Shain Matthew Malloy, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1645
Filed May 25, 2016
SHAIN MATTHEW MALLOY,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Duane E.
Hoffmeyer, Judge.
An applicant appeals the court’s summary dismissal of his postconviction
relief applications. AFFIRMED.
Rees Conrad Douglas, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Shain Malloy appeals the district court’s summary dismissal of his
applications for postconviction relief (PCR). In 1995 Malloy was convicted of
extortion following a guilty plea and convicted of burglary following a jury trial. He
was also convicted of interference with official acts following a guilty plea in
January 2004. In June 2009, Malloy was sentenced in federal court as a “career
offender” for participating in a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.
Malloy’s convictions in 1995 and 2004 were found to be “crimes of violence,”
resulting in an enhanced sentence for the 2009 conviction under the federal
guidelines. See United States v. Malloy, 614 F.3d 852, 860 (8th Cir. 2010).
In this proceeding, Malloy claimed his attorneys in the 1995 and 2004
proceedings were ineffective for failing to advise him prior to his guilty pleas of
the possible collateral consequence of a future enhanced federal sentence. In
addition, with respect to the burglary conviction, Malloy claimed newly discovered
evidence of the victim’s recantation justifies a new trial. The PCR court rejected
these claims, finding they were time barred by the three-year statute of limitations
for PCR proceedings. See Iowa Code § 822.3 (2013). Specifically, the court
concluded, with respect to the first claim, no exception to the three-year bar is
applicable because the law has not changed with respect to counsel’s duty to
inform a defendant of the effect of a conviction on future convictions. See State
v. Christensen, 201 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa 1972) (noting counsel has no such
duty to warn a defendant of the effect a conviction has on future convictions). In
addition, the court rejected Malloy’s second claim, finding the “newly discovered
evidence” Malloy offered was “merely cumulative and impeaching of the victim’s
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credibility and [was] not likely to result in a different outcome on retrial.” See
Adcock v. State, 528 N.W.2d 645, 647 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (outlining what a
PCR applicant must prove to prevail on a claim of newly discovered evidence
and noting “[a] witness’s recantation testimony is looked upon with the utmost
suspicion”).
On appeal, Malloy raises these claims again. Upon our review for
correction of errors at law, see Lopez-Penaloza v. State, 804 N.W.2d 537, 540
(Iowa Ct. App. 2011), we agree with the decision of the district court and affirm its
dismissal of Malloy’s PCR applications without further opinion pursuant to Iowa
Court Rule 21.26(1)(d) and (e).
AFFIRMED.