State of Iowa v. James Curtis Craig III ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1074
Filed June 10, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES CURTIS CRAIG III,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Calhoun County, Kurt J. Stoebe,
Judge.
A defendant appeals from his conviction of operating while intoxicated,
first offense. AFFIRMED.
Jennifer Bonzer of Johnson & Bonzer, Fort Dodge, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather Ann Mapes, Assistant
Attorney General, Cynthia Voorde, County Attorney, and Tina Meth Farrington,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Goodhue, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
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GOODHUE, S.J.
James Curtis Craig III was convicted of operating while intoxicated, first
offense. He has appealed. We affirm.
I. Factual Background and Course of Proceedings
On December 22, 2013, Officer Israel Swanson of the Manson Police
Department was performing routine parole duties when he observed an individual
exit a local bar and grill, get into a parked car, and head down Main Street. The
vehicle suddenly stopped and began reversing, causing the driver of the
following vehicle to take evasive actions by slamming on the brakes and
reversing the vehicle in order to avoid being struck. Officer Swanson activated
his lights, pulled between the two vehicles, and stopped the reversing vehicle.
Officer Swanson determined that Craig was driving and charged him with
careless driving and operating while intoxicated.
Craig filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the stop of his vehicle was
an illegal seizure. The trial court concluded that Craig’s operation of his vehicle
was neither reckless driving nor careless driving but Officer Swanson had
probable cause to stop Craig’s vehicle and overruled Craig’s motion to suppress
as to the stop issue. Craig waived his right to a jury trial and consented to a trial
on the minutes. Craig was convicted of operating while intoxicated and has been
sentenced accordingly.
II. Preservation of Error
When a pretrial motion to suppress is overruled by the trial court no further
objection to the evidence’s submission at trial is necessary to preserve error.
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State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 232-33 (Iowa 1975). Error has been
preserved.
III. Scope of Review
Constitutional issues have been raised; therefore, review is de novo and
requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Pals, 805
N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011).
IV. Discussion
Craig contends that since Officer Swanson thought he was guilty of
violating the reckless driving or careless driving prohibition and it was later
determined that neither violation had occurred, there was therefore no right to
stop his vehicle. The stop of a motor vehicle by law enforcement is a seizure.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). Stopping a vehicle based
on an officer’s mistaken belief that a law has been broken, when in fact no law
exists that prohibits the observed act, does not constitute reasonable cause to
justify a traffic stop. State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Iowa 2010).
However, if a law enforcement officer has a reasonable and articulable belief that
criminal activity is afoot he can make a stop consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). The purpose of
such an investigatory stop is to resolve any ambiguity as to whether criminal
activity is afoot. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 101 (Iowa 1997). A mistaken
factual basis for a stop does not necessarily make the stop invalid. Id. Whether
Officer Swanson’s mistake is a mistake of law or fact is not critical as to the
legality of the stop in this instance. The State is not limited to the reason the
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officer gave for justifying the stop. State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 295 (Iowa
2013).
As opposed to Tyler, other reasons in the record justify for the stop. The
underlying issue in this case is not whether a traffic violation occurred justifying
the stop, but instead whether other factors support a clear and articulable reason
to believe criminal activity was afoot. We agree with the trial court when it stated
in its ruling on the motion to suppress,
There is no factual dispute that the defendant was operating
his car in reverse on a winter night on a commercial street [on] a
collision course with another vehicle. The other vehicle took an
evasive maneuver to avoid the collision. The defendant did not
stop until the officer intervened with his red lights and patrol car.
The officer could reasonably conclude that the defendant did not
see the minivan, wanted to hit it, wanted to intimidate the driver,
and/or simply disregarded the safety of the minivan and its
occupants.
The Court therefore concludes that there was probable
cause to stop the defendant’s vehicle.
Even though Officer Swanson believed the actions he observed
constituted careless or reckless driving but the court later disagreed, it is
reasonably clear that “the ambiguity” of Craig’s action warranted an “investigatory
stop” to determine what was precipitating the erratic driving.
AFFIRMED.