State of Iowa v. Chad P. Finn , 919 N.W.2d 767 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1013
Filed June 6, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHAD P. FINN,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark D. Cleve, Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) with intent to deliver. AFFIRMED.
Thomas A. Hurd of Glazebrook & Hurd, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
Chad Finn appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) with intent to deliver. We find Finn has not shown he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. The evidence does not show the State breached
the terms of the plea agreement and, therefore, defense counsel did not have an
obligation to object. We affirm Finn’s conviction.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Finn was charged with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) with intent to deliver, in violation of Iowa Code section
124.401(1)(c) (2016), a class “C” felony. He signed a written plea agreement in
which he agreed to plead guilty to the charge and “[t]he State will recommend
supervised probation, recognizing the Court may grant a deferred judgment.” The
district court accepted Finn’s guilty plea.
At the sentencing hearing, held on June 8, 2017, the following exchange
occurred:
THE COURT: What is the State's recommendation?
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, the State recommends that the
Court sentence Mr. Finn to 10 years of incarceration at the
Department of Corrections; that that sentence be suspended; that he
be placed on 3 years of probation; that his driver’s license be
suspended for 180 days; that he provide a DNA sample; and the
State has no objection to the Court declining to impose any minimum
under 124.413.
THE COURT: In other words, deferring that decision,
counsel?
PROSECUTOR: No.
THE COURT: I am not sure I understand what you are
recommending.
PROSECUTOR: I am saying that the Court need not—that
there are sufficient extenuating circumstances to not impose a
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124.413 minimum. And on July 1st, even if you did impose it, it would
vanish into nothing.
THE COURT: Now I understand what you are telling me.
Thank you.
Defense counsel also initially requested supervised probation. The court
sentenced Finn to a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years, suspended the
sentence, and placed him on probation for two years. The court stated:
The reasons for the Court’s sentence are first of all, it
incorporates and adopts the plea agreement of the parties, which the
Court finds to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances, and
the Court determines that the sentence imposed will provide properly
for the reform and rehabilitation of Mr. Finn and for the protection of
the community.
At the close of the hearing, defense counsel stated Finn was also requesting
a deferred judgment. The court stated it would consider the request and asked the
parties to address it. The prosecutor stated, “The State abides by its plea
agreement and—where we were not objecting to it.” The following then occurred:
THE COURT: What position does the State take on the merits
in regards to the defendant's request for a deferred judgment?
PROSECUTOR: The State believes that if—it appears the
Defendant is eligible.
THE COURT: Does the State resist or join in the request for a
deferred judgment?
PROSECUTOR: The State recognizes that it is within the
Court’s power to grant it here today.
THE COURT: All right.
The court denied the request for a deferred judgment, noting Finn’s lengthy
criminal history. Finn now appeals, claiming he received ineffective assistance of
counsel.
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II. Standard of Review
We conduct a de novo review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove (1) counsel failed to
perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied the
defendant a fair trial. Id. A defendant’s failure to prove either element by a
preponderance of the evidence is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance. State
v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2003).
III. Ineffective Assistance
Finn claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel did
not object when the prosecutor responded, “No,” to the court’s question, “In other
words, deferring that decision, counsel?” Finn states the prosecutor’s response
was contrary to the terms of the plea agreement, which provided the State would
“recommend supervised probation, recognizing the Court may grant a deferred
judgment.” Finn claims the State’s negative response breached the plea
agreement by indicating the State was opposed to Finn receiving a deferred
judgment.
Finn’s argument misapprehends the gist of the exchange between the court
and the prosecutor. At the end of his recommendation, the prosecutor indicated
the State would not object if the court declined to impose a mandatory minimum
sentence under section 124.413. The court then asked if “that decision” should be
deferred, and the prosecutor said, “No.” The court asked for further clarification
and the prosecutor again stated a mandatory minimum sentence did not need to
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be imposed.1 Based on the prosecutor’s statements after the court stated, “I am
not sure I understand what you are recommending,” we find the prosecutor was
not indicating whether Finn should receive a deferred judgment but was making a
recommendation about whether a mandatory minimum sentence should be given.
Furthermore, when the issue of whether Finn should receive a deferred
judgment was explicitly raised, the prosecutor’s response followed the terms of the
plea agreement. The prosecutor stated, “the State abides by its plea agreement
and—where we were not objecting to it.” Also, when asked if the State resisted or
joined in the request for a deferred judgment, the prosecutor stated, “The State
recognizes that it is within the Court’s power to grant it here today,” which follows
the plea agreement providing the State would “recogniz[e] the Court may grant a
deferred judgment.”
We find Finn has not shown he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
The evidence does not show the State breached the terms of the plea agreement
and, therefore, defense counsel did not have an obligation to object. We affirm
Finn’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
1
The prosecutor noted even if a mandatory minimum sentence were imposed, on July 1,
2017, “it would vanish into nothing.” This is because at the time of the hearing, on June 8,
2017, section 124.413 had been amended, to be effective on July 1, 2017, to eliminate
the requirement of a mandatory minimum sentence for those convicted under section
124.401(1)(c), as was Finn. See 2017 Iowa Acts ch. 122, § 10.