State of Iowa v. Joshua Snyder ( 2019 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 18-1101
    Filed June 5, 2019
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    JOSHUA SNYDER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, John J.
    Bauercamper, Judge.
    Defendant Snyder appeals his guilty plea and sentence for possession of a
    controlled substance, third offense. AFFIRMED.
    John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Blane, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
    2
    BLANE, Senior Judge.
    Joshua Snyder appeals from his guilty plea,1 claiming the trial court did not
    state a factual basis on the record for his plea as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 2.8(2). The State contends we should not reach the merits of Snyder’s
    claims, as he did not file a motion in arrest of judgment to preserve error as
    required. See Iowa R.Crim. Pro. 2.24(3)(b). In response, Snyder argues the trial
    court did not advise him of the forty-five day deadline following a plea for filing the
    motion, which he claims waives the preservation requirement. See State v. Meron,
    
    675 N.W.2d 537
    , 540 (Iowa 2004) (providing that failure to advise a defendant of
    the necessity to file a motion in arrest of judgment relieves a defendant of the
    consequence of not filing the motion).
    An appeal court generally reviews a challenge to a guilty plea for corrections
    of error of law. State v. Ortiz, 
    789 N.W.2d 761
    , 764 (Iowa 2010).
    Upon our review of the plea and sentencing transcript, we observe the trial
    court advised Snyder that if he wanted to challenge his plea on appeal, he had to
    file a motion in arrest of judgment at least five days before sentencing. Since the
    plea and sentencing both occurred on the same date, the forty-five day alternative
    was not applicable. Our court has previously held that under the circumstance
    where the forty-five-day alternative is not applicable, the trial court complies with
    the rule by advising a defendant of only the five-day deadline. State v. Krabill, No.
    10-1054, 
    2011 WL 2556038
    , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2011) (determining
    1
    Snyder appeals only from his guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, third
    offense, a class “D” felony. He does not appeal his written Alford plea to operating a motor
    vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a serious misdemeanor.
    3
    defendant was bound by the rule requiring him to file a motion in arrest of judgment
    where judge advised him of the “alternate” “five days before sentencing” deadline);
    see also State v. Straw, 
    709 N.W.2d 128
    , 132 (Iowa 2006) (ruling that the court
    advising of the five-day limitation “conveyed the pertinent information and
    substantially complied with the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d)”). Based on Krabill,
    because Snyder was advised by the court regarding the five-day deadline, he was
    bound to comply with it in order to preserve error. Therefore, his claim regarding
    his plea is not preserved, and we do not consider the merits.
    We affirm Snyder’s judgment and sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-1101

Filed Date: 6/5/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/5/2019