DCPP VS. J.M.S. AND B.M., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF G.J.S. (FG-11-0042-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5644-17T2
    NEW JERSEY DIVISION
    OF CHILD PROTECTION
    AND PERMANENCY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    J.M.S.,
    Defendant,
    and
    B.M.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    GUARDIANSHIP OF G.J.S.,
    a Minor.
    _____________________________
    Submitted May 21, 2019 – Decided May 31, 2019
    Before Judges Rothstadt, Gilson and Natali.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County,
    Docket No. FG-11-0042-17.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant B.M. (Steven Edward Miklosey, Designated
    Counsel, on the brief).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Jason Wade Rockwell, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Alicia Y. Bergman, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
    attorney for minor (Olivia Belfatto Crisp, Assistant
    Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant B.M. (Benjamin) 1 appeals from a judgment terminating his
    parental rights to his son, G.J.S. (George), who was born on May 31, 2014. The
    child's mother, J.M.S. (Jennifer), whose parental rights were terminated during
    the same proceeding, has not appealed. We find no merit in Benjamin's appeal
    and affirm.
    Benjamin argues that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency
    (Division) failed to prove prongs three and four of the "best interests of the
    child" test under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence.
    1
    We use fictitious names for B.M., G.J.S., J.M.S., L.A.R., and C.T., to protect
    their privacy and for ease of reference. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
    A-5644-17T2
    2
    With respect to prong three, Benjamin maintains that the Division did not
    consider "alternatives to termination of parental rights" because it failed to
    promptly locate and evaluate relatives for George's placement, including
    Benjamin's mother, L.A.R. (Lacey).         He further asserts that the Division
    improperly ruled out Lacey as a resource placement, without facilitating a
    second bonding evaluation. As to prong four, Benjamin claims that the Division
    did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his
    parental rights "will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4).2
    All of the judge's findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence
    and, therefore, are entitled to our deference. N.J. Div. of Youth and Family
    Servs. v. F.M., 
    211 N.J. 420
    , 448-49 (2012); Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    ,
    413 (1998).     Accordingly, we reject Benjamin's arguments and affirm
    substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Rodney Thompson in his
    comprehensive and well-reasoned forty-eight-page written opinion. We add the
    following comments.
    2
    On appeal, Benjamin has not argued that the Division failed to establish prongs
    one and two of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Nor has he challenged the court's
    finding under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3) that the Division made "reasonable
    efforts to provide services to help [him] correct the circumstances which led to
    the child's placement outside the home." We have nevertheless independently
    reviewed the record and are satisfied that the Division clearly and convincingly
    satisfied those statutory elements as well.
    A-5644-17T2
    3
    Parents have a constitutionally protected right to the care, custody, and
    control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 
    455 U.S. 745
    , 753 (1982). "The
    rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic
    civil rights . . . ,' and 'rights far more precious . . . than property rights.'" Stanley
    v. Illinois, 
    405 U.S. 645
    , 651 (1972) (citations omitted). "[T]he preservation and
    strengthening of family life is a matter of public concern as being in the interests
    of the general welfare . . . ." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a); see also In re Guardianship
    of K.H.O., 
    161 N.J. 337
    , 347 (1999).
    The constitutional right to the parental relationship, however, is not
    absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 
    103 N.J. 591
    , 599 (1986).
    At times, a parent's interest must yield to the State's obligation to protect
    children from harm. In re Guardianship of J.C., 
    129 N.J. 1
    , 10 (1992). To
    effectuate these concerns, the Legislature created a test for determining whether
    a parent's rights must be terminated in the child's best interests.            N.J. S.A.
    30:4C-15.1(a) requires that the Division prove by clear and convincing evidence
    the following four prongs:
    (1) The child's safety, health or development has been
    or will continue to be endangered by the parental
    relationship;
    (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
    harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
    A-5644-17T2
    4
    provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
    delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
    Such harm may include evidence that separating the child
    from his resource family parents would cause serious and
    enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
    (3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to
    provide services to help the parent correct the
    circumstances which led to the child's placement
    outside the home and the court has considered
    alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
    (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
    harm than good.
    See also A.W., 
    103 N.J. at 604-11
    .
    With respect to Benjamin's challenge to the court's prong three findings,
    as noted, he asserts that the Division failed to conduct a search for appropriate
    relative placements.   We acknowledge that under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1, the
    Division may not "embark on a course set for termination of parental rights and
    adoption by a foster parent without at least first exploring available relative
    placements." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.S., 
    433 N.J. Super. 69
    , 81
    (App. Div. 2013). In this regard, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a) requires that once the
    Division accepts a child into its care or custody, it shall "initiate a search for
    relatives who may be willing and able to provide the care and support required
    by the child." Further, "the Division's statutory obligation does not permit
    willful blindness and inexplicable delay in assessing and approving or
    A-5644-17T2
    5
    disapproving a relative known to the Division . . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth &
    Family Servs. v. K.L.W., 
    419 N.J. Super. 568
    , 582 (App. Div. 2011). There is
    no presumption, however, in favor of relative placement. J.S., 433 N.J. Super
    at 82.
    Here, three days after George's placement with his resource family,
    Benjamin provided the Division with the name of C.T. (Cathy), as a potential
    placement for George. 3 The Division promptly assessed Cathy, and determined
    that because her boyfriend had two active warrants, George could not be placed
    in a home with her. Based on this evidence, Judge Thompson concluded that
    the Division "conducted the necessary checks" before ruling Cathy out.
    With respect to Benjamin's contention that the Division failed to
    appropriately consider Lacey as a relative resource placement, we note that there
    is no evidence in the record to suggest that the Division knew, or should have
    known, of Lacey's existence prior to her contact with the Division to identify
    herself as a prospective relative resource placement.        Indeed, as Benjamin
    concedes, while Lacey provided support to the family after George's birth, she
    "became estranged shortly afterward" and distanced herself from the family for
    "many months." As we have previously held, the Division is not expected "to
    3
    There is nothing in the record describing Cathy's relationship to the parties.
    A-5644-17T2
    6
    locate a relative with no information" or "search the fifty states or even the
    twenty-one counties to identify a parent's siblings, cousins, uncles and aunts."
    K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super at 582.
    As Judge Thompson explained, once Lacey identified herself as a
    potential relative placement, "[t]he Division conducted the necessary
    background checks and home assessment, and facilitated visits" between Lacey
    and George. The Division also assisted Lacey in obtaining a resource license.
    The Division thereafter scheduled a bonding evaluation between George
    and his resource family. The results of that evaluation, conducted by Amy
    Becker-Mattes, Ph.D., concluded that George's resource mother served as his
    primary attachment figure and removing George from the resource family's care
    would be detrimental to his well-being.       Additionally, Dr. Becker-Mattes
    testified at trial that severing George's bond with his resource family "would
    cause harm that would be ongoing and potentially irreparable." Accordingly,
    Dr. Becker-Mattes concluded it was in George's best interests not to be removed
    from their care.
    Despite the results of the bonding evaluation with George's resource
    family, the Division continued to assess Lacey.       Indeed, after months of
    facilitated visits with George, the Division scheduled a bonding evaluation
    A-5644-17T2
    7
    between Lacey and George. According to the trial record, that evaluation went
    poorly as George would only permit the Division worker to console him. In
    light of the bonding evaluation between George and his resource family, the
    Division issued Lacey a rule-out letter advising her that George would not be
    placed with her as the Division concluded it would be contrary to George's best
    interests. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(c).4
    Based on these facts, George's reliance on K.L.W. for the proposition that
    the Division failed to satisfy prong three is misplaced.      In that case, the
    Division's failed to contact and assess a child's maternal grandparents, whom it
    knew had custody of the child's siblings, thereby depriving the court of a
    meaningful opportunity to determine whether the placement was in the child's
    best interests. K.L.W., 
    419 N.J. Super. at 581-82
    . Here, Lacey did not have
    Benjamin's siblings in her care and custody, nor is there any evidence that the
    Division had knowledge of Lacey's existence and abjectly failed to consider her
    as a relative resource placement.
    4
    Neither Benjamin nor Lacey requested a best-interests hearing to address the
    propriety of the Division's rule-out letter. See J.S., 433 N.J. Super. at 83-84.
    The court, in its prong three findings, however, conscientiously considered all
    of the evidence, including the unrebutted testimony from Dr. Becker-Mattes that
    adoption by his resource parents was in George's best interests. Based on that
    evidence and the court's factual findings, we conclude the Division correctly
    ruled out Lacey.
    A-5644-17T2
    8
    Rather, based upon the results of bonding evaluations between Lacey and
    George, and George and his resource family, the Division concluded it would
    be contrary to George's best interests to be placed with Lacey. Accordingly, the
    Division complied with its statutory obligations, and the court's determination
    was not "made without information relevant to the best interests of the child,"
    as in K.L.W. Id. at 581.
    Nor do we find any support in the record that a second bonding evaluation
    of Lacey was required. Benjamin presented no expert evidence to suggest the
    initial bonding evaluation was improper, or that there was a serious and enduring
    bond between Lacey and George. To the contrary, the trial evidence supported
    the court's conclusion that severing the bond between George and his resource
    family would cause George ongoing and irreparable harm.
    Finally, we also reject Benjamin's challenge to the court's prong four
    finding. Prong four addresses "whether, after considering and balancing the two
    relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties
    with her natural parents than from the permanent disruption of her relationship
    with her foster parents." K.H.O., 
    161 N.J. at 355
    . Here, Benjamin failed to
    complete mental health services and substance abuse treatment, remained
    unemployed without consistent and stable housing, and failed to present any
    A-5644-17T2
    9
    plan to remedy these issues. Further, he failed to visit George consistently, and
    did not participate in his scheduled bonding evaluation.
    As Judge Thompson explained, there was no evidence that Benjamin
    could appropriately care for now-four-year-old George. In addition, the court
    noted that the bonding evaluation with George and his resource family, along
    with Dr. Becker-Mattes's unrebutted expert testimony at trial, demonstrated a
    strong, positive bond, "and severing th[at] bond would result in severe and
    enduring harm" to George.
    In sum, after a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Judge
    Thompson's factual findings are fully supported by the record developed during
    the four-day trial and, in light of those facts, his legal conclusions as to the best
    interests of the child test are unassailable. To the extent we have not specifically
    addressed any of Benjamin's arguments, we find them to be without sufficient
    merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    A-5644-17T2
    10