In the Interest of Z.C., Minor Child , 919 N.W.2d 769 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0698
Filed June 20, 2018
IN THE INTEREST OF Z.C.,
Minor Child,
G.C., Father,
Appellant,
H.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Phillip J. Tabor,
District Associate Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to their child. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
J. David Zimmerman, Clinton, for appellant father.
Jennifer M. Triner Olsen of Olsen Law Office, Davenport, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Brian P. Donnelly of Mayer, Lonergan & Rolfes, Clinton, guardian ad litem
for minor child.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ. Tabor, J., takes no
part.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
The mother and father separately appeal the district court’s termination of
their parental rights to their child, Z.C. Both parents contend the State failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds to terminate their parental
rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (g), (h), and (i) (2018). The mother
also asserts termination is not in the child’s best interests and that she has a strong
bond with Z.C, which should preclude termination. The father asserts he should
have been given additional time to work towards reunification. Because the district
court properly terminated both parents’ rights under paragraph (h), the parents
have unresolved substance-abuse and mental-health issues resulting in Z.C.
being unable to be placed in either parent’s care, termination is in Z.C.’s best
interests, and no factors preclude termination, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human Services
(DHS) in May 2017 after Z.C. was born prematurely and tested positive for THC.1
Z.C. remained in the hospital until July 10 due to complications from his premature
birth, including eating “spells” where he would lose oxygen during feedings. Upon
Z.C.’s discharge, he was removed from the parents’ care and placed with a
biological sibling in a foster home where he remained during these proceedings.
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This is the mother’s fifth involvement with the DHS and her parental rights to four other
children were previously terminated. The record is unclear as to whether the father is also
the father to all of the mother’s other children but the child-in-need-of-assistance file
indicates the father’s parental rights to a child born April 2015 were terminated in January
2016. See In re M.C., No. 16-0182, 2016 WL 1359130 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2016).
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On July 25, Z.C. was adjudicated CINA under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b),
(c)(1), (c)(2), (g), (l), (n), and (o) (2017).
Following Z.C.’s removal, the DHS offered services to both parents. The
mother and father were required to obtain mental-health and substance-abuse
evaluations. They then sporadically attended treatment for their mental-health and
substance-abuse issues. Further, the parents participated in some parenting
services until the end of November when they stopped attending and ceased
visitation with Z.C. After neither parent exhibited sustained progress toward
reunification, January 18, 2018, the State petitioned to have both parents’ parental
rights to Z.C. terminated. The matter was heard on March 15, 2018, after which
the mother’s and father’s parental rights were terminated under Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(d), (g), (h), and (i) (2018).
The mother and father separately appeal.
II. Standard of Review
We review termination proceedings de novo, giving weight to but not being
bound by the district court’s fact findings. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa
2016). There must be clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for
termination. Id.
III. Statutory Grounds
As noted, the district court terminated the mother’s and father’s parental
rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (g), (h), and (i). “On appeal,
we may affirm the juvenile court’s termination order on any ground that we find
supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707
(Iowa 2010). The mother and father both tacitly appeal the termination of their
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parental rights. The mother failed to appeal any statutory grounds. The father
states no finding of the district court with which he disagrees under Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1), nor any factor under 232.116(2) or (3) that would preclude
termination. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1401-Form 5. Because they provide no
supportive facts, argument, or analysis, we may consider the arguments waived.
See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all-encompassing
argument is insufficient to identify error in cases of de novo review.”); Hyler v.
Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e will not speculate on the
arguments [a party] might have made and then search for legal authority and comb
the record for facts to support such arguments.”). Nevertheless, we briefly discuss
the grounds proven under paragraph (h).
Under section 232.116(1)(h), the court may terminate parental rights if it
finds the State has proved by clear and convincing evidence the child (1) is three
years of age or younger; (2) has been adjudicated CINA; (3) has been removed
from the physical custody of the parent for the last six consecutive months and any
trial period at home has been less than thirty days; and (4) cannot be returned to
the parent’s custody at the time of the termination hearing.
It is undisputed that Z.C. was three years of age or younger, was
adjudicated CINA, and had been removed from the physical custody of both
parents for the last six consecutive months. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(1)-
(3). The remaining question is whether there was clear and convincing evidence
Z.C. could not be returned to the mother’s or the father’s custody at the time of the
termination hearing. Id. § 232.116(1)(h)(4); see In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111
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(Iowa 2014) (indicating the statutory language “at the present time” refers to the
termination hearing).
At the time of the termination hearing, the mother and father had only just
begun to reengage in visitation with Z.C. They had not engaged in visitation since
November 2017, either failing to return phone calls from the DHS or not showing
up to scheduled visitation. The mother testified she would continue to use
marijuana to self-medicate for her mental-health issues, even if Z.C. was returned
to her care because it is the only “medication” she claimed would help her. The
following exchange occurred during the termination hearing:
Q. And you have never engaged in a substance abuse
treatment program, have you, anywhere? A. No. . . . Because I don’t
feel I have a drug problem.
Q. And you—the reports also indicate your statement now that
you don’t have a drug problem and that you’re not going to stop using
illegal substances; right? A. It’s not illegal. It’s decriminalized. But
why would I stop smoking when that’s the only thing that keeps me
calm?
Q. The question was: You’re not gonna stop; right? A. No, I’m
not. And I don’t smoke around my children, if that was a concern.
Due to the mother’s unwillingness to attend to her substance-abuse and
mental-health issues and her testimony that she will continue to use marijuana, the
State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Z.C. could not be returned to
the mother at the time of the termination hearing.
Like the mother’s substance-abuse issues, the father testified he has had
issues with alcohol and anger. The father was required to undergo an evaluation
and complete services, but he failed to do so. Instead, the father claims he was
able to stop drinking alcohol and attend to his mental-health issues without the
help of a professional. He testified that he “just stopped [drinking alcohol], because
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it’s not a problem,” and he did not attend anger-management classes “[b]ecause
somebody else, even whether a shrink or not, they can’t help you. You have to be
able to help yourself.” The father’s unwillingness to attend to his substance-abuse
and mental-health issues is clear and convincing evidence that Z.C. could not be
returned to his custody at the time of the termination hearing.
We therefore find clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of
the mother’s and father’s parental rights to Z.C. under section 232.116(1)(h).
IV. Best Interests
Both the mother and the father contend termination of their parental rights
is not in Z.C.’s best interests, citing Iowa Code section 232.116(2) and (3). Both
also assert they share a bond with Z.C.
In considering a child’s best interests, we give consideration “to the child’s
safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of
the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the
child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).
According to the DHS, Z.C. is thriving in his foster placement where he receives
attention to meet his medical and everyday needs. Given the mother’s and father’s
apparent unwillingness to attend to the issues that led the DHS involvement,
termination of their parental rights is in Z.C.’s best interests because his long-term
nurturing and growth and his physical and emotional needs are being met outside
of their care.
The record also reflects that no impediment to termination found in Iowa
Code section 232.116(3) precludes termination. Z.C. was removed from the
parents’ care shortly after he was born and has been out of their care for nearly
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his entire life, refuting the conclusion that Z.C. shares a strong parent-child bond
with either the mother or the father. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s order terminating both the mother’s and father’s
parental rights to Z.C.
The father also requests additional time to work toward reunification. See
id. § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a court may authorize a six-month extension of time
if it determines “the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no
longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period”). At the termination
hearing, the father did not provide anything of substance that would support a
finding that the need for removal would not exist if an extension of time were
granted. He simply testified reunification depended on when he could obtain
treatment, but he could not specify when treatment would begin or how much time
he would need to complete it. Additionally, because the father does not believe he
needs treatment to attend to his mental-health and substance-abuse issues,
though treatment is clearly indicated as necessary, the record does not show the
father would be able to safely care for Z.C. even with a six-month extension of
time.
V. Conclusion
Because the district court properly terminated both parents’ rights under
paragraph (h), their unresolved substance-abuse and mental-health issues result
in Z.C. being unable to be placed in their care, termination is in Z.C.’s best
interests, and no factors preclude termination, we affirm.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.