Ronald James Taylor, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1493
Filed September 14, 2016
RONALD JAMES TAYLOR,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buena Vista County, Carl J.
Petersen, Judge.
Ronald Taylor appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief seeking to overturn his convictions upon entry of Alford pleas to two counts
of lascivious acts with a child. AFFIRMED.
Andrew J. Smith of Mack, Hansen, Gadd, Armstrong & Brown, P.C.,
Storm Lake, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Ronald Taylor appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief (PCR) seeking to overturn his convictions upon entry of Alford pleas1 to two
counts of lascivious acts with a child, class “C” felonies, in violation of Iowa Code
sections 708.8(1), and 702.5 (2011). Taylor asserts his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in failing to sufficiently investigate prior to trial, ensure
Taylor’s Alford pleas were knowing and voluntary, and present sufficient
evidence in support of the motion to withdraw the Alford pleas. Taylor also
asserts appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the district court’s
denial of posttrial motions on direct appeal. Because we find trial and appellate
counsel did not render ineffective assistance, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On November 7, 2011, Taylor was charged by trial information with four
counts of second-degree sexual abuse, class “B” felonies, based on allegations
he committed sex acts with a minor between June 2010 and March 2011. The
matter proceeded to trial on March 13, 2012. After jury selection but prior to the
start of testimony, the State advised Taylor it intended to file additional charges
involving other known victims if Taylor proceeded to trial, and it offered Taylor an
opportunity to plead guilty. After deliberation with his attorney and wife, Taylor
expressed to the court a desire to enter Alford pleas to counts I and II. The State
agreed to amend counts I and II to the lesser charges of lascivious acts with a
child, dismiss counts III and IV, refrain from filing charges involving other alleged
victims, and dismiss a pending contempt charge. Taylor presented two signed
1
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
3
Alford pleas, the court completed a colloquy, and the pleas were accepted to
counts I and II as amended.
Taylor filed a motion to withdraw the Alford pleas on April 2, 2012, and a
motion in arrest of judgment on April 9, 2012. Both motions were denied.
Judgment and sentence were entered on July 30, 2012. The district court
sentenced Taylor to concurrent terms of incarceration not to exceed ten years on
each count. Taylor’s first appeal raised only the issue of restitution and was
dismissed as premature. Taylor’s second appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on issues not raised in and unrelated to the first appeal.
Taylor filed the PCR application on April 15, 2013, and an amendment to
the PCR application on March 5, 2015, claiming Taylor was denied effective
assistance by trial and appellate counsel. After a PCR hearing held May 21,
2015, the district court denied Taylor’s PCR application in an August 28, 2015
order. Taylor now appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
“We normally review postconviction proceedings for errors at law.” Castro
v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011). Applications for postconviction relief
that allege ineffective assistance of counsel, however, raise a constitutional
claim, which we review de novo. Id.III. Analysis.
To be successful on his claim for ineffective assistance, Taylor “must
satisfy the Strickland test[2] by showing ‘(1) counsel failed to perform an essential
2
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
4
duty; and (2) prejudice resulted.’” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Iowa
2012) (citation omitted).
A. Failure to Investigate. Taylor asserts trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to obtain a picture of the tattoo on Taylor’s back, Taylor’s dental records,
and testing of Taylor’s truck seat prior to the start of trial. Taylor contends these
pieces of evidence were necessary to contradict the victim’s statements and
prove his innocence.
Specifically, Taylor contends a picture of the tattoo on his back was
necessary to contradict the victim’s statements that she saw Taylor without a
shirt on during the assault and he did not have a tattoo. Also, Taylor’s argues the
dental records were needed to show that Taylor had dentures at the time of the
assault and could not have had a tooth knocked out by the victim as she stated.
Taylor also claims testing of the truck seat was necessary to show an assault did
not occur in the truck as the victim alleged.
Trial counsel explained during the PCR hearing that he had not obtained a
picture of Taylor’s tattoo or Taylor’s dental records because he planned to ask
Taylor at trial to remove his shirt to show the tattoo and to take out his dentures.
The PCR court determined:
Although it is unusual to have a witness take off his shirt or
take out his dentures during trial, this court cannot say it was an
unreasonable trial strategy. Had Taylor gone to trial, the defense
would have needed to cast doubt on the victim’s statements to [the
department of human services]. It may have been more
professional to take a picture and obtain the [dental] records, but
[trial counsel]’s strategy, nonetheless, would have been just as
effective.
5
The PCR court also found trial counsel’s failure to complete DNA testing
did not constitute ineffective assistance:
Taylor also wanted [trial counsel] to have the carpet from the
bedroom floor and his pick-up truck [seat] analyzed for his DNA. . . .
[Trial counsel] could have had multiple reasons as to why he did
not have the carpet tested. First, there was other exonerating
evidence. . . . Second, [trial counsel] may not have wanted to risk
having the carpet tested for Taylor’s DNA and having it come back
positive. It is a risk that a reasonable attorney would have to weigh.
We agree with the PCR court that trial counsel had strategic reasons for
not pursuing the pretrial investigation now sought by Taylor. Trial counsel’s
failure to obtain a picture of the tattoo or the dental records did not prejudice
Taylor because trial counsel had an alternative strategy to present the same
facts at trial. Further, it was reasonable for trial counsel to forgo testing of the
truck seat to avoid the potential discovery of incriminating evidence when there
was already exonerating evidence available. We conclude trial counsel
“conduct[ed] a reasonable investigation or ma[de] reasonable decisions that
ma[de] a particular investigation unnecessary,” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d
134, 145 (Iowa 2001), and did not render ineffective assistance in that regard.
B. Failure to Ensure Knowing and Voluntary Pleas. Taylor also contends
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure Taylor knowingly and voluntarily
entered the Alford pleas. Taylor argues he advised trial counsel that he believed
the State’s offer—to refrain from filing additional charges involving other known
victims if he entered the Alford pleas—constituted a threat. Taylor asserts trial
counsel was ineffective in allowing him to enter the Alford pleas that were
induced by a threat and that such pleas were not knowing or voluntary.
6
However, the prosecutor’s offer to refrain from filing additional charges
was not an improper threat. See State v. Longbine, 263 N.W.2d 527, 528 (Iowa
1978) (“[T]he fact that a plea was induced by the possibility of a more serious
charge does not render the plea involuntary.”); Parrott v. Haugh, 158 N.W.2d
766, 770 (Iowa 1968) (“[A] plea of guilty is not rendered involuntary by the fact it
was partly induced by the possibility a more serious charge might be
prosecuted.”); see also State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa 1998)
(stating “Speed’s concern that he must choose between trial on a murder charge
and pleading guilty to a lesser charge has no bearing upon the voluntariness of
his plea”). Because the offer was not an improper threat, trial counsel did not fail
to perform an essential duty by failing to raise concern regarding the threat
before the court.
Also, Taylor gave both oral and written affirmation that his pleas were not
entered as a result of improper threats or promises. During the plea-taking
colloquy, the court asked Taylor, “Have any threats or promise been made by
any law enforcement officer to induce you to enter your pleas of guilty?” Taylor
responded, “No, Your Honor.” Further, each written Alford plea contained a
section titled advisory of discretion of court, which stated in part, “I acknowledge
that I am entering this Alford plea as my own voluntary and informed act because
of all the reasons indicated on page three, below. I am not entering this plea
because of any threats of severe sentence or additional prosecution or any other
promises or threats.” Taylor signed both written Alford pleas.
Taylor contends he did not understand the court’s question in the colloquy
to include the prosecutor as a “law enforcement officer” and did not express
7
concern of the threat of additional prosecution to the court because of this
misunderstanding. However, Taylor was advised by the court to consult his
attorney if he did not understand any of the questions, and Taylor did not indicate
he did not understand the question regarding threats or promises. Taylor also
claims he did not read the written Alford pleas before signing them and was
unaware of their terms. However, at the PCR hearing, trial counsel testified he
extensively reviewed the written pleas with Taylor prior to signing. We find
Taylor has not overcome the presumption that the Alford pleas were voluntarily
entered. See State v. Bringus, No. 15-0478, 2016 WL 903161, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Mar. 9, 2016) (“The record at a plea hearing presumptively reflects the
facts. Where a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a plea, but had
asserted the plea was voluntary at the plea hearing, the defendant must
overcome that presumption.” (citations omitted)). Thus, Taylor has failed to
establish trial counsel failed in an essential duty.
Additionally, we find no ineffective assistance because Taylor has not
shown prejudice. Taylor may have considered the potential for other charges to
be filed in deciding whether to accept the plea offer, but it was not the sole
consideration. Taylor testified at the PCR hearing that he was not afraid of the
threat of additional prosecution:
Q. So why did you enter Alford pleas that day? A. For one I
was scared because when [trial counsel] was telling me that without
the evidence that I would not be able to—there’s a good chance I
would not be able to win the jury; that I would not be able to win the
trial; that without—without this we won’t be able to go. I didn’t care
about the threat. That was the last of my worries.
8
Moreover, in exchange for entering the Alford pleas, the State amended counts I
and II to the lesser charges of lascivious acts with a child, dismissed counts III
and IV, dismissed the pending contempt charge, and Taylor received a
significantly shorter prison sentence than what was possible under the four
counts originally charged.
Taylor has not shown “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he . . . would not have [pled] guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.” State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa 2006). Thus, Taylor
has not established the requisite prejudice to support the ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim.
C. Failure to Present Sufficient Evidence. Taylor also claims trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to present sufficient evidence in support of the motion to
withdraw the Alford pleas. However, this issue was not ruled on by the PCR
court, and Taylor did not file a motion requesting a ruling on the issue. See Iowa
R. Civ. P. 1.904(2). Therefore, this claim is not preserved for our review. See
Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental
doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and
decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal. . . . When a
district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who
raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error
for appeal.”).
D. Failure of Appellate Counsel to Challenge Trial Court’s Denial of
Posttrial Motions. Last, Taylor argues appellate counsel was ineffective in failing
to properly raise challenges to the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw
9
and motion in arrest of judgment on direct appeal. However, “[t]o prove appellate
counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice, the applicant must show
his [ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel] claim would have prevailed if it had
been raised on direct appeal.” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142. Because we have
determined trial counsel was not ineffective, appellate counsel’s failure to raise
the challenges on direct appeal did not result in prejudice.
Further, Taylor did not suffer prejudice because the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Taylor’s meritless requests to withdraw the Alford
pleas. See State v. Hellickson, 162 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Iowa 1968) (“[T]he rule is
clear that if an accused, with full knowledge of the charge against him, and of his
rights and consequences of a plea of guilty, then enters such a plea, the court
may, absent abuse of discretion, refuse to permit its withdrawal.”).
IV. Conclusion.
Because we find trial counsel and appellate counsel did not render
ineffective assistance, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.