Justin Boliver and Nicole L. Boliver v. Larry Kester ( 2016 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-1973
    Filed August 17, 2016
    JUSTIN BOLIVER AND NICOLE L. BOLIVER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    vs.
    LARRY KESTER,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, John J. Haney,
    Judge.
    Property owners appeal the district court’s order denying their claim of
    negligent misrepresentation by the property’s developer. AFFIRMED.
    Gail E. Boliver and Merrill C. Swartz of Boliver Law Firm, Marshalltown, for
    appellants.
    William J. Lorenz of Moore, McKibben, Goodman & Lorenz, LLP,
    Marshalltown, for appellee.
    Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
    2
    DOYLE, Judge.
    Property owners appeal the district court’s order denying their claim of
    negligent misrepresentation by the property’s developer. On appeal, the property
    owners assert the trial court erred in ruling that the developer’s supplying of
    erroneous information to their plumbing subcontractor as to the location of the
    sewer connection was not negligent and did not violate a duty of the developer to
    provide accurate information.    Upon our review, we find the district court’s
    conclusion that the property owners failed to establish a claim of negligent
    misrepresentation is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    The facts underlying this case are generally undisputed. In 1998, Larry
    Kester decided to create a residential housing development on a portion of the
    eighty acres of land he owned in the Marshalltown area. To that end, Kester
    hired an engineering firm, and its engineers designed a preliminary plat for the
    creation of a subdivision named Cross Country Estates. The original preliminary
    plat was approved by the city, and phases of development of the subdivision
    subsequently began.
    In 2004 a “service lateral form” was submitted to the city concerning the lot
    in question (Lot 6).1 The form, signed by Kester, detailed information concerning
    the location of Lot 6’s sewer connection, such as the location of nearby manholes
    and distances thereto.
    1
    The lot was originally designated Lot 57 in the preliminary plats and was later
    renumbered as Lot 6 of the Sixth Addition in the final plat, dated July 11, 2006.
    3
    In 2006, before the sixth phase of the development of Cross Country
    Estates—which included Lot 6—was scheduled to begin, the preliminary plat for
    that area was modified by Kester’s engineers at his request.          One of the
    modifications was the realignment of Travis Drive and its “T” intersection at
    Seventh Avenue. Lot 6 is located at the southern corner of the two streets. On
    the original plan, Travis Drive met Seventh Avenue at a slight angle, whereas
    Travis Drive is perpendicular to Seventh Avenue in the modified plan. In the
    redesign, the city requested that the nearby manhole’s location on Seventh
    Avenue be moved south to the center of the Travis Drive and Seventh Avenue
    intersection.   Kester’s engineers did so, and the drawing designs for the
    modification were all submitted to and are on file with the city. The city approved
    the plan. Another service lateral form detailing the relocation of the manhole was
    not submitted to the city, though the city never requested one.
    Kester sold Lot 6 to a third party in 2008, who in turn sold it to Justin
    Boliver and Nicole Allen, now Nicole Boliver, sometime in 2012.         After their
    purchase, the Bolivers hired a general contractor to build a home on the lot. The
    general contractor had plans drawn up, and he applied to the city for a building
    permit. As part of that process, the general contractor received from the city a
    copy of the filed 2004 service lateral form.
    The general contractor subcontracted with a plumbing company to
    connect the house to the sewer main.           A licensed master plumber and a
    journeyman plumber, both employed by the plumbing company, worked on the
    job. The plumbers received from the general contractor a copy of the 2004
    4
    service lateral form, and they verified with the city that what they had been given
    was correct.
    The plumbers dug from the house towards the location where the form
    stated the sewer connection would be found.        They found nothing, but they
    continued to dig. Kester saw the trenching going on at the construction site, and
    he stopped and visited with “a couple of persons that were there working on the
    trench.” After learning the plumbers were having a problem, Kester went home
    and brought back a copy of the 2004 service lateral form. The plumbers advised
    Kester they already had a copy of the form. Kester indicated the plumbers “really
    weren’t interested in what [he] had to offer.” Kester did not mention the changed
    location of the manhole or provide the more recent designs to the plumbers or
    general contractor.
    Approximately sixteen days after the search began—including eleven
    working days—the sewer connection was found. The trench made during the
    plumbers’ search was seventy- to eighty-feet long, ten- to twelve-feet wide, and,
    in some places, eighteen-feet deep. The original estimated cost of $2500 to
    connect the house to the water and sewer lines skyrocketed to an actual amount
    just under $15,000. At some point during their search, the plumbers contacted
    the city engineer, but the engineer told them he was uncertain where the
    connection was. The city engineer came to the site after the trench had already
    been dug, and he suggested where to look for the connection. Beyond Kester’s
    stop at the construction site, neither he nor his engineers were contacted by the
    plumbers during their search.
    5
    In August 2014, the Bolivers filed suit against Kester.     They asserted
    claims of negligence and, after amending their petition, of negligent
    misrepresentation. Following a trial to the district court, the court entered its
    order concluding the Bolivers failed to prove their claims.
    The Bolivers now appeal, contending the district court erred in so finding.
    They assert “Kester gave erroneous information to [the contractors] that caused
    them to spend time and money digging for a sewer connection at the wrong
    place. Kester violated his duty by negligent[ly] misrepresenting the location of
    the sewer hookup.”
    II. Standard of Review.
    We review the trial court’s decision for correction of errors at law. See
    Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; see also Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
    
    788 N.W.2d 386
    , 390 (Iowa 2010). “Under this scope of review, the trial court’s
    findings of fact have the force of a special verdict and are binding on us if
    supported by substantial evidence,” viewing the evidence “in the light most
    favorable to the trial court’s judgment.” 
    Brokaw, 788 N.W.2d at 388
    (citation
    omitted). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different
    conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding
    actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” 
    Id. at 393
    (citation omitted).
    III. Negligent Misrepresentation.
    “Generally, if a negligent misrepresentation results in personal or property
    damage, courts treat it the same as other negligence claims.” Van Sickle Constr.
    Co. v. Wachovia Commercial Mortg., Inc., 
    783 N.W.2d 684
    , 690 (Iowa 2010).
    6
    “However, when the negligent misrepresentation only interferes with intangible
    economic interests, courts have developed more restrictive rules of recovery.”
    Pitts v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 
    818 N.W.2d 91
    , 111 (Iowa 2012) (citation
    omitted). Specifically, “Iowa has adopted the definition of the tort of negligent
    misrepresentation found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,” which provides,
    in relevant part:
    One who, in the course of his business, profession or
    employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
    pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
    others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
    pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
    information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in
    obtaining or communicating the information.
    Bagelmann v. First Nat’l Bank, 
    823 N.W.2d 18
    , 30 (Iowa 2012) (quoting
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) (Am. Law. Inst. 1977)). Based upon the
    Iowa Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 552 over the years, it can be said
    that a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements to support a claim of
    negligent misrepresentation:
    (1) [T]he defendant was in the business or profession of supplying
    information to others; (2) the defendant intended to supply
    information to the plaintiff or knew that the recipient intended to
    supply it to the plaintiff; (3) the information was false; (4) the
    defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the
    information was false; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the
    information in the transaction that the defendant intended the
    information to influence; (6) and the false information was the
    proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff.
    McLeodUSA Telecomm. Servs., Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 
    469 F. Supp. 2d 677
    , 692
    (N.D. Iowa 2007) (discussing the evolution of the elements of negligent
    misrepresentation under Iowa law).
    7
    The Bolivers argue on appeal “Kester gave erroneous information to [the
    Bolivers’] workers that caused them to spend time and money digging for a
    sewer connection at the wrong place.” However, viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the district court’s judgment, the court’s ruling is clearly
    supported by substantial evidence.
    After hearing the evidence at trial, the district court found “Kester did not
    supply any information” and the plumbers were “not interested in anything
    [Kester] might have had to offer.”     Both of these findings go directly to the
    necessary elements of the claim: if no information was provided, there could be
    no misrepresentation by Kester. Moreover, even if Kester did supply information
    to the plumbers, it was not provided to them as part of Kester’s business. Finally,
    even if the information was so provided, the plumbers did not rely upon the
    information.
    Kester gave a copy of the 2004 service lateral form to the plumbers
    working at the construction site. But, even assuming without deciding Kester did
    supply information to the plumbers within the meaning of section 552 of the
    restatement, there certainly was no testimony by the plumber that the plumbers
    relied upon the information Kester provided.        The Bolivers’ own argument
    demonstrates there was no reliance upon the information provided by Kester.
    They assert, among other things: “The fact that the [Bolivers’] workers already
    had similar information[] does not change the fact that Kester’s information
    damaged [the Bolivers].” The plumbers did not have “similar” information—the
    plumbers had the exact same information.        Notably, they had already begun
    digging before Kester happened by and offered to help.           Furthermore, the
    8
    plumbers “really weren’t interested in what [Kester] had to offer.” There simply
    was no evidence offered to show that the Bolivers or the plumbers relied upon
    the information provided by Kester; the Bolivers are in the same place they would
    have been if Kester had opted not to stop by the construction site.
    IV. Conclusion.
    Upon our review, we find the district court’s conclusion that the Bolivers’
    failed to establish a claim of negligent misrepresentation is supported by
    substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm. Costs on appeal are assessed to
    the Bolivers.
    AFFIRMED.