.
Pomeroy claims the State’s actions after the allegations of sexual assault
arose against Cubbage show there is a factual dispute as to whether the State
had an ongoing duty to supervise or monitor Cubbage. After the sexual assault
came to light, Pomeroy contacted the physicians who had treated Cubbage at
the CCUSO and those physicians visited Pomeroy, spoke to staff members, and
offered training. However, the fact the State volunteered help to Pomeroy after
the assault occurred does not establish the State owed a duty to the Pomeroy
residents or to Pomeroy after Cubbage was unconditionally discharged from the
CCUSO. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the State in
light of the fact that there was no duty of care owed by the State after Cubbage’s
discharge from the CCUSO.
IV. Sovereign Immunity.
Next, the Estate claims the district court erred in concluding the State was
immune from suit for claims based on misrepresentation. We note the Estate
never asserted a cause of action for misrepresentation against the State. It was
Pomeroy that sued the State alleging the State misrepresented Cubbage’s
likelihood to reoffend when the staff of the CCUSO met with Pomeroy’s staff to
discuss placing Cubbage in the facility. The State never made any
representations to Gottschalk, her family, or the other residents of Pomeroy. It
was Pomeroy, not the Estate, that suffered an adverse ruling when the district
court concluded the State had sovereign immunity for claims of
misrepresentation under Iowa Code section 669.14(4). However, Pomeroy does
12
not challenge the district court’s sovereign immunity ruling on appeal. Because
the Estate did not suffer as a result of this portion of the district court’s ruling and
because the Estate cannot raise claims on appeal on behalf of Pomeroy, we
affirm the decision of the district court concluding the State had sovereign
immunity for the misrepresentation claims asserted by Pomeroy. See Vicorp
Restaurants v. Bader, 590 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 1999) (“It is true that a party
may appeal only from an adverse judgment and not from a finding or conclusion
of law not prejudicial, no matter how erroneous.”); Ackerman v. Lauver, 242
N.W.2d 342, 347 (Iowa 1976) (“Without passing on the correctness of the trial
court’s decision, we hold [a party] cannot have a reversal because the court—
correctly or incorrectly—decided the claim of two other litigants.”).
V. Factual Disputes.
Pomeroy asserts the district court was wrong to grant summary judgment
when there were factual disputes regarding issues of material fact. Specifically,
Pomeroy asserts there were issues of fact regarding whether the State acted
negligently in discharging Cubbage from the CCUSO, and whether the State
acted negligently in performing its role in the civil commitment of Cubbage at
Pomeroy under Iowa Code chapter 229. As stated earlier, the actual discharge
and placement decisions were made by the district court. Pomeroy did not
preserve error to the extent it wanted to assert the State was negligent in its role
in entering into an agreement with Cubbage’s attorney to discharge Cubbage
from the CCUSO under chapter 229A or any role it might have played in having
Cubbage civilly committed and placed at Pomeroy under chapter 229. The
district court did not address the negligent discharge or negligent placement
13
claims in the summary judgment decision and no motion under rule 1.904(2) was
filed. Thus, any claim of error alleging there were disputes regarding issues of
material fact on these claims when the summary judgment was granted was not
preserved for our review.
VI. Motion to Compel.
Finally, Pomeroy claims the district court erred in granting summary
judgment when there was a pending motion to compel that was relevant to the
very issues before the court. First of all, we note it was the Estate’s motion to
compel, not Pomeroy’s. The pending motion to compel sought for the State to
produce Cubbage’s annual evaluations while he was at the CCUSO; the 90-day
patient assessments of Cubbage; copies of all correspondence between the
CCUSO, the Iowa Department of Human Services, and the Iowa Attorney
General’s office concerning Cubbage’s transfer of care to the Pomeroy Care
Center; and all documents reviewed by the physician who prepared the
discharge evaluation of Cubbage.
Pomeroy claims the discovery is directly relevant to the State’s duty of
care. The district court dismissed the State as a party based on its conclusion
the State had no duty to supervise, monitor, or provide a safety plan after
Cubbage was discharged from the CCUSO. These discovery requests do not
address whether the State had a duty to supervise, monitor, or provide a safety
plan after Cubbage was discharged from the CCUSO. The pending motion to
compel discovery pertained to the claims that the State was negligent in entering
into an agreement that discharged Cubbage from the CCUSO and placing him at
Pomeroy, as well as negligent in failing to warn the residents of Pomeroy—
14
claims the district court did not address in its ruling on summary judgment. No
one filed a motion under rule 1.904(2) requesting the court to address the State’s
duty pursuant to these claims. As we indicated above, these negligence claims
have not been preserved for our review due to a lack of a rule 1.904(2) motion.
Likewise, any claimed error based on the court’s failure to consider these claims
when determining how to rule on the motion to compel was also not preserved.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the motion
to compel was moot in light of its decision on the motion for summary judgment.
See Keefe v. Bernard, 774 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Iowa 2009) (“Our review of a ruling
by the district court on a motion to compel discovery is for abuse of discretion.”).
VII. Conclusion.
Because we conclude the State did not owe a duty to supervise, monitor,
or provide a safety plan for Cubbage following the district court’s decision to
unconditionally discharge Cubbage from the CCUSO, we affirm the district
court’s decision granting summary judgment to the State. To the extent that
Pomeroy or the Estate assert claims that the State was in some way negligent in
its role in the proceedings to discharge Cubbage or place him in the Pomeroy
facility following his civil commitment, those claims are not preserved for our
review. We affirm the decision of the district court concluding the State had
sovereign immunity for the misrepresentation claims because Pomeroy did not
seek appellate review of this decision. We likewise agree with the district court’s
decision that the motion to compel is moot because the motion did not seek
discoverable information related to the claims addressed by the district court and
15
the parties did not preserve error on the negligent discharge or negligent
placement claims.
AFFIRMED.