In re the Marriage of Schenkelberg ( 2019 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 17-2035
    Filed May 15, 2019
    IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JULIANNE R. SCHENKELBERG
    AND GARY W. SCHENKELBERG
    Upon the Petition of
    JULIANNE R. SCHENKELBERG,
    Petitioner-Appellee,
    And Concerning
    GARY W. SCHENKELBERG,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, William C. Ostlund,
    Judge.
    Gary Schenkelberg appeals the district court’s order denying his petition to
    modify the parties’ dissolution decree to decrease his spousal support obligation
    to Julianne Schenkelberg. AFFIRMED.
    Gregory J. Siemann of Green, Siemann & Greteman PLC, Carroll, for
    appellant.
    J.C. Salvo and Bryan D. Swain of Salvo, Deren, Schenck, Gross, Swain &
    Argotsinger, PC, Harlan, for appellee.
    Considered by Vogel, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
    2
    VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
    This is the second appeal arising from the spousal support provision of Gary
    and Julianne Schenkelberg’s dissolution decree. The couple married in 1994 and
    divorced in 2009. The district court ordered Gary to pay Julianne spousal support
    of $5000 per month until she turned sixty-two, died, or remarried, and $2000 per
    month thereafter, until she turned seventy, died, or remarried.
    Gary appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court increased his obligation to $7000
    per month until Julianne’s death or remarriage.             See In re Marriage of
    Schenkelberg, 
    824 N.W.2d 481
    , 488 (Iowa 2012). The court reasoned that the
    district court failed to consider his “substantial distributions” from his subchapter S
    corporation. 
    Id.
     at 484–85. Specifically, the court stated:
    As long as Gary has an interest in the corporation, there is no
    reason to believe that he will not be receiving a substantial cash
    distribution from the corporation, even if he no longer receives a
    salary from it. Moreover, if he divests himself from his ownership in
    the corporation, we believe the value he will receive for his interest
    in the corporation will generate sufficient funds to reinvest in another
    asset that will provide him with substantial income.
    
    Id. at 487
    .
    In time, Gary filed a petition to modify the spousal support provision. He
    testified deterioration in the agricultural economy required a forced sale of the
    business and his advancing age and declining health prevented him from obtaining
    meaningful employment.
    The district court denied the petition after finding “no material change of
    circumstance or one that was not contemplated by the supreme court.” Gary
    moved for enlarged findings and conclusions. The district court denied the motion,
    reasoning as follows:
    3
    [T]his Court will stand with its ruling recently filed and order that the
    $7000 per month continue. The Court does so for a number of
    reasons. First, it was contemplated by the [supreme court] that
    [Gary] might ultimately sell his income-producing business and
    reinvest in other income-producing properties. This indeed has
    happened. [Gary] has received substantial funds as noted in the
    opinion. Further, [Gary] has invested in several businesses and is
    currently building a home valued at $1 million.
    In short, the Court once again reiterates that [Gary]’s financial
    position is very secure, and his financial holdings would support the
    continued payment of $7000.
    On appeal, Gary acknowledges that the standard for modification of a
    dissolution decree requires a material, substantial, and essentially permanent
    change of circumstances not within the contemplation of the court at the time of
    the decree. See In re Marriage of Sisson, 
    843 N.W.2d 866
    , 870 (Iowa 2017). To
    support his assertion that this standard was satisfied, he points to “the support of
    Julianne by another person” and “changes in the parties’ employment, earning
    capacity, and income.”
    “[C]ohabitation can affect the recipient spouse’s need for spousal support
    and is therefore a factor to consider in determining whether there has been a
    substantial change in circumstances warranting modification.” In re Marriage of
    Ales, 
    592 N.W.2d 698
    , 703 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Although Julianne mentioned
    she was involved with someone, she testified her romantic partner “does not take
    care of me financially.” Gary did not refute this assertion.
    We turn to the claimed changes in employment, earning capacity, and
    income. As predicted by the supreme court, Gary divested his interest in the
    corporation, receiving $2.88 million in proceeds. And, as predicted, Gary invested
    his share of the proceeds in other businesses.           Although he maintains the
    businesses “hemorrhag[ed] money,” the outflow did not deplete his personal
    4
    assets. Those assets, disclosed in a personal financial statement filed on the day
    of the modification hearing, left Gary a multimillionaire. As the district court noted,
    they allowed him to buy land and build a luxury home months before the
    modification hearing. And they cushioned Gary from the effects of his diminished
    earning capacity.
    In contrast, Julianne’s income remained negligible. Although she attempted
    to start a home-decoration business, she made little money at this new venture.
    Her minimal earnings were in part due to the substantial hours she devoted to
    caring for ill family members.
    On our de novo review, we agree with the district court that Gary failed to
    carry his burden of proving a substantial change not in the contemplation of the
    supreme court. See In re Marriage of Michael, 
    839 N.W.2d 630
    , 636 (Iowa 2013)
    (stating the party seeking a modification bears the burden of establishing the
    substantial change in circumstances); In re Marriage of Maher, 
    596 N.W.2d 561
    ,
    564–65 (Iowa 1999) (“A party seeking modification of a dissolution decree must
    establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a substantial
    change in the circumstances of the parties since the entry of the decree or of any
    subsequent intervening proceeding that considered the situation of the parties
    upon application for the same relief.”). The changes in Gary’s employment and
    income were within the contemplation of the court and the remaining changes he
    cited were “reasonable and ordinary changes that may be likely to occur.” Cf. In
    re Marriage of Wessels, 
    542 N.W.2d 486
    , 490 (Iowa 1995) (“The initial decree is
    entered with a view to reasonable and ordinary changes that may be likely to
    occur.”); In re Marriage of Skiles, 
    419 N.W.2d 586
    , 589 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987)
    5
    (observing medical problems associated with the aging process are in
    contemplation and knowledge of the district court). We affirm the denial of Gary’s
    modification petition.
    All that remains is the issue of attorney fees. Gary asks us to reverse the
    district court order requiring him to pay $3000 of Julianne’s trial attorney fees. “The
    controlling factor in awards of attorney fees is the ability to pay the fees.” In re
    Marriage of Romanelli, 
    570 N.W.2d 761
    , 765 (Iowa 1997). Because Julianne’s
    assets pale in comparison to Gary’s, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
    court’s award.
    Julianne seeks an award of appellate attorney fees. “[W]e look to the needs
    of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether
    the party making the request was obligated to defend the trial court’s decision on
    appeal.” 
    Id.
     Considering these factors, we order Gary to pay Julianne $1500
    towards her appellate attorney-fee obligation. Costs on appeal are assessed to
    Gary.
    AFFIRMED.