State of Iowa v. Jacob Christopher Adams ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1347
Filed June 5, 2019
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JACOB CHRISTOPHER ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hamilton County, Kurt L. Wilke
(suppression) and James C. Ellefson (trial), Judges.
A defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Nicholas A. Sarcone of Stowers & Sarcone PLC, West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., Bower, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
2
GAMBLE, Senior Judge.
Jacob Adams appeals from his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5)
(2017), following a trial on the minutes. On appeal, he alleges the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
On August 26, 2017, someone burglarized Steve Carpenter’s home,
stealing several items. The Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department considered
Adams’s brother, Brett, to be a suspect in the burglary and investigated him.
Carpenter’s home is located on the same street as Adams’s home. As part of the
investigation, Deputy Sheriff Rodney Hicok sought and obtained a warrant to
search Adams’s home, believing Brett left evidence of the burglary in Adams’s
home.
When investigators executed the search warrant, they did not recover any
evidence of the burglary. However, investigators observed drug paraphernalia and
substances appearing to be methamphetamine and marijuana. Based on these
observations, Deputy Hicok sought and obtained another search warrant for
Adams’s home to search for evidence of the possession, dealing, or distribution of
controlled substances. When the investigators executed the second search
warrant, they recovered marijuana and methamphetamine. As a result, the State
charged Adams by trial information with count I, possession with intent to deliver
methamphetamine, and count II, possession of marijuana, third or subsequent
offense.
3
Adams filed a motion to suppress, alleging the first search warrant
application was not supported by probable cause so all evidence, including
evidence resulting from the second search warrant, which stemmed from the first,
must be suppressed. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion to
suppress. The parties then agreed to amend count I of the trial information to
possession of methamphetamine, third offense. Adams proceeded to a trial on the
minutes, and the court found him guilty of count I, possession of
methamphetamine, third offense.
Adams now appeals, challenging the district court’s ruling on the motion to
suppress.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
Although challenges with constitutional dimensions are reviewed de novo,
“we do not make an independent determination of probable cause; rather, we
determine ‘whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding
probable cause existed.’” State v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 99 (Iowa 2015)
(quoting State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997)). Accordingly, “we
examine only the information actually presented to the judge.” Id.III. Analysis
Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution require search warrants be supported by probable
cause. Adams alleges the first search warrant was not supported by probable
cause and the State violated his state and federal constitutional rights. However,
he “does not advance a distinct analytical framework under the Iowa Constitution.”
See State v. Baker, 925 N.W.2d 602, 610 (Iowa 2019). “Because [Adams] did not
4
advance a distinct analytical framework for his claim under article I, section 8 of
the Iowa Constitution, in our discretion we choose to apply the federal framework”
and consider his state and federal constitutional claims concurrently. Id.“The test for probable cause is well established: ‘whether a person of
reasonable prudence would believe a crime was committed on the premises to be
searched or evidence of a crime could be located there.’” Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at
363 (quoting State v. Weir, 414 N.W.2d 327, 330 (Iowa 1987)). “Probable cause
to search requires a probability determination that ‘(1) the items sought are
connected to criminal activity and (2) the items sought will be found in the place to
be searched.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Edmiston, 46 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir.
1995)). When considering the totality of the circumstances,
[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him [or her], including the “veracity” and
“basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). On appeal, we interpret the affidavit of
probable cause “in a common sense, rather than a hypertechnical, manner.” See
McNeal, 867 N.W.2d at 100 (quoting State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 132
(Iowa 2006)). “[W]e draw all reasonable inferences to support the judge’s finding
of probable cause and give great deference to the judge’s finding.” Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 364). “Close cases are decided in favor
of upholding the validity of the warrant.” Id. (quoting Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 364).
Adams argues the State failed to establish probable cause because it did
not establish a nexus between the evidence sought—evidence of the burglary—
5
and his home. “Although a nexus must be established between the items to be
seized and the place to be searched, direct observation is not required.” Id. at 103
(quoting State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204, 212 (Iowa 1982)). The nexus between
the criminal activity, the evidence sought, and the place to be searched “can be
found by considering the type of crime, the nature of the items involved, the extent
of the defendant’s opportunity for concealment, and the normal inferences as to
where the defendant would be likely to conceal the items.” Id. (quoting Groff, 323
N.W.2d at 212).
On our review, we conclude the warrant application provided a sufficient
nexus and conclude the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
probable cause existed. In support of the warrant request, Deputy Hicok’s affidavit
cited to several facts, some of which were obtained through a confidential
informant. Some information merely supported the proposition that Brett
perpetrated the burglary. However, the affidavit also provided several facts
indicating evidence of the crime could be discovered in Adams’s home. These
facts include: Brett “frequently resided with his brother”; Adams’s home is located
on the same street as the victim’s; Adams told the victim he was “100 [percent]
certain Brett did it”; and Adams’s has a history of storing stolen items in his home.
From this information, the magistrate could reasonably infer Brett had access to
Adams’s home, Brett could easily stash evidence at Adams’s due to its close
proximity to the location burgled; Adams knew of Brett’s involvement in the
burglary because he provided Brett with a place to store the stolen goods, and
Adams was willing to store stolen goods because he had done so in the past.
Moreover, Deputy Hicok’s affidavit confirmed several of the confidential
6
informant’s related claims were corroborated by the recovery of evidence,
indicating the informant’s claims were reliable.1 See id. at 100–01 (noting
anonymous tips must be corroborated to be considered reliable enough to
establish probable cause).
Adams draws our attention to the following portion of the warrant struck by
the issuing magistrate and argues this amendment demonstrates the magistrate
did not believe Brett frequently resided at the residence.
However, we agree with the district court that the magistrate struck this phrase
from the warrant because it was unnecessary to the identification of the residence
to be searched and is not indicative of her disbelief that Brett frequently resided at
Adams’s home. The magistrate’s amendments to the following paragraph bolster
this conclusion.
1
Based on the informant’s information, investigators recovered some of the missing items
at another location. The informant’s information also led to the recovery of a tool matching
markings Brett allegedly left in a door during an earlier attempted burglary of the victim’s
home.
7
Here, the magistrate again struck the phrase but did not strike the portion of the
warrant permitting the search of “the room in which Brett Adams sleeps in or
occupies when staying at this residence.” This provides a clear indication the
magistrate understood Brett stayed at the residence and provides the necessary
nexus between the evidence sought and Adams’s residence. It bolsters our
conclusion there was a substantial basis for the magistrate to find probable cause
existed to support the warrant.
IV. Conclusion
We have considered each of the defendant’s arguments on appeal, whether
or not directly addressed herein. We conclude there was a substantial basis for
the issuing magistrate to conclude probable cause existed to support the warrant.
The district court properly denied Adams’s motion to suppress. We affirm Adams’s
conviction for possession of methamphetamine, third offense.
AFFIRMED.