In the Interest of R.Q., Minor Child ( 2019 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 19-1410
    Filed November 27, 2019
    IN THE INTEREST OF R.Q.,
    Minor Child,
    R.J., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Colin J. Witt, District
    Associate Judge.
    A father appeals the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights.
    AFFIRMED.
    Marcy Lundberg of Lundberg Law Firm, Indianola, for appellant father.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    ConGarry D. Williams of Juvenile Public Defender Office, Des Moines,
    attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
    Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.
    2
    SCHUMACHER, Judge.
    A father appeals the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights. We
    find the court properly determined in the permanency order the child should remain
    in foster care with his half-sibling rather than moving to the home of the father’s
    cousin. We find termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best
    interests and none of the exceptions to termination should be applied. We affirm
    the decision of the juvenile court.
    I.     Background Facts & Proceedings
    R.J., father, and S.T., mother, are the parents of R.Q., born in 2018. 1 The
    parents have experienced problems with mental health and drug addiction, in
    addition to concerns with criminal behavior. The child was removed from the
    parents’ care on July 20, 2018, as both of the parents were in prison on drug-
    related charges and were unable to care for the child. The child was placed in
    foster care with A.A. and D.A., who had adopted one of R.Q.’s half-siblings on the
    mother’s side.
    A combined child in need of assistance (CINA) adjudication and
    dispositional order was filed on November 23, 2018. The child was adjudicated
    CINA pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (n) (2018). The court ruled
    the temporary legal custody and guardianship of the child was with the Iowa
    Department of Human Services (DHS) “for purposes of family foster care.” The
    child continued in the care of A.A. and D.A.
    1
    The father’s rights to another child were terminated, while the mother’s rights to five
    other children have been terminated.
    3
    In a February 25, 2019 order, the court changed the permanency goal from
    reunification to termination of parental rights.      The court stated, “It is fairly
    anticipated that both parents will be incarcerated for the next decade or more.”
    The father asked to have the child placed with his cousin, S.K. The court found
    S.K. would be “an excellent relative placement option,” but determined it would be
    in the child’s best interests to keep him in his current placement with a half-sibling.
    The father filed a motion to reconsider under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2).
    The court denied the request to change the placement of the child.
    On March 26, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate the parents’
    rights. The father was in federal prison and participated by telephone in the
    termination hearing. He testified he expected to remain in prison until 2031. The
    father admitted he could not have the child returned to his care at the time of the
    hearing. He again asked to have the child placed with S.K. S.K. appeared at the
    hearing and asked to have the child placed in her care. She stated she was willing
    to have the child stay in contact with his current foster family, including his half-
    sibling.
    The juvenile court terminated the parents’ rights under section 232.116(1)(j)
    (2019), finding, “Both parents are imprisoned and it is unlikely the parents will be
    released from prison for five years or more.” The court found termination was in
    the child’s best interests. The court stated, “This allows young [R.Q.] to stay in the
    only home he has ever known. This allows for young [R.Q.] to be with his biological
    sibling. This meets [R.Q.’s] needs for safety and stability and permanency.” The
    4
    court determined none of the exceptions to termination should be applied. The
    father appeals.2
    II.    Standard of Review
    Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re A.B., 
    815 N.W.2d 764
    , 773 (Iowa 2012). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means there are no
    serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn
    from the evidence.” In re C.B., 
    611 N.W.2d 489
    , 492 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted).
    Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re J.S., 
    846 N.W.2d 36
    ,
    40 (Iowa 2014).
    III.   Placement of Child
    The father claims the juvenile court should have placed the child with his
    cousin, S.K., at the time of the permanency hearing, rather than keeping the child
    in foster care. He states it would be better for the child to be placed in a family
    with biological connections to him. He contends relatives should be given priority
    in placement decisions.
    Prior to the termination of parental rights, “chapter 232 favors relative
    placements over nonrelative placements.”3 In re N.M., 
    528 N.W.2d 94
    , 97 (Iowa
    1995). Also, DHS should strive to maintain sibling relationships, unless there is
    clear and convincing evidence the relationship would be detrimental to the child.
    In re A.J., No. 13-0216, 
    2013 WL 1227360
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2013)
    2
    The mother has not appealed the termination of her parental rights.
    3
    After a parent’s rights have been terminated “there is no statutory preference for
    placement with a relative.” In re A.S., 
    906 N.W.2d 467
    , 477 (Iowa 2018). Additionally,
    after termination of a parent’s rights, the parent no longer has standing to challenge
    actions by the juvenile court, including placement of the child. See In re M.N.W., 
    577 N.W.2d 874
    , 875–76 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
    5
    (citing 
    Iowa Code § 232.108
    (1), (4)). In determining a placement for a child, our
    primary concern is the best interests of the child. See J.S., 846 N.W.2d at 40.
    The State cites to In re L.B., No. 18-1165, 
    2018 WL 4361066
    , at *2 (Iowa
    Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2018), which provides:
    Once the juvenile court selected IDHS to serve as the child’s
    custodian, it was not the juvenile court’s place to select the particular
    physical placement of the child. Instead, IDHS, as legal custodian of
    the child, was vested with the authority to select the particular foster
    care placement subject to the juvenile court’s review. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.2
    (11)(b)(1) (providing the custodian has the right to
    “maintain or transfer to another the physical possession of that
    child”).
    In the joint adjudication and dispositional order the court placed temporary
    legal custody and guardianship of the child with DHS “for purposes of family foster
    care.” DHS continued entrusting the care of the child to A.A. and D.A., with whom
    the child had been placed upon removal from the parents’ care on July 20, 2018.
    In November 2018, S.K. indicated to DHS she was interested in having the child
    placed in her care. S.K.’s mother has custody of the child’s half-sibling on the
    father’s side and S.K. testified, “I go to my mother’s a lot.”
    In the permanency order filed on February 25, 2019, the juvenile court
    stated:
    The Court accepts that [S.K.] appears to be an excellent
    relative placement option. The record is that both biological parents
    would like [S.K.] to be the custodian of the child, it is unclear whether
    they would prefer that under a guardianship or via
    termination/adoption.
    The child . . . is 7 months old. He is placed with a biological
    sibling. He has formed attachments in the home where he has been
    placed since his birth.
    Both homes provide some relative connections. [S.K.]’s home
    clearly provides more relative connections for this child. However,
    the only home this child has known over his seven months of life also
    provides an important biological sibling connection. It is this later
    6
    concern that sways the undersigned that it is in this child’s best
    interest not to disrupt his placement and that is in his short term and
    long term best interest for his emotional health and well being. This
    decision is by the slimmest of margins, as the Court noted on the
    record that both homes appear to be able to provide this child with
    unconditional love and supports and desire to be his permanent
    placement.
    In the termination order, the court again noted the home of A.A. and D.A. was the
    only home the child had ever known.
    We conclude the juvenile court acted in the child’s best interests by
    determining the child should remain in the home of A.A. and D.A., rather than being
    moved to the home of S.K. While S.K. is the father’s cousin, she did not express
    an interest in having the child placed in her care until November 2018, when the
    child had already begun to build relationships with A.A. and D.A. and with the
    child’s half-sibling who was in their care. S.K.’s mother has custody of another of
    the child’s half-siblings, but that child does not live in the same home as S.K. We
    agree with the juvenile court’s conclusion the child should remain in “the only home
    this child has known over his seven months of life [and which] also provides an
    important biological sibling connection.”
    IV.    Best Interests
    The father claims termination of his parental rights is not in the child’s best
    interests. He states, “Courts are not free to take children from parents simply by
    deciding another home offers more advantages,” citing In re C. & K., 
    322 N.W.2d 76
    , 81 (Iowa 1982).
    In considering the best interests of a child, we “give primary consideration
    to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing
    and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and
    7
    needs of the child.” In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2)). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency
    after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by
    hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
    home for the child.” Id. at 41.
    We find termination of the child’s parental rights is in the child’s best
    interests. The father was in federal prison on drug charges and did not expect to
    be released until 2031. Even after being released, the father would still need to
    address his mental-health and substance-abuse problems. The juvenile court
    found the child needed “safety and stability and permanency.” We concur in the
    court’s findings. The child should not have to wait for his father to be in a position
    to care for him.
    V.    Exceptions
    The father asserts the juvenile court should have placed the child with a
    relative, S.K., and then applied the exception to termination found in section
    232.116(3)(a), which states the court may decide to not terminate a parent’s rights
    if “[a] relative has legal custody of the child.” We have determined the juvenile
    court properly concluded the child should remain in foster care with the child’s half-
    sibling, so the exception in section 232.116(3)(a) does not apply to the facts of this
    case.
    The court considered all of the exceptions in section 232.116(3) and found,
    “no exception should be applied to prohibit termination in this case.”           The
    exceptions in section 232.116(3) “are permissive, not mandatory.”          A.S., 906
    N.W.2d at 475. “We may use our discretion, ‘based on the unique circumstances
    8
    of each case and the best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this
    section to save the parent-child relationship.’” Id. (citation omitted). We conclude
    none of the exceptions to termination should be applied in this case.
    We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
    AFFIRMED.