In the Matter of the Estate of Atellia J. Kinzenbaw, Doyle Kinzenbaw, Intervenor-Appellant. ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0981
Filed July 27, 2016
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
ATELLIA J. KINZENBAW, Deceased.
DOYLE KINZENBAW,
Intervenor-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, Paul D. Miller, Judge.
Doyle Kinzenbaw appeals the enforcement of a settlement agreement.
AFFIRMED.
Peter C. Riley of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
John C. Wagner of John C. Wagner Law Offices, P.C., Amana, for
appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
Doyle Kinzenbaw appeals the district court’s order enforcing a settlement
agreement between the beneficiaries of the Estate of Atellia J. Kinzenbaw (The
Estate). Doyle claims his attorney did not have authority to accept the settlement
agreement. We affirm the district court’s ruling.
We adopt the district court’s findings of fact:
Atellia Kinzenbaw died testate leaving one-sixth shares of
the family farm to six of her children. Doyle was one of the six
children receiving a share of the family farm. The Final Report was
approved and the Estate closed on August 4, 2014. There appears
to be a history of bad blood/bad relationship between Doyle and his
other five siblings. This included some litigation in the estate file
and also a [forced entry and detainer] action to remove Doyle from
the family farm. . . .
During some of the intra-family disputes, Doyle was
represented by attorney Eric Tindal. At some point there was
discussion between Doyle and his other five siblings about the five
siblings purchasing (through an LLC) Doyle’s one-sixth interest in
the farm. Attorney John Wagner represented the other five siblings
in this process/negotiation.
A series of emails between attorneys Wagner and Tindal . . .
establish the following:
a. August 14, 2014, email from Tindal (Doyle’s attorney) to Wagner
indicating that Doyle is perfectly willing to have his interest in the
farm bought out;
b. August 15, 2014, email from Wagner to Tindal indicating that the
siblings are going to meet to discuss whether interest exists to buy
Doyle out;
c. November 7, 2014, email from Wagner to Tindal indicating that
Wagner had attached a proposed Settlement Agreement based on
Doyle’s acceptance of the siblings $233,000 settlement offer;
d. November 7, 2014, email from Tindal to Wagner indicating he
(Tindal) would take a look at it and get back to Wagner;
e. November 9, 2014, email from Wagner to Tindal asking for
progress update;
f. November 9, 2014, email from Tindal to Wagner indicating that
he (Tindal) had made two minor changes on the Settlement
Agreement;
g. November 9, 2014, email response from Wagner indicating the
changes are agreeable;
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h.November 9, 2014, email from Tindal indicating that “Doyle’s
coming in to sign in the next hour”;
i. November 9, 2014, email from Tindal to Wagner that starts “This
is the damnedest thing John” and continues to state that Doyle
wants to participate in the LLC as a minor member and subject to
its direction and decision as a minor member;
j. November 9, 2014, email from Tindal to Wagner indicating that
Tindal would accept service if Wagner elects to attempt enforcing
the settlement.
In May 2014, the Estate filed an application to enforce the agreement
claiming the parties had reached a final and complete settlement. It also claimed
the parties’ attorneys had the authority to enter into a settlement agreement on
behalf of the parties. Doyle resisted the Estate’s application.
The district court held a hearing on the Estate’s application in March 2015.
Concerning the parties, the court made the following observations:
Attorney Tindal testified at the hearing that:
a. Doyle never had the opportunity to read the settlement
agreement.
b. The content of [Tindal’s] emails. . . were accurate at the time
Tindal authored those emails.
c. In response to a question from Wagner concerning the content of
the emails—“And you believe that you were authorized to make
those offers on behalf of your client, do you not?” Tindal responded
“I would generally agree that I would not make an offer without
having authorization.”
d. During this relevant time frame, Tindal and Wagner had
numerous phone calls, some of which were probably about the
subject of Doyle’s buyout.
e. Tindal had a phone conversation with Doyle concerning the
$233,000 buyout offer from the siblings. Doyle had concerns that
that figure was not fair market value. Tindal explained to him about
the length of time litigation could go on and some of the potential
problems (attorney fees, length of litigation, cost of partitioning the
real estate) including the fact that farmland values were starting to
drop and could continue to drop if the litigation dragged on.
f. At the end of the phone conversation, Tindal felt that Doyle had
authorized him to accept the $233,000 offer, and Tindal then
conveyed this to Wagner.
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g. Under cross-examination, Tindal felt it was his general practice,
and also the case in this situation, that any final acceptance was
subject to Doyle’s approval of a definitive document.
Doyle testified at the hearing that:
a. He has extensive hearing loss and is hard of hearing. He does
not have a computer and does not email and, therefore, never
received any of the emails between Tindal and Wagner.
b. He gave Tindal authorization to try and negotiate a buyout of his
interest in the family farm but never gave him authorization to settle
or accept an offer.
c. He would never agree to the $233,000 buyout price since he felt
under current farmland values that his portion of the family farm is
worth at least $750,000 to $1,000,000.
Executor Denise Kaestner credibly testified to the dollar
amount reductions the siblings took into account in formulating their
buyout offer to Doyle as follows:
a. $155,000 mortgage against the farm (one-sixth share equals
approximately $26,000).
b. Possible environmental clean-up problems and expense caused
by Doyle. (Doyle disputes this allegation). Estimated clean-up cost
was $40,000.
c. Doyle lived on the farm property for approximately seven years
without paying rent and also had livestock and horses there. Rent
at $1000 per month equals $84,000 in unpaid rent.
d. $70,000 spent in legal fees by Atellia when she was sued over a
motor vehicle accident caused by Doyle.
e. These amounts (including one-sixth share of the mortgage) total
$220,000.
The court found the parties entered into a valid settlement agreement and
the parties’ attorneys had authority to enter into the agreement. Doyle filed a
motion to enlarge the findings claiming enforcement of the settlement agreement
is prohibited by the statute of frauds provision in Iowa Code section 622.32(2)
(2013). The Estate resisted. The district court denied the motion finding Doyle
had not preserved error on his statute of frauds claim. Doyle now appeals.
“[T]he decision of the trial court has the effect of a jury verdict, and our
review is limited to claims of error. The findings made by the trial court are
binding [on appeal] if supported by substantial evidence.” Wende v. Orv Rocker
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Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (citations
omitted).
Doyle claims the district court’s finding his attorney had authority to accept
the settlement agreement was not supported by substantial evidence and, thus,
the court improperly enforced the settlement agreement.
An attorney has the authority to “[b]ind a client to any agreement, in
respect to any proceeding within the scope of the attorney’s or counselor’s
proper duties and powers.” Iowa Code § 602.10114(2).
An attorney’s offer of settlement is generally within the scope
of the attorney’s litigation duties. See Strong v. Rothamel, 523
N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994); Starlin v. State, 450 N.W.2d
257, 258 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). However, an attorney cannot settle
or compromise a case without authority. Dillon v. City of
Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Iowa 1985). If a settlement is
made with authority, that settlement is binding on the client. Id.;
see Iowa Code § 602.10114(2).
An attorney is presumed to act with authority. Dillon, 366
N.W.2d at 923. The presumption, however, is not conclusive and
may be rebutted. Id. The presumption is overcome only by clear
and satisfactory proof. Lonning v. Lonning, 199 N.W.2d 60, 62
(Iowa 1972).
Gilbride v. Trunnelle, 620 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Iowa 2000).
In finding Doyle’s attorney had the authority to accept the settlement
agreement, the court noted:
The evidence clearly establishes that: Tindal initiated and
undertook discussions/negotiations with Wagner concerning the
siblings buying out Doyle’s interest in the farm and was authorized
to do so by Doyle. Tindal was retained as an attorney by Doyle to
engage in such negotiations. Tindal felt that Doyle had authorized
him to accept the $233,000 offer and that Tindal conveyed this
acceptance to Wagner.
As stated in my Conclusions of Law, an attorney is
presumed to act with authority. Based on the evidence presented
and my Findings of Fact, buttressed by the presumption of
authority, I FIND that attorney Tindal was authorized to accept the
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sum of $233,000 from Wagner for the buyout of Doyle’s interest in
the family farm. Although Doyle now appears to have buyer’s (or in
this case seller’s) remorse, he is unable to rebut the presumption of
authority by clear and satisfactory evidence.
We agree with the district court and find Doyle has not proven, by clear
and satisfactory evidence; he did not consent to the settlement agreement. We
find substantial evidence supports the court’s finding Doyle’s attorney had
consent to accept the settlement agreement, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.