Ed S. Nassif v. State of Iowa , 922 N.W.2d 104 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0762
Filed July 5, 2018
ED S. NASSIF,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady,
Judge.
Ed Nassif appeals the denial of his postconviction-relief application.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Meyer, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ. Potterfield,
J., takes no part.
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MULLINS, Judge.
Ed Nassif was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole. At the time of the offense in September
1990, Nassif was twenty-one years old. In June 2014, Nassif filed a pro-se
application for postconviction relief claiming his sentence amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment because “the brain is not fully developed until the age of 25.”
Following a hearing, the district court denied Nassif’s application.
Nassif appeals. He contends his sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole amounts to cruel and unusual punishment and violates his
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Nassif takes the position that
the separate sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders created by our supreme
court in recent years1 should be extended to young adult offenders because the
brain does not fully mature until around the age of twenty-five years. Our review
is de novo. See Zarate, 908 N.W.2d at 840.
As to Nassif’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment argument, the supreme court
has made clear that its sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders has “no
application to sentencing laws affecting adult offenders.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 403.
“[T]he line between being a juvenile and an adult was drawn for cruel and unusual
punishment purposes at eighteen years of age.” Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556
1
See generally State v. Harrison, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2018 WL ______ (Iowa 2018); In re
T.H., ___ N.W.2d ___, 2018 WL 2999628 (Iowa 2018); State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153(Iowa 2018); State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 2018); State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d
127 (Iowa 2017); State v. Graham, 897 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 2017); State v. Propps, 897
N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 2017); State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 2017); State v. Sweet,
879 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 2016); State v. Louisell, 865 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 2015); State v.
Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2015); State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 2014); State v.
Hoeck, 843 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 2014); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013); State
v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013).
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(discussing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005)). Nassif was not a
juvenile at the time of his offense. He is not entitled to be treated as a juvenile for
purposes of sentencing and is therefore not entitled to any relief. We also note our
previous rejection of arguments identical to Nassif’s. See, e.g., Smith v. State, No.
16-1711, 2017 WL 3283311, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2017), further review
denied (Dec. 7, 2017); Thomas v. State, No. 16-0008, 2017 WL 2665104, at *1–2
(Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017). We see no reason to deviate from these prior
decisions.
Nassif additionally argues his sentence violates his constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws, asserting juvenile offenders and young adult offenders
both have adolescent brains and are therefore similarly situated, but are treated
differently under current law. We agree with the State that Nassif failed to preserve
error on this argument, as it was not raised in the district court. See Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of
appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the
district court before we will decide them on appeal.”); see also State v. Mulvany,
600 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa 1999) (“[W]e require error preservation even on
constitutional issues.”). In any event, juveniles and young adults are not similarly
situated for the purposes of sentencing. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 395 (noting
juveniles “are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing”).
We affirm the denial of Nassif’s postconviction-relief application.
AFFIRMED.