State of Iowa v. Bradley J. Qualls ( 2016 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-1292
    Filed September 14, 2016
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    BRADLEY J. QUALLS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Gary P.
    Strausser, District Associate Judge.
    Bradley Qualls appeals his conviction for invasion of privacy claiming
    insufficient evidence and further alleges the trial court abused its discretion in
    denying his request for deferred judgment. AFFIRMED.
    Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Elisabeth Reynoldson, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
    2
    POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
    Bradley Qualls appeals from his conviction of invasion of privacy, in
    violation of Iowa Code section 709.21 (2013). Qualls asserts there is insufficient
    evidence to uphold his conviction and requests this court reverse his conviction
    for entry of acquittal. He further avers the trial court abused its discretion by
    denying his request for deferred judgment. We affirm.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings
    Bradley Qualls was charged by trial information with invasion of privacy—
    nudity, a serious misdemeanor. The complaining witness is an adult relative of
    Qualls’s wife.
    In the spring of 2014, the complaining witness went to Qualls’s home to
    use a basement shower, as the shower at the complaining witness’s home was
    inoperable. While she showered, Qualls admitted to recording her using a cell
    phone camera while standing in a bathroom directly above the basement shower.
    Qualls removed a floor vent above the basement shower and pried a hole in the
    floor that gave him an unobstructed view into the shower below.
    Qualls then placed the cell phone over the hole to record the complaining
    witness. During the seven-plus-minute recording, the camera is positioned and
    re-positioned so the complaining witness is always in the camera’s frame. Qualls
    contends that he did not watch as the camera was recording but does admit that
    he knew the camera was recording. The video, recorded without any audio,
    concluded at the exact time the complaining witness exited the camera’s frame
    after finishing her shower and drying off.
    3
    Qualls’s wife found the unfamiliar cell phone in the laundry room of her
    home. Believing that her husband may be having an affair, she contacted the
    complaining witness for help accessing the information stored on the phone. It
    was later discovered to contain the recording of the complaining witness
    showering.
    Qualls immediately admitted to recording the video and apologized to the
    complaining witness. He blamed his actions on some traumatic events of his
    childhood along with the “demons” inside him.
    The major issue in this case was not whether Qualls recorded the video,
    as that was undisputed; it was whether Qualls recorded it for sexual arousal or
    gratification, or to exact revenge on the complaining witness.
    Qualls asserts that he and the complaining witness have a troubled past.
    He recalled the complaining witness and his wife frequently arguing and the
    complaining witness would call the wife names.            Further, he stated the
    complaining victim had previously wrecked his classic car and never attempted
    or offered to reimburse him for his loss. He also remembered an incident where
    the complaining witness walked in on him when he was not dressed.
    At his bench trial, Qualls testified and presented testimony from a licensed
    mental-health counselor who, at the time of trial, had conducted twenty-three
    sessions with Qualls during the preceding year. Her testimony indicated that
    Qualls had suffered traumatic events during his childhood and had a mindset that
    he was powerless to control the people who hurt him. She testified Qualls had
    been diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive
    4
    disorder, and alcohol dependence in remission. The counselor also indicated
    that Qualls exhibited remorse for having recorded the complaining witness.
    Additionally, she testified that Qualls had been affected by past incidents
    involving himself, his wife, and the complaining witness. She opined that Qualls
    felt humiliated by the complaining witness and the past incidents, and that he
    wanted to “balance” things out with her; the recording of the complaining witness
    in the shower was a means of “settling the score.”
    The counselor further testified that, in her opinion, Qualls did not record
    the video for sexual purposes but rather because the complaining witness was in
    a vulnerable state. She stated that she did not believe Qualls had predatory
    inclinations, nor that he was sexually deviant. In its bench trial verdict, the court
    made a credibility finding against Qualls and did not mention the counselor’s
    testimony.
    At the sentencing hearing, Qualls requested deferred judgment; however,
    the court sentenced Qualls to 180 days in jail—150 days of which were
    suspended.    The court also imposed a fine and indicated Qualls would be
    required to register as a sex offender. His request for work release during the jail
    portion of the sentence was granted.
    Qualls appeals.
    II. Discussion
    A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Qualls contends the trial court should not have found him guilty because
    there was insufficient evidence of sexual motivation, and as such, the conviction
    should be reversed for entry of acquittal. Specifically, Qualls argues that his
    5
    conviction cannot stand because the evidence presented did not prove the
    element of sexual purpose. Section 709.21 provides:
    Any person who knowingly views, photographs, or films
    another person, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual
    desire of any person, commits invasion of privacy if all of the
    following apply:
    a. The other person does not have knowledge about and
    does not consent or is unable to consent to being viewed,
    photographed, or filmed.
    b. The other person is in a state of full or partial nudity.
    c. The other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
    while in a state of full or partial nudity.
    (Emphasis added.)
    “Challenges to the sufficiency of evidence are reviewed for errors at law.”
    State v. Keopasaeuth, 
    645 N.W.2d 637
    , 639-40 (Iowa 2002). In so doing “[w]e
    consider all of the record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
    including all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.”
    State v. Howse, 
    875 N.W.2d 684
    , 688 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). “We will
    uphold a verdict if substantial record evidence supports it.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    “Evidence is substantial when ‘a rational trier of fact could conceivably find the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”        
    Id.
     (citation omitted).   If the
    “evidence only raises ‘suspicion, speculation, or conjecture,’ it is not substantial
    evidence.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). In criminal cases tried to the court, the court’s
    findings of fact have the force and same effect as a special jury verdict. See
    State v. Hall, 
    287 N.W.2d 564
    , 565 (Iowa 1980).
    Qualls stipulates that he recorded the video while the complaining witness
    was showering, where she would have expected privacy. He admits to knowing
    she was unaware of the recording and that she had not consented to being
    6
    recorded. However, he contends that he did not record her for sexual arousal or
    gratification but rather did so in an attempt to exact revenge for past occurrences
    between the two. In finding Qualls had a sexual motivation, the district court
    relied on the circumstances upon which Qualls observed the complaining witness
    during the recording—the fact he adjusted the phone so that the camera could
    capture a better picture—continued the recording for seven minutes, the
    elaborate lengths Qualls went in order to prevent disclosure. The court made
    explicit credibility findings against Qualls. The court did not mention in its verdict
    the testimony of Qualls’s counselor, who described Qualls’s feelings of
    helplessness and humiliation as a motivation for his actions. The rule does not
    require the judge to discuss every witness in making its detailed findings of fact.
    See 
    Iowa Code § 2.23
    (3)(d) (2013) .
    When reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a
    factfinder could reasonably conclude Qualls recorded the victim for sexual
    arousal and gratification. “Intent is a matter that is seldom capable of direct
    proof. Consequently, we have recognized that a trier of fact may infer intent from
    the normal consequences of one’s actions.” State v. Evans, 
    672 N.W.2d 328
    ,
    330 (Iowa 2003). The evidence presented from the recording itself show that
    Qualls did not simply record a snippet of the complaining witness in the shower;
    the recording exceeded seven minutes and indicated that Qualls was
    maneuvering the camera during the recording to maximize the view of the
    complaining witness.     Qualls did not stop recording until she was no longer
    visible from the first-floor bathroom vent. The evidence is sufficient to prove
    intent, notwithstanding the testimony of Qualls or the counselor. To the extent
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    the counselor’s testimony was based on the statements Qualls made to her, as
    argued by the State, the court’s credibility finding against Qualls applies to that
    testimony as well. We are satisfied the verdict is sufficiently detailed and there is
    sufficient evidence to uphold Qualls’s conviction.
    B. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing
    Qualls next argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying deferred
    judgment using only one essential factor.        At sentencing, Qualls requested
    deferred judgment; however, the court sentenced him to 180 days in jail with all
    but thirty days suspended.     Qualls will also be required to register as a sex
    offender. See Iowa Code § 692A.113 (2013).
    We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. State v. Evans,
    
    672 N.W.2d 328
    , 331 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Laffey, 
    600 N.W.2d 57
    , 62
    (Iowa 1999)).   “An abuse of discretion is found when the court exercises its
    discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” 
    Id.
    We consider “all pertinent matters when determining a sentence including the
    nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant’s age, character,
    propensities, and chances of his reform. 
    Id.
     “Sentencing decisions of the district
    court are cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor.” State v. Thomas, 
    547 N.W.2d 223
    , 225 (Iowa 1996).
    A sentencing court must exercise its discretion without application of a
    personal, inflexible policy relating only to one consideration. State v. Hildebrand,
    
    280 N.W.2d 393
    , 397 (Iowa 1979). In doing so, [t]he sentencing court should
    engage in an independent consideration in each case, and reject the use of fixed
    policies. State v. Hager, 
    630 N.W.2d 828
    , 834 (Iowa 2001). If the court focuses
    8
    on only one factor or has a policy against considering any factor, the court has
    abused its discretion. See Hildebrand, 
    280 N.W.2d at 396
    .
    Here, we do not find that the court focused on one sole factor in
    sentencing. At sentencing, the court explained why it imposed the sentence it
    did. First, the court recognized that both the State and defense counsel called to
    its attention prior similar cases before the court. The court acknowledged those
    cases and mentioned that each prior case’s final disposition was expected to be
    different than other cases given that “each case stands on its own either merit or
    lack thereof.” The court further explained that one reason for its rejecting the
    request for deferred judgment was due to the manner in which Qualls committed
    the crime. The court focused on the level of trust that existed between Qualls
    and the complaining witness, the type of relationship the two had prior to this
    incident, and the high level of vulnerability of the complaining witness.
    The court further stated Qualls’s method of committing the crime also
    justified the denial of deferred judgment. The court described Qualls’s decision
    to record the complaining witness for over seven minutes and the calculated
    movements of the camera by Qualls justified the imposed sentence. The court
    also stated that it had concerns that Qualls may reoffend in a similar crime in the
    future.
    The court did explain that it considered both longer and shorter sentences
    than that which was imposed. However, the court opted for the shorter sentence
    because Qualls had a job and had no criminal history. The court considered
    these factors and took them into account when granting Qualls’s request for work
    release. Furthermore, the court imposed a sentence within the statutory limit.
    9
    See 
    Iowa Code § 903.1
    (1)(b) (“For a serious misdemeanor, there shall be a fine
    of at least three hundred fifteen dollars . . . . In addition, the court may also order
    imprisonment not to exceed one year.”).
    A court “is generally not required to give its reasons for rejecting particular
    sentencing options.”    Thomas, 
    547 N.W.2d at
    225 (citing State v. Loyd, 
    530 N.W.2d 708
    , 713-14 (Iowa 1995)). The court need only “state on the record its
    reason for selecting the particular sentence.” 
    Iowa Code § 2.23
    (3)(d).
    We do not find the court’s imposition of judgment on Qualls to be clearly
    unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds. We find that the sentence
    imposed and the denial of deferred judgment were acceptable exercises of the
    court’s discretion   See State v. Formano, 
    638 N.W.2d 720
    , 725 (Iowa 2002)
    (stating the appellate court’s “task on appeal is not to second guess the decision
    made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on
    untenable grounds”).
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.