In the Interest of M.P. and C.P., Minor Children, L.P., Mother ( 2016 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-0277
    Filed May 11, 2016
    IN THE INTEREST OF M.P. AND C.P.,
    Minor children,
    L.P., Mother,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Butler County, Peter B. Newell,
    District Associate Judge.
    A mother appeals the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights to
    her children. AFFIRMED.
    Elizabeth M. Biwer of Papenheim Law Office, Parkersburg, for appellant
    mother.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Lana L. Luhring of Laird & Luhring, Waverly, for minor children.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
    A mother appeals the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights to
    her children, M.P. and C.P.1 She argues termination was inappropriate because
    the State did not prove a ground for termination by clear and convincing
    evidence, termination was not in the best interests of her children, and a
    permissive factor weighing against termination existed due to the closeness of
    the children’s bond with her. We find the State proved grounds for termination,
    that termination was in the children’s best interests, and no permissive factor
    precluded termination. We therefore affirm.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings
    M.P. and C.P. are three and two years old, respectively.                They were
    removed from their parents’ care in December 2014 and placed with their
    maternal grandfather and step-grandmother. M.P. had previously been removed
    from the parents’ care for the six-month period from February 2013 through
    August 2013.
    After M.P. and C.P. were removed from the parents’ care, the mother
    failed to take full advantage of the services provided to her and failed to make
    significant progress towards reunification. The mother did not progress beyond
    fully-supervised visits with her children and struggled during those visits to
    provide the children with proper supervision and boundaries.                     An Iowa
    Department of Human Services (DHS) caseworker testified that the children
    enjoy spending time with the mother but that the parent-child bond has
    1
    The children’s father consented to the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights,
    and he is not part of this appeal.
    3
    weakened since the fall of 2015. In August of that year, the mother’s visits with
    her children became inconsistent, and then in October 2015, the mother ceased
    contact with her children altogether. When the caseworker testified at the first
    scheduled termination hearing on November 4, 2015, she explained the mother
    was homeless and her whereabouts were currently unknown. At that time, the
    mother was actively avoiding contact with DHS, had stopped taking her
    medication, and was no longer participating in her mental health counseling.
    According to the caseworker’s testimony at a second termination hearing
    on January 13, 2016,2 the mother resumed contact with DHS in December 2015
    and participated in three supervised visits with M.P. and C.P. in December and
    January. The mother explained to the caseworker she had cut off contact with
    her children because she had decided involvement with them was too stressful
    and difficult. The mother was homeless and unemployed at the time. Around the
    time she resumed contact, the mother also decided to reinvest herself in her
    marriage with the father. Their relationship was volatile and negatively affected
    her ability to care for M.P. and C.P. In fact, the father had to be transported to
    the first termination hearing from jail, where he was awaiting sentencing for
    domestic abuse assault, third offense, committed against the mother.
    On January 27, 2016, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental
    rights to both M.P. and C.P. pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2015).
    The mother now appeals.
    2
    A second hearing was held because the mother did not appear at the first hearing and
    her attorney represented to the court that the mother had not received appropriate notice
    of the proceedings. Thus, the court continued proceedings to a second hearing date
    after obtaining the father’s consent to termination and hearing brief testimony from the
    DHS caseworker. The mother was present for, but did not testify at, the second hearing.
    4
    II. Standard of Review
    We conduct a de novo review of proceedings terminating parental rights.
    In re A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    , 110 (Iowa 2014). An order terminating parental
    rights will be upheld if there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for
    termination under Iowa Code section 232.116. In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 706
    (Iowa 2010). Evidence is “clear and convincing” when there are no serious or
    substantial doubts as to the correctness of conclusions drawn from it.           
    Id.
    Although we are not bound by the factual determinations of the juvenile court, we
    do give weight to them, particularly regarding the credibility of witnesses. 
    Id.
    The primary consideration of our review is the best interests of the child. In re
    J.E., 
    723 N.W.2d 793
    , 798 (Iowa 2006).
    III. Discussion
    Termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a
    three-step analysis. See In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 40 (Iowa 2010). First, the
    court must determine if a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has
    been established. 
    Id.
     Second, if a ground for termination is established, the
    court must apply the framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if
    proceeding with termination is in the best interests of the child. 
    Id.
     Third, if the
    statutory best-interests framework supports termination of parental rights, the
    court must consider if any statutory factors set forth in section 232.116(3) should
    serve to preclude termination. 
    Id.
    The mother’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to section
    232.116(1)(h), which provides the juvenile court may order the termination of
    parental rights if:
    5
    The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
    (1) The child is three years of age or younger.
    (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
    assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
    (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
    the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months,
    or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home
    has been less than thirty days.
    (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
    cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided
    in section 232.102 at the present time.
    The mother first argues the State failed to prove grounds for termination of her
    parental rights because it failed to show by clear and convincing evidence her
    children could not be returned to her care.3
    We agree with the juvenile court that M.P. and C.P. could not be returned
    to the mother’s care at the time of the termination hearing in January 2016. At
    that hearing, the DHS caseworker testified the mother still lacked basic parenting
    skills and the means to support her children. The mother was homeless and
    unemployed.      She had only recently resumed regular attendance at her
    scheduled mental health treatment. She had recently decided to reinvest herself
    in a volatile and abusive relationship with the children’s father. She was not in a
    position to safely and adequately care for M.P. and C.P.
    The mother next argues termination was not in the best interests of her
    children, due to the bond she shared with M.P. and C.P., and that the same
    strong bond satisfies a statutory factor rendering termination unnecessary. See
    3
    The mother also argues the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that
    she lacks the ability or willingness to respond to services and an additional period of
    rehabilitation would not correct her situation. These, however, are factors relevant to
    grounds for termination in section 232.116(1)(g), which was not the juvenile court’s basis
    for terminating the mother’s parental rights. As a result, this argument is irrelevant and
    we do not address it on the merits.
    6
    
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (3)(c) (“The court need not terminate the relationship
    between the parent and child if the court finds . . . [t]here is clear and convincing
    evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to
    the closeness of the parent-child relationship.”).
    On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court’s conclusion that
    termination was in the best interests of M.P. and C.P. despite the fact both
    children had a bond with the mother and enjoyed seeing her. The bond had
    been weakened by the mother’s decision to cut off all contact for a two-month
    period in late 2015, and she has never demonstrated the ability to provide safe
    and reliable care for her children. In contrast, the DHS caseworker testified the
    children’s maternal grandfather and step-grandmother had provided excellent
    care and were interested in adopting the children. As a result, the children’s
    safety, long-term nurturing and growth, and physical, mental, and emotional
    needs will be best served by termination of the mother’s parental rights so that
    M.P. and C.P. can achieve permanency through adoption.
    We also agree with the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of the
    mother’s parental rights was appropriate in this case despite some bond between
    the mother and the children, which was weakened by the mother’s recent,
    temporary abandonment of the children.           The language of 232.116(3) is
    permissive, and the juvenile court correctly decided any bond was insufficient to
    justify declining to order termination. See In re D.S., 
    806 N.W.2d 458
    , 474–75
    (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).
    7
    For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the
    mother’s parental rights to her children, M.P. and C.P.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-0277

Filed Date: 5/11/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021