State of Iowa v. Sy Roeuth ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0954
Filed June 15, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SY ROEUTH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
Sy Roeuth appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to correct an
illegal sentence. FIRST-DEGREE MURDER SENTENCE VACATED AND
CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Jeremy B.A. Feitelson of Feitelson Law, L.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ. Blane,
S.J., takes no part.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
A jury found Sy Roeuth guilty of first-degree robbery, willful injury, and
first-degree murder. The district court sentenced Roeuth to prison terms of
twenty-five years, a term not exceeding ten years, and life in prison respectively.
Seventeen years later, Roeuth filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence
alleging he was born in 1979 and “was a juvenile at the time of the crime,”
triggering application of recent juvenile sentencing precedent. See State v.
Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013) (holding “article I, section 17 require[d]
an individualized sentencing hearing where . . . a juvenile offender receive[d] a
minimum of thirty-five years imprisonment without the possibility of parole”); State
v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 76 (Iowa 2013) (holding a 52.5 year sentence for a
juvenile based on the aggregation of mandatory minimum sentences for second-
degree murder and first-degree robbery was unconstitutional without an
individualized sentencing hearing). See also State v. Sweet, ___ N.W.2d ___,
___, 2016 WL 3023726, at *29 (Iowa 2016) (holding “a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender violates article I, section 17 of the
Iowa Constitution”); State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 402 (Iowa 2014) (holding “a
mandatory minimum sentencing schema . . . violates article I, section 17 of the
Iowa Constitution when applied in cases involving conduct committed by youthful
offenders”).1
The State resisted the motion, asserting “[t]he record [was] replete with
evidence” that Roeuth was born in 1978 rather than 1979 and, accordingly, was
1
Sweet was decided after briefing in this case. Lyle was decided after Roeuth filed his
motion for correction of illegal sentence.
3
eighteen years old at the time of the offense. The district court scheduled a
hearing “to determine whether [Roeuth] c[ould] establish his true and correct date
of birth as different from what the court records reflect.” The court stated “[i]f so,
[he] may be entitled to a resentencing hearing.”
At the hearing, Roeuth testified his parents brought him to this country as
a baby and he was a naturalized citizen of the United States. At the time of the
offenses, he represented himself as eighteen to gain employment and buy
cigarettes. He testified he did not understand the importance of stating his
correct age.
Upon learning he was subject to a detainer for deportation, Roeuth
realized the significance of his age, and attempted to determine his correct
birthdate. Because his parents had died and documentation they may have had
was lost, Roueth contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He
received a “Memorandum of Creation of Record of Lawful Permanent Residence”
from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The document identified him by name,2 set forth his Des Moines
address, and listed his date of birth as 1979 rather than 1978. The document
was approved in 1981 and served as “temporary evidence of lawful admission for
permanent residence.” The document was admitted without objection.
Roeuth also obtained correspondence from the Social Security
Administration confirming that his attorney correctly identified his date of birth as
being in 1979. This correspondence was admitted without objection.
2
The name was spelled “Reouth” rather than “Roeuth.”
4
Following the hearing, the district court denied the motion to correct illegal
sentence. The court found Roeuth failed to establish “by a preponderance of the
evidence that his birthdate [was in] . . . 1979,” determined it was in 1978 and,
concluded Roeuth committed the offense when he was eighteen, rendering the
juvenile sentencing precedent inapplicable.
On appeal, Roeuth contends he “met his burden of showing by the
preponderance of the evidence that he was a minor when the incident took
place.” The State concedes “[f]acts relied on in imposing sentence must be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires “a
probability assessment of more likely than not.” Backstrom v. Iowa Dist. Court,
508 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Iowa 1993) (Carter, J., dissenting). See also State v.
Kollasch, No. 09-0305, 2009 WL 4842498, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009)
(“A preponderance is such proof as leads the trier of fact to find that it is more
probable than not, or more likely than not, that a contested fact exists.” (quoting
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1627, at 713-14 (2008))).
Assuming without deciding Roeuth had the burden to establish his age,3
we conclude he satisfied this burden. He provided documentation from two
federal agencies charged with maintaining birthdate records. Those records
unequivocally established that Roeuth was born in 1979. True, the Immigration
and Naturalization document contained a misspelling of his name. But, the
Social Security Administration, which had access to his social security number in
addition to his name, confirmed the birthdate.
3
See Ross Pearson, Note, What’s My Age Again? The Immigrant Age Problem in the
Criminal Justice System, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 745, 757-58 (2013).
5
It matters little that all involved in the trial cited a different birthdate or that
Roeuth misrepresented his birthdate. Because Roeuth was of sufficient age to
be tried as an adult whether he was seventeen or eighteen4 and age was not an
element of the charged crimes, this fact never had to be proven. His age only
became an issue after the Iowa Supreme Court held certain juvenile sentences
unconstitutional. At this juncture, Roueth raised the question of his true age and
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was seventeen years old at
the time of the offenses.
This brings us to the disposition. Roueth was sentenced to life in prison for
first-degree murder. See Iowa Code § 902.1 (1996) (“[A] person convicted of a
class ‘A’ felony,” which includes first-degree murder, “shall not be released on
parole unless the governor commutes the sentence to a term of years”). Sweet
held that this statutory life-without-parole sentence was unconstitutional as
applied to juvenile offenders. 2016 WL 3023726, at *29. Based on Sweet, we
reverse the sentence imposed by the district court and remand “for resentencing
consistent with this opinion,” which we surmise is life in prison with immediate
eligibility for parole.5 Id.
FIRST-DEGREE MURDER SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
4
See Iowa Code § 232.8(1)(c). See also Pearson, What’s My Age Again, 98 Minn. L.
Rev. at 752-753.
5
Roueth does not challenge his remaining sentences. At the time of the offenses,
persons convicted of first-degree robbery were required to serve 100% of their
sentences. See Iowa Code § 902.12 (1996). However, this sentence was reduced to
seventy percent in 2003 and was made retroactive in 2004. The willful injury sentence
did not carry a mandatory minimum period of incarceration.