Blake Allen Huffman v. State of Iowa , 919 N.W.2d 766 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-2035
Filed June 6, 2018
BLAKE ALLEN HUFFMAN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Grundy County, George L. Stigler,
Judge.
Applicant appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Chad R. Frese of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Aaron J. Rogers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
2
MCDONALD, Judge.
Blake Huffman appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. By way of background, Huffman was convicted of five counts of sexual
abuse in the second degree, one count of sexual abuse in the third degree, and
one count of assault with intent to commit sex abuse arising out of the abuse of
two minors. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions. See State v.
Huffman, No. 14-1143, 2015 WL 5278980, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015).
More recently, this court affirmed the denial of Huffman’s motion for new trial, in
which Huffman contended one of the victims recanted the abuse allegations. See
State v. Huffman, No. 16-0980, 2017 WL 6513562, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20,
2017) (affirming denial and explaining the witness did not recant but actually
reasserted the allegations of abuse in a later deposition).
In this appeal, Huffman contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally
deficient representation in failing to object to a single sentence in the testimony of
a forensic interviewer that allegedly vouched for the credibility of the victims. To
establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Huffman must establish
that his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that this failure resulted
in prejudice. See State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1999). To show
a breach of an essential duty, Huffman must establish “the attorney performed
below the standard demanded of a reasonably competent attorney.” Ledezma v.
State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). The attorney’s performance is measured
against “prevailing professional norms,” and it is presumed the attorney performed
competently. See id. The ultimate inquiry regarding prejudice is whether counsel’s
allegedly deficient performance caused a complete “breakdown in the adversary
3
process” such that the convictions are unreliable. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This requires a showing “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Iowa 1998)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the defendant’s trial.” Id.The district court concluded Huffman failed to establish he suffered
constitutional prejudice from the alleged breach of duty. Huffman contends this
was error because prejudice should be presumed when an expert bolsters the
credibility of the witnesses. We disagree. In an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim challenging the failure to object to allegedly impermissible vouching
testimony, the defendant must still prove he suffered constitutional prejudice. See
State v. Basquin, No. 17-0057, 2018 WL 1858378, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 18,
2018) (rejecting vouching claim on prejudice grounds); State v. Simonich, No. 16-
1906, 2017 WL 5179004, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2017) (finding no prejudice
in resolving improper vouching claim); State v. Aguilar, No. 14-1225, 2015 WL
5965076, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2015) (same).
Huffman also contends he has proved constitutional prejudice. We
disagree. First, this court has already rejected substantially the same claim on
direct appeal. In Huffman’s direct appeal, he contended his “trial counsel was
ineffective for allowing the expert witness to vouch for the witness’s credibility
without proper objections.” Huffman, 2015 WL 5278980, at *1. In his direct appeal,
Huffman identified the specific testimony to which he claimed his counsel should
have objected. This court rejected the claim, concluding Huffman was not
4
“prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object.” Id.; see also id. at 6 (“We also do not
believe Huffman has established that he suffered prejudice because of trial
counsel’s failure to act.”). Like the prior panel, we conclude Huffman has not
established constitutional prejudice. Second, Huffman’s claim is barred res
judicata. See Iowa Code § 822.8 (“Any ground finally adjudicated or not raised, or
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in
the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to
secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application.”); Lambert v. Iowa
Dep’t of Transp., 804 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Iowa 2011) (“A valid final judgment on a
claim generally precludes relitigation of the same claim or any part of it. The rule
governing claim preclusion is based on the principle that a party may not split or
try his claim piecemeal, but must put in issue and try his entire claim or put his
entire defense in the case on trial.”); Holmes v. State, 775 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2009) (“A post-conviction proceeding is not intended as a vehicle for
relitigation, on the same factual basis, of issues previously adjudicated, and the
principle of res judicata bars additional litigation on this point.”)
The district court did not err in denying Huffman’s application for
postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.