In the Interest of G.J., Minor Child ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0282
Filed May 1, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF G.J.,
Minor Child,
V.L., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Adam D.
Sauer, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Michael J. Moeller of Sorensen & Moeller Law Office, Clear Lake, for
appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Crystal L. Ely of North Iowa Youth Law Center, Mason City, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights.
She claims the State did not show by clear and convincing evidence her parental
rights should be terminated, the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) failed
to make reasonable efforts at reunification, and she should be granted additional
time. We find reasonable efforts were made to reunify the family and the child
could not be safely returned to the mother’s care even with additional services and
time. We affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
V.L. is the mother of G.J., born in 2017. The mother listed several putative
fathers to the child throughout the proceedings. The mother’s rights had been
terminated to an older child in early 2016 following two years of services.
On October 15, 2017, the child was removed from the mother’s care
following a domestic dispute between the mother and her paramour. The mother
is deaf and mute. While law enforcement were in the home investigating the
domestic dispute, the mother picked up and abruptly moved the three-month-old
infant back and forth in a jerky manner without supporting the child’s head, and the
child’s head struck the mother’s shoulder. The child was hospitalized for
observation and the mother was charged with child endangerment. 1 When
released from the hospital, the child was placed with the foster family that adopted
the older sibling. The child was adjudicated in need of assistance (CINA) on
December 1.
1
The mother was found guilty of assault causing bodily injury in March 2018 and served
twenty-eight days in jail.
3
In addition to services provided by DHS and Family Safety, Risk, and
Permanency services (FSRP), the mother also worked with service providers from
Deaf Iowans Against Abuse (DIAA) and Crisis Intervention Service. In July, the
court ordered interpreters be present at all visitations and in-person interactions
between the mother, DHS, and FSRP.
The mother preferred a Certified Deaf Interpreter (CDI) to American Sign
Language (ASL) interpreters, stating she primarily spoke a pidgin version of sign
language. The interpreters available to DHS for in-person visits were ASL
interpreters; the only CDI interpreters meeting DHS standards were based in other
states. The mother was able to communicate with the ASL interpreters. The court
ordered the CDI interpreters be available in person at court hearings, and
approved availability through a video chat during FSRP and DHS sessions with
the mother.2 Early in the case, visitation occurred whether or not an interpreter
was available. Following the court’s order, later visits where an interpreter was not
available were rescheduled.
DHS, FSRP, and the mother’s DIAA advocate all worked to get the mother
into ASL classes to facilitate her communication abilities. When the mother moved
back to Mason City in February, she no longer had transportation to in-person ASL
classes she was signed up for in Charles City. In August, the DIAA advocate
helped the mother enroll in an online ASL class. The mother did not participate in
any of the classes, blaming her time in jail and then lack of an iPad as preventing
2
The mother also makes use of an app that video conferences an interpreter for phone
calls. Additionally, the record shows she does significant amounts of texting and writing
to others through Facebook and other social media.
4
her attendance. The mother provided conflicting communication information to
providers. At times, she would claim to be unable to communicate clearly via
written communications and other times would stop providers from reading things
to her and indicate she could read and understand things on her own.
From October 2017 until the beginning of February 2018, the mother lived
in a homeless shelter. In February, she moved into a one-bedroom apartment,
and was still there at the time of the termination hearing. The mother was not
employed throughout the case, but she received social security disability income,
housing assistance, and food assistance every month. The mother has a payee
through the county who pays her bills and distributes money to her weekly for food
and other purchases.
From the beginning of the CINA case, the court ordered the mother to
actively participate in mental-health treatment. While she was in the shelter, the
mother met weekly with a therapist, communicating via writing. Once she was out
of the shelter, the mother’s insurance did not cover the same therapist. DHS and
FSRP brought the mother information on other locations. She eventually chose a
new therapist, but did not obtain an evaluation until June. She saw a therapist in
July, but beginning in August did not show up to appointments or reschedule them.
By the time of the termination hearing, the mother had not been to therapy for six
months, but she had been reporting to FSRP she was attending consistently. The
mother obtained her medications from the same healthcare facility.
DHS arranged a psychological evaluation for the mother in early
September. The appointment was made with a psychologist able to communicate
through sign language and recommended by the Iowa School for the Deaf. After
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initially agreeing to the evaluation, the mother changed her mind, alternately
claiming it would violate her probation, it conflicted with when she was to serve jail
time, the transportation company would not take her, her lawyer and DIAA
advocate told her she did not need to go, and various other reasons. Ultimately,
she claimed DHS should have provided her with a deaf psychologist with an
understanding of deaf culture, but the mother made no suggestions to DHS for a
psychologist she felt was sufficiently qualified.
FSRP reports throughout the case show the mother tends to rely on others
to make her appointments, sign her up for services and aid, and to generally tell
her how to take care of the child. While she seemed receptive to suggestions or
corrections from FSRP workers, she struggled to retain and develop those skills
between visits and as the child grew. The mother repeatedly showed a lack of
attention that could easily lead the child to harm, including being primarily focused
on her phone, forgetting to feed the child or put the child down for a nap, not
noticing the child putting items in her mouth that should not be eaten or climbing
on outdoor furniture, and the child generally wandering around the apartment
without the mother paying attention. The mother cancelled and cut short several
visits with the child and many parenting sessions with FSRP in the months leading
up to termination because she was stressed, tired, or sick and did not feel up to
caring for the child for the full visitation period.
At the termination hearing on January 7 and 8, 2019, the court heard
testimony from the mother, the DHS social worker, a crisis intervention worker who
assisted the mother, the mother’s DIAA advocate, the FSRP provider, the mother’s
probation officer, and the mother’s CINA attorney.
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On February 1, 2019, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2018).3 She appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re A.B., 815
N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012). “There must be clear and convincing evidence of
the grounds for termination of parental rights.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219
(Iowa 2016). Clear and convincing evidence means there are “no serious or
substantial doubts as to the correctness of conclusions of law drawn from the
evidence.” In re L.H., 904 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). The
paramount concern in termination proceedings is the best interest of the child. In
re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). “We give weight to the juvenile court’s
factual findings, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we
are not bound by them.” In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745 (Iowa 2011).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
“When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find
supported by the record.” A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 774. We find termination was
proper under section 232.116(1)(h).
Under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), the court may terminate a parent’s
rights when the child is three years of age or younger, has been adjudicated CINA,
has been removed from the parent’s physical custody for at least six of the last
twelve months without a trial period at home longer than thirty days, and there is
3
The court also terminated the parental rights of the child’s putative father. The putative
father did not contest the termination and does not appeal.
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clear and convincing evidence the child could not be returned to the home at the
present time. The mother does not contest the first three elements have been
established.
The district court found clear and convincing evidence existed that the child
could not be returned to the mother’s care, finding the child would likely suffer
harmful effects from the mother’s failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care
in supervising the child. We agree and find the mother has not shown a willingness
to follow through with evaluations and therapy ordered by the court. Two FSRP
service providers noted the mother did not understand the child’s cues and
required multiple reminders and supervision to ensure the child did not come to
harm. The mother testified having DHS or FSRP ask her questions about her
mental health, her medication, or discussing court requirements caused stress and
made her health worse.
While individual incidents of lack of care and supervision may seem small,
put in a cumulative context they show the child cannot safely return to the home.
See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111–12 (Iowa 2014). The mother has not
progressed beyond supervised visits and was still asking basic care questions over
a year after the child’s removal. When the time came to take court-recommended
action to facilitate the child’s return, the mother did not follow through, always
shifting the blame to others. We find clear and convincing evidence establishes
the child cannot be returned to the mother’s care at this time.
IV. Reasonable Efforts
The mother claims the State did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her
with the child. She raises the issue of reasonable accommodations under the
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), to support a need for additional assistance
by DHS. We note the mother raised similar claims on appeal with the child subject
to the 2016 termination. See In re J.L., 868 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Iowa 2015); In re
J.L., No. 16-0601, 2016 WL 3554927, at *2–4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2016). Iowa
Code section 232.102(9) requires DHS to “make every reasonable effort to return
the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best
interests of the child.” The purpose underlying the reasonable-efforts requirement
is to help the parent to make the changes necessary for the child to return. As we
noted in her prior appeal, “the reasonable-efforts requirement is not a strict
substantive requirement for termination.” J.L., 2016 WL 3554927, at *3.
In this case, the juvenile court found DHS had made reasonable efforts
toward reunification through providing: “FSRP services, paternity testing, mental
health services, Certified American Sign Language and Certified Deaf Interpreters,
Crisis Intervention Services, referrals for in-person ASL classes, transportation,
and referral for psychological evaluation.”
On appeal, the mother identifies four reasonable effort “accommodations”
she claims to have been denied: picture books to help her comprehend the
parenting curriculum, the provision of an alert system for when the child cries, an
“appropriate” psychological evaluator, and providing adequate communications.
She asked the court for more time for reunification with these requested
accommodations. On the record before us, the mother has failed to show any of
her requested accommodations are either reasonable or would make it safe for the
child to return to her care.
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First, DHS and FSRP provided reasonable efforts to teach the mother
parenting skills. FSRP used demonstrations with dolls and the child to show the
mother appropriate actions. FSRP would communicate role-playing scenarios with
the mother and inquire what appropriate actions would be in those situations.
FSRP provided the written materials given to parents to review and discuss. FSRP
arranged for weekly sessions with the mother and two interpreters to discuss both
the current status and to work on parenting skills. The mother cancelled multiple
sessions because they caused her too much stress. The mother does not provide
an explanation how the addition of picture books would have improved her
understanding of parenting skills beyond the services already provided.
Next, the record shows more than once the mother was offered and refused
an alert system for when the baby cried. The child’s doctor had offered her a
system before the CINA proceedings ever began, and the FSRP reports note the
mother told them she did not want an alert system until the child was returned to
her care. In her testimony, the mother stated she would get the alert system “once
I have [G.J.]” At no point prior to the hearing did the mother exhibit interest in
pursuing the alert system, either refusing it or telling DHS and FSRP she was
getting a system elsewhere. To now claim DHS has denied providing the mother
the system is misleading at best, and we find the mother’s claim has no merit.
Third, we find DHS made reasonable efforts to find an appropriate
psychological evaluator for the mother. DHS consulted with the Iowa School for
the Deaf to identify an appropriate psychologist with experience working with the
deaf and able to communicate through sign language. DHS also approved the
mother’s DIAA advocate attending the evaluation, but even with that the mother
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refused to attend, claiming she needed a deaf evaluator who understood the deaf
culture. Then, at the termination hearing, the mother testified she objected to the
psychologist DHS arranged due to his use of ASL instead of the mother’s pidgin
signing and stated she would prefer to have a certified interpreter for her evaluation
rather than the designated evaluator signing for himself. We find DHS made
reasonable efforts to find an appropriate psychological evaluator.
Finally, as to communications, we find DHS made reasonable efforts. An
ASL interpreter was provided at visitations, and a CDI was available via video
conference for parenting and review sessions between FSRP, DHS, and the
mother, and in-person for court hearings. Despite efforts by both DHS and her
DIAA advocate, the mother chose to not pursue ASL classes or make any effort to
improve her communication abilities. The mother exhibited varying levels of
understanding of ASL and the ability to read and write in the English language
throughout the proceedings, alternately claiming lack of understanding and full
understanding.
We find DHS made reasonable efforts to facilitate the reunification of the
mother and the child. DHS provided reasonable accommodations in compliance
with the ADA to the extent possible given the mother’s refusal to actively participate
in ordered services. The mother has failed to show she requested a reasonable
service that was not offered to her. DHS can offer the services, but the parent
must make the effort if the services are to remedy deficiencies and help return the
child to the home.
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V. Additional Time
Finally, the mother requests additional time to work toward reunification.
The legislature has established a statutory scheme governing CINA cases,
including appropriate time frames. See, e.g., In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494
(Iowa 2000). Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) specifically limits the time period to
six months for children under four years of age. The court may only grant
additional time if it can “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected
behavioral changes” which will occur and eliminate the need for removal. Iowa
Code § 232.104(2)(b).
G.J. has been out of the mother’s care for fourteen months—the majority of
this young child’s life. In July, the court granted the mother additional time to work
toward reunification following a change in FSRP providers and earlier failures to
provide in-person interpreters. In the same order, the court ordered the mother to
“actively participate in, and demonstrate progress with, all services ordered
herein.” These services included individual mental-health therapy and medication
management. The mother did not comply with the mental-health requirement and
actively avoided a mental-health psychological evaluation. We see no evidence in
the record to support a finding the mother is willing and able to make the changes
necessary for the child to return home within six months.
We find the State has proven a ground for termination of the mother’s
parental rights, DHS made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification, and
additional time is not warranted. Termination of the mother’s parental rights is in
the child’s best interest, and we affirm the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED.