In the Matter of L.R.-N., Alleged to be a Person with a Substance-Related Disorder , 919 N.W.2d 768 ( 2018 )


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  •                        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 18-0095
    Filed June 20, 2018
    IN THE MATTER OF L.R.-N.,
    Alleged to be a Person with a Substance-Related Disorder,
    L.R.-N.
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey L.
    Poulson, Judge.
    L.R.-N. appeals from the district court order finding he is a person with a
    substance-related disorder and placing him in outpatient treatment pursuant to
    Iowa Code chapter 125 (2017). AFFIRMED.
    Zachary S. Hindman of Mayne, Arneson, Hindman, Hisey & Daane, Sioux
    City, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Gretchen Kraemer, Special
    Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
    2
    DOYLE, Judge.
    On December 18, 2017, an application alleging L.R.-N. to be a person with
    a substance-related disorder was filed in the district court. The court subsequently
    appointed an attorney to represent L.R.-N. and a physician to examine L.R.-N.
    Following the physician’s examination, the doctor opined L.R.-N. was a person
    with a substance-related disorder—specifically, alcohol use disorder and
    marijuana use disorder. The doctor recommended L.R.-N. be discharged prior to
    hearing with follow-up at a treatment center “for intensive outpatient substance
    abuse treatment.”
    A hearing was held on December 28, 2017, and the court filed its order the
    same day. The court’s order is a preprinted form with numerous blanks to be filled
    in and lines to be checked as appropriate. The order indicates the hearing was
    uncontested and L.R.-N. appeared with his attorney. The court noted the parties
    stipulated to “all statutory elements and treatment as recommended.” The court
    checked the lines stating:
    Court after reviewing court file; hearing the evidence and
    statements      of   parties   and     being    otherwise     advised
    FINDS: Respondent is a person with a substance-related disorder as
    set forth below by clear and convincing evidence.
    Respondent:
    (1) has a diagnosable substance abuse disorder of sufficient
    duration to meet diagnostic criteria specified within the most current
    Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by
    the American Psychiatric Association that results in a functional
    impairment.
    The court checked the line that followed, which stated “(2) (Set forth factual basis
    for above),” and in the following blank line wrote “Application, report from [the
    doctor].” The court checked the line stating, “IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
    3
    the Respondent is a person with a substance-related disorder.” The court ordered
    L.R.-N. be placed at a treatment center for further evaluation and treatment, and
    he was to contact the provider to begin treatment within fifteen days of the order.
    L.R.-N. was also ordered to comply with intensive outpatient treatment.
    L.R.-N. did not contact the treatment facility as ordered, and the court
    subsequently entered another order directing L.R.-N. to comply with its prior order
    within ten days. Four days later, L.R.-N. filed a notice of appeal from the district
    court’s December 28, 2017 order finding he is a person with a substance-related
    disorder and placing him in outpatient treatment pursuant to Iowa Code chapter
    125 (2017).
    On appeal, L.R.-N. acknowledges “he did not argue before the district court
    that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support a finding that he is a person
    with a substance-related disorder—indeed, L.R.-N. stipulated to the district court’s
    order.”1   Nevertheless, he asserts the district court eschewed its statutory
    “obligation to independently review the evidence in the record” and “ensure that
    the evidence in the record in fact satisfies the statutory standard.” On this basis,
    he argues the ordinary error preservation rules should not be applied here.
    We think L.R.-N. misses a critical point. To be sure, the court’s order
    indicates the parties stipulated to “all statutory elements and treatment as
    recommended.” Nevertheless, the court’s order did not base its finding that L.R.-
    N. is a person with a substance-related disorder solely upon the parties’ stipulation.
    1
    Below the judge’s signature line, the order provides “Agreed to by:” with signature lines
    following for the assistant county attorney, L.R.-N.’s attorney, and L.R.-N. The assistant
    county attorney, L.R.-N.’s attorney, and L.R.-N. all signed on their respective signature
    lines. L.R.-N.’s attorney in the proceedings below is also his appellate attorney.
    4
    Rather, the order states that the court’s findings were made “after reviewing court
    file; hearing the evidence and statements of parties and being otherwise advised.”
    Furthermore, the order acknowledges the statutory presumption in favor of L.R.-
    N., and that the burden of proof is by clear and convincing evidence. There is no
    question the court’s order lacks detail, but more detail is not required here. Even
    assuming without deciding the traditional error preservation rules would not apply
    to the situation alleged by L.R.-N., the court’s order does not factually support L.R.-
    N.’s request for an exception to the rule.
    We are cognizant that “[t]he procedural aspects of an involuntary civil
    commitment hearing are of great public importance,” particularly “[b]ecause a
    person’s liberty interests are at stake.” In re T.S., 
    705 N.W.2d 498
    , 502 (Iowa
    2005). However, our error preservation rules also serve an important purpose.
    These rules “allow the district court to correct error without the necessity of an
    appeal,” and they further serve “to create a record for appellate review.” State v.
    Harrington, 
    893 N.W.2d 36
    , 42 (Iowa 2017).           They are not a new creature;
    preservation of error “is a fundamental principle of law with roots that extend to the
    basic constitutional function of appellate courts,” and the rules generally apply to
    issues not first raised before the district court, even constitutional issues. Id.; see
    also State v. Mitchell, 
    757 N.W.2d 431
    , 435 (Iowa 2008). There are, of course, a
    few exceptions to the rules, such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
    but that is not the claim asserted here. See State v. Ondayog, 
    722 N.W.2d 778
    ,
    784 (Iowa 2006).
    Under the facts of this case, L.R.-N. was represented. He received an
    examination by a physician.       He received a hearing and was afforded the
    5
    opportunity to be heard and offer evidence. He made no claim before the court at
    the hearing or thereafter to allow the district court to consider his changed position.
    L.R.-N. failed to preserve error on his claim that the district court’s order lacked
    substantial evidence to support its finding he was a person with a substance-
    related disorder. For these reasons, we affirm the order of the district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-0095

Citation Numbers: 919 N.W.2d 768

Filed Date: 6/20/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023