State of Iowa v. Jason D. Gryp ( 2019 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 18-1132
    Filed February 20, 2019
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    JASON D. GRYP,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Thomas G. Reidel and
    Mark D. Cleve, Judges.
    The defendant appeals his ten-year sentence. AFFIRMED.
    Lauren M. Phelps, Davenport, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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    POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
    Jason Gryp appeals the district court’s imposition of a ten-year sentence of
    incarceration    for   his   conviction   for   possession   with   intent   to   deliver
    (methamphetamine), a class “C” felony. Gryp maintains the court should have
    suspended his sentence. He argues the court abused its discretion by failing to
    place more weight on positive factors outlined in the report from the presentence
    investigation (PSI) and failing to consider the “naturally deterrent effect” of the fact
    that, during the commission of this crime, Gryp was shot multiple times by the
    friend to whom he intended to sell methamphetamine.
    “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within
    the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only
    be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate
    matters.” State v. Bentley, 
    757 N.W.2d 257
    , 262 (Iowa 2008) (alteration in original)
    (citation omitted).    “Abuse of discretion occurs only when ‘the decision was
    exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.’”
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    As Gryp concedes, the sentence imposed by the district court is within the
    statutory limits. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(c)(6) (defining the crime as a class
    “C” felony); 902.9(1)(d) (providing the maximum sentence for a class “C” felony is
    “no more than ten years”). Additionally, we note that both the State and the
    preparer of the PSI recommended incarceration. Still, Gryp maintains the court
    abused its discretion because it did not place more emphasis on the facts that Gryp
    did not commit any additional offenses during the thirteen months he was out on
    bond between his arrest and sentencing, he was prepared for and cooperated with
    3
    the preparation of the PSI report, only one crime in his long criminal history was
    violent in nature, he had been steadily employed at the same job for two years at
    the time of sentencing, he has a consistent employment history, and he graduated
    high school.
    First, we cannot agree with all Gryp’s contentions. While he maintains he
    did not committ any additional offenses while out on bond, the more accurate
    statement would be that he was not charged with any additional offenses during
    that time period. According to Gryp’s statements to the PSI preparer, he continued
    to smoke marijuana “a couple times per week” until “a few weeks” before meeting
    with the preparer on May 23, 2018.       Additionally, Gryp told the preparer he
    continued to use methamphetamine monthly until a week before their meeting.
    And while Gryp has generally maintained employment during the times he has not
    been incarcerated, having a job has not prevented Gryp from using or selling illegal
    substances. At the time of the present offense, he was employed but decided to
    sell drugs in order “make some quick cash.”
    That being said, the factors Gryp claims the court should have placed more
    emphasis on—including the specific facts surrounding his commission of the
    crime—were included in the PSI report, which the district court explicitly stated it
    considered. During the sentencing colloquy, the court said:
    The—it has been noted by both parties, the primary issue
    before the Court this morning is whether or not the Court should
    suspend that sentence. And in making that determination, I have
    taken into consideration all of the information contained in the
    presentence investigation report as well as the recommendations
    made by the presentence investigation writer, by the State, and by
    the defense in this case.
    And when I put all that together, I note with considerable
    concern, Mr. Gryp, your prior criminal conviction history which
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    consists of two felony convictions and a conviction of 2013 that led
    to your probation being revoked on two occasions in connection with
    that file, ultimately landing you in prison on that offense and the fact
    that this offense took place less than a year—or approximately a
    year, I should say, after you finished your parole from that offense. I
    also note the positive information that’s contained in the presentence
    investigation report, and again, all of the statements that have been
    made by the various parties here today.
    In—on balance, the Court does find that for the protection of
    the community, that imposition of the sentence is the most
    appropriate sentence to be entered here today.
    I do note the positive things, Mr. Gryp. These are things you
    should have taken into consideration before this particular offense
    was undertaken. And for all of the reasons I have stated, I—the
    Court concludes it is the most appropriate sentence. And therefore,
    the Court will order that mittimus will issue immediately.
    It is the role of the sentencing court, in an exercise of its discretion, to determine
    the weight to place on the various considerations. See State v. Wright, 
    340 N.W.2d 590
    , 593 (Iowa 1983) (“The right of an individual judge to balance the relevant
    factors in determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the discretion
    standard.”). Though the court did not give the same weight to the factors Gryp
    emphasizes, the sentence imposed by the court was not based “on grounds or for
    reasons clearly untenable,” nor was its choice “clearly unreasonable” under the
    circumstances.     See 
    Bentley, 757 N.W.2d at 262
    (providing standard for
    determining an abuse of discretion). Thus, we affirm the sentence imposed by the
    district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-1132

Filed Date: 2/20/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/20/2019